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Abstract 
 
 
The “Woman question” in Islam, under its various titles – “women in Islam”, “women’s rights in 
Islam”, “the status of women in Islam”, “gender in Islam” – is one that has been a topic of heated 
debate for the last century, and continues to be a field of intense debate and thriving scholarship. 
Likewise, pioneers of modern Islamic reform are often referred to in relation to modern 
discourses on gender, and the issue of gender is often touched on in discussions of these 
pioneers’ reform projects, but often in a generic and superficial manner. While the Egyptian 
reformist scholar Muhammad µAbduh is a figure often referred to in this context, this aspect of 
his thought has never been studied in detail. This study aims to deepen the study of these two 
questions – gender and reform – and the intersection between them. Various general books on 
“the father of Islamic reform” exist, often devoting a few pages to “women’s reform” (or more 
commonly referring to the question of women’s reform under the few pages devoted to µAbduh’s 
“social reform”), creating a rather vague view of this critical figure’s views on this topical 
question, often with unsubstantiated generalisations.  
  
 This study aims at addressing this through a detailed study and analysis of µAbduh’s own 
discourse on women in order to discover its themes, distinctive characteristics, the questions it 
poses and the answers it attempts to give, as well as the tensions and contradictions within it. The 
study locates the gender question within the bigger context of the reform discourse that emerged 
in a specific historical context in response to the Muslim world’s encounter with modernity. The 
study further addresses the extent of µAbduh’s influence on subsequent discourses on women and 
his legacy which continues to be contested and competed over. The study provides, for the first 
time, a detailed study of µAbduh’s writings on women and gender, based on primary sources, and 
addresses the overlaps between various rival trends often seen as distinct, pointing to the 
multiple and diverse roots of the contemporary genre of “Muslim feminism”, which indeed 
draws influence from the reformist views of µAbduh, but not necessarily through a single linear 
and coherent route. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The “Woman question” in Islam – under its various titles: “women in Islam”, “women’s 
rights in Islam”, “the status of women in Islam”, “gender equity in Islam” – is one that has been 
a topic of heated debate for the last century, and continues to be a field of intense debate and 
thriving scholarship.  
The methodologies and approaches to “women’s reform” vary greatly, between those that 
do not recognise the centrality of the normative sources of Islam, or approach them in a 
fragmentary, static, and superficial manner, or approaches based on a re-interpretation of those 
sources. The dynamics that have shaped the history and evolution of Muslim societies point to 
the continued relevance of the Qur’an and the Sunna, as well as the legacy of Islamic 
jurisprudence that was developed out of them. Thus, it is argued that approaches that recognise 
the centrality of these sources, and attempt to understand them on their own terms have the 
greater potential to appeal to Muslim societies. This is attested by the renewed interest in this 
field and its widening appeal to various sectors of Muslim women. 
Within those, one also finds a multitude of approaches. Two broad trends that are 
interlinked yet divergent are the “Islamist reformist” and “Muslim feminist” trends. Both base 
their arguments and discourses on an acceptance of the Qur’an as the central normative text in 
Islamic thought and practice, and propose to re-interpret it as a response to the requirements of a 
modern context. They differ, however, in their appraisal of the Sunna, of the heritage of Islamic 
jurisprudence, and on the limits of re-interpretation and the nature of the interpreters, among 
others. These differences are reflected in their different terms of reference and their different 
audiences, with the latter being more accessible, more known to, and more favoured in western 
academia.  
While differences are often emphasised between the two trends above, often assumed to 
be distinct and opposed, there is in fact a lack of a clear defined line of departure between the 
10 
 
two, as has been analysed in recent studies by authors1 who emphasise the overlap between 
“liberal” and “Islamist” approaches to gender reform. This overlap is evident in their competition 
over the monopolisation of the title of “reformist”, and the appropriation of the legacy of the 19th 
century reform movement. 
It is common to categorise the current debate over gender in Muslim societies into three 
groups: the Conservatives or Traditionalists – who refuse to engage in creative new 
interpretations of the text or to criticise opinions held by earlier scholars in the tradition of fiqh; 
the Liberals or Secularists who call for a new discourse that marginalises the religious sources 
opting for a discourse presented in non-religious and often Western terms; and the Reformists or 
Revivalists who call for new interpretations of the religious texts, accepting both the authenticity 
and centrality of the texts and the continued relevance and efficacy of fiqh and religious sciences, 
while stressing that the two are distinct and the latter are a human effort that can be criticised and 
rejected.2  
The Muslim feminist discourse is often situated as part of the new “liberal reformist” 
thought –in the above categorisation – and in opposition to “Islamist” discourses. The “liberal 
reformist” trend is seen to be  “consolidating a conception of Islam and modernity as compatible, 
not opposed”, articulated by “Reformists, who emerged in the closing years of the century as part 
of an internal response to political Islam … Muslim thinkers – such as Mohammad Arkoun, Nasr 
Abu Zayd and Abdolkarim Soroush”.3 Nevertheless, in order to strengthen its position and 
influence, the Muslim feminist discourse has developed the tendency to seek to find deeper roots 
within the Islamic framework. Interesting in this debate between the two trends discussed above 
is the attempt to appropriate the reform movement of the 19th century and to lay sole claim to be 
the heirs of figures such as Mu^ammad µAbduh. This brings to mind similar attempts by voices 
from the opposite sides of the Muslim spectrum to appropriate both the founding figures of the 
reformist school, and their disciples from various trends (for instance, Qāsim AmÏn in Egypt, 
>āhir Al-Haddād in Tunisia), an effort that has continued to this day, in a battle over legitimacy 
and representation. 
                                                
1 Such as Sherine Hafez, Lila Abu-Lughod, Leila Ahmed, Mervat Hatem and Margot Badran 
2 Mir-Hosseini, Ziba, “The Construction of Gender in Islamic Legal Thought: Strategies for Reform”. Hawwa: 
Journal of Women in the Middle East and the Islamic World, 1/1, 2003, pp 3-20. 
3Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Voices of Islam, Volume 5, Voices of Change, edited by Vincent Cornell, Omid Safi and 
Virgina Gray Henry, Westport, Connecticut and London, 2007)  pp. 85-113, p. 101. 
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This points to the complex nature of the debate on gender in Muslim societies, and the 
confluence of political and historical dimensions in its evolution. It also points to the need for a 
closer and deeper reading of the early reformist school’s writings on the gender question, in 
order to critically assess the current gender discourses in Islamic thought, their reformist claims, 
and their potential to resolve these tensions and bring about significant change. 
The telling of the history of “the Arab women’s movement” often starts from Q¥sim 
AmÏn, and reflecting the polarisation of the current intellectual and political scene in the Arab 
world, AmÏn’s position and contribution is selectively presented and appropriated by some and 
against others, whereas a return to AmÏn’s own writings, relations and stances rejects such 
simplification. This study aims to go back further in time, to a figure that is less polarising, that 
is uniting and widely referred to in the context of women’s reform, yet without any detailed 
study or analysis of his contribution. My aim is to transcend polarisation, enrich the writing of 
the history of Arab and Muslim feminism, and highlight the social, political and historical 
dimensions of all writings on women, and the complex and diverse nature of all discourses on 
women and women’s reform.  
My aim is to analyse µAbduh’s writings on women, locate them in their historical context, 
within his own reformist discourse and within various contemporary discourses on women at his 
time. Highlighting and analysing µAbduh’s contribution to the cause of Arab women’s reform 
will provide useful findings for understanding the subsequent evolution and bifurcation of 
Egyptian and Arab gender discourses, and evaluating current projections of differences and 
appropriations onto the formative period of the end of the nineteenth century. 
The late-nineteenth century Islamic Reformist discourse on gender has not been studied 
in so much detail, although, because of its complex and rich nature, it seems to continue to 
influence the mainstream discourses on gender in the Muslim world, rendering it deserving of a 
more serious and indepth analysis. While pioneers of this modern Islamic reform are often 
referred to in relation to modern discourses on gender, and the issue of gender is often touched 
on in discussions of these pioneers’ reform projects, this is done in a generic and superficial 
manner. No one has studied in detail and in depth the writings of these pioneers on gender in a 
comprehensive way, rather than focusing on a single fatwā or interpretation presented in an 
isolated way. 
12 
 
I plan to explore this discourse through the writings of the “father of Islamic Reform”, 
Mu^ammad µAbduh, in order to discover its themes, its distinctive characteristics, the questions it 
poses and the answers it attempts to give, as well as the tensions and contradictions within it.  
I will locate the gender question within the wider context of the reform discourse that 
emerged in a specific historical context in response to the Muslim world’s encounter with 
modernity. The motivation is providing the basis for exploring the evolution of this discourse 
and the historical and political contexts which led to its divergent interpretations and 
appropriations, in order to understand the current competing discourses, addressing the extent of 
µAbduh’s influence on subsequent discourses on women and his legacy which continues to be 
contested and competed over. However, tracing that evolution in addition to an in-depth study of 
the original discourse is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, the study of this discourse 
will provide the necessary foundation for exploring such interesting questions in the future. This 
study aims to provide, for the first time, a detailed study of µAbduh’s writings on women and 
gender, based on primary sources, and addresses the overlaps between various rival trends often 
seen as distinct, pointing to the multiple and diverse roots of the contemporary genre of “Muslim 
feminism”, which indeed draws influence from the reformist views of µAbduh, but not 
necessarily through a single linear and coherent route. 
 
a. Reading µAbduh 
 
In order to answer the questions posed above, this work is primarily centered on reading, 
analysing, contextualising and critiquing µAbduh’s writings on women. The daunting nature of 
this task is partly due to the “irregular” nature of µAbduh’s writings: they are not to be found in 
fixed separate clear coherent books, but are diverse in nature, length and style, and are scattered 
in various media and contexts: from articles, treatises and letters, to fat¥w¥, speeches and tafsÏr 
lecture notes (written down, summarised, and expanded by his disciple, as will be discussed 
below). Out of these, µAbduh’s writings on women have to be, on the one hand, extracted, and on 
the other read within the wider context of µAbduh’s compiled writings (5 volumes). 
µAbduh’s intellectual and practical reform efforts had various dimensions, but were 
concentrated on religious-based ethical and social reform. His writings on women followed the 
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same pattern, with the major themes being education, reform of family law, and innovative 
Qur’anic re-interpretations in order to correct misconceptions about the nature of women. 
Unlike, for instance, the “father of women’s liberation” Q¥sim AmÏn, µAbduh did not set out to 
write a book (or even a dedicated article) on women, covering all contentious issues. His 
writings on women are situated within his broader concerns such as the reform of Shariµa courts, 
modern Qur’anic interpretation, or promotion of education. In fact, other than education, family 
law reform, and interpretation of verses on the essence of women, certain themes that are 
frequently found in other contemporary discourses on women, such as the question of veiling 
and seclusion, women’s public participation or women’s work are absent in µAbduh’s writings. 
This is partly due to the fact that µAbduh did not write any dedicated works on women, as 
mentioned above – I estimate that what he wrote on women comprises no more than 10% of his 
writings. Furthermore, µAbduh’s writings are often general and vague, as a strategy for uniting 
rather than dividing – unless there is an urgent need for change and a significant possibility of its 
success. In addition, the themes that are absent are related to practices that are neither fixed nor 
uniform, affecting rural/urban, rich/poor women in different eras differently. Finally, such 
practices were already changing, and µAbduh possibly judged that discussing them could 
contribute to further polarisation, rigidity and defensiveness, especially as they were stressed in 
the colonialist discourse. 
Out of the above themes, I focus on the one on which µAbduh’s writings on women 
concentrated: family law – the reform of men’s and women’s understanding of the family and of 
Islamic rulings on marriage, polygyny and divorce, and reform of those laws. µAbduh’s views on 
these areas are extracted from his articles, tafsÏr and fat¥w¥. These are analysed and evaluated in 
Chapters 4-7, including the question of the common attribution of chapters from Q¥sim AmÏn’s 
book – TahrÏr al-Mar’a – to µAbduh (See below). 
 In addition, an important dimension of µAbduh’s writings on women, one which receives 
less attention than his proposals for family law reform, is covered in my discussion of his views 
on women’s nature, essence and equality, in Chapter 3, as revealed in his commentary on verses 
dealing with the creation of men and women. 
µAbduh’s most important theological work is most probably his Ris¥lat al-Taw^Ïd, originally 
given as a series of lectures in his exile in Beirut. This is followed by his two responses to 
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orientalist critiques of Islam: his reply to Gabriel Hanotaux, Al-Isl¥m wa’l-Na|r¥niyya, bayna’l-
µIlm wa’l-Madaniyya and his reply to Farah Antoun Al-Isl¥m wa’l-Radd µal¥ muntaqidÏh. 
Although these do not deal with women explicitly, they are of great importance for 
understanding µAbduh’s thought in general, his reform methodology and motivation. These as 
well as a selection of his articles in al-Waq¥’iµ al-Mi|riyya and al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥ were first 
compiled by RashÏd Ri\ā, while Mu^ammad µIm¥ra’s compilation is more comprehensive. 
µIm¥ra’s compilation also includes µAbduh’s other important work, his tafsÏr of a number of 
Qur’anic chapters, both the parts published separately by µAbduh and those published in al-
Man¥r and compiled later by Ri\ā. 
The compiler of µAbduh’s complete works Mu^ammad µIm¥ra analysed texts attributed to 
µAbduh and – to some extent – distinguished between what was written by him and what was 
written by others: “we distinguished between his own writings and those of al-Afgh¥nÏ, RashÏd 
Ri\¥, Saµd Zaghl‰l and µAbdull¥h al-NadÏm, for the first time in the history of the thought of 
these figures”.4 However, confusion persists when writing about µAbduh’ ideas, with even 
experts sometimes wrongly attributing to him what he possibly – or in some cases, definitely – 
had not written. This is a result of the fact that µAbduh had written few complete books himself, 
with his writings including a large number of newspaper articles or reports of circles or speeches 
given by him. The use of pen-names, the custom of publishing under one’s mentor’s name and 
vice-versa, and methods such as the dictation of ideas, which were all common at the time, make 
the task of distinguishing µAbduh’s own writings even more complicated. Another complicating 
factor is the politicisation of µAbduh’s works and the wish of some to highlight certain aspects of 
his thought while undermining others. 
For instance, µIm¥ra described the second volume of Ri\¥’s T¥rÏkh al-Im¥m5 (compiling 
µAbduh’s writings) as “weak… comprising only a sixth of what is really µAbduh’s” and also as 
“disfigured, for politics played a part in the material included in it”.6 Ri\¥ himself even wrote 
that certain articles – and more shockingly certain sentences – were left out. According to Ri\¥, 
Fat^Ï Zaghl‰l suggested removing certain parts – particularly articles of al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥ – 
                                                
4 µIm¥ra, al-Aµm¥l al-K¥mila li’l-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m Mu^ammad µAbduh, Cairo: D¥r al-Shorouk, 2006, vol. 1, p. 18. 
5 Mu^ammad RashÏd Ri\¥, T¥rikhrÏkh al-ustUst¥dh al-Im¥m al-Shaykh Mu^ammad µAbduh (, Cairo: D¥r al-Fa\Ïla, 
2003).. 
6 Aµm¥l, vol. 1, p. 204. 
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that would anger the British and Ri\¥ agreed to “remove what was purely political and in relation 
to Egypt, Sudan and mobilising the Muslim world and India against Britain, but leave general 
reform articles... but he also asked to remove certain sentences from certain articles, which I only 
reluctantly agreed to”.7  
µIm¥ra notes that although he first tended towards trusting the conclusions of the 
committee formed after µAbduh’s death to compile his works, he became suspicious due to 
inconsistencies. Fat^Ï Zaghl‰l who compiled 35 articles from al-Waq¥’iµ was close to the British 
and the Khedive, implying that he tended to remove or reduce µAbduh’s articles supporting the 
µUr¥bÏ revolution. Among the supporting evidence cited by µIm¥ra was the fact that Zaghl‰l 
compiled 30 articles by µAbduh in 1881 including a number criticising the revolution and calls 
for a parliament, while during the six months in the beginning of 1882 when µAbduh supported 
the revolution, only one – apolitical – article was included. Also in some articles µAbduh referred 
to previous related articles which formed part of the same series, of which only one out of six 
was included, while others (in support of the revolution) were left out. Thus µIm¥ra decided to 
ignore compilations of that committee and go to the original sources. He found 65 rather than 34 
articles written by µAbduh in al-Waq¥’iµ. Although he gives many arguments to support his 
conclusions, not all of the articles included were explicitly µAbduh’s, indicating once again the 
persistent confusion about µAbduh’s writings. 
In addition to the political factor, the Sufi/orthodox split and secularist/Islamist split 
among µAbduh’s followers have led to a similar bias in highlighting or rejecting particular 
aspects of µAbduh’s thought. This is the case for instance in relation to works of philosophical 
Sufism such as Al-TaµlÏq¥t µal¥ Shar^ al-Daw¥nÏ li’l µAq¥’id al-µA·∙udiyya. µIm¥ra concludes this 
latter was the work of al-Afgh¥nÏ, based on arguments such as µAbduh’s age, the writing style 
and a number of other supporting arguments detailed over 16 pages – in addition to µAbduh’s 
own explicit confirmation of that attribution to his mentor in the introduction he wrote to the 
work. However, others8 argue that µIm¥ra’s and Ri\¥’s conclusions are motivated by their wish to 
deny µAbduh’s Sufi dimension. 
                                                
7 ibid. 
8 Such as AbdµAbd al-RazzaqRazz¥q µAid, Mu^ammad µAbduh, Im¥m al-¤ad¥tha wa al-Dust‰r, Beirut and 
Baghdad: The Iraqi Strategic Research Centre, 2006, and Oliver Scاﺍahrbrodt, Islam and the Baha'i Faith: A 
Comparative Study of Mu^ammad µAbduh and ‘Abdul-Baha ‘Abbas, London: Routledge, 2007. 
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 Sadly, the same confusion reigns in relation to one of µAbduh’s most important works – 
his tafsÏr of the Qur’an. While his own tafsÏr of the last thirtieth part of the Qur’an was separately 
published and conclusively attributed to him, the rest of the tafsÏr was reports of the tafsÏr circles 
by his student Ri\¥ – a part published during his life and presumably checked by him,9 and 
another published in the years following his death. In addition µAbduh’s circles did not cover the 
entire Qur’an, being interrupted by his death, reaching verse 126 of the fourth chapter, S‰rat al-
Nis¥’. Ri\¥ then continued to publish his own tafsÏr under the same name of TafsÏr al-Man¥r, 
reaching S‰rat Yusuf. Ri\¥ explicitly states that following µAbduh’s death, his own tafsÏr tried to 
follow the same methodology but deviated from it.10 However, it is surprising that even specialist 
Orientalist scholars fell into this confusion, such as Goldziher in his book on tafsÏr where he 
attributed to Mu^ammad µAbduh the words of Ri\¥.  
Anyone who wishes to analyse µAbduh’s views on any issue should approach with 
caution TafsÏr Al-Man¥r, which – one must remember – was not written by µAbduh word for 
word, but compiled by Ri\¥ during the lectures delivered by µAbduh. In the absence of µAbduh’s 
approval of what was published after his death, one cannot be absolutely certain that each word 
is to be attributed to µAbduh and not to Ri\¥. This is a point that requires further research, and 
one which is often neglected by most researchers.  
The compiler of µAbduh’s complete works, Mu^ammad µIm¥ra comments on this issue, 
and criticises Mu^ammad RashÏd Ri\¥ for unnecessarily confusing his words and those of 
µAbduh by not clearly marking the difference between the two, particularly after µAbduh’s death. 
However, although µIm¥ra stresses that he has, in his edition of µAbduh’s works, taken care to 
extract what µAbduh himself had said/written,11 there is no guarantee that he has been completely 
successful in that quest.  
Scholars who have analysed the style and methodology of µAbduh’s TafsÏr stress that one 
must bear in mind it was not a word-for-word report: 
                                                
9 Up to verse 224 of S‰rat al-Baqara. 
10 Ri\¥ admits the difference between the 2two parts- “when I took over the writing after his death I contradicted his 
methodology by writing extensively on matters related to the verse from the Sunna whether in relation to its tafsÏr  
or to the ruling; as well as ookinglooking into the meaning of terms or phrases and into matters of difference 
between scholars; and in extensively referring to related verses in other S‰ras as well as long side-notes to discuss 
matters which Muslims needed to understand. p 197. 
11 µAbduh, al-Aµm¥l, vol. 1, p. 246-9. 
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I believe that what was reported was a close report of what the Im¥m said rather than an 
exact report of all that he said, nor does it convey all that he believed.12  
 
While Sha^¥ta notes that “the circles of Mu^ammad µAbduh were such that the listener 
would be able to write them down fully without adding a letter, in view of his concise and exact 
style, as if they were a written chapter read by a reader”,13 long side-notes are found in the TafsÏr 
attributed to him. µAbd al-Ghaff¥r µAbd al-RahÏm, in his Im¥m Mu^ammad µAbduh and his 
TafsÏr Methodology notes that Al-Shaµb newspaper published TafsÏr Juz’ µAmma by µAbduh “in 
five consecutive editions in a short space of time, each edition in the thousands of copies. As 
soon as they were out, they were taken. That was because it was a concise tafsÏr in a style close 
to the people. In contrast TafsÏr al-Man¥r had side discussions that sometimes took up 50 or 75 
pages”.14  
Another major difference between µAbduh’s and Ri\¥’s tafsÏr methodologies was 
µAbduh’s tendency to interpret the Qur’an without reliance on other taf¥sÏr and on narrations. In 
fact, Ri\¥ had explicitly criticised µAbduh’s neglect of narrations and his “deficiency in the 
sciences of Hadith”.15 In contrast Ri\¥’s method was to “at times reject the im¥m’s tafsÏr on the 
basis of a^¥dÏth he considered authentic”16 and “at times reject the tafsÏr of some mufassirÏn 
because the related a^¥dÏth contradicted it”.17 
Shah¥ta warns that Ri\¥’s role was more than simply a scribe, as he sometimes 
elaborated on µAbduh’s original ideas, and sometimes contributed his own additions:  
“sometimes the author of al-Man¥r presents al-im¥m’s ideas, simplifying and explaining them 
fully in such a way that it may seem to you that he himself is the source of the idea and 
explanation”.18 Similarly, in her Qur'anic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern 
                                                
12 Introduction by Mu^ammad Ab‰ Zahra to µAbdallah Shah¥ta’s Methodology of Im¥m Mu^ammad µAbduh’s 
TafsÏr of the Qur’¥n, iv. Sha^¥ta, µAbd All¥h Ma^m‰d, Manhaj al-Im¥m Mu^ammad µAbduh fÏ TafsÏr al-Qur¥n al-
KarÏm. Cairo: Al-Majlis Al-Aµl¥ li-Riµ¥yat Al-Fun‰n Wa’l-¥d¥b Wa’l-µUl‰m al-Ijtim¥µiyya, 1984. 
13 Sha^¥ta p. 201. 
14 µAbd al-RahÏmRahīm, µAbd al-Ghaffār. Al-Imām Mu^ammad µAbduh wa Manhajuhu fi al-TafsÏr, Cairo: Dār al-
An|ār, 1980, p. 237. 
15 T¥rÏkh, vol. 1, p. 6. 
16 Sha^¥ta, p. 204. 
17 ibid., p. 210. 
18 ibid., p. 208. 
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Exegesis,19Jane Dammen McAuliffe criticises Adams, Goldziher and Schacht for reducing 
Ri\ā’s role to a “scribe”.20  
Nevertheless, Shah¥ta stresses that “Rashīd Ri\¥ was a trustworthy reporter, reporting al-
im¥m’s ideas and explaining and simplifying them, praising what was correct and warning 
against any errors”.21 He reminds us of Ri\¥’s invaluable contribution to preserving µAbduh’s 
thoughts on tafsÏr: “Who knows what would have been the fate of al-im¥m’s views on tafsÏr had 
Ri\¥ not transmitted them to us? The schools of many prominent scholars were lost in the past 
because their disciples did not publish them”.22 
Thus when µAbduh passed away, he left behind thriving and diverse schools of thought 
inspired by his personality, his ideas and his life, but also a persistent ambiguity regarding his 
actual writings. This lack of certainty about the attribution of µAbduh’s compiled works fully to 
him is a constant preoccupation throughout this work, and distinguishing between what he wrote 
and what was likely the words of others is a major challenge, primarily in relation to two 
questions: the attribution of chapters from Q¥sim AmÏn’s Ta^rÏr al-Mar'a to µAbduh, and the 
distinction between µAbduh’s words in TafsÏr al-Man¥r. For the former, I assess the arguments of 
the compiler of µAbduh’s work for including those chapters in µAbduh’s works, and compare 
µAbduh’s own writings on the subjects on polygyny and divorce with chapters on the same 
subjects in Ta^rÏr al-Mar'a  as a further contribution towards an opinion on the question of their 
attribution to µAbduh. The second question is a more complex one and which emerges at 
numerous points throughout this work. I use the following sources: the compiled TafsÏr al-Man¥r 
published in 1927 (and subsequent versions), the Complete Works of Mu^ammad ‘Abduh, edited 
by Mu^ammad ‘Im¥ra (1979, 1991 and 2006), which tries to exclude some additions of Ri\¥’s, 
TafsÏr Juz’ ‘Amma, written by µAbduh himself and published during his life, and Al-Man¥r 
Journal during the years it published notes from µAbduh’s tafsÏr lectures (1900-1912) – it should 
be noted that the lectures were delivered over five years, while the notes were published over 
twelve years. I adopt the strategy of relying on the serialised tafsÏr published in Al-Man¥r journal 
                                                
19 Jane Dammen McAuliffe, Qur'anic Christians: An Analysis of Classical and Modern Exegesis, Cambridge 
University Press, 2007. 
20 Another work on modern tafsÏr which includes an analyses of µAbduh’s tafsÏr methodology is Baljon, J. M. 
S., Modern Muslim Koran Interpretation, E. J. Brill, 1961, 
21 Sha^¥ta, p. 209 . 
22 ibid., p. 209-210. 
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during µAbduh’s life. As that only extends to the first chapter and part of the second chapter, for 
subsequent chapters (until the middle of the fourth chapter), I critically analyse and compare the 
two versions (the compiled and serialised) as well as relevant writings of µAbduh’s and Ri\¥’s to 
reach a conclusion. 
 
b. Works on µAbduh and Women 
 
While most works on µAbduh devote a few lines or a few pages to “µAbduh and women” 
or “µAbduh and women’s reform”, often under “µAbduh and social reform”, only a handful of 
works attempted a closer look at this aspect of µAbduh’s thought and reform activities. They 
range from general papers on µAbduh and women, with pertinent conclusions but no detailed 
analyses of the texts, to more detailed analyses of one aspect of the subject such as marriage, 
divorce, education or polygyny. 
Samira Haj’s Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity falls 
under the second of the two categories described above. According to Haj, µAbduh’s aim was to 
“restore Islamic orthodoxy by reordering Islamic knowledge for the sake of informing and 
regulating social practices under the new modern condition”. 23  µAbduh envisioned the 
“construction of a new Muslim subject”, as fundamentally moral with a concern for the public 
good”, to depend on reform of the institutions of education, law and family. Haj stresses that this 
vision was not the liberal modern self of Europe, but drew on a long-standing history within the 
Islamic tradition of “subjective interiority”.24 Haj highlights particularly the Mu’tazilite concept 
of rationality and Al-Ghaz¥lÏ’s “hermeneutics and technologies of the self”.25  
It is “in line with his strategy of first reviving a Muslim subject” according to Haj, that 
“µAbduh placed huge importance on the family as a site for moral development”.26 Haj argues 
that “Abduh imagined the future family to be both nuclear and monogamous; marriage should be 
founded on love, compassion and mutual respect between two adult individuals”. However, Haj 
                                                
23 Haj, p. 74. Samira Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2009, p. 74. 
24 ibid., p. 110. 
25 Ibrahim Moosa, Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination, quoted by Haj, p. 111. 
26 Haj, p. 127. 
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bases her arguments about µAbduh’s vision of marriage, his criticism of the traditional definition 
of marriage and of arranged marriage, as well as his description of polygyny as degrading, and 
his opposition to segregation and veiling, exclusively on the chapters from TahrÏr al-Mar’a, 
which she simply presents as “µAbduh’s section on family” within AmÏn’s book. 
Surveying µAbduh’s reforms of the court system, Haj stresses that he “did not question 
the importance of Shariµa law for the advancement of Egypt as a modern nation-state”. He 
criticised the khedives’ introduction of European laws into Egypt, which were ineffective 
because no one understood them and few abided by them. Haj holds that µAbduh upheld the 
Islamic view that the Shariµa is the source of the law “implicitly discarding the liberal European 
view that the state ought to be the source of law”.27 
 Haj’s main weakness in her analysis of µAbduh’s view of marriage and divorce is the fact 
that she bases her conclusions on the chapters on marriage, divorce and polygyny from Q¥sim 
AmÏn’s TahrÏr al-Mar’a. As well as the uncertainty in the attribution of the chapters used, Haj 
does not refer to or analyse µAbduh’s views on those topics as expressed in the TafsÏr and 
µAbduh’s articles. 
Fahmy Taufiq Mu^ammad Makbul’s PhD thesis: The Development of Reform Concepts 
in Nineteenth-Century Egypt with Special Emphasis on Shaykh Mu^ammad µAbduh and his 
Group28 predictably touches on “Abduh’s Views on Women” in seven pages of the thesis. 
Makbul emphasises the concept of women’s equality in µAbduh’s tafsÏr. Similarly to Haj, 
Makbul assumes µAbduh’s “involvement in Amin’s writings” citing µIm¥ra, al->awÏl, Hourani 
and Vatikiotis for support. The main subjects addressed by µAbduh in relation to women’s reform 
are concluded to be the education of women, reform of divorce laws and control of polygyny. 
Makbul also underlines the significance of Abduh’s call for the enlightened women of his 
generation to form a society for the service of women and the establishment of schools and 
welfare centres for girls.  
In her thesis on Egyptian women and family law reform, Hoda Helmy discusses the roots 
of the Egyptian modern feminist movement, tracing its roots to the “reformist movement”. 
Starting with al->ah~¥wÏ, Helmy then highlights µAbduh and his time as the “phase of 
                                                
27 ibid., p. 139.  
28 Victoria University of Manchester, 1983. 
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liberation”.29 Helmy attributes progress in women’s status in this phase to “the courage of 
khedive Ismail and intellectuals such as Mu^ammad µAbduh and his disciples”. Helmy notes that 
µAbduh talks less about women’s education, which had become an accepted matter, and more 
about the reform of their marriage relations and calling for restricting polygyny and divorce.30  
Another thesis on Muslim family law, Du’a Mahmoud Abd Fino’s The Influence of the 
Concepts of Qawama and Wilaya in the Formation of the Status of Muslim Women in Light of 
Maqasid al-Shariµa, refers to µAbduh’s views on the subject,31 but falls into making conclusions 
about µAbduh’s views on qiw¥ma based on Ri\ā’s statements. 
Mu^ammad µIm¥ra, the compiler of The Complete Works of Mu^ammad µAbduh 
discusses µAbduh’s views on “the cause of women” in his Islam and Women in Mu^ammad 
µAbduh’s View.32 µIm¥ra unequivocally argues that µAbduh’s thought was “the greatest effort in 
Islamic ijtih¥d by the greatest Muslim mind which looked into the Qur’an and Sunna to find 
within them – using the mind of the enlightened Muslim – the cure for the illnesses of our 
contemporary societies, and in particular those of family life”.33  
Unlike Haj’s study, µIm¥ra considers µAbduh’s writings on family reform in his articles, 
tafsÏr and fat¥w¥. Im¥ra argues that “the Muslim world in general remains behind the progressive 
enlightened stance adopted by al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m on family issues in general, and particularly 
marriage, divorce and polygyny”.34 Im¥ra highlights the link between µAbduh’s family law 
reform and his wider reform views, in which the family represents the building basic unit of a 
strong reformed united nation – a recurring theme of nationalist discourse at the time, although 
µIm¥ra does not link µAbduh’s views to that discourse.  
While µIm¥ra focuses on µAbduh’s alarm at the “disintegration” of the Egyptian family, he 
correctly notes that µAbduh did not blame that state on women and did not “unlike others, place 
sole responsibility on women because she ‘induces fitna’ but rather places more responsibility on 
                                                
29 Helmy, p. 283. Helmy, The status of women in Islam: A comparative study with particular reference to Egypt. 
PhD Thesis, University of Wales, Lampeter, 1994, p. 283. 
30 ibid., p. 285. 
31 Du’a Mahmoud Abd Fino, The influence of the concepts of Qawama and Wilaya in the formation of the status of 
Muslim women in light of Maqasid al-Shariµa (, Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2004), pp. 184-189. 
32 µIm¥ra, 1975: Al-Isl¥m wa’l-Mar’a fÏ Ra’y Mu^ammad µAbduh, Cairo, Al-Q¥hira Lil-Thaq¥fa al-µArabiyya, 1975. 
33 ibid., p. 4-5. 
34 ibid., p. 11. 
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men”.35 Instead µAbduh goes beyond this “superficial view of the problem” to relate it to 
“incorrect understanding of the Shariµa view of the relationship between men and women and of 
family relations”.36 µIm¥ra highlights the important and revealing, but rarely referred-to quote 
from µAbduh, where he relates degrading views of women to the pre-Islamic j¥hilÏ views from 
which Islam “liberated women and gave them equal rights to men”.37 µIm¥ra highlights µAbduh’s 
assertion that, before Islam, “people did not view women as important for the success or 
corruption of their social life, until revelation taught them that”.38 However, “people in each 
epoch only take from revelation as much as they are ready for, and the Qur’an’s rulings for the 
reform of families – in good treatment of women – was not fully practiced by the umma, but it 
was rather forgotten by it, returning to the ignorance of j¥hiliyya”.39 Although µIm¥ra does not 
explicitly stress this, the quote is important in its setting of the text (the Qur’an) as the ideal 
expression of women’s liberation, and not any application of the ideal in practice, not even that 
of the first generation of Muslims. This principle is one that is often ignored, both by later 
reformists who focused on Islam’s liberating principles without distinguishing between the ideal 
principles and their imperfect expression in Muslim societies, thus setting early Muslim society 
as the complete ideal model, and by critics of µAbduh who failed to discern this distinction and 
agreed with later reformists by insisting that “reformist Islam” in general only looks back in time 
to a perfect golden age to be duplicated uncritically. 
Im¥ra emphasises µAbduh’s belief in a “real equality between men and women in rights 
and duties”,40 and sees no contradiction between that equality and µAbduh’s emphasis of men’s 
“leadership” within the family which is a necessity of division of roles. Although µIm¥ra accepts 
µAbduh’s justification of this leadership and its consequences (such as discipline), he suggests 
that this justification is on the basis of particular “natural and acquired” leadership 
characteristics, and are thus not necessarily restricted to men absolutely. 41  In relation to 
“discipline”, µIm¥ra chooses to selectively focus on µAbduh’s statements which consider the 
                                                
35 ibid., p. 13. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid., p. 16. 
38 ibid. 
39 ibid. 
40 ibid., p. 17. 
41 ibid., p. 18. 
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husband’s right to “discipline” to be restricted, not the norm, and not morally commendable, 
while not commenting on other statements which consider it something natural and un-
condemnable. 
Im¥ra’s book is more of a compilation of articles and sections from the tafsÏr which 
addressed µAbduh’s views on marriage, divorce, polygyny and equality, than an indepth analysis 
and contextualisation of µAbduh’s writings on women. The compilation is indeed useful and 
extensive, if not comprehensive. Interestingly he does not include the chapters on marriage, 
divorce, polygyny and ^ij¥b from Q¥sim AmÏn’s Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a although in his compilation of 
µAbduh’s complete works, he strongly – if not completely convincingly – argues in support of the 
claim that they were written by µAbduh. According to µIm¥ra, µAbduh’s writings on women 
constituted “a contribution of rationalist enlightened Islamic ijtih¥d” which are important in their 
content as well as the “advanced Islamic methodology of interpreting Islamic texts” they 
demonstrate.42  
Fatima Ouzouil agrees with µIm¥ra’s view on µAbduh’s contribution to Islamic discourse 
on women and their liberation, but laments the lack of progress since his time:  
In reality, Mu^ammad µAbduh’s contribution was an important founding step as part of a 
process which did not see significant progress over the period in question. It established 
the foundation for solving a problem that still exists. He sought to produce an enlightened 
reading of religious texts that does not contradict progress and does not obstruct Muslim 
women’s enjoyment of a number of rights. In his view religion was not a factor in 
establishing patriarchal domination, attributing the latter to the state of intellectual 
stagnation and social decline. Subsequent discourses, however, did not deepen the 
rational element in his contribution, nor did they look into the foundations of that 
domination in the social, political and cultural histories of Muslim societies, away from 
religion. Instead, they repeated the same hypotheses he adopted, in one way or another, in 
various phases.43 
 
Whereas µIm¥ra stresses µAbduh’s enlightened, progressive and radical aspects in 
µAbduh’s writings on women, Fraj Ben Rom\¥n, in contrast, exposes the shortcomings, 
ambiguities and contradictions in the same writings. In his Qa\iyyat al-Mar’a fÏ Fikr al-Nah\a 
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(The Question of Women in the Nah\a Thought),44 Ben Rom\¥n highlights that despite the 
Nah\a school (Arab renaissance reform school) reformists’ promotion of women’s education and 
family law reform,  “when one turns to some theoretical fundamentals, one finds a not 
insignificant amount of contradiction and confusion”. Most importantly, although reformists 
seemed to embrace the principle of equality between men and women, their maintenance of 
gendered hierarchies, particularly within the family, exposes “the fundamental contradiction 
which has become a fixed characteristic of all those who talk about the woman question from an 
Islamic perspective”.45 This contradiction, in Ben Rom\¥n’s view, demonstrates the urgency of 
the cause of women’s reform in practice, like other practical pressing problems at the time, 
which led to the hasty formulation of incoherent theories more focused on practical results than 
theoretical adequacy. In other words, “it is in the nature of this [reformist] vision to adopt 
premises then decline to take them to their eventual conclusions”.46  
Another criticism of the reformist school’s approach to the question of women was its 
marginalisation of women, as individuals, on the one hand, and on the other the exaggeration of 
women as tools for social reform: thus on the level of theoretical foundations, the reformist 
discourse was patriarchal, assuming a gendered division of social roles, whereas on the other 
hand it made the reform of women the starting point and key to everything, as some sort of 
magical wand of reform. Ben Rom\¥n sees this as an expression of reformists’ personal 
experience, after failed reform attempts, leading them to seek refuge in the cause of women’s 
reform, particularly in the case of Tahar al-Haddad.47 Ben Rom\¥n emphasises the patriarchal 
view of reformists which believed in a natural division of social roles, and glorified the 
institution of the family. However, Ben Rom\¥n follows the classical view of these 
characteristics as resulting from colonised societies taking refuge in the last sphere of resistance 
against cultural invasion, and does not relate this belief to the rise of the modern bourgeois 
family cult prevalent at the time. Another “paradox” highlighted by Ben Rom\¥n is the 
discrepancy between the author of the discourse and its object, as all those who wrote on the 
subject of women were men. He does not seem to be aware that this is of course an illusion, due 
                                                
44 Fraj Ben Rom\¥n, Qa\iyyat al-Mar’a fÏ Fikr al-Nah\a, Sfax, Tunisia: D¥r Mu^ammad ʻAlÏ al-H¥mmÏ, 1988. 
45 ibid., p. 19. 
46 ibid., p. 18. 
47 ibid., p. 75. 
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to the over-emphasis on male reformers at the expense of the women who wrote on the subject 
even before these “pioneering men”, as has been highlighted in more recent literature. The third 
criticism is the “utilitarian” nature of reformist writings on women, which focused on women’s 
education and work, and the related issues of unveiling and mixing of the sexes, suggesting that 
“women’s liberation” in the view of these reformists meant the activation of an unused means of 
production.48 I believe this is not a fair assessment of µAbduh’s writings on the subject, which 
focused on family law reform as well as education, and unlike others, did not dwell on women’s 
alleged “unproductivity”. 
Nevertheless Ben Rom\¥n stresses the “positive content which is not to be undermined 
when compared to the condition of women at the time”.49 He also credits µAbduh with greatly 
influencing all subsequent writers on the question of women in the nature of the topics addressed 
and the manner in which they were approached. He further credits the reformist trend of having 
developed an effective idea that “placated conservatives and status-quo supporters and paved the 
way for later pioneers who wrote on this question theoretically or applied it in practice” that is 
that “the condition of Arab Muslim women had nothing to do with Islam” and that Islam granted 
women a high status and called for their reform.50 Importantly, despite the incoherence within 
the reformist school’s writings on women, Ben Rom\¥n notes the overall connectedness of the 
thought of Nah\a, such that the “faulty methodology, exaggerated conclusions and generalising 
rulings” evident in the discussion of the question of women are present throughout the Nah\a 
thought in general, as “an authentic school and clear expression of this sensitive historical 
juncture”, which accounts for it being the most effective movement in criticising social 
conditions and acting to change them.51 
Unlike others who ignore the uncertainty about alleged authorship of chapters from 
Ta ^ rÏr al-Mar’a, or unquestionably accept the attribution, Ben Rom\¥n briefly discusses these 
claims, suggesting that they were likely part of campaigns against both AmÏn and µAbduh aimed 
at belittling AmÏn’s book and distracting from its essence.52    
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In Qa\iyyat al-Mar'a fi TafsÏr al-Man¥r,53 Monji al-Chemli discusses the “issue of 
women in TafsÏr al-Man¥r”. To his credit, Chemli acknowledges the inextricable nature of the 
TafsÏr which cannot be completely attributed to either µAbduh or Ri\ā, and hence prefers 
referring generically to TafsÏr al-Man¥r (although he sometimes attributes passages to µAbduh 
without caution). Chemli highlights the difficulty in determining the Al-Man¥r views on women, 
as it is ordered classically, and not thematically, but concludes that the main gender-related 
issues addressed within it are: equality of men and women, polygyny, divorce, women’s 
education and public participation, and ^ij¥b. On the question of gender equality, “TafsÏr al-
Man¥r believes the answer lies in commitment to the text, interpreting it in a way that makes it a 
means for reforming the status of women”.54 Chemli notes, on the basis of µAbduh’s emphasis on 
the superior treatment of women in Islam, “TafsÏr Al-Man¥r’s absolute defensive approach to 
Islam’s position on women, and general rulings with little historical scrutiny, as characteristic of 
apologetics and conservative salafism”.55 
Chemli highlights µAbduh’s tafsÏr of s›rat al-Nisā’ emphasising women’s equality with 
men in rights and obligations. However, that equality is not absolute, as leadership must go to the 
men, referring to the tafsÏr of al-qiw¥ma. µAbduh’s rationalisation of the concept of riy¥sa “could 
have been appealing, had it not been for the fact that it is based on premises that are not free 
from arbitrariness”,56 basing men’s leadership on their “greater knowledge of interests and 
greater strength and wealth”. However, Chemli wrongly attributes a further justification of men’s 
leadership to µAbduh – women’s hypothetical trading of their equality for a financial 
compensation – which is in fact Ri\ā’s view as expressed in his own writings, as I point out in 
later chapters. 
Chemli highlights the differences between µAbduh’s and Ri\ā’s views on polygyny. 
µAbduh's writings, since 1881, on polygyny view it as harmful to Egyptian society and impeding 
its reform, stressing the restrictive nature of the Qur’anic verses on polygyny, while stopping 
short of basing a complete ban on polygyny on the Qur’an. In contrast, Ri\ā’s view is more 
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conservative “clinging to the traditional justifications of polygyny”57 although recognising its 
restricted and conditional nature. On divorce, Chemli focused on µAbduh’s disapproval of 
divorce, out of his concern for family stability and social stability, and highlights µAbduh’s 
rejection of triple divorce and of "ta^lÏl" marriage. He does not focus on µAbduh’s expansion of 
women’s access to divorce. 
Chemli stresses µAbduh's call for women to “learn the duties and rights due to their Lord, 
their husbands, children, families, their nation and their faith”. He highlights the difference 
between µAbduh’s encouragement of women’s education, which was general, and Ri\ā’s, which 
was more specific and restricted.  
Chemli’s conclusion is that the stance of the authors of TafsÏr al-Man¥r on the question of 
women is sometimes “reservedly reformist” and at other times “old and rigid, based on a salafi 
vision – returning to the position of women in the first phase of Islam”.58 
 
c. Knowing µAbduh 
 
In addition to µAbduh’s writings, attention to his activities, evolution and connections can 
give further insights. µAbduh is undoubtedly one of the most studied figures in modern Arab 
history. His life, thought and works are the subject of hundreds of studies, papers, books and 
theses. µAbduh addressed the questions that emerged out of the critical point in the history of 
Egypt (and the Arab and Muslim worlds) which are still being debated to this day, such that he 
“represented the concentrated historical expression of the birth of the modern intellectual in the 
chronological sense”.59 
Portrayals of ʿAbduh vary just like studies of his life and thought. One of the earliest and 
most important studies of µAbduh is Charles Adams’s Islam and Modernism in Egypt: A Study 
of Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Mu^ammad ʿAbduh.60 Adams defines modernism 
as “an attempt to free the religion of Islam from the shackles of a too rigid orthodoxy, and to 
accomplish reforms which will render it adaptable to the complex demands of modern life. It is 
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inspired and dominated chiefly by theological considerations”.61 He emphasises µAbduh’s novel 
interpretation of the text, which “gives reason full authority in interpreting revealed text” and 
promotes the “precedence of reason over the literal meaning of the divine law in the case of 
conflict between the two”.62 µAbduh held that if there is contradiction, “reason must believe that 
the apparent sense was not intended. It is then free to choose between interpreting the passage 
consistently with the rest of the words of the prophet in whose message the doubtful passage 
occurs, and between resigning the matter to God and His Knowledge”.63 However, µAbduh does 
not always apply this – or rather what may have seemed reasonable to him no longer seemed 
reasonable to some Muslims – particularly women – a century later – who made use of the 
principle of “re-interpreting” or “resigning the matter to God” when facing religious texts which 
seemed to contradict reason. 
Adams highlights µAbduh’s emphasis of the “absolute equality of all men in their 
essential nature and inherent rights, including women”.64 µAbduh compares the status of women 
in other nations belying “the claim of Europeans to be the first to honour women” – though 
admitting that “Muslims have been at fault in the education and training of women and 
acquainting them with their rights”.65 Adams also highlights µAbduh’s letter to an English 
clergyman where he distinguishes between laws that are open to modification according to 
circumstances like divorce, polygamy and slavery.  
Adams’ work remains the most “well-integrated study”66 of µAbduh, conscious of “the 
vital relation which existed between the character of his thought and his activities as a 
reformer”.67 
There are numerous primarily biographical works on µAbduh, such as those by 
Sedgwick, 68  Uthm¥n AmÏn, 69  and RashÏd Ri\¥’s T¥rÏkh al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m al-Shaykh 
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Mu^ammad µAbduh. In his paper on “Biographical Works on Mu^ammad µAbduh”, Suhail 
Hanna notes that despite all the above works and others, there is no “definitive biography” and 
there remains the “lack of a solid, complete, balanced, integrated, fair and sensitive portrayal of 
µAbduh’s life”.70 
In addition, a number of works focused not on µAbduh’s life and activities but on 
religious, legal and intellectual reform in his thought. The main studies include Jacques Jomier’s 
Le Commentaire Coranique du Man¥r: tendances modernes de l’exegese coranique en Egypte,71 
Goldziher’s Die Richtungen der Islamischen Koranauslegung,72 Malcolm Kerr’s Islamic Reform: 
The political and legal theories of Mu^ammad µAbduh and RashÏd Rid¥, 73  and Horten’s 
Mu^ammad µAbduh: sein Leben und seine theologisch-philosophische Gedankenwelt.74  
 Horten’s two-part study of µAbduh’s life and ideas concluded a negative evaluation of 
µAbduh’s intellectual reform: “How much that is unacceptable still shackles the flight of his 
thought! There still remains fundamental rubbish to be carted away in order to create room for a 
new building”.75 Horten’s comments betray a tendency by some orientalists to write off “Islamic 
reform” as, in their view, one must do away with what they deem unacceptable so that a 
completely new building can be constructed – thus always ending with a disappointed evaluation 
of µAbduh’s contribution for not going far enough.  
Whereas the early decades of the twentieth century brought a number of important 
western works on µAbduh which enthusiastically translated some of his works and presented his 
life and ideas to a western audience, with a generally sympathetic evaluation of his reform 
project, at least in terms of ideas if not actual achievements, the middle decades of the twentieth 
century saw the publication of a new genre of works on µAbduh. The general decline of 
enthusiasm for “Islamic modernism” in the Muslim world, with its replacement by its two heirs – 
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secularism and Islamism/revivalism – contributed to the emergence of negative evaluations of 
µAbduh’s reform project, judging it to be rather unsuccessful. In addition to Kerr’s generally 
negative evaluation of µAbduh’s contribution to Islamic reform, a different image of µAbduh 
appears in the work of Elie Kedourie, Afgh¥nÏ and ʿAbduh: An Essay on Religious Unbelief and 
Political Activisms in Modern Islam.76 In this study, Kedourie calls into question the authenticity 
of al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh as Muslim reformers, and instead regards the two men as unbelievers 
exploiting religious discourse purely for political ends. Professor Mohsen Mahdi discusses 
“Kedourie’s debunking tactics”77 and Arnold Toynbee also detects Kedourie’s urge to debunk 
and remains mistrustful of his conclusions, in his review of the work.78 Nevertheless, Kedourie’s 
study suggests that “in the wester of the psychological-physical happenings and in the bulk of 
µAbduh’s work, there are many clues that have remained untapped by sympathetic and critical 
biographers”.79  
Leaving aside Kedourie’s motivations, I believe that the prior stance adopted by 
researchers on µAbduh – whether sympathetic or unsympathetic – has been one of the reasons for 
both the partly-arbitrary attribution of chapters from Ta^rÏr al-Mar'a to him, and for the lack of 
interest in a detailed, indepth, critical study of µAbduh’s writings on women. A sympathetic view 
on µAbduh and desire to highlight his positive contribution to “women’s liberation” is an implicit 
factor in, for instance, µImara’s efforts to attribute the chapters to µAbduh.80 However, a detailed 
study of µAbduh’s writings on women could result in a view of µAbduh as more “liberal” or more 
“conservative” than those with a pre-determined view of µAbduh – and on “women’s liberation” 
– may prefer. 
Another book also “casting doubts on their [Afghānī and µAbduh’s] posterior perception 
as Sunni reformers of Salafi provenience”81 is Oliver Scharbrodt’s Islam and the Baha'i Faith: A 
Comparative Study of Mu^ammad µAbduh and ‘Abdul-Baha ‘Abbas. However, Scharbrodt’s 
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work does not embrace sweeping judgments on µAbduh’s alleged agnosticism but criticises them 
as well as “standard narratives on his allegiance to Sunni Islam”,82 seeing both as simplistic 
constructions of orthodoxy and heterodoxy that ignore the evolution in µAbduh’s thought. 
Scharbrodt presents µAbduh and Abul-Baha as “religious dissidents who made use of the 
creative output of charismatic authority in order to develop alternative readings of the Islamic 
tradition which would accommodate Western modernity without blindly imitating it”.83 They 
also “experienced the precarious character of religio-political dissent” and moved on to non-
charismatic models of religious authority, with µAbduh dissociating himself from religious 
dissidence and buttressing his credentials as a mujaddid and a Sunni reformer.84 He “returned to 
traditional scholarly authority” but wanted to create a new type of “activist religious scholar who 
is socially active and politically conscious without becoming too closely associated with 
governmental policies”,85 moving away “from politics to the private sector”.86 The evolutions 
and incomplete transformations in µAbduh (and Abul-Baha) led to intellectual legacies and 
movements with “tensions and contradictions which had to be resolved by their disciples and 
successors”.87 Scharbrodt also links these tensions to patterns in Muslim historical experience 
and inherent tensions within Islam. In my study of µAbduh’s writings on women, I consider the 
different – and sometimes contradictory – views expressed by µAbduh in various media and 
contexts, and possible causes.  
Scharbrodt’s study advocates a novel look at movements that have acquired standardised 
portrayals: reformism, modernism, traditionalism and Sufism. In addition to his conclusions, 
Scharbrodt’s method of placing two figures from seemingly completely dissimilar movements in 
a common context in relation to each other to reveal “the common ground shared” by them and 
“the processes that led to the parting of their ways”88 is insightful and useful for studying other 
apparently dichotomous movements: for instance the two branches of the µAbduh school, or 
current feminist and Islamist groups. 
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 Vatikiotis portrays µAbduh as a “humanist”, in his “Mu^ammad ʿAbduh and the Quest for 
a Muslim Humanism”.89 Vatikiotis’ introductory remark that “the contact between East and 
West... has been further complicated by the unreadiness of the Muslim to rationalise, since his 
religion never constituted for him an abstract intellectual system”90 suggests early on a not 
entirely sympathetic view of the chances for “Islamic reform”.  
In Vatikiotis’ view, µAbduh's humanism begins with his introduction of “a novel concept 
of social responsibility” and the idea that Islam is “a social religion which has combined in its 
message the welfare of man in this world and in the hereafter”.91 Despite the shortcomings of his 
thought, he “came closest to a reformulation of the fundamental position of Islam”, but his 
“rationalist-humanist” reformulation of Islam had to contend with major “solidly anti-liberal 
forces” within Islam. Vatikiotis insists on the “humanist”, “anti-revolutionary”, “anti-pan-
Islamism” singular nature of µAbduh. Articles or passages that do not fit into this image, such as 
µAbduh's emphasis of “Islamic patriotism” above “national taµa||ub” are undermined and ignored 
as “full of contradictions and erroneous presuppositions”.92 
µAbduh’s main aim, according to Vatikiotis, was “to activate the belief in God into social 
action”, hence his emphasis on social action, justice, public interest. However, his failure is 
mostly due to the insurmountable obstacles inherent in Islam itself which are opposed to 
“humanism of any kind in Islam”. This echoes Cromer’s remark that “Islam cannot be reformed; 
that is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer”93 – which reveals that negative evaluations of 
µAbduh’s reform efforts by a number of intellectuals are often less about their unsympathetic 
stances on µAbduh, and more about their unsympathetic stances on the possibilities of Islamic 
reform itself. 
 
d. Situating µAbduh: Islamic Reform 
 
µAbduh did not write in a vacuum, but is to be read within various discourses: within 
scholarly Islamic scholarship, within the revivalist discourse, and within nationalist discourses. 
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Undoubtedly, he was first and foremost a reformer, promoting “Islamic reformism”, or “Islamic 
modernism”. This movement has been the subject of various studies, such as Gibb’s Modern 
Trends in Islam,94 Albert Hourani’s Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939,95 Fazlur 
Rahman’s Islam,96 Nadav Safran’s Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of the 
Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952, 97  Charles Kurzman’s Modernist 
Islam, 98  Pioneers of Islamic Revival, edited by Ali Rahnema, 99  Hisham Sharabi’s Arab 
Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914,100 and Basheer Nafi’s The Rise and 
Decline of the Arab-Islamic Reform Movement101 and “The Rise of Islamic Reformist Thought 
and its Challenge to Traditional Islam”.102 
As well as the material on µAbduh’s life and thought, the above works are highly relevant 
to the understanding of µAbduh’s environment, the nature, diversity and evolution of the reform 
movement he belonged to, and the various definitions and portrayals of this movement. 
 Taking the history of thought as his method, Hourani pays close attention to what ʿAbduh 
wrote and thought on the discourse of reform and links his reformist thought to circumstances in 
which µAbduh lived and grew up. According to Hourani, ‘Abduh’s reform was based on a 
“distinction between what is essential and unchanging in Islam and what is inessential and could 
be changed without damage”, the “compatibility of reason and religion”, “adopting Ibn 
Taymiyya’s distinction between µib¥d¥t and muµ¥mal¥t” and “identifying traditional concepts of 
Islamic thought with dominant ideas of modern Europe”.103  
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Hourani highlighted µAbduh’s “tendency to blur intellectual distinctions and refusal to 
open old controversies”,104 which agrees with and explains his selective, gradualist incomplete 
reform in some areas of which authors such as Kerr and Horten had complained. The ambiguity 
of some of his views allowed him to influence a broad and diverse set of individuals and groups. 
Nevertheless, Hourani stresses the importance of µAbduh’s influence, as “his teaching was in the 
end to be rejected by many of those to whom he addressed himself, but remained working 
beneath the surface, the unacknowledged basis of the religious ideas of the ordinary educated 
Muslim”.105  
Hourani, however, added that µAbduh’s attempt to reconcile Islam and modernity was 
destined to result in eclecticism and more seriously to distort the “authentic” Islam for future 
generations, generating more confusion. Regarding the charges of agnosticism, Hourani gives a 
mixed response, judging that while theses charges cannot “stand against evidence of his own 
writings and of those who knew intimately the movement of his thought”, “the doubts have a 
certain validity” pointing to “a sort of eclecticism”. 106 
Sharabi divides Arab intellectuals into conservatives, reformists and modernists, ranging 
between modernism “a positive attitude toward innovation and change and toward western 
civilization” and “traditionalism”, “a negative attitude toward all types of innovation and toward 
the west”. Reformists occupied the space in the middle. While reformism is categorised by some 
as “Islamic modernism”, Sharabi holds that reformism was “modernising only in a special sense 
and a limited degree” and was “at heart tradition-bound”, “not much more than an enlightened 
conservatism”. The result was that reformism “opposed the secularisation and “westernisation” 
elements of social modernisation more effectively than conservative traditionalism ever did”.107  
Between the poles of conservatism and modernism, Sharabi identifies four trends 
composed of two pairs: Islamic conservatism and Islamic reformism, describing both as 
“tradition-bound”, and Christian Westernism and Muslim secularism, described as “modern-
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oriented”.108 µAbduh’s reform movement, according to Sharabi was far from the Protestant 
reform movement, but rather “a neo-orthodox movement”, which “could neither free itself from 
the weight of traditional dogmatism nor properly adapt itself to the new modern concepts”.109 
Sharabi’s depiction of the reform movement, particularly in his emphasis of both its 
“traditionalism” and its emergence primarily as a reaction to the European political and cultural 
threat, as well as his positive depiction of “secular modernism”, as two completely opposed 
categories, exemplifies traits of the “modernisation theory” which was still dominant at the time. 
However, the rise of post-modern and post-colonial critiques contributed to the emergence of a 
more nuanced view of the terms “modernism” and “traditionalism”. My study of µAbduh’s 
writings on women assesses these views of the reform school by questioning the 
“traditionalism”/“modernism” of µAbduh’s views and the extent of western influence on them. 
Samira Haj’s Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity falls 
under more recent studies critical of previous portrayals of µAbduh, reform and tradition. Haj 
notes that µAbduh has been depicted “as a liberal humanist, a liberal salafi, and sometimes as an 
agnostic… never regarded as a fanatic or a fundamentalist in spite of his insistence on the letter 
of the Qur’an and the Shariµa, the two defining features of ‘fundamentalism’”.110 According to 
Haj, µAbduh questioned the “singular humanist secular image of modernity” which is based on 
“the assumption that modernisation will inevitably lead to the retreat of religion from the public 
into the private nonpolitical domain, as it did in the Western hemisphere”.111  
Haj addresses doubts about µAbduh’s faith expressed by some, linking them to the above 
“traditional orientalist view” of Islam. She notes that from Hourani’s perspective, what is “even 
more reprehensible than µAbduh’s commitment to Islam is his invention of a fictitious Islam” 
stripped of its “true and authentic meanings” and infused with “liberal and democratic qualities 
that it never had”.112  In contrast, Haj sees µAbduh as “neither a traditionalist nor a liberal but as a 
Muslim reformer who was critical of both traditionalist religious authority and colonial 
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modernity”,113 of both taqlīd and taghrīb. He sought to “both challenge and accommodate the 
changes in his age… to ensure the continuity of Islamic authority in the context of an 
overwhelming colonial modernity”.114  
Haj situates µAbduh “within an intellectual genealogy of tajdid-islah”. Far from trying to 
recreate a past historical moment or fabricate a new Islam, Haj argues that µAbduh “drew on 
multiple tendencies and arguments within the tradition in order to establish a counter-discourse 
that could vie with the established Islamic orthodoxy, on the one hand, and Europeanisation, on 
the other.” 115  Haj also disagrees with Hourani’s assumption that µAbduh’s rationalism is 
“constructed on a frame of Comptean positivism”. In fact, Hourani himself, decades after the 
appearance of his seminal Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, admitted that his background and 
training had not allowed him to perceive the indigenous roots of reformers’ ideas which he had 
exclusively viewed as products of western influence.116  
Haj highlights µAbduh’s defence of AshµarÏsm and adoption of Ghaz¥lÏ’s doctrine of the 
mean, or miz¥n – the middle-of-the road balance between two extremes – adding that it does not 
demonstrate his “traditionalism” or “conservatism” as Kerr suggests, but an adoption of a 
successful historical example of selective incorporation of new concepts and practices into the 
mainstream orthodox discourse enabling it “to overcome incoherence and reassert its religious 
authority”.117 In my study, I assess how far µAbduh strays from Islamic “tradition”, and his 
attitude towards it. 
 In addition to the stimulus provided by western encroachment, Basheer Nafi emphasises 
the internal mechanisms of renewal and revival and the “cycles of reform” in Islamic history, 
arguing that “deviation and correction are inherent features of the Islamic experience”.118 In his 
study of the rich history of Islamic reform, Nafi places µAbduh and other late-nineteenth century 
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reformists within the same tradition of reformism, but recognises the difference that while 
previously reform reflected “a conversation between the self-past and reality”, modern 
reformism faced a more complex interaction which added the element of western imperialism. 
Nafi stresses that reformists’ vision of Islam was readily affected by their perceptions of 
the demands of modern times: “modernity, however it was perceived, was the internalized, 
powerful influence against which the project of Islamic reconstruction and revival was 
envisioned”.119 Reformists sought to grasp elements of western strength and introduce them to 
their own people – hence their discourse was bound to generate a mainly positive image of the 
west.  
Nevertheless, Nafi notes that the reformist movement’s views of the west were largely 
selective, non-historical and incohesive, exhibiting “some of the gravest of its inner 
contradictions” and reflecting “the deepening sense of self-decline and inability to repel Western 
military, economic and cultural challenges”. 120  They lacked a deliberate methodological 
approach, a historical context and a frame of reference. However, Nafi stresses that reformists 
did not embrace everything western, but rather “Islam represented the only frame of reference 
that the reformists, whether ulama or statesmen could imagine”, “reformists’ opposition to the 
increasing Western penetration of Islamic societies was genuine” and “the positive projection of 
the West in reformist thought was equally employed as a weapon in the ongoing conflict with the 
traditionalist circles as it was an expression of appropriationist and assimilationist attacks.”121 In 
my study of µAbduh’s writings on women, I assess the extent of western influence on his views, 
in terms of ideas, stances and motivations. 
Whereas Nafi uses the “reformist” label for µAbduh and his school, Charles Kurzman, 
embraces the “modernist” label in Modernist Islam: 1840-1940: A Source Book, which presents 
selected writings of modernists who “typically believed that it was not only possible but 
imperative to show how “modern” values and institutions could be reconciled with authentically 
Islamic ideals.”122 Unlike traditionalists and secularists, modernists “saw the tension between 
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Islamic faith and modern values as a historical accident, not an inherent feature of Islam”.123 
According to Kurzman, modernism distinguishes this movement from previous Islamic reform 
movements, and from contemporaneous religious traditionalists. It also distinguishes them from 
their successors: “from secularists who downplayed the importance of Islam in the modern 
world… and religious revivalists who espoused modern values (such as social equality, codified 
law, and mass education) but downplayed their modernity.”124 Whereas early use of the term 
“modernism” was more neutral and descriptive, the label was subsequently challenged either by 
modern reformers who preferred the term “reformism”, or by more secular reformers who saw 
the early modernists and those associated with their legacy as more traditional than modern, and 
hence undeserving of association with modernism – preferring labels such as salafists, islamists, 
fundamentalists or neo-traditionalists. Also with the rise of political movements based on Islamic 
reform ideas and their hostility to Sufi trends – seen as “traditional” – a re-habilitation of the 
term “traditional” occurred, associating traditionalism not with conservatism but with 
authenticity and purity, whereas rival “Islamist”/”fundamentalist” trends were more frequently 
described as “modernists” which acquired connotations of alien roots and lack of authenticity, 
depth and coherence. Some prefer the use of the terms ‘reformists’ or ‘revivalists’ to 
‘modernists’, since these were the terms used by the protagonists themselves, who often referred 
to the hadith, “God sends to this nation at the beginning of every century someone who renews 
its religion”.125 My preferred use in this work is the term “reformist” which is less value-laden 
and describes more closely the principal concerns and methods of these figures, and it is the term 
used by the figures of this trend themselves and their contemporaries. 
  
e.  Temporalising µAbduh: µAbduh’s Era and Legal Reform 
 
Abduh’s era is one of change, conflict, resistance, transformation, failures, and hopes. 
While µAbduh’s writings – and those of fellow reformists and other contemporaries – help 
readers learn about this critical phase of Arab and Muslim history, conversely, to understand, 
appreciate and contextualise µAbduh’s writings and thought, one needs to study the legal, social, 
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economic, political and cultural history of that era. As a result, my work has an important 
historical dimension, particularly focusing on the history of legal reform, social change, and the 
women’s movement in Egypt and the Middle East, drawing on those historical accounts, and 
aiming to contribute to them.  
Whereas earlier studies of Islamic reform movements, and of Middle Eastern history in 
general, used the writings of reformers, politicians and thinkers to create an intellectual history of 
the Middle East, the last decades of the twentieth century saw a growing interest in “social 
history”, focusing on the relationships between power and wealth as key to understanding 
historical evolutions. While scholars more familiar with the classical “intellectual history” 
tradition, such as Hourani, appreciated the new insights provided by social history, they warned 
that “the danger of social history is that it may tend to reduce the lives of individual human 
beings to movements of classes or other collectivities”. An attempt to correct this is “linking 
socioeconomic change to another kind of change, that of collective mentalities.”126 Hourani 
advocated an integration of all these approaches to the study of the history of the Middle East, 
“we need to show historical processes as reflected in the minds of individuals who are able to 
articulate them and, in so doing, to change their nature.”127 
Abduh’s era was a time of thriving debate, scholarship, reform and activism, witnessing 
the rise of the nationalist movement, the spread of literacy, printing and journalism, educational 
reform including the reform of al-Azhar, and legal reform including reform of the Shariµa courts. 
µAbduh was involved in all these activities and debates. 
The major transformation of judicial structures occurred with the reinforcement and 
consolidation of central state administration in Ottoman Turkey and Egypt during the whole 
course of the nineteenth century. Although such measures started in the eighteenth century, both 
in scope and tempo, the changes in nineteenth century Egypt were unprecedented. 
In the seventeenth century Shariµa courts were the centre-piece of the legal system, 
administering criminal, civil, and family Islamic law; non-religious state law, or qanun, was an 
exceptional legislation dealing with penal, administrative taxation, land and military matters. At 
the close of the nineteenth century, Shariµa courts became restricted to hearing family, 
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inheritance and endowment property cases. Furthermore Islamic family law underwent a semi-
codification by the state. Many scholars, who saw the radical change of the centuries-old legal 
system and the loss of their own status and influence, opposed the state’s reforms.  
Oussama Arabi describes how “Islamic law has successfully been recast into a utilitarian 
tool to be used by governing elites in furthering modern goals such as national integration, 
economic development and egalitarianism”.128 Arabi prefers to refer to “positivisation of the 
Shariµa”, the process of integration of Shariµa into the modern state political structure, rather than 
“legal reform”.129  
Abduh’s support of the process of standardisation and codification of Islamic law draws 
criticism from scholars who studied the process and its shortcomings and lasting effects. 
According to Arabi, µAbduh sought the unity of Islamic law “to the point of a ‘sacrilegious’ 
break with the millenary tradition of tolerance of judicial differences on the altar of the 
centralising state”.130 This placing of blame on µAbduh and the reform school is not entirely 
justified, since the process of centralisation and standardisation had begun decades before 
µAbduh. Mu^ammad QadrÏ was asked in 1875 to put Hanafi family law in the form of a code of 
personal status which served as a manual for lawyers and judges. Mu^ammad µAlÏ had already in 
his first penal legislation on 1829 initiated a process of massive borrowing of western codes and 
judicial structures and patronised the translation of European legal codes as a means of their 
successful implementation in Egypt. In 1849, new judicial structures, secular tribunals were 
being established and adjudicated criminal and commercial disputes under the new Europeanised 
codes rather than Islamic Shariµa. Nineteenth-century legal modernisation culminated in the 
Mixed Courts of 1876 (adjudicating litigation involving foreigners) and the National Courts of 
1883, both of which applied commercial, civil, procedure and penal laws that were primarily of 
French inspiration.  
Abduh’s project was “the creative integration of Islamic norms into the rationality of the 
modern Egyptian state”,131 through ijtih¥d, talfÏq and takhayyur. The problem with those tools, 
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according to Wael Hallaq, is that they do not conform to the centuries-old tradition of Islamic 
jurisprudence, but only seek to maintain an illusory preservation of that tradition. For Hallaq,  
Codification is not an inherently neutral form of law, nor is it an innocent tool of legal 
practice, devoid of political or other goals. It is a deliberate choice in the exercise of 
political and legal power, a means by which a conscious restriction is placed on the 
interpretive freedom of jurists, judges, and lawyers.132 
 
Arguing against the dominant reductionist view of Shariµa as rigid, monolithic and 
unchanging, Wael Hallaq has devoted his efforts to a deeper study of the history of Islamic 
jurisprudence,133 emphasising that the tradition of Islamic jurisprudence was a system where 
“plurality was not seen as a problem” but as “conducive to both legal flexibility and legal 
change”. This proficient juristic activity was further strengthened by the fact that “the religious 
ethic was the…. final arbiter of legal legitimacy” and the entire system was “supported by 
financially and administratively self-sufficient and independent institutions”. None of these 
elements exist in modern Muslim legal systems, but what remains of the traditional system are 
“remnants of mutilated doctrine patched up in a disparate and methodologically deficient 
manner”, which are “incapable of further development and change” due to their disconnection 
from their original “vibrant school tradition”.134 Thus, despite all the continuous references to 
“Shariµa” or its revival or renewal, according to Hallaq, “traditional Shariµa can surely be said to 
have gone without return”.135  
Nevertheless Hallaq believes “the legality and legal-mindedness that governed Muslim 
life for so many centuries is again required to surface in order to redress the havoc that the 
problems of cultural and religious crises have wreaked”.136 The solution then is “to alter what 
can be altered” to “remold legal theory” rather than try to “sweep modernity aside”. Although 
that is indeed what µAbduh attempted to do, Hallaq is strongly critical of his attempts and of later 
“religious utilitarians” who “fail to produce a cogent legal theory or methodology and thus offer 
nothing more than shallow juristic devices that at best attempt to justify the existing arbitrariness 
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of state legislation”.137 Despite the current Muslim states’ exploitation of pseudo-Islamic legal 
reform for political ends, Hallaq still stresses the role of the state in the required “revival of 
Islamic law”, as “the state must re-create the necessary conditions for a modern version of 
Islamic law to be constructed and to evolve largely on its own”.138 Again, that seems to have 
been the view of µAbduh who opted for the use of official positions to reform official legal and 
educations institutions. However, his attempts had met with opposition from various quarters: 
conservative scholars, the khedive, nationalist leaders allied with the khedive, and the colonial 
administration. His disciples continued the same attempts, succeeding to incorporate themselves 
into state administration, with mixed results.  
 
f . The Object of µAbduh’s Reform 
 
Understanding and assessing µAbduh’s writings on women requires an understanding of 
the situation of women in 19th century Egypt, the changes it has undergone as a result of legal, 
political and socio-economic developments, and the various discourses on women. 
Whereas early studies of Egyptian (and Middle Eastern) women’s lives at the turn of the 
century focused on the “improvements” in family law and positive changes in the status of 
Egyptian, and Arab women in general, due to the advent of modernity, more recent studies have 
questioned such early optimistic views. More recent historiography on women in the Muslim 
world generally views the codified reforms in family laws carried out by the nationalist elites of 
the post-Ottoman era as a form of state patriarchy that these elites needed to enact under the 
influence of European imperial powers. Simultaneously, these historians highlight the 
considerable degree of freedom, choice and autonomy enjoyed by women in the Ottoman era.  
The change occurred in the nature of historiography of the Middle East and in approaches 
to modernisation theory. Judith Tucker, a pioneer of the application of “social history” to women 
in modernizing Arab states, particularly in Egypt in her detailed study of Women in Nineteenth-
Century Egypt, analysed changes in women’s lives in a period where Egypt underwent great 
political and economic developments. Tucker focused on four dimensions of women’s roles and 
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status and how they were affected by the changes of the nineteenth century: access to property, 
family relations, participation in social production and the public sphere, and ideological 
definitions. Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt constituted not only the first comprehensive 
study on realities of Middle Eastern women, but for the first time lower-class women were at the 
heart of such an investigation. 
Tucker’s study and similar historical works attempted to correct “problems in 
historiography of women in the Middle East”.139 Tucker calls Middle East history “a stepchild of 
‘orientalism’” continuing to bear “the imprint of its birth up to the present in its use of sources, 
its methodology, and its isolation”.140 Most studies of “Middle Eastern women history” tended to 
“not emphasise the effects of Egyptian integration into a European market on the organisation of 
economic and social activities, but rather the transfer of western ideas about women’s roles 
which gradually permeated and transformed the receiving society”.141 To avoid the same pitfall, I 
draw on these new approaches to the history of Middle Eastern women in order to discover 
possible concrete socio-economic changes in the lives of Egyptian women which could have 
motivated µAbduh’s ideas and reforms, rather than seeing them as motivated by abstract 
motivations.  
Later historical studies of Middle Eastern women moved away from sweeping 
generalisations to reveal, based on growing evidence, especially court records, “the diversity and 
complexity of social organisation in societies where Islam is the dominant religion”. The 
emerging picture was one where modernisation, unlike previously thought, had mixed effects on 
the situation of women. One of the main changes resulting from the new socio-economic set-up 
was the change in the private-public configuration: “The firmer the differentiation of these two 
spheres became, the more women were isolated from each other and placed under the authority 
of their male family members”.142 
Tucker emphasised the potential of court records to study women’s activities as well as 
their own perceptions of their rights under the law. While courts applied Islamic law according to 
a specific madhhab, mostly the Hanafi madhhab, judges often demonstrated a flexible and 
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accommodating approach to women’s cases.143 Such historical works, mostly based on court 
records, which have been very useful for understanding the significance and context of µAbduh’s 
proposed family law reforms. Bishara Doumani’s Family History in the Middle East: Household, 
Property, and Gender,144 Ron Shaham’s Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt,145 Yossef 
Rapoport’s Marriage, Money and Divorce in Medieval Islamic Societ,y146 Kenneth Cuno’s The 
Pasha’s Peasants: Land, Society and Economy in Lower Egypt, Amira Sonbol’s Women, the 
Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History,147 and Judith Gran’s “Impact of the World Market 
on Egyptian Women”,148 are useful studies of the transition to modernity and its effects on 
women’s lives and family structure, challenging the widespread view of pre-modern family as 
uniformly extended, stable and polygynous.  
 Another useful development was the linking of social history and legal studies, enabling a 
look at the interaction between legal texts and opinions and the way they were understood and 
applied. Judith Tucker’s more recent In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in 
Ottoman Syria and Palestine deals with gendered legal discourse and social relations in 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Syria and Palestine, drawing on fat¥w¥ literature and Shariµa 
court records. The major themes in the legal discourse on gender were marriage, divorce, 
parenthood, and sexuality. Tucker shows that this discourse highlighted gender differences, but 
at the same time proved flexible and responsive to changing conditions. In agreement with Wael 
Hallaq’s emphasis of the use of ijtih¥d as part of the established tradition of Islamic 
jurisprudence, rather than a modern innovation, Judith Tucker’s In the House of Law highlights 
the possibility of change and fluidity in a scholarly tradition based on a plurality of authoritative 
texts, as before the modern codification of Shariµa, no one definite set of texts embodied the 
whole of Islamic law.  
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 Middle Eastern historiography continued to evolve. Iris Agmon describes the shift from 
focusing on social institutions using quantitative methods to analyse patterns of behaviour and 
trends of change in Middle Eastern societies, to a move toward anthropology, linguistics, and 
literature.149 This change of orientation entailed historical investigations focusing on human 
relationships and the meanings attributed to them; in such investigations, historians employed 
textual analyses and methods of microhistory and, more frequently than in the previous fifty 
years, structured their studies as narratives. Marilyn Booth’s May Her Likes be Multiplied: 
Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt150 and Amira Sonbol’s Beyond the Exotic: Women's 
Histories in Islamic Societies151 are examples of this trend. 
Each different approach to the history of Middle East women and Muslim family law has 
its own advantages and shortcomings, and despite the integration of various approaches within 
single works, the emergence of new perspectives and application of new methods to the study of 
“Middle Eastern women” and “Middle Eastern history” makes it necessary for anyone analysing 
debates on women to seek to build a complex understanding of these through reliance on books 
from a variety of disciplines: law, religion, political history, social history, literature and others. 
Works that combine elements from all the above continue to constitute indispensible reading, 
such as Leila Ahmed’s  Women and Gender in Islam :  Historical Roots of a Modern Debate,  and 
Beck & Keddie’s Women in the Muslim World. 152 
 
g. Contextualising µAbduh’s Writings: Contemporary Discourses on Women 
 
With the aim of understanding and assessing the significance or µAbduh’s writings on 
women, this work analyses other writings in the same period, particularly in Egypt and on 
women, from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century. A number of works have 
focused on the broader discourse on women, moving away from complete reliance on religious 
and legal texts to analysing writings on women in nationalist and colonialist discourses, most 
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importantly by Leila Ahmed, Lisa Pollard, David Mitchell, Mervat Hatem, Fawziyya Ghassani, 
Nimat Hafez Barazangi, Omnia Shakry, Afsaneh Najmabadi, Hanan Kholoussy and Lila Abu-
Lughod. I draw on these to highlight aspects of µAbduh’s discourse on women that are 
similar/different from the broader nationalist discourse. 
While earlier works on discourses on women and the “women’s liberation” movement 
focused on their supposed male pioneers, more recently interest has grown in the previously-
ignored women writers. Among the growing literature in this field, Beth Baron focused on 
women’s magazines in turn-of-the-century Egypt, 153  Marilyn Booth looked into the 
autobiographical works of turn-of-the-century Arab women, such as ‘®’isha Taym›r, Zaynab 
Faww¥z, and Mayy Ziy¥da,154 and Mervat Hatem has provided an alternative reading of ‘®’isha 
Taym›r and Malak HifnÏ N¥|if’s lives and writings.155 
Understanding the effect of these discourses, including reformists’ discourses, on 
contemporary Arab and Muslim women’s movement requires an understanding of the roots and 
emergence of the women’s movement at the turn of the century. The works of Margot Badran, 
Soha Abdel-Kader, Beth Baron and Lama Abu-Odeh discuss the emergence of the Egyptian 
women’s movement and its evolution. All these works briefly mention µAbduh as having 
provided motivation/legitimisation/support for the women’s movement, but do not provide any 
details or analysis of µAbduh’s contribution. 
The above approaches and studies point to the complexity of the “women’s question”, in 
which law, religion, history, culture and politics merge. This continues to be the case today. 
Lama Abu-Odeh in “Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate”,156 discusses how the 
involvement of all trends and groups in the discussion of women’s issues and the tense manner in 
which they did so partially explains the slow progress in change in relation to this question. Abu-
Odeh attributes the lack of rapprochement or interaction to the fact that each trend saw this as a 
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“battle” to be won – for secularists it was a battle for ‘enlightenment’ and ‘liberation’; for 
nationalists a battle for ‘independence’ and ‘nation-building’; for Islamists a battle for ‘identity’ 
and ‘morality’. Each camp had no interest in understanding the other camp’s motives and fears, 
nor in self-critique, locking the debate in repetitive polemics and apologetics.  
 The writing of the history of women’s liberation in the Arab world has focused on Q¥sim 
AmÏn and seeing it as a movement born with that book. This overlooks women, whose writings 
preceded – and were more radical than – AmÏn, such as Zaynab Faww¥z and ‘®’isha Taym›r. It 
also overlooks books from a more religious perspective. Recent works have started to challenge 
this incomplete and unrepresentative history of women’s liberation in the Arab world. Yet much 
work remains to be done to present these unknown contributors to the discourse on women. As 
for µAbduh, although his name appears in most of these historical reconstructions, it is always in 
a brief and general way, focusing on his fatwa on polygyny with no background or context, and 
without linking him to contemporary discourses. The same applies to other figures such as Rif¥‘a 
al->ah~¥wÏ F¥ris al-Shidy¥q, al-Afgh¥nÏ, al-Kaw¥kibÏ and others who contributed to those 
discourses on women, but whose contribution is overlooked or only briefly alluded to without 
elaboration. Of these, al->ah~¥wÏ has perhaps received more attention than other reformers, with 
an already established prominent position as a pioneer of Egyptian nationalism and liberalism, 
and being the most prolific writer amongst them.  
Abduh’s influence is also acknowledged on modern interpretations of women-related 
religious texts, and his name appears often – if briefly – in the works of authors such as Barbara 
Stowasser, Asma Barlas, and Amina Wadud, for instance. The works of Aziza al-Hibri, Fernea 
and Bezirgan, Mernissi, amongst other Muslim feminist interpretations, have also benefited from 
µAbduh’s reformist ideas and methods, as have more “mainstream” Islamist authors on “women 
in Islam” such as Mu^ammad al-Ghaz¥lÏ, Y›suf al-Qara\¥wÏ, ‘Abd al-HalÏm Ab› Shuqqa, 
R¥shid al-GhannoushÏ, and Husain Fa\lallah. 
The history of women’s reform/liberation was traditionally presented as the case of elite 
modern-educated male reformers. Later critics corrected this bias by including the contribution 
of women writers as well as the voices of women of other classes and backgrounds. My study of 
µAbduh points to another need: correcting the writing of the history of women’s reform in Egypt 
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(and the Arab and Muslim worlds) by including the important contribution of non-secular male 
and female voices. 
While a study of ‘Abduh’s writings on women benefits from the various approaches to 
family law reform, women’s movements and discourses on women and gender in Islam and in 
modern Egypt, it can also provide useful material and conclusions which can in turn benefit these 
areas, particularly overcoming the “battle-mode” dichotomous relation between various trends as 
described by Abu-Odeh.  
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Translations and Transliterations 
 
 
I have mostly used Mu^ammad Abdel-Haleem’s The Qur’an for translations of verses 
from the Qur’an, although I occasionally used alternatives, as indicated. All translations from 
Mu^ammad ‘Abduh and other primary sources are mine. Arabic words have been fully 
transliterated, following the Journal of Islamic Studies transliteration system, except words 
commonly used in the English language. Arabic names have also been transliterated, except 
where authors have themselves transliterated their names differently.. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
MU¤AMMAD µABDUH, FATHER OF MODERN ISLAMIC 
REFORM 
 
 
Perhaps no other Egyptian figure has been the subject of as many studies, in the Arab as 
well as western worlds, as Mu^ammad µAbduh. His fame owes as much to his ideas as it does to 
the groups, movements and events of which he was a part, and to the critically influential 
historical period through which he happened to live. µAbduh’s life, thought and works are the 
subject of hundreds of studies, papers, books and theses. The issues he raised, discussed, 
challenged or promoted have dominated intellectual discussions in the 20th century Arab world 
and still do, such that his name still frequently appears in various media – from scholarly works 
to magazine articles and television debates.  
 
 
1.1  Context & Influences 
 
1.1.1 Revival, Reformism and Modernism 
 
The nineteenth century was a period of great political and socio-economic changes, as 
well as intellectual and religious reform. Questions of reform and progress preoccupied thinkers 
and scholars in the Nah\a or renaissance/awakening school, particularly the central question: 
“how did the Arab and Muslim worlds decline while the West was in ascendance, and how can 
that state be changed?”  
The term ‘modernist’ was the preferred term used by western scholars to describe 
Muslims who sought to reconcile their faith with modern values such as constitutionalism, 
nationalism, freedom of religious interpretation, scientific investigation, women’s rights and 
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modern education. There was an existing polarisation between two principal trends characterised 
by avid westernisation and rigid conservatism. The third trend which emerged combined the 
following characteristics: rejection of both westernisation and rigidity; reform of society based 
on reform of religion; establishing a modern civilization on Islamic principles and positive 
interaction with other civilizations.157 The term ‘reformists’ or ‘revivalists’ is preferred by those 
who see this nineteenth-century movement as part of the long chain of reform movements 
throughout Islamic history.158 These shared the same characteristics of criticising taqlÏd and 
calling for a return to the pure sources and new interpretations of Islam.  
This movement was far from monolithic, with variations and even disagreements on 
virtually all subjects, comprising “state-building and limits on state power; elitism and 
egalitarianism; discipline and liberty; Europhilism and anti-imperialism… mysticism and 
abhorrence of mysticism; strategic use of traditionalism and rejection of traditional scholarship; 
return to pristine early Islam and updating of early practices in keeping with historical 
change”.159  
Western observers tended to be intrigued but skeptical about the chances of such a 
venture, since they were convinced that Islam was incompatible with modernity. For observers 
such as Lord Cromer, reformists were “too much tainted with heterodoxy to carry far along with 
them the staunch conservative Moslem. On the other hand they are often not sufficiently 
Europeanised to attract the sympathy of the Egyptian mimic of European ways”.160  
The context in which µAbduh lived and acted was critical and of great consequence on him 
and the evolution of his thought, and thus will be central to the study of his writings.  
 
1.1.2 Rural Origins: Simplicity, Conservatism, Pride 
 
Like the majority of Egyptians at the time – and indeed today – µAbduh grew up in a 
typical Egyptian village. In 1849, he was born in Ma^allat Na|r in the Egyptian Delta, into a 
modest family of knowledge and piety with local influence. µAbduh was keen to emphasise in his 
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short autobiography that although his family was of modest means, they held a position of 
respect locally. This awareness seem to have had a profound influence on µAbduh who wrote that 
“dignity and prestige have no relation to wealth”161 highlighting his parents’ character, good 
deeds, and background of opposition to injustice.162 The persecution of µAbduh’s father – and 
other villagers – at the hands of unjust rulers engendered within him a strong hostility to political 
authoritarianism, and particularly that of the Mu^ammad µAlÏ dynasty. The relatively simple and 
family-centred village upbringing also clearly affected µAbduh’s views on family ties and 
materialism, as a natural consequence of the contrast he later experienced between the rural and 
urban settings. 
µAbduh describes his childhood as “just as was the upbringing of the majority of those 
from the middle class in Egypt”.163 Nevertheless, his father seems not to have had an ordinary 
farmer’s life in mind for his son Mu^ammad. µAbduh began to learn to read and write from his 
father and local village teachers, and finished memorising the Qur’an in two years. Aged 
thirteen, his father sent him to the A^madÏ Mosque in >an~a – then the greatest centre of Islamic 
learning in Egypt after al-Azhar – to continue his education. However, µAbduh’s experience was 
so negative that he despaired of education altogether. Put off by the rote learning of traditional 
texts where he “teachers would surprise us with grammatical and juristic terms we did not 
understand, nor would they care to explain their meanings to those unfamiliar with them”,164 
µAbduh left after one and a half years, returning to the village in 1865, to get married and work in 
agriculture.  
 
1.1.3 Sufism: Sheikh DarwÏsh  
 
The second lasting influence on µAbduh was to come from his maternal uncle. He 
succeeded in liberating µAbduh from his aversion to education. He convinced him to read to him 
treatises from the Sh¥dhilÏ ~arÏqa such that after one week, he “had no concern other than 
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acquiring perfect knowledge and manners”.165 µAbduh’s love of learning was rekindled, and he 
returned to education, re-joining al-A^madÏ mosque in >an~a until 1869. 
µAbduh’s uncle had the greatest influence in his life prior to his meeting with al-Afgh¥nÏ. 
He described him as “the key to my happiness… who, in a few days, took me out of the prison of 
ignorance into the vastness of knowledge, from the chains of taqlÏd to the freedom of taw^Ïd”.166 
Sheikh DarwÏsh’s influence would be lasting and manifest in his manners for the rest of his 
life. As his student and prominent Egyptian philosopher Mu|~af¥ µAbd al-R¥ziq wrote: “the 
influence of ta|awwuf and Sufi teachings on the Im¥m were evident in his manners”.167 DarwÏsh 
also encouraged him to study logic and mathematics, which were not taught at al-Azhar. 
Although µAbduh expressed his indebtedness to ta|awwuf, saying that “all the blessing I 
enjoy in my religion, praise be to God, is due to ta|awwuf”,168 he also criticised in retrospect the 
“corruption of pseudo-Sufis of our time whose ways are even worse than the disobedience and 
deviant whims of those who corrupted Sufism before them”.169 Nevertheless spirituality and 
ethics remained among his major interests and concerns. µAbduh lamented the absence of those 
disciplines in modern religious teaching170 and his interest is clear in the texts he chose to teach, 
edit and publish.  
 
1.1.4 Al-Azhar: Orthodoxy and Sufi Reformism 
 
In 1866, µAbduh went to Cairo to join al-Azhar.171 Al-Azhar at the time had two groups: a 
conservative legalistic group, and a less conservative Sufi-leaning group. µAbduh attended 
lectures by both, studying under Shaykh µIllÏsh, al-Rif¥µÏ, al-JÏz¥wÏ, al->ar¥bulsÏ, al-Ba^r¥wÏ and 
others from the former group, but was closer to scholars of the latter, mainly Sh. ¤asan Ra\w¥n 
(d. 1892), Sh. ¤asan al->awÏl and Sh. Ma^m‰d al-Basy‰nÏ.  
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He was particularly influenced by Shaykh ¤asan al->awÏl who “used to teach the books 
of Ibn SÏna and Aristotle’s logic, which were unusual within al-Azhar”.172 He was also taught by 
Shaykh Mu^ammad al-Basy‰nÏ, who gave particular attention to literary style, Arabic literature 
and oratory.173 Despite µAbduh’s strong criticism of the rigidity of the content and methods of 
teaching at al-Azhar, he was undoubtedly influenced by his years of learning at this institution 
which continued to be central to his life and his later reform efforts. He studied at al-Azhar for 
ten years before graduating in 1879. The delay in being awarded the µ¥lamiyya certificate was 
due to the opposition of members of the Azhar committee who disliked his novel ideas and his 
association with al-Afgh¥nÏ, until he was eventually supported by Shaykh Mu^ammad MahdÏ al-
µAbb¥sÏ.174 It was also Shaykh al->awÏl whom µAbduh would accompany to meet al-Afgh¥nÏ, the 
next major influence in his life. 
 
1.1.5 Al-Afgh¥nÏ: Politicisation 
 
Jam¥l al-DÏn al-Afgh¥nÏ visited Cairo in 1869 and 1871, and µAbduh met him in his 
second visit, while still a student at al-Azhar. µAbduh was drawn to his circles, which satisfied 
his unfulfilled longing for new ideas and stimulating discussions. The young student developed a 
strong admiration for the charismatic scholar after a long discussion of tafsÏr and Sufism, “for 
Sufism and tafsÏr were the coolness of his eyes, or as he said, the key to his happiness”.175 
Al-Afgh¥nÏ transformed µAbduh’s spiritual immersion in inner reflection into an immersion 
in public service, motivating him to begin writing and teaching, even before his graduation, 
starting with books on logic, philosophy and ta|awwuf, such as Miskawayh’s FÏ TahdhÏb al-
Akhl¥q”,176 demonstrating µAbduh’s view of his own primary role as social and cultural reformer 
and educator. 
In addition, al-Afgh¥nÏ’s revolutionary spirit drew µAbduh into direct political activism. 
He joined al-¤izb al-Wa~anÏ al-¤urr (Free National Party) with al-Afgh¥nÏ, with the slogan 
“Egypt for Egyptians”. Al-Afgh¥nÏ was expelled from Egypt in 1879, and µAbduh exiled to his 
                                                
172 µAbdull¥h Shah¥ta, p. 13. 
173 ibid. 
174 Sedgwick, p. 12-14. 
175 T¥rÏkh, p. 25. 
176 On the Refinement of Morals. 
55 
 
village for their political activism. The National Party joined the µUr¥bÏ movement following the 
µAbdÏn demonstration of 9 September 1881, with µUr¥bÏ becoming the defence minister and 
acting head of government in early 1882, and provoking the British to end the threat of Egyptian 
independence through the attack on Alexandria and the imposition of British occupation in July 
1882. µAbduh was exiled to Beirut then joined al-Afgh¥nÏ in 1884 in Paris where they produced 
the famous, though short-lived, al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥ which promoted reform and unity and 
campaigned against imperialism. This intense political experience would help elaborate µAbduh’s 
choices and accentuate the difference between him and al-Afgh¥nÏ, the difference between the 
reformer and the revolutionary.177 
 
1.1.6 Western Influences: How Significant? 
 
Mu^ammad µAbduh, like preceding reformers, acknowledged the West’s advancement 
and Muslims’ backwardness, but with differences in views of that relationship – between al-
Afgh¥nÏ’s viewpoint calling for confrontation in view of the West’s role in causing and 
maintaining our backwardness for the sake of hegemony,178 al->ah~¥wÏ ’s viewpoint calling for 
catching up with the West’s advancement and arguing that following in its footsteps does not 
constitute an abandonment of identity, the Christian intellectuals’ viewpoint regarding modern 
nationalism as compatible with adopting the West as a model for advancement, and 
conservatives seeing any western influence as a threat. Mu^ammad µAbduh’s reformist school 
thus had an open, but complex, attitude in its approach to the West. 
µAbduh’s time saw an intensification of the penetration of western ideas and writings into 
Egypt, which had already begun from the early years of the century and expanded under the rule 
of Ismail. The movement of translation accelerated during al->ah~¥wÏ ’s time who was appointed 
director of the School of Languages in 1835 where he and his students translated European 
works including legal codes, military manuals, and books on science and history. Even RashÏd 
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Ri\¥ published several reviews of translated European works, often those related to the ideas of 
progress, in al-Man¥r. 
It was also a time of thriving free press, particularly by Christian Arab intellectuals who 
settled in Egypt. µAbduh was familiar with these papers, and started writing in the press early on, 
publishing articles in al-Ahr¥m, as early as 1876, when he was still a student at al-Azhar. One of 
the books µAbduh taught in his informal pre-graduation circles was François Guizot’s al-tu^fa al-
adabiyya fÏ t¥rÏkh tamaddun al-mam¥lik al-‰rubbiyya (History of Civilisation in Europe), which 
he and al-Afgh¥nÏ reviewed in al-Ahr¥m.179 
Abduh referred to western authors and writings in his articles and books, including 
Guizot, Spencer, Renan and Hanotaux. He, like other modern reformers used concepts and terms 
of Enlightenment Europe. He was influenced by the ideas of progress and scientific 
advancement. Although he stressed that the mission of the Qur’an was ethical reform, his TafsÏr 
fell into justifying scientific theories on the basis of Qur’anic verses. For instance, he defended 
natural selection and survival of the fittest based on Qur’an verses.180 He argued that God 
revealed religions as divine intervention to correct human behaviour, every time they deviated 
from the right path, and that revelation was according to the evolution of humanity.  
µAbduh was clearly fascinated with Europe and saw it as a source of inspiration: “I never 
once went to Europe that there was not renewed within me hope of the change of the present 
state of Muslims to do something better”.181 He was deeply conscious of European advancement, 
and in contrast the state of Egypt which had “gone down to the abyss – ^a\Ï\ - of decline - 
in^i~¥~”. His fascination did not lead him to believe in complete emulation of European ways or 
to blame Egyptian backwardness on culture and faith, as had been preached by European 
scholars and politicians. Instead, he applied his conviction that education was the key to all 
success and progress to his observations of Europe, concluding: “I do not find a reason for their 
advanced wealth and power other than advancement in knowledge and science, which led them 
to guidance, they realised their benefits and they acquired them”.182 µAbduh preached that the 
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positive characteristics that led to Europe’s progress were in fact universal and were best 
embodied by early Muslim practice.  
His attribution of European advancement to superior education and his own unshakable 
belief in education as the key to reform led him to read a number of European writings on 
theories of education, which often agreed with his own perspectives. One of the works 
µAbduh admired was Herbert Spencer’s On Education, which he had, as an exercise, read in 
French and translated into Arabic. 183  µAbduh’s educational reform plans were peppered with 
such Spencerian ideas as the “utility” of certain subjects, the importance of active as opposed to 
rote learning, and the need to educate mothers. µAbduh promoted Spencer’s interest in moral 
education, and Spencer’s argument that acquisition of science was a prerequisite for national 
strength.184 µAbduh’s works also echoed Leo Tolstoy’s emphasis on the importance of religious 
morality for individual happiness and correct functioning of society.185 
 
 
1.2 The Many Faces of µAbduh 
 
What is this sheikh who speaks French, travels to the lands of the Franks, translates their 
books, refers to their philosophers and discusses with their scholars; issues fatwas unheard of 
previously, participates in charity associations, raises funds for the poor and needy? If he is 
one of the men of religion, let him spend his life between the mosque and his home, and if he 
is a man of this world, then we see that he is doing by himself more than all the rest 
altogether!186 
 
µAbduh’s biographers focused on the many different aspects of his life and writings. 
Mu^ammad al-Bahiyy saw him as a political leader struggling against colonialism and foreign 
domination. Mu|~af¥ µAbd al-R¥ziq concluded he was a social reformer whose project included 
political reform as one aspect. µUthm¥n AmÏn saw µAbduh’s reform as “ethical reform with 
religion as a tool”,187 while Horten and Adams saw µAbduh’s reform as religious leading to 
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ethical. This is due to the fact that µAbduh was, in various phases of his life, involved, and often 
leading, a number of reform projects in diverse domains. 
 
1.2.1 Educator 
 
Teaching seemed to be µAbduh’s preferred occupation, and the one of which his 
opponents tried to deprive him. Even before graduation he began to hold circles for students, 
teaching philosophy, ethics, theology, al-Afgh¥nÏ’s teachings and translated books. After 
obtaining his Azhar diploma, al-µ®lamiyya, granting him the title of µ®lim and permission to 
teach, he was appointed as a history teacher in D¥r al-µUl‰m, a modern school with the aim of 
preparing Azhar students for work as judges or teachers in government schools. He introduced 
Ibn Khald‰n’s Muqaddima (published by al->ah~¥wÏ in 1857). He was also appointed as a 
teacher of Arabic sciences in the schools of linguistics and management.188 
In 1879, al-Afgh¥nÏ was exiled and µAbduh’s teaching career was interrupted as a result 
of his political views and association with al-Afgh¥nÏ. He was dismissed by Khedive Tawfiq and 
sent to his village. In 1880 he was reinstated by Prime Minister Riy¥\ Pasha and appointed sub-
editor of the official gazette al-Waq¥’iµ al-Mi|riyya, becoming its editor in October, with the role 
of supervising all publications. His articles mostly dealt with education, linguistic style and 
reform, and modern sciences. He frequently criticised the state of education in Egypt.189 In 
March 1881 the supreme council of the department of education (al-Majlis al-Aµl¥ li’l-Maµ¥rif al-
µUm‰miyya) was established and µAbduh was appointed a member. µAbduh joined the nationalist 
movement when Britain occupied Egypt and actively participated in the rebellion, leading to his 
imprisonment and exile to Lebanon. 
In 1884 he joined al-Afgh¥nÏ in Paris where they founded al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥ society 
and started publishing the weekly pan-Islamist anti-British paper. After 18 issues (March 13 to 
October 16 1884), it was terminated and µAbduh left for London.190 Eventually he settled in 
Beirut, where it was a time of reform under Mid^at Pasha. µAbduh started teaching at al-Madrasa 
al-Sul~¥niyya, teaching Arabic, Jurisprudence, theology, logic and Islamic history. He also had 
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tafsÏr circles three nights a week at al-B¥sh‰ra mosque, which were attended by Sunnis, Shias, 
Christians and Druze. These continued for two years, but they were not recorded. 
 In Beirut µAbduh also wrote a proposal for the reform of Ottoman education, and a 
proposal for reform in Syria, and began writing a proposal for the reform of education in Egypt. 
He also wrote letters to Shaykh al-Islam in Istanbul and the governor of Beirut with 
recommendations for educational reform. There he also wrote Ris¥lat al-Taw^Ïd, a summary of 
his lectures on theology. In 1888 µAbduh was permitted by the Khedive to return to Egypt.  
µAbduh believed in education as the key to all reform and success. In 1881, in an article 
on gradual reform through education, titled “the error of the wise”, he wrote that “whoever seeks 
the good of the country, let him strive for nothing other than perfection of education, then 
everything that he was seeking would be accomplished… without exhausting the mind or the 
body”.191 Scharbrodt points out that Abduh’s attention to education is a result of his association 
with the “Sufi model of education which stresses individual transformation and its beneficial 
effects on wider society rather than imposing values and changes from the top”.192 
Indeed after their exile from Egypt, µAbduh pressed his teacher al-Afgh¥nÏ to “go 
somewhere far away and establish a school to develop leaders and reformers”.193 However, due 
to his mentor’s influence, and the absence of other viable options, µAbduh continued his 
participation in revolutionary activities for another year. His later activities after his separation 
from al-Afgh¥nÏ show once again his unwavering belief in education as the key to change. He 
believed in postponing certain political and social reforms until people were ‘prepared’, through 
education, to comprehend and assume those changes. Thus, the expansion of education was 
amongst his main aims, and he helped to establish an Islamic charity with the aim of founding 
private schools, promoting education – including education for girls – and helping the needy, in 
1892, becoming its president in 1900. He was also one of the founders of the Egyptian 
university, later Cairo University. 
However, µAbduh promoted class-based education – the schools of his Islamic charity 
association targeted the poor children of manual workers, but only aimed at providing them with 
education that perfected their skills and enabled them to raise their salaries, except in the cases of 
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“exceptional students” who showed exceptional abilities to follow different professions than 
those of their fathers, and the association would help them in that regard. These schools also 
promoted skill-based jobs rather than governmental clerical work. 
µAbduh’s focus on education to the detriment of addressing other factors in Egypt’s 
development attracted criticism. µIm¥ra highlighted this weakness in µAbduh’s reform vision and 
efforts, pointing out how at a time when the country was living under occupation in 1896, 
suffering countless social and economic problems calling for a revolution to radically change 
society once it is liberated from occupation, µAbduh believed that the country lacked nothing 
other than education.194 Moreover, his efforts in educational reforms – Im¥ra believes – could 
have accomplished a higher degree of success had he taken a more revolutionary route, which 
would have attracted the revolutionary nationalist trend he opposed.195 
One of the fields of reform to which µAbduh devoted a significant part of his time and 
effort was the reform of education at al-Azhar. In 1895 he succeeded in convincing the khedive 
µAbbas HelmÏ to form an Azhar managing committee, which succeeded in introducing many 
reforms.196 However, reforms were opposed by many Azhar sheikhs. In particular Sheikh al-
Azhar S¥lim al-BishrÏ, appointed in 1899, was close to the khedive and opposed any reform, 
canceling scholarships and annual exams. In 1903 Sheikh µAlÏ al-Bibl¥wÏ was appointed and he 
supported µAbduh’s reforms. However, a group of opposition scholars led by Sheikh Mu^ammad 
al-Rif¥µÏ organised petitions criticising the Azhar administration committee. Around the same 
time, µAbduh issued the Transvaal fatw¥, which was used by his opponents to tarnish µAbduh and 
claim he wanted to merge Islam with Christianity.197 There were rumours of khedive plans to 
dismiss µAbduh which were stopped by Cromer.198 Eventually, when µAbduh found himself 
unable to execute his reform plans, he resigned from the administration committee. 
Perhaps despairing of rigid education at al-Azhar, µAbduh’s aim was to give this 
generation an Islamic education and a national consciousness, after he despaired of traditional 
structures. His focus was on western-educated youth who were dazzled by western modernity, 
“for whom belonging to their religion is an insult, and being seen to be committed to it an 
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embarrassment, so they know that belief in God and divine revelation to His prophets does not 
belittle the mind nor is it a deviation from true science, nor a fault in leadership, nor a weakness 
in politics”.199 
Despite the significant results achieved through µAbduh’s lectures, articles, and 
educational reforms he was able to introduce, the limited success of µAbduh’s educational reform 
plans, due to resistance by conservatives, the khedive and the British administration, must have 
led µAbduh to question his exclusive reliance on education as the sole key to change in Egypt. 
Although he was aware of the limited success of his educational reforms, µAbduh still believed, 
even after leaving al-Azhar that 
I have kindled a fire within the precincts of al-Azhar, which no hand can put off… if it 
does not blaze forth today or tomorrow it would do so in three decades; and then it would 
be more than a simple blaze.200 
 
1.2.2 Social Reformer  
 
µAbduh’s interest in social issues is apparent from his early articles as a student, and his 
project continued to be principally a social project, despite its diverse dimensions. 
Abduh’s idealistic view of family life was influenced by his rural roots which idealised 
family ties which are weakened in industrial and commercial settings. µIm¥ra criticised that 
idealisation and µAbduh’s wrong belief that “mutual hatred and seeking revenge” – rather than 
socio-economic factors – are behind family disputes, although µIm¥ra himself attributes such 
family problems to “values of the new society in relation to financial dealings and life matters”, 
although they were not necessarily a modern phenomenon.201 
Many of µAbduh’s articles criticised social ills and promoted civic values.202 He believed 
in slow gradual social change through raising awareness and changing mentalities. He believed 
any other way would fail and be counter-productive: 
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It is wrong, or rather ignorant, to require the nation to follow ways unfamiliar to it... It is 
wiser to preserve the nation’s customs entrenched in its members’ minds, then call for 
improvements that are not far from them. Once they are accustomed to them, something 
higher can be asked of them, gradually. Thus, not long would pass before they leave 
behind their backward habits and ideas for what is higher and more refined, without their 
realising.203 
 
As part of his focus on social reform, µAbduh demonstrated a special interest in family 
reform. He stressed that “the nation is composed of families and the reform of the nation depends 
on the reform of families”.204 Thus he devoted significant efforts to reform the family through his 
articles, his tafsÏr, his fat¥w¥, and his proposals for the reform of family law and SharÏµa courts 
(which dealt mostly with family law). 
It is mostly in the context of family reform that µAbduh wrote about women, focusing on 
their education in order to fulfill their role in the family. His fat¥w¥ on polygyny and divorce 
were critical for the course of legal reform in Egypt and continue to be as controversial today as 
they were when they were first issued. His tafsÏr also stressed women’s equal rights and duties as 
independent individuals, which is also emphasised in his fatw¥ on women’s financial 
independence, rejecting the European-based law requiring the husband’s permission for 
managing a wife’s bank account.205 
Although µAbduh promoted charity and the improvement of the lives of the poorest 
sections of society, he – like most reformers of his time – still believed in a class-based Egyptian 
society, with various roles expected of each class. He did, however, criticise the exploitation of 
workers and peasants. In 1900, at the time of the longest workers’ strike in Egypt’s history 
involving 30,000 tobacco factory workers, µAbduh’s view was solicited on the Islamic view of 
disputes between workers and employers and the legitimacy of strikes. µAbduh argued that the 
matter was not a simple dispute to be left to the two sides, but that Islam requires the government 
to intervene in the economy in the interest of the masses.206 
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1.2.3 Political activist and leader 
 
µAbduh had become involved in political work under the influence of al-Afgh¥nÏ. 
Together they were involved in founding the National Party, which had the aims of opposing 
foreign interference; “Egypt for Egyptians” – reducing the power of Turks and Circassians and 
transforming power from absolute individual rule to one based on sh‰r¥ and restricted by the 
constitution, law and deputies. The national party was “a political, not religious, party, composed 
of men from diverse faiths. Whoever ploughs the land of Egypt and speaks its language belongs 
to it”.207 
However µAbduh’s gradualist social-focused approach meant that he was against the 
revolutionary trend for many months in 1882, and continued to advise against it, arguing that 
“what one should start with is education and training in order to form men who would undertake 
the responsibility of representative government (...) it is not wise to grant the people what they 
have not been prepared for”.208 He was initially opposed to the µUr¥bÏ group and to military 
coups. Although he believed in constitutional reform, he held that people were not ready for 
complete political change, and feared “this turmoil could bring on foreign occupation whose 
cause would be eternally cursed”.209 
µAbduh believed in the central role of the middle classes in change, in “control of 
despotic governments, the restriction of their powers and imposing sh‰r¥ on them, establishing 
equality between the people”, once those classes have been expanded and education becomes 
widespread, which was not the case in Egypt.210 That stance and suspicion towards µUr¥bÏ 
continued until the µAbdÏn protest. Only then did he join the revolution, in order to unite ranks 
against foreign intervention, once Khedive TawfÏq sought help from the British. Once µAbduh 
joined the ranks of the revolution, he did so fully and unreservedly. It seems, as µIm¥ra noted, 
that the heat of the revolutionary moment melted his cold rationalism. He defended the 
revolution against criticisms similar to those he had previously used: “our country is undoubtedly 
no different from others where sh‰r¥ has been achieved, gaining its resources, and subsequent 
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benefits, in terms of its acceptance of public interest, readiness for good, ability to distinguish 
between what is appropriate and what is not, loving the former and disliking the latter, joy at 
reform and sadness at corruption”.211 
 µUr¥bÏ’s forces suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the superior British army, 
many wealthy members of the nationalist party abandoned it, and the Ottoman sultan declared 
µUr¥bÏ as a disobedient rebel. Following the failure of the revolution and the return of the 
Khedive to power, µAbduh was arrested and imprisoned for three months where he was 
maltreated. The failure of the revolution and dismantling of the national movement would leave 
a lasting and deep influence on µAbduh. His lawyer Broadley said that “spirit and body alike 
seemed crushed out beyond hope of recovery by the cruel reaction born of shipwrecked hopes 
and the agony of despair”.212  
All the above led µAbduh to tend towards a return to his former ‘reformist’ anti-
revolutionary roots. According to Ri\¥, he urged al-Afgh¥nÏ to focus on developing a group of 
enlightened leaders. However, under the influence of his restless teacher, and in the absence of 
alternatives in exile, he continued his political activism, most importantly through the famous 
Al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥. 
Al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥ had four themes: al-J¥mi’a al-Isl¥miyya (the Islamic union), al-
R¥bi~a al-Sharqiyya (the Eastern bond), al-Mas’ala al-Mi|riyya (the Egyptian question), al-
Mas’ala al-S‰d¥niyya (the Sudanese question). In µIm¥ra’s opinion, it was a continuation of the 
Egyptian nationalist party, with the aims of “reviving Islamic countries out of their weakness and 
ending Britain’s dominance in eastern lands”.213 Its methods included recruiting members and 
building links to European social and political movements striving for liberation.  
Others, such as µAid, argue that al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥, with its “religious references” 
(jih¥d, rights of Muslims, supporting Islam, hostility to the enemies of Islam – most importantly 
the British) is unrepresentative of µAbduh’s thought.214 This is yet another example of the way 
different scholars choose to focus on certain works written by/attributed to µAbduh and take them 
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as representing his “real thought” while rejecting/belittling/questioning others, instead of 
accepting all as integral to µAbduh’s complex life. 
µAbduh’s revision of his participation in the revolution and despair of direct political 
work and popular revolution against occupation did not happen suddenly following the µUr¥bÏ 
revolution, but seems to have evolved over a number of years. Nevertheless, his aversion to 
politics cannot be equated with support for occupation. In a meeting with Lord Hartington during 
µAbduh’s visit to London in 1883 as a representative of al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥, Lord Hartington 
argued that the majority of Egyptians were ignorant and hence could not really be opposed to 
foreign rule. µAbduh replied angrily that aversion to foreign rule was part of human nature. 
µAbduh even described the spread of education and science under Mu^ammad ¢AlÏ, and Egyptian 
villages which all have literate individuals.215 His negative view of the British could still be seen 
in some of his articles. For instance, in 1886 he wrote rejecting the claim that the Egyptians were 
responsible for the British occupation, writing that the cause was “British greed, as agreed by the 
world’s politicians”.216 
Following the banning of al-µUrwa al-Wuthq¥ in 1884, µAbduh travelled to London then 
to Paris, before settling in Beirut. µAbduh’s Beirut residence was devoted to education and 
writings.217 He finally returned to Cairo in 1889,218 following a khedival pardon by Khedive 
TawfÏq. µAbduh’s revolutionary political activism with al-Afgh¥nÏ and his secret societies 
seemed to be part of his past, once he returned to Cairo and turned 40. 
In Egypt, µAbduh opted for a different way of dealing with the British colonisers, 
submitting a proposal to Lord Cromer for reforming education in Egypt. This was a result of his 
past experience, as well as hostility from the Khedive who refused to allow µAbduh to teach out 
of fear of his influence. He was appointed as a judge, first in Banha province to keep him away 
from Cairo, but later was promoted and moved to Cairo. µAbduh’s preference for dealing with 
the British rather than the Palace opened up the door for nationalist criticism, with collusion from 
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the Palace, particularly after µAbduh stood against Khedive µAbb¥s’ attempts to usurp the waqf  
lands, when µAbduh resorted to seeking Cromer’s help in 1899. 
His position also brought upon him his mentor’s anger who intensified his reproaches in 
his letters after settling in Istanbul in 1892. Al-Afgh¥nÏ’s reproaches became increasingly 
unbearable for µAbduh.219 Perhaps this explains µAbduh’s initial silence upon al-Afgh¥nÏ’s death, 
not taking part in the eulogies on the day of his death on 9 March 1897. Nevertheless, he 
expressed his intense sadness at the loss of his mentor whose favours he considered to exceed 
those of his father’s.220 
µAbduh’s stance vis-à-vis the British, appeasing Cromer and the occupation, was based on 
his view that his direct battle was not to be fought with them, but rather with obstacles to the 
reform of al-Azhar, awq¥f, SharÏµa courts, and education, all of which he saw as his priorities and 
his vehicles for progress. The British welcomed and encouraged this stance as it provided them 
with much-needed calm and stability. µAbduh’s view of politics seems to have been an inherent 
conviction, not just a tactic, as he defended his position and called others towards it. That is what 
he did when he visited Tunisia and Algeria, advising the scholars there to “endeavour to acquire 
religious and secular sciences; seek to acquire wealth and develop society; have peaceful 
relations with the government and avoid preoccupation with politics.”221 He nevertheless added 
that if conciliatory efforts failed to resolve problems with the government “they would be 
excused for their anger towards it and plotting against it”.222 
He rejected calls for boycotting the British, arguing that seeking help and expertise from 
foreigners of different creeds and races and cooperating with them to that end are permissible by 
law and religion. This was based on his naive assumption that his interests – education and 
reform – could not be opposed by the British “for there could be no contradiction between the 
interest of the British and the interest of Egyptians in this aim”.223 According to µIm¥ra, this 
stance was also fed by his engagement in inter-faith dialogue which led him to believe that the 
British were more tolerant, in terms of religion, in comparison with other occupiers. In the end, 
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“colonialism benefited a lot from Mu^ammad µAbduh’s political stance, whereas he benefited 
very little from colonialists’ formal support for his projects”.224 
As for µAbduh’s view of the ruler and his nature and powers, he held that “the umma 
possesses the right to control the ruler, and can depose him whenever it sees an interest in that, 
for he is fully a civil ruler”.225 He also denied any parallels between the Caliphate and theocracy, 
arguing that the q¥\Ï, muftÏ or shaykh al-isl¥m “do not have the least authority over beliefs or 
legislation (…) and any power exercised by any of these is civil”.226  
One question that was debated at the time was the one posed in “al-J¥miµa al-
µUthm¥niyya” magazine: “which is better: granting Easterners freedom before they are worthy of 
it, or preparing them for it before they achieve it?” µAbduh supported the latter.227 His response, 
Al-Mustabidd al-µ®dil which he had written in May 1899 and which was published by Farah 
Antoun,228 had made that term associated with µAbduh.  The “Just despot”, as envisioned by 
µAbduh, had a temporary set mission: to unite the nation and prepare the ground for democratic 
institutions, by forming local councils, administrative councils, and finally parliament once 
people have become familiar with participation in public affairs. Arguments continue to surround 
the question of whether µAbduh intended his description of such a ruler as a model. µAbduh’s 
evaluation of Mu^ammad µAlÏ’s rule may suggest otherwise. Indeed he was among very few 
reformers to have a very critical view of Mu^ammad µAlÏ’s authoritarianism, at a time when the 
nationalist movement celebrated Mu^ammad µAlÏ’s policies. Although he recognised the material 
progress achieved under Mu^ammad µAlÏ, he lamented that it was progress at the ruler’s service 
rather than the nation. In 1902, he wrote that Mu^ammad µAlÏ was “a trader, agriculturer, brave 
soldier, astute despot, but he oppressed Egypt and killed its true life”.229 
Thus, µAbduh seems to be averse to authoritarianism, yet his bitter experience of the 
failure of the µUr¥bÏ revolution and the post-revolution incoherent and divided nationalist 
movement which often sided with the Khedive and conservatives – µAbduh’s main opponents – 
made him also averse to politics altogether. Moreover, his convictions and nature tended towards 
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gradualism and moderation, which made him suspicious of coups and revolutions, preferring to 
focus on education and slow reform, since “whoever hastens something before its due time, will 
be punished by being deprived of it”.230 
As noted by Kerr, “it would be fruitless to try to present Abduh's political ideas as a 
systematic structure”.231 He generally supported constitutional principles, but had no specific 
views on the mechanism or timeframe for their application. Although he saw the details of 
political organisation as something to be elaborated by society, Kerr noted that “occasionally he 
spoke of the SharÏµa as prescribing social laws both in general and in detail, and these laws he 
extended on occasion to constitutional questions in a manner reminiscent of medieval jurists”.232 
Although he rejected the claim that Islam prescribes “theocracy” insisting that the authority of 
the ruler is “civil in every respect”, he denied that there can really be any separation of religious 
and temporal powers. His aversion to politics and disinterest in elaborating any coherent political 
theories can be attributed to the complexity of this field where the harmony that µAbduh yearns 
for is impossible to achieve. In Kerr’s words: “in politics he seems to find the disunity and 
destructive competition that is opposed to his notion of the coincidence of revelation, moral 
temperament, and reason, and the natural cohesion and consistency of human activities and 
interests when rightly guided”.233  
 
1.2.5 Jurist and MuftÏ  
 
µAbduh’s Azhar training qualified him to teach religious sciences and to issue fat¥w¥ - or 
juristic opinions. µAbduh seemed more inclined towards the career of a teacher than a judge, but 
his opponents tried to restrict his influence by limiting him to the latter. Nevertheless, µAbduh 
succeeded in being just as influential and controversial in his judicial career. 
After his return to Egypt from exile, µAbduh was appointed as a judge in Banha and then 
in Cairo. In 1889 he was appointed as a judge in the national court, and in 1891 at the court of 
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appeal in Cairo. In early 1899 he was appointed member of the legislative council, and in June of 
that year he was appointed Grand MuftÏ of Egypt.234 
µAbduh often criticised the state of fiqh and fuqah¥. Although a jurist by training, he 
seems to agree with the traditional division between fuqah¥ and muta|awwifa: 
Sufis started going far away from ta|awwuf gradually, until this class became completely 
extinct except what we know, and with the weakening of this class, we lost religion, and 
fuqah¥’ who are far from ta|awwuf - which is religion itself – gained control…fuqah¥’, 
due to being far from ta|awwuf  were ignorant of the politics and state of their country, 
and due to their ignorance of politics, they did not know how to implement judicial 
rulings.235 
 
µAbduh criticised the state of muftÏs and judges in Egypt, but he also proposed practical 
steps for their reform. He also detailed reforms for SharÏµa courts and the administration of 
awq¥f.236 His detailed report on reform of SharÏµa courts included a number of proposals, 
including extending the jurisdiction of SharÏµa courts, and not restricting the position of judge to 
the Hanafi madhhab. 
The same year he was appointed a muftÏ, on 25 June he joined the legislative Sh‰r¥ 
council established in 1883, comprising 30 members as an advisory body. It seems by the end of 
the century, µAbduh had established himself as a leading figure, perhaps the most prominent in 
the Arab world after al-Afgh¥nÏ’s death, which forced the Palace to accept him begrudgingly. 
  As a member of Majlis Sh‰r¥ al-Qaw¥nÏn, according to his colleague ¤asan Pasha µAbd 
al-R¥ziq, µAbduh succeeded in removing the state of disagreement and hostility between the 
Majlis and the government which had led to the freezing of a number of projects of reform.237 
Ri\¥ stressed µAbduh’s unusual approach to work as a Grand MuftÏ. Whereas in the past all 
major files would be passed to the Grand MuftÏ simply for formal approval, “in contrast, al-
ust¥dh al-Im¥m238 would ask for the whole case file and study it then issue a fatw¥ based on what 
he believes to be the truth, while pointing to the evidence”.239 
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µAbduh supported the modern movement towards official codification of Fiqh: “how 
could this scattered mess reasonably serve as a law by which the people should abide?... It is 
necessary to reform this obvious flaw in our legal system, which has deprived people of their 
rights and jeopardized security”.240 He argued that judges were not all equipped to derive the 
correct verdicts from the texts, and even those who were could fall into invalid conjectures. To 
avoid corruption and injustice “it is necessary that the articles of the law be written explicitly, 
indicate rulings in a straightforward manner, apply to all possible cases, be set forth in logical 
categories, and use simple linguistic constructions”.241  
Although a proponent of judicial reform, even in his role as a muftÏ and jurist, µAbduh 
was faithful to his gradualist approach, believing that laws could not be imposed unless people 
were convinced of their suitability. He strongly argued, in various contexts but most clearly in 
his article on “Change of laws in accordance with the conditions of nations”242 that in order for 
people to abide by laws, they must be suitable for their conditions and needs: 
 
It is not permissible to apply the law of one group of people to another group who differ 
from and surpass the first in level of understanding, because the law will not suit their 
state of thinking and will not match their customs and traditional habits… need is the 
guiding master, and the first teacher. When people properly recognise need, they strive to 
fulfill it. They are restricted by it, and do not go against its dictates and prescriptions. If 
the institution of laws within a nation is motivated by its need for them, it will not 
contravene them simply because of circumstances.243 
 
The above quotes partly explain the fact that, despite his criticism of taqlÏd, as a judge 
and muftÏ, µAbduh on the whole followed the same orthodox methods and restricted himself to 
the opinions of the ¤anafÏ madhhab – sometimes even contradicting his own views on the same 
issue as expressed elsewhere in his tafsÏr or articles. 
However, in a number of fat¥w¥, he deviated from the expected opinions and expressed 
novel perspectives – often meeting with great opposition and condemnation. It is important to 
remember that the opposition was not simply to his views, but brought together a ‘coalition’ of 
figures and trends with political, professional, juristic and even personal disagreements with him. 
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µAbduh’s rivals awaited any fatw¥ or declaration to ignite campaigns against him.244 It is these – 
few – controversial fat¥w¥ (out of 944 recorded fat¥w¥) that have become well-known and the 
focus of most studies of µAbduh as a jurist. Among the most well-known such fat¥w¥ are the 
Transv¥l fatw¥ permitting Muslims living as a minority to eat food prepared by non-Muslims and 
to adopt their dress,245 and his fatw¥ allowing Muslims to deposit money in banks and draw 
interest on it, with certain conditions.246 
Critics often decried what they saw as µAbduh’s innovations, insisting that his position 
requires him to restrict himself to the orthodox views of the Hanafi madhhab, since he was not a 
mujtahid. Ri\¥ responded to µAbduh’s critics, on the basis of two arguments: that  
All scholars have said that taqlÏd of certain im¥ms in certain issues and taqlÏd of other 
scholars in other matters is permissible, and there is no famous scholar who does not have 
fat¥w¥ that contradict the madhhab to which he belongs. Secondly: that he is a mujtahid – 
indeed how could the one who engages in the tafsÏr of the Qur’an in the manner he does and 
presents proof on the basis of the Qur’an for the rejection of taqlÏd and how the one guilty of 
taqlÏd deserves God’s anger and punishment, himself be a muqallid?247 
 
Ri\¥ then added that the above “does not contradict the fact that he issues fat¥w¥ for the 
government and judges following the Hanafi madhhab, for they ask him for that in particular 
rather than his own ijtih¥d, whereas when he is asked about his own opinion he gives fatw¥ 
according to it”.248 
 
1.2.6 Religious reformer 
 
µAbduh wrote that his primary mission was to “liberate the mind from the chains of 
taqlÏd, and to understand religion in the way of the early generations of the umma, before the 
emergence of disputes, and to go back to the study of its early sources”.249 For µAbduh, taqlÏd 
was worse than a crime, for the muqallid is “trivial with no importance, as if he did not exist, for 
Islam came to liberate minds from their slavery and free them from their chains, and take them 
                                                
244 Sedgewick, p. 129. 
245 Aµm¥l,, vol. 2, p. 500. 
246 ibid., vol. 1, p. 783-6. 
247 T¥rÏkh, p. 689. 
248 ibid. 
249 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 312. 
72 
 
out of the humiliation of imprisonment and slavery, such that we find that the Qur’an condemns 
the muqallidÏn – imitators – describing them in worse terms than criminals.250 
 This war on taqlÏd and return to of the salaf clearly has much in common with the 
salafism of the wahh¥bÏ trend. However, µAbduh criticised wahh¥bÏ Salafism, because even 
though it also waged a war on taqlÏd, its limiting of the value and role of reason led it to fall back 
into the danger of taqlÏd. In contrast µAbduh’s rationalism is evident. He talks about religion as 
“one of the scales of human reason”,251 and considers reason to be the way towards knowing and 
believing in the divine, for “reason is the source of conviction in belief in God, His knowledge 
and power and belief in the message… whereas revelation is the source of what follows that: the 
unseen such as the hereafter and details of worship”.252 For µAbduh, Islam is a religion in which 
“reason and religion were brought together for the first time in a holy book, conveyed by a 
messenger”.253 He repeatedly argued that Islam recognised Man’s “free will and independence of 
opinion and thought, thus perfecting for him his humanity”.254 
Thus µAbduh was critical of “the group of Muslims that claimed to have removed the dust 
of taqlÏd and removed the veils separating them from reflecting on the verses of the Qur’an and 
the content of the Hadith in order to understand God’s rulings within them” but “had narrower 
horizons and worse arrogance than the muqallidÏn”. Although “they condemned innovations and 
removed some of what had been added to religion”, their literalism meant they were “no 
supporters of science nor lovers of civilisation.”255 µAbduh’s Salafism was to return to the 
sources to seek inspiration from what is pure and fundamental in order to use it as the starting 
point and the catalyst for building a new society – hence it is not a return to duplicate that early 
society, nor is it a building on new alien foundations. Thus, µAbduh’s efforts were divided 
between two groups, the orthodox imitators, hostile to rational enquiry and novel interpretations, 
and the modern-educated elite that is dazzled by superficial aspects of western culture. His aim 
was to convince the former that modernity was not incompatible with their Islam, while 
convincing the latter that Islam was not incompatible with their modernity.   
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In µAbduh’s view, reason and revelation are different paths to the truth and fulfill 
different functions, but cannot contradict each other. Conclusions of both reason and revelation 
may be either decisive (qa~µÏ) or suppositional (·∙annÏ), with the decisive always taking 
precedence. But most of the indications from both sources are of the suppositional kind and 
therefore are open to interpretation. Logical inconsistencies should not be accepted at face value. 
Still, when further rational investigation fails to reconcile the contradiction, the matter should be 
“committed to God in His omniscience”, that is, a rational explanation exists although it has not 
yet been discovered.  
One such example is µAbduh’s view of free will. After a rational reconciliation of free-
will and divine pre-destination, µAbduh dismissed any lingering ambiguities, warning against the 
quest  “to seek to penetrate the secrets of Destiny… it is forbidden to us to plunge into this abyss 
and occupy ourselves with what reason is virtually incapable of attaining”.256 Being primarily 
interested in an intellectual reform aimed at practical reform, µAbduh considered such quests as 
unnecessary, as discussions of the free will issue have always proved fruitless, and occupying 
oneself with such unattainable secrets only leads to “destruction of SharÏµa, obliteration of 
obligations, and invalidation of that unpremeditated rational judgment which is fundamental to 
religious faith”.257 This pragmatism is, according to Kerr, an expression of µAbduh’s “distaste for 
pure speculation and his reluctance to probe the roots of fundamental theological problems when 
their direct relevance to the needs of the individual believer is not established”.258 
As discussed as part of his view of social reform, µAbduh stressed the flexibility and 
adaptability of laws and applications of revealed principles according to time and place. This 
emphasis on variation and adaptation in society led Kerr to conclude that in µAbduh’s view, 
prophets have “a purely spiritual function”, not “to explain the practical details of material 
welfare but leave this to man’s ingenuity, within the broad and tolerant limits of sound religious 
faith”.259 Experts, such as Kerr, who stress µAbduh’s “secular” view of social and political norms, 
note that µAbduh’s break with tradition was “incomplete and equivocal” since he also wrote that 
“the Quran established for men laws conforming to their interests; the utility of observing them 
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and applying them has been proved. Justice is established by them and the whole social order has 
been organised by them as long as their limits are respected”. 260  Kerr explains this 
“contradiction” by the fact that “µAbduh hedged his espousal of secular notions and avoided a 
clear-cut rejection of orthodox conceptions”.261 
µAbduh stressed the absence of religious authority in Islam, to the extent of arguing that it 
is “a fundamental in Islam to topple religious authority and uproot it altogether”.262 He sought to 
reinstate revelation as the source of teachings and inspiration. This was evident in the attention 
and effort he devoted to the re-interpretation of the Qur’an and a new way of access to the 
Qur’an as a source of guidance for all people. µAbduh stressed that the purpose of tafsÏr is “to try 
to understand the meaning and wisdom of divine revelation, in terms of beliefs and rulings, in 
such a way that attracts hearts and incites them to action and towards the guidance contained in 
the words, such that they achieve what God described as “guidance and mercy” and other similar 
descriptions”.263 He criticised the misunderstanding of tafsÏr as a complex study of lengthy 
linguistic, juristic and theological discussions, lamenting how “the student of tafsÏr would read 
the old books of TafsÏr and find everything therein except tafsÏr – linguistic sciences, sects and 
schools, jurisprudence.”264  
As regards the Hadith, µAbduh did not deviate from the orthodox approach, although he 
implicitly criticised the Muslims’ “obsession with narration”.265 In Ris¥lat al-Taw^Ïd, µAbduh 
seems to only accept the authenticity of mutaw¥tir hadith (reported through multiple authentic 
chains of narration), and considered ¥^¥d a^¥dÏth (narrated by a single chain of narration) to lack 
the authenticity to make them binding on all. µAbduh states that what a Muslim is required to 
believe is “the Holy Qur’an, and what has been authentically continuously reported fulfilling all 
conditions – that is, ‘what has been reported by a group such that it is impossible that they could 
have colluded in lying’”.266 µAbduh explicitly details that “what must be believed must be 
restricted to what is explicit in the report, and is not to include both what is suppositional and 
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what is qatµÏ”.267 µAbduh seems to reject ¥^¥d a^¥dÏth, which constitute the majority of a^¥dÏth, 
as a basis for beliefs: “as for ¥^¥d reports, it is obligatory to believe in their content for the one 
who has received the report [directly] and who believes in the authenticity of its narration. As for 
the one who has not received the report, or the one who has, but has a doubt regarding its 
authenticity, and it is not a mutaw¥tir, the fact that he does not accept it does not undermine his 
faith.”268 Although µAbduh seems to have avoided any separate in-depth explanation of his view 
of hadith, he emphasises in a number of statements the difference between the Qur’an and Hadith 
in their reliability and authenticity. For instance, when discussing the Qur’an as a basis for faith 
in prophecy, he describes the Qur’an as a miracle “whose content is mutaw¥tir and whose 
presence has been continuous – that alone is evidence, whereas everything beyond it in akhb¥r 
(reports), whether their chain of narration is considered authentic, known, or weak, does not 
imply certitude (qatµ) for Muslims. When such are used as proofs, they are used to support what 
is already certain”.269 This is supported by later authors: Mu^ammad ¤usayn al-DhahabÏ reports 
that µAbduh was reluctant to use ¥^¥d a^¥dÏth in tafsÏr. Ri\¥ also reported that µAbduh rejected 
isr¥’Ïliyy¥t [Judeo-Christian reports] and fitan [reports about matters such as the Anti-Christ) 
a^¥dÏth, even when reported in ßa^i^ collections. It is not clear, however, whether µAbduh is 
specifically discussing the reliability of ¥^¥d a^¥dÏth for µaq¥’id – matters of faith 270- which 
would not be unique to him – or whether it also extends to the use of such a^¥dÏth in fiqh rulings, 
which could be problematic. In any case, we cannot find any systematic approach to the criticism 
of Hadith in µAbduh’s writings.  
According to his own short autobiographical text, µAbduh considered his second aim, 
after liberating the mind from the chains of taqlÏd, to be reforming the Arabic language style. 
Many of the texts he taught or edited and published dealt with Arabic literary style. His early 
move from the use of sajµ - widely used at the time – in his articles to prose was a sign of “the 
critical move caused by µAbduh in moving the Arab mind from the prison of medieval taqlÏd to 
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the vastness of the modern age”.271 In 1900, he participated in founding the society for the 
revival of Arabic sciences and became its president.  
µAbduh’s religious reform had the aim of inducing moral reform leading to 
comprehensive reform in society. Perhaps it is this practical aim that led some scholars to deny 
µAbduh the title of religious reformer or intellectual. In Horten’s view, µAbduh’s methods were 
not scientific and his results deficient, “not once does he undertake the search for a solid critique 
of knowledge”;272 “Pure science one cannot find in him, philosophy is for him almost a defection 
from the faith. To seek in him questions of world view of scientific content is therefore almost a 
fruitless undertaking”.273 Horten’s negative evaluation of µAbduh’s efforts is tempered by his 
condescending excusing comment that “it would be a great injustice to expect of an Oriental 
completed results in fields in which the West itself is still far from such results. Mu^ammad 
µAbduh had to reckon with his environment and was dependent on it. Its surpassing 
backwardness allows the work of our reformer to appear in all the clearer light, and makes us 
forgive him many failings”.274 
Malcolm Kerr’s evaluation shares the same dissatisfaction with µAbduh’s intellectual 
contribution, noting that “his ideas provided a better basis for apologetics and polemics than for 
social reform and cultural rebirth”.275 This was due to the fact that “µAbduh was prudent and 
pragmatic, avoiding sharp breaks with traditional dogmatic formulas and elaborating what was 
novel in his thought only to the extent demanded by clear and present needs.”276 Kerr, however, 
recognised that “µAbduh was a conservative by language and manner and a radical by the 
implication of many of his teachings. For a reformer, to be doctrinaire or systematic is not 
always a virtue, and one can admire the humane, tolerant, practical, conciliatory spirit that 
prevented Abduh from so being.”277 Indeed this approach, although µAbduh was not short of 
enemies, “made his message more palatable to the orthodox and established a common ground of 
discourse between them and the products of modern secular education.”278 
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Kerr suggests that Muslim reformists had two options “the first is to assign separate 
spheres of competence to reason and revelation, along lines roughly similar to the Thomist 
tradition in Catholicism” and the second is “to recognise the parallel competence of both reason 
and revelation within the same sphere, denying that there is either a separation or a conflict 
between them”.279 The perceived ambiguities and unresolved contradictions, in this view, are due 
to the fact that “it was this approach, in which reason and revelation form an integrated 
combination, and which is more congenial to the Islamic religious outlook, that Mu^ammad 
µAbduh and many other modernists adopted”.280 
This ‘wrong choice’, that Kerr criticises in the reform project of µAbduh – and subsequent 
related projects – led to the “duality of themes… on the one hand, that Islam, unlike other 
religions, carries its own revealed message in public matters and that this message must be taken 
seriously; on the other hand, that Islam endorses, in effect, the modern liberal values familiar in 
the West and does not deprive men of independence and latitude of judgment and action… 
engaged in establishing the comprehensive relevance of the Quran and Sunna, yet forever 
seeking permission from the Quran and Sunna (and, happily, obtaining it) not to be bound too 
restrictively by the Quran and Sunna”.281 In other words, this “incomplete” and “hedged” 
intellectual reform, according to such critics, merely served “to provide Islam with a fashionable 
image”.282 
Indeed µAbduh repeatedly made his aim clear:  
to use the Muslim’s confidence in his religion to reform his affairs. It can be said that the 
aim they all have is to correct beliefs and remove the errors which had affected their 
understanding of religious texts; once beliefs are free from innovations, actions will as a 
result be freed from error and inconsistency, conditions are redressed, understanding is 
enlightened with true sciences – religious and worldly-, their morals are refined with 
sound capabilities, and reform would flow from them to the umma.283  
 
Scholars such as Horten and Kerr held that µAbduh had no coherent project for 
intellectual reform, and that all µAbduh’s writings were driven by the social and political ends he 
had in mind. Indeed µAbduh believed in the futility of abstract theories disconnected from reality. 
                                                
279 ibid., p. 107. 
280 ibid. 
281 ibid., p. 211. 
282 ibid., p. 213. 
283 T¥rÏkh, vol. 2, p. 459. 
78 
 
He believed that “the traditional discussions in which Azhar scholars spend their lives are not 
equal to one hour’s effort if they do not benefit people in their actions and the running of their 
lives”.284 He was explicit about the use of religious zeal, understanding and interpretation as a 
tool towards reform: “the religious factor is among the strongest factors in the morals of the elite 
and the masses, and its authority over them is higher than that of reason”.285 Indeed he was 
convinced that any other basis for reform would be futile, since  
The souls of Egyptians have been filled with submission to religion such that it has 
become part of their nature; whoever seeks to reform them through other than religion 
would have sowed a seed that is unsuitable for the soil in which he planted it, it will give 
no fruit and his effort would have been in vain.286 
 
 
1.3 µAbduh’s Legacy 
 
The conditions of µAbduh’s era as well as his personality enabled a diverse following, 
brought together by the common hope and desire to lead their nation to revival and progress. The 
change in circumstances, perhaps more so than their mentor’s death, led to their divergence and 
the creation of distinct trends – often at odds with one another, and often claiming to be the 
legitimate heirs of the revival and reform project while denying the other those labels. 
As a result of the diversity of µAbduh’s works (in terms of medium, style and context), 
the change and evolution during his tumultuous life, the lack of complete books written directly 
by him, and sometimes the ambiguity of his words and as well as real or apparent contradictions 
therein, µAbduh’s words have been interpreted differently or selectively by different trends. 
When µAbduh passed away in Alexandria on July 11 1905, aged 56, he left behind 
thriving and diverse schools of thought inspired by his personality, his ideas and his life, but also 
a persistent ambiguity regarding his actual words. Nevertheless, the influence of Abduh’s ideas 
spread far beyond Egypt’s borders – to the rest of North Africa, Turkey, South-Asia, Malaysia 
and Indonesia and beyond.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ‘WOMAN QUESTION’ IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY EGYPT 
 
 
¢Abduh did not write in a vacuum, nor did he initiate the discussion of the woman 
question in Egypt. He contributed to the already existing discussion, responded to some of the 
already-posed questions, but in his own way and as part of his own reform project. He is to be 
read within the context of a growing debate both in Egypt, and in Istanbul and other capitals of 
the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 
2.1 The Nineteeth century: A Time of Change 
 
The nineteenth century has been called “the Ottoman Empire’s longest century”, which 
saw the increasing encroachment of western powers on its affairs and territories, the introduction 
of radical administrative reforms in a desperate rush to redress the balance of powers, and the 
precipitation of social, economic, cultural and political changes as a result. The Tanzimat period 
(re-organisation) in Turkey (1839-1876) formally began with the Rose Garden decree (Khatt 
Sherif of Gulhane) of 1839 – which spoke of the need to eliminate inequality and create justice 
for all subjects. In 1856, another imperial decree (Khatt Humayun) reiterated the state’s duty to 
provide equality and stressed guarantees of equality for all subjects, including access to state 
schools and state employment. In the Ottoman Empire, just as in Europe and the US, women 
were only slowly included in such “modern” notions of equality, and the above decrees did not 
discuss women.  
New developments included the emergence of the press, the translation of European 
works, and modern educational institutes (medicine, administration, military training, 
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languages). Women’s education expanded, and as early as the 1840s women began receiving 
education in state schools. By the end of the century, one in three school-age girls were attending 
state primary schools.287 Not all the new reforms had an “equalising” effect.288  
Egypt not only experienced the effects of these changes as one of the capitals of the 
Ottoman Empire, but it also had its own major project of centralisation and modernisation under 
Mu^ammad ¢AlÏ. Egypt’s viceroy who ‘liberated’ it from the French occupation and gained some 
autonomy from the Ottoman Empire, consolidated his rule by eradicating the old Mamluke 
ruling elite and bringing all under a powerful centralised bureaucracy, including agricultural 
production, trade, education, and the religious establishment with their Awq¥f. Egypt’s peasants, 
constituting the overwhelming majority of its population, who had previously experienced no 
great changes under the French occupation, became the object of the state’s interference and 
regulation. In addition to radical changes in the modes of production and trade, the drafting of 
men and women into corvee labour (in industrial factories and public works) and the army also 
disrupted the lives of peasants, and weakened family structures and resources. The transition 
from a subsistence economy to statist industrialisation facilitated Egypt’s incorporation into the 
European capitalist economy, and inaugurated an age of thriving European presence and 
influence in Egypt. Modern colleges were opened to train staff to fill government posts. Foreign 
instructors were imported. Mu^ammad ¢AlÏ and his successors hired European teachers for their 
children, but children of the lower ranks of the elite started to be educated in modern schools. 
About fifty primary schools were set up. A Woman’s Medical College was established as early 
as 1832. A printing press was established in 1822, and an official newspaper was founded in 
1828. 
All the above socio-economic changes had important consequences for the various 
classes of Egyptian women: “elite women (wives and daughters of princes, prominent scholars, 
military commanders and landowners); middle-class women (wives and daughters of traders, 
artisans and jurists); ‘common’ or working women (home commodity sellers, midwives, 
beauticians, wailers, itinerant sellers and peasants); and the class of slaves and servants”.289 
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These various classes were affected by the socio-economic changes in very different ways. Yet, 
those differences tended to be often ignored by most discourses on women which tended to be 
homogenising, talking about one “Egyptian woman” – that of the urban upper and middle 
classes. Judith Gran has shown that generally upper-class Egyptian women found their horizons 
expanded, while women of the lower middle class experienced just the opposite.290 
Mu^ammad µAlÏ’s successors continued along the same lines: further integration into the 
European market, sponsoring student missions to Europe, attracting European professionals and 
businessmen, and expanding the public education and health systems. The first state secondary 
school for girls was established in 1873. Foreign presence in Egypt continued to increase 
(religious missions, schools, diplomats and thousands of businessmen). The foreign population 
of Egypt jumped from 3,000 in 1850 to 70,000 in 1878 and 120,000 by 1897291 (excluding 
Syrians, who were Ottoman subjects). In addition to the numerical importance of this foreign 
presence, Europeans enjoyed absolute freedom under the Capitulations system and the assistance 
of diplomatic intervention, acquiring a stranglehold over the country’s economy. 
At the end of this brief overview of the nineteenth century, it is important that, although 
the narrative begins here, it is not to imply that no changes had taken place in the preceding 
centuries, or that the changes that took place were all positive. While those assumptions had been 
the basis of much of what was written on ‘modernisation’ in the Muslim world, new historical 
research has questioned their accuracy. Works by scholars such as Sonbol, Spellberg, Peirce, 
Ahmed, Zilfi, Keddie, Baron and others have explored the lives of Middle Eastern, particularly 
Ottoman, women, before 1800, through studying court records, fat¥w¥, proverbs and other 
records to gain an insight into women’s lives and the gender system before the modern era. Such 
research has dispelled misconceptions of the pre-modern era as one of constant stagnation, and 
of modern changes as unilinear or progressive.  
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 The Contexts of the Discussion of Women 
 
Although women were not openly central to official discourses, their mention is prevalent 
in various contexts – the description of the social customs of Egyptians or Europeans, analyses of 
the reasons for the Muslim world’s decline, and discourses of occupation and nationalism. 
 
 
2.2 Travel literature: Curiosity about gender differences between East and West  
 
2.2.1 Al->ah~¥wÏ (1801-1873) in Paris 
 
The themes dominating ¢Abduh’s writings – reform, reasons for the West’s progress, 
accommodation of modern concepts in Islamic thought – were also among the major 
preoccupation of an earlier Azhari scholar Rif¥¢a R¥fi¢ al->ah~¥wÏ, who, within those contexts, 
touched on the topics of women’s education, chastity, marriage, work, etc. Al->ah~¥wÏ’s early 
attempt to provide a comprehensive Arab-Islamic model of modernity clearly had an influence 
on ¢Abduh, including the channels he used for the propagation of his ideas, such as his positions 
in the official press and in educational institutions.    
Sent as an imam to accompany a group of students on a mission to Paris (1826-1831), 
Rif¥¢a al->ah~¥wÏ rose to prominence as one of modern Egypt’s most influential intellectuals. In 
addition to his Paris memoirs al-DÏw¥n al-NafÏs fi ¬w¥n B¥rÏz, or TakhlÏs al-IbrÏz fi TalkhÏs 
B¥rÏz, and other books, he became a pioneer in the movements of translating western texts into 
Arabic,292 reform of the Arabic language, and development of the education system. 
Mu^ammad ¢AlÏ sponsored two institutions for the production of knowledge about 
Europe: D¥r al-Alsun (School of Languages) and student missions abroad. The translation and 
publication of texts on geography and history of European nations “exposed Egyptians to a very 
specific, positivist teleology of historical and national development… where the habits and 
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customs of rulers and ruled alike were assumed to have produced a particular kind of 
‘modernity’”.293 The accounts of Egyptians sent abroad produced an image of modern European 
society and institutions according to which Egypt can model itself. In these accounts, “intimate 
details of domestic activities stood out as prominent features and were used as units of 
measurement” 294  of modernity. Al->ah~¥wÏ was the most prominent figure in both state-
sponsored movements: translation and travel accounts producing an image of modern Europe. 
Although these institutions began from the 1820s, the images they produced had their most 
forceful effects on the generation of the last third of the nineteenth century.295 
Al->ah~¥wÏ’s description of Parisian society constitutes “the first positive and 
comprehensive account of a European society in the Arabic language”.296 It contains numerous 
comments on French women and French homes, and comparisons with their Egyptian 
counterparts. Al->ah~¥wÏ’s confirmation or rejection of certain assumptions regarding French 
women indicates that interest in the different attitudes towards women predated his trip to 
France. The difference between French and Egyptian women which was among those differences 
highlighted by commentators on the French occupation on both sides, persisted as a matter of 
interest and concern among Egyptians, as seen from al->ah~¥wÏ’s comment: “And since one is 
often asked by many people regarding the condition of women of the Franks, we have revealed 
their condition”.297 Al->ah~¥wÏ describes, in great detail, and often with open admiration and 
childish awe, French women’s dress,298 the cleanliness of their homes,299 their beauty,300 female 
writers,301 women travelling alone,302 and the various forms of Parisian entertainment, including 
theatres, parks and ballrooms, favourably comparing the ‘civilised’ French dance with the 
‘vulgar’ Egyptian women’s dance.303 
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In al->ah~¥wÏ’s writings we also find the same link made between a nation’s ‘civility’ or 
‘barbarism’ and between its respect for women, which later becomes one of the central themes of 
both colonial and nationalist discourses: “The greater the respect for women is amongst a people 
the greater their civility and good manners, for withholding women’s rights, in that in which they 
should have freedom, is a sign of barbarian nature”.304  
Al->ah~¥wÏ proves to be open to different conceptions of chastity and ready to ‘correct’ 
prejudices, for instance, about French men’s “lack of jealousy over their women”.305 However, 
this does not necessarily lead him to approve or seek to adopt French gender relations, nor is he 
able to see the latter outside the power relations of ‘leadership’: “The main issue is that they are 
wrong in giving leadership to women”;306 “their men are slaves of women and under their 
command, whether or not they are beautiful”.307 Indeed, maintaining the current gender power 
relations, whilst “improving women’s conditions”, would continue to be an implicit or explicit 
concern of all writers on the “woman question”, including the “liberation discourse”. 
 Generally, throughout his TakhlÏs, although al->ah~¥wÏ does not disguise his admiration 
for many aspects of French women’s lives, his work – when compared with later works that took 
up the same theme of comparing Muslim/Egyptian and European attitudes to women – is more 
descriptive of western customs in relation to women, neutrally and without judgment. This may 
well be because, at the time, there was no strong suggestion that they constituted a plausible 
alternative, and so did not undermine traditional customs which were still well established and 
unthreatened. His works are also more optimistic than later writings, as there was a feeling of 
greater confidence in Egypt’s ability to advance. Later writings were more conscious of Egypt’s 
‘backwardness’ and the threat of colonisation. For instance, different attitudes to women’s 
seclusion and veiling, which would later become central to the heated debates of the “woman 
question” are merely mentioned as different customs: “And the custom of this country is to 
reveal the face, head, neck and what is below it, and the back [of the head] and what is below it, 
and the arms up to the shoulders.”308 Elsewhere al->ah~¥wÏ seems to approve of unveiling more 
                                                
304 In al->aht¥wÏ’s introduction to his translation of Depping’s A Historical View of the Manners and Customs of 
Nations. Cited in Ronak Husni and Daniel L. Newman, Muslim Women in Law and Society, Routledge, 2007, p. 2.  
305 TakhlÏ|, p. 276-278. 
306 ibid., p. 276. 
307 ibid., p. 95. 
308 ibid., p. 67-68. 
85 
 
explicitly, explaining that “there has been some confusion regarding women’s chastity which 
does not result from their covering or uncovering, but the source of that is good or bad 
upbringing”.309 However, it is not clear whether he is limiting the validity of this rule to the 
French context or whether he believes it to be also applicable to the Egyptian context.  
While the condition of Egyptian women only implicitly appeared in al->ah~¥wÏ’s TakhlÏ|, 
his subsequent involvement in the building and development of the state education system led 
him to more explicit discussions of Egyptian women, their potential, the need to educate them, 
and the content of their education. Again, in al->ah~¥wÏ’s characteristic generalisation which at 
times leads to contradictions, he praises women’s virtues and equal mental abilities, whilst 
simultaneously emphasising the “different form in their natures”. While he stresses that physical 
differences are small and relate to “masculinity and femininity and things related to them”, he 
reminds that “their natures, in terms of strength and power, are below those of men.”310 This 
ambiguity in stance vis-à-vis the concept of “equality” when applied to the context of gender will 
persist through the writings of later reformers, and through writings on “women in Islam” to this 
day, where, generally “equality” is emphasised and accepted in matters such as education, while 
self-contradiction surfaces when dealing with contexts of authority and power, where difference 
and superiority are emphasised. 
The function of women as mothers, to become the most common context in which 
women are discussed, and one of the main themes of the turn-of-the-century nationalist 
discourses, makes its appearance in the context of women’s essential nature and the need to 
educate them: “Among what is also found in women is the strength of rational faculties, and the 
heightened sense of correct understanding … Thus primary upbringing of children is specific to 
them.”311 The education of girls was a cause promoted during the nineteenth century. By al-
>ah~¥wÏ’s time, debates centred mostly not on the legitimacy of educating girls, but rather on the 
content of that education. In his Al-Murshid Al-AmÏn, written upon Khedive Ismail’s request to 
be taught in the first secondary-level state girls’ school, al->ah~¥wÏ suggested teaching girls 
“what is suitable for them such as reading, matters of religion, and all that is suitable for women 
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including sewing and embroidery” but added that in the future it may be necessary to also teach 
them “writing and some principles of useful knowledge concerning home management… 
calculation/mathematics and the like” In addition, “boys and girls are both to be taught morals, 
good manners and good behaviour.312  
Girls’ education was justified by the benefits it would bring to their future husbands “for 
that would increase them in good manners and intelligence, make them worthy of knowledge, 
and fit to participate in speaking and giving opinion with men… to remove the silliness and 
foolishness that result from the ignorant women’s mixing with her likes”, but also “to enable the 
woman, when the need arises, to undertake the work done by men to the extent of her ability and 
strength… for work protects women from what is improper, and brings her closer to virtue”.313  
Al->ah~¥wÏ’s writings thus represent an intermediate phase between pre-modern/early 
modern approaches, such as that of al-JabartÏ, and those following the occupation of Egypt by 
the British, both of which are characterised by the implicit and explicit opposition to western 
influence. In contrast, al->ah~¥wÏ’s historical context allowed him to view the western 
experience in a less threatening way, and to propose educational reforms that were not yet 
complicated by British interference and obstacles.  
 
2.2.2 Edward Lane and Stanley Lane-Poole in Egypt 
 
The publication of the Description de l’Egypte by the French scholars who had 
accompanied Napoleon’s French occupation of Egypt, and Britain’s political interest in Egypt 
encouraged interest in everything Egyptian, and the nineteenth century saw the proliferation of 
travel accounts on Egypt. Just as Muslim travelogues wrote about the differences between 
Muslim and European women, western travelogues’ accounts of the East devoted significant 
space to expounding those differences, stressing the superiority of European traditions and 
attitudes in relation to women, and relating the inferiority of Muslim women to the religion of 
Islam.  
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Several studies have explored the indulgence of European travel literature with the erotic 
Oriental Other, uncovering the obsession with the ‘Muslim woman’ who, in the eyes of the 
European male viewer, was far more ‘oriental’ than the man.314 As Valentine Moghadam 
remarked, “the constructed oppression of ‘Muslim women’ was central to what Edward Said has 
identified as the Orientalisation of the Middle East”.315 
Clearly fully aware of such accounts, Ottoman author Fatima Aliye (1862-1936), as early 
as 1891, published Nisvan-i-Islam (The Women of Islam) addressing “Europeans… whose ideas 
concerning us are so mistaken and false that they are a cause of amazement”, demonstrating 
awareness of what is written in “the books of Europeans in all their languages, known as 
travellers’ books” adding that “anyone who reads these books and looks at their content thinks 
that he/she must be reading fiction books or comical stories”.316 Muslim scholars were clearly 
aware of European representations of Islam and Muslim nations, as can be seen from the 
responses written, for instance by Tunisian Mu^ammad Ibn AbÏ al-øi¥f’s Ris¥lat al-Mar’a 
(Essay on Women) in response to the criticisms of France’s consul in Tunis Leon Roche, Q¥sim 
AmÏn’s “Les Egyptiens” in response to Duke D’harcourt’s Egypte et les Egyptiens, and 
Mu^ammad µAbduh’s responses to Hanoteaux, Ernest Renan, Isaac Tiller and others.317 
The views expressed by Orientalist scholars on Egyptian women can be seen from the 
influential Account of the Manners and Customs of Modern Egyptians (1836), written by 
Edward Lane (1801-1876). The outcome of his observations during his residence in Egypt, the 
book has been reprinted a great number of times and has had a significant influence on 
subsequent western Orientalist scholarship. They are also often referred to in the colonialist 
discourse, as seen in the British Consul in Egypt Lord Cromer’s frequent references to Lane and 
Lane-Poole. The focus on the – inferior – domestic customs of Egyptians, particularly women, 
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which began in the travel literature of the nineteenth century continued through the colonialist 
discourse, as travel accounts shaped “an Egyptian landscape on which the colonial experience 
was later played out”.318 
Direct encounter with the ‘East’ is as preceded by curiosity and pre-formed assumptions 
as was al->ah~¥wÏ’s encounter with ‘the West’. Even where observations do not conform to the 
established assumptions, they are often explained away in such a way that the assumptions can 
safely remain unchanged. Thus the absence of face-veils and strict segregation among the vast 
majority of Egyptian women319 does not preclude a long and detailed description of the life of 
“Egyptian women” secluded in the harem, although, being restricted by the inaccessibility of 
women’s quarters to foreign men, Lane’s account of life in the harem must rely on second-hand 
reports. And, according to him, the reason for the surprising rarity of polygynous marriages320 is 
“for the sake of domestic peace, if for no other reason”. Thus “at precisely the same time that 
monogamous, bourgeois couples and modern, single-family dwellings became the products of 
Egyptian modernisation and centralisation, European travellers were emphasising Egypt’s 
polygamy, extended families, timeless domestic practices, and bizarre sexual habits”.321 
Lane’s lack of direct access to women and their homes does not prevent him from 
forming a conclusive judgment on their treatment and upbringing of their children: “In the 
treatment of their children, the women of the wealthier classes are remarkable for their excessive 
indulgence; and the poor for the little attention they bestow, beyond supplying the absolute wants 
of nature”.322 At the same time we are told that “the care of their children is the primary 
occupation of the ladies of Egypt”,323 but that “the parents seldom devote much of their time or 
attention to the intellectual education of their children”.324 We are told that “the higher and 
middle orders of Muslims in Egypt are scrupulously clean, and the lower orders are more so than 
in most other countries”,325 but that “with the exception of those of the wealthier classes, the 
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young children in Egypt, though objects of so much solicitude, are generally very dirty, and 
shabbily clad. The stranger here is disgusted by the sight of them.”326 
The theme of the ‘failure’ of Egyptian parenthood, and particularly motherhood, and the 
responsibility of that failure for all the ills of Egyptian society, later becomes more pronounced 
in both the colonial discourse which asserts its moral position as Egypt’s guardian, and the 
nationalist discourse which adopts as its mission the reform of domestic norms and the ‘training’ 
of mothers in order to produce good modern Egyptian citizens. 
Edward Lane’s great-nephew, Stanley Lane-Poole (1854-1931), writing half a century 
after his great-uncle, at a time when Britain’s interference in Egypt was no longer hidden, having 
occupied the country in 1882, contains more strongly and explicitly pronounced judgements on 
Egyptian social customs, not only stressing their inferiority and their deep roots established since 
childhood, but also the impossibility of their reform, despite superficial “improvements” brought 
about by European influence on Egypt’s elite.327  
By the time Lane-Poole was writing, the formula was complete: the clearest marker of 
difference between the East and West is the position of women. Eastern and western women are 
so completely different in their character, their relationship with their husbands, their upbringing 
of their children, and their ordering of their homes, that they have nothing in common. And 
Egyptian women’s corrupt influence is inevitably passed on to their husbands and children, 
guaranteeing the perpetuation of Egypt’s corrupt and inferior state. Moreover, there is no hope of 
reform, since this inferior position of women is based on the religion of Islam, which governs all 
aspects of life in Muslim society.    
The fatal spot in Mohammedanism is the position of woman… Their education is entirely 
neglected; as for their morals, they are simply taught to make themselves seductive to 
their husbands… True love is too rare in the East, and faithful devotion to one woman is 
not to be reckoned among ordinary Muslim virtues…. And this false relation between 
husband and wife makes itself felt in the bringing up of children. The early years of 
childhood, perhaps the most critical in a whole life, are tainted by the corrupt influences 
of the harem… As long as the Mohammadan religion exists, the social life with which it 
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has unfortunately become associated will also survive; and so long as the latter prevails in 
Egypt we cannot expect the higher results of civilisation.328 
 
Egyptians’ parenting is again criticised and discredited, the ignorant fathers for failing to 
develop their children’s intellect “for the excellent reason that he seldom knows anything 
himself”,329 while the mothers are only implicitly present through the “corrupt influences of the 
harem”. It is not sufficient to point out the religious basis of Egyptian women’s position, but it 
must be repeatedly emphasised that it is “unalterable”, “incontrovertible” and that they have 
“always” been thus treated, offering no possibility of any improvement, whether through 
education – a major cause of the emerging nationalist movement – or otherwise. 
Interestingly, Lane-Poole’s view of Egyptian peasants (i.e. the overwhelming majority of 
Egypt’s population) is no less negative than that of women, although the roots of the peasants’ 
character are not to be confused with those of women’s position. They are both lacking in 
intelligence, unable to be independent or think for themselves, and in need of ‘guardians’. Of the 
Egyptian peasant, we are told “we cannot expect him to be intelligent… He is not, certainly, fit at 
present to govern himself … He needs nursing and guiding and protecting (against himself as 
against his oppressors) like a child for many years”.330 Both peasants and women are infantilised, 
but it is women who are singled out as responsible for society’s corruption and “diseased 
condition”, and the “failure to set women on their true level has done more harm than anything 
else to Muslim society.”331 Echoes of this approach can be seen in Egyptian men’s discourse on 
women, including the “liberation discourse”: The focus is on women as the locus of the nation’s 
backwardness; their situation is abstracted and treated away from the rest of the country’s socio-
economic problems, and compared to an theoretical external ideal, rather than to the state of 
Egyptian men. 
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2.3 Historical Accounts of the Occupier and Occupied: 
 
2.3.1 Al-JabartÏ and the French invasion 
 
Napoleon Bonaparte’s excursion into Egypt in 1798, in order to sever his rival England’s 
route to India, brought the French and the Egyptians into direct contact with an alien culture. The 
extent of the influence of the French invasion on social, cultural and political ideas and its 
position as the principal catalyst of revival are matters of intense debate. The fundamental 
discontinuity between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the view that the “modern” 
era followed centuries of “political anarchy, intellectual and cultural sterility, and economic and 
demographic decline”332 have been questioned by some historians. They argue that the idea that 
the modern revival began with Mu^ammad ¢Ali and/or Napoleon only emerged later, while 
“scholars, like Al-JabartÏ failed to perceive Napoleon and Mu^ammad µAlÏ as initiators of a new 
and better era”,333 tending to look back with nostalgia to past eras. They also argue that the view 
that the revival occurred after a long period of decline was a result of a number of contributing 
factors, not only foreign rhetoric, but internal discourses, including classical polemic Ottoman 
political writings on decline following the “golden age” as early as the sixteenth century, the 
rhetoric of the Tanzimat reformers who emphasised decline as a way of legitimising reform, and 
the writing of history patronised by King Fu¥d and F¥r‰q.334 It is interesting to note that ¢Abduh 
wrote very critically on Mu^ammad µAlÏ and his legacy.335 Judith Tucker notes that “the French 
invasion had little impact on Egyptian society at its roots”.336 
Nevertheless, the impact of the French invasion – Egypt’s first encounter with the West 
since the Crusades – can be deduced from al-JabartÏ’s description of that event as one of “fierce 
fights and important incidents; of the momentous mishaps and appalling afflictions; of the 
multiplication of malice and the acceleration of affairs; of successive sufferings and turning 
                                                
332 See Cuno K. M., “Muhammad Ali and the Decline and Revival Thesis in Modern Egyptian History”, in I|l¥^ am 
Ta^dÏth: Mi|r fÏ µAhd Mu^ammad µAlÏ, Symposium organised by the Egyptian Society for Historical Studies, 9-11 
March 1999, ed. Raouf Abbas, Cairo: al-Majlis al-AµAlá lil-Thaqāfa, 2000, p. 94. 
333 ibid., p. 105. 
334 ibid. 
335 Aµm¥l, vol. 1, p. 839. 
336 Tucker, “Problems in the Historiography of Women in the Middle East: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Egypt” 
p. 33, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 15, 1983. 
92 
 
times; of the inversion of the innate and the elimination of the established; of horrors upon 
horrors and contradicting conditions; of the perversion of all precepts and the onset of 
annihilation”.337 
The theme of difference dominates discourses of the invader and invaded. Napoleon’s 
hundred scholars wrote in their famous study of Egypt, “Everything, in this people, carries the 
imprint of a striking contrast with the habits of European nations. This difference is the result of 
climate, civil institutions and religious prejudices”.338 The difference was most visibly seen in 
the appearance, view and attitude towards women. Christopher Herold, in his Bonaparte in 
Egypt, wrote that there were no women to be seen except “a few women… whose aspect struck 
the French as unappetising. Their sole garment was a shirt, usually blue and always dirty; they 
went barefoot and bare-salved, smeared kohl on their eye-brows, painted their fingernails red, 
and blithely exposed any part of their anatomy save their faces”.339 
Egyptians found the French attitude just as bizarre and condemnable. Egypt’s most 
prominent historian of the time, µAbdurra^m¥n al-JabartÏ, in his chronicle of the French 
occupation of Egypt, wrote about the colonisers: 
They follow this rule: great and small, high and low, male and female are all equal. 
Sometimes they break this rule according to their whims and inclinations or reasoning.  
Their women do not veil themselves and have no modesty… They have intercourse with 
any woman who pleases them and vice versa.340 
 
What most provoked al-JabartÏ was the “humiliation and degradation… when the French, 
in their desire of and submission to women… sought to win over other women and undermine 
their minds”.341 The attraction of the French was such that “many a Frenchman became engaged 
to the daughters of local dignitaries, the latter giving their daughters away, in their greed for 
power and favour”. These wives defied local customs and sentiments by marrying the French 
who were occupiers and who “pretend to embrace Islam”, by behaving like French women, and 
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by rising socially and gaining privileges, while others, like the ¢ulam¥’, suffered “humiliation and 
degradation”.342  
Al-JabartÏ described at length the defiance of social mores and reversal of the social 
hierarchy. While the traditional elite were humiliated, Egyptian women married to French 
officers “would walk in the streets, take interest in public affairs and current regulations... 
preceded by guards and servants who would pace with batons to pave them a path, as if for a 
governor. Women commanded and forbade”.343 Al-JabartÏ clearly shows the same concern seen 
in al->ah~¥wÏ’s writings with gender relations, social hierarchies, ‘dominance’ and ‘submission’, 
which has endured in all discourses on women.  
However, this concern seems to be more of a reflection of a state of insecurity in the face 
of externally-imposed changes and loss of status. The same shock and dismay is not apparent in 
Al-Jabarti’s description of other instances of female public appearance or political participation, 
as for instance in his report of women’s protest at Mu^ammad ¢Ali’s policies, on 5 RabÏ¢ al-
Awwal 1229, (Feb. 25, 1814) when “a large group of women tax farmers went to al-Azhar 
Mosque and shrieked in the jurists’ faces, disrupting their classes and scattering their satchels 
and papers, causing the shaykhs to disperse to their homes. A large number of the populace 
joined the women and they kept up their uproar… declaring, ‘We will come every day in this 
manner until they release our shares, our incomes, and our stipends!’”344 This use of gender to 
express dissatisfaction with socio-economic and political changes and to express political aims 
was to persist through the reformist and nationalist discourses.   
  
2.3.2 Lord Cromer and the Colonialist Discourse 
 
While Mu^ammad ¢AlÏ succeeded in avoiding direct European intervention in Egypt’s 
administration, his successors would end up mortgaging Egypt to its European creditors and 
reducing it to bankruptcy, leading eventually to the beginning of Britain’s ‘veiled protectorate’ in 
1879. In 1881, this developed into direct occupation as the order Britain had always sought to 
preserve became threatened by the coalition that emerged between the constitutional demands of 
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Egyptian elite and the demands of junior military officers. The new ¢Ur¥bÏ government promised 
an end to the absolute power of the Turkish elite and their European creditors. ¢Abduh was a 
prominent leader in the ¢Ur¥bÏ movement, and its end would have a profound impact on his 
views on political action and social change. 
Britain first watched as the ‘new’ and ‘old’ orders negotiated and confronted, but finally 
intervened to preserve the position of the Khedive and overthrow the new nationalist 
government. The ¢Ur¥bists were defeated within eight weeks by the British forces, who 
responded to the nationalist uprising by placing the country under direct military occupation. The 
failure of nationalist aspirations would have a profound effect on the Egyptian elite who came – 
with the continued penetration of colonialist themes – to accept their defeat not as a result of 
foreign intervention and the superior weaponry of the occupiers, but as a sign of the 
‘unreadiness’ of the country for self-rule and the prematurity of calls for change.  
The British colonial representation of Egyptian society and women in particular was 
overwhelmingly negative and judgmental, in contrast to the descriptions of scholars of the 
French expedition a century earlier, which were more similar to al->ah~¥wÏ’s mixed 
observations. In Description de l’Egypte, we are told about the “beauty and prosperity” of Harem 
women and the “strength and lightness” of working peasant women.345 Egyptian mothers are 
characterised by “happiness and courage”. Descriptions are not entirely free from condescension, 
but – unike later colonialist writings – balance their criticism with admiration for positive 
qualities. While “the Egyptian” does not enjoy “our delights and pleasures or our physical or 
spiritual qualities”, he nevertheless “knows more than us the meaning of natural emotions”.346 
And readers are warned that “we would be very wrong to think that Muslim women – although 
they submit to their husbands’ control – can be treated by authoritarianism and injustice by their 
husbands, for on the contrary, their status is good to a large extent… they achieve an undoubted 
influence over the minds of their husbands who can never mistreat them or even scold them”.347 
All these warnings and balancing qualifications disappear in the instrumentalist colonialist 
discourse later. 
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The British colonial representation of Egyptian society and its discourse on women in 
particular had a lasting effect on the Egyptian nationalist discourse on women. The colonial 
discourse can best be seen from the writings of Lord Cromer, British Agent and Consul-General 
from 1883 to 1907. Cromer and ¢Abduh were known to have a relationship of mutual respect, 
and Cromer is credited with supporting ¢Abduh’s promotion to various prominent official posts. 
Following the shock of the defeat of the ¢Urabi movement, ¢Abduh came to believe in the futility 
of political action dependent on external aid or on the khedive’s cooperation. This led him to 
prefer focusing on building the people’s self-confidence and capacity through educational, 
social, ethical and judicial reform, where possible benefiting from British support, despite his 
opposition to the occupation in principle. The complex relationship is clear from Cromer’s mixed 
praise and criticism of ¢Abduh in his Modern Egypt.348  
Chapter XXXIV of his Modern Egypt is entitled “The Dwellers in Egypt”, seemingly 
refuting the existence of the Egyptian people claimed by nationalists. Nevertheless, these 
“dwellers” share a ‘mental constitution’ to which their inferiority is attributed. The ‘Oriental 
mind’ or ‘character’ is no new concept, as seen in Lane-Poole to whom Cromer often refers, but 
it is used to great effect in colonialist discourse. This new subject of colonial politics, the 
individual character or mentality, rather than institutions, systems or laws, was to later be 
replaced by ‘race’ and then ‘culture’.  
The reader is moved to sympathise with the European in his almost impossible mission of 
civilising ‘the Eastern’, by virtue of the absolute opposition between the two species, and the 
Eastern’s: 
Want of accuracy, which easily degenerates into untruthfulness, is, in fact, the main 
characteristic of the Oriental mind … His reasoning is of the most slipshod description… 
the grave and silent Eastern, devoid of energy and initiative, stagnant in mind, wanting in 
curiosity about matters which are new to him, careless of waste of time and patient under 
suffering… his love of intrigue is inveterate… He reposes unlimited faith in his own 
cunning, his fatalism which accepts the inevitable, and with his submissiveness to all 
constituted authority.349 
  
Here one can see more than a few common themes between the colonialist discourse on 
“the oriental character”, and the nationalist movement’s discourse on women, including the 
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“liberation” discourse of Q¥sim AmÏn and others. In the latter, the same characteristics of 
“laziness”, “lack of curiosity”, “carelessness of waste of time”, “love of intrigue”, and 
“cunningness” are reflected onto Egyptian women, whereas the “new modern Egyptian man” 
embodies the “western” qualities of the “energetic” conscious reformer.350 
Having given such a bleak summary of the state and ‘character’ of Egyptians in general, 
Cromer then focuses on the state of Egyptian women, as if it were particularly degraded, even 
though the entire population has already been described as mentally and morally inferior in all 
respects. Cromer singles out two main phenomena of the “degradation of women in 
Mohammedan countries” and markers of difference “between the position of Moslem women 
and that of their European sisters”. These two points, which continued to raise heated debate in 
the “discourse on women”, are seclusion and polygamy.351 By seclusion, Cromer means both the 
physical veil – “the face of the Moslem woman is veiled when she appears in public”, and other 
restrictions which mean that “she lives a life of seclusion”. In contrast, “the European” woman’s 
situation is superior and ideal, as “the face of the European woman is exposed to view in public. 
The only restraints placed on her movements are those dictated by her own sense of propriety”. 
The condition of European women is not only perfect, but is presented as a result of Christian 
teaching: “The monogamous Christian respects woman; the teaching of his religion and the 
incidents of his religious worship tend to elevate them… The Moslem, on the other hand, 
despises women.” Seclusion is harmful for women “as seclusion, by confining the sphere of 
woman’s interest to a very limited horizon, cramps the intellect and withers the mental 
development of one-half of the population in Moslem countries”, and also has “a deteriorating 
effect” on society “inasmuch as women, in their capacities as wives and mothers, exercise a great 
influence over the characters of their husbands and sons”.352  
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As for polygamy, like Lane and Lane-Poole, Cromer ignores statistics and observations 
that polygamy is rare and decreasing in Egyptian society, insisting that “the East is polygamous, 
the west is monogamous”. Cromer adds that “the effects of polygamy are more baneful and far-
reaching”353 than seclusion, though he does not detail those effects. While visitors to Egypt, 
decades before Cromer, had all reported the rarity of polygamous marriages, Cromer recognises 
that polygamy has “of late years” decreased, but attributes its fall to “education and association 
with Europeans”.354 
Immediately after discussing the ills of Egyptian family life, particularly the degradation 
of women, Cromer moves on to the subject of the different standpoints from which the European 
and the Oriental approach the subject of government, thus instilling the link between the two, 
and making the former responsible for the latter. As Lisa Pollard explains in her Nurturing the 
Nation, just as in British colonies in India and Africa,  
For the British, Egyptian politics were synonymous with familial habits – marital 
practices, living arrangements, relations between parents and children – of Egyptian 
rulers… The realpolitik of British foreign policy was thus undergirded by the 
moralpolitik of domestic affairs, turning familial practices into family politics – in 
essence, domestic mores as measures of the ability of the nation to govern itself.355  
 
In the colonial – and later in the opposing nationalist – discourse, the subjects of politics 
and governance on the one hand and family life on the other become inextricably linked to the 
point of being confused. Re-organising the family becomes a political action and a principal part 
of the nationalist struggle, bringing the ‘nationalist question’ and the ‘woman question’ into an 
unbreakable union. 
Identifying the Egyptian character as the root of decline, its reform through education 
became the cause of the nationalist movement, and the focus on education as the key to all 
progress is strongly present in µAbduh’s writings. But, the colonialist discourse is quick to 
downplay the link between education and “self-governance”, and to point out the predicted 
failure of education without the presence of the foreign tutor, for then “a relapse would 
inevitably ensue”.356 
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This is perhaps the reason for Britain’s lack of support for Egyptian state education, 
leaving the responsibility to fall on private initiative, as clear from the establishment of several 
charity associations with the provision of free or subsidised education for poor boys and girls 
being among the main priorities, including the Islamic Charity Association chaired by 
Mu^ammad ¢Abduh. Cromer still warned that “it, of course, remains an open question whether, 
when the Egyptian women are educated, they will exercise a healthy and elevating influence 
over the men. The few Moslem women in Egypt who have, up to the present time, received a 
European education are, with some very rare exceptions, strictly secluded… All that can at 
present be said is that those results must necessarily be uncertain”.357 Again, Cromer moves the 
focus away from the issue of education, on which consensus existed among Egyptians, to the 
controversial issue of seclusion. This would seem to influence the choice of writers on women’s 
reform to take up, avoid, or oppose this call. 
Nevertheless, the colonialist discourse emphasised in very strong, sometimes 
exaggerated, terms the inseparability of reforming “the position of women” and social advance, 
and the importance of women’s liberation for the advance of “Christian Europe”, stressing that 
“Change the position of women, and one of the main pillars, not only of European civilisation 
but at all events of the moral code based on the Christian religion, if not Christianity itself falls to 
the ground.”358 This ‘colonial feminism’, as Leila Ahmed remarked, was merely used to 
legitimise Britain’s ‘civilising mission’.359 While at home, Europeans were far from agreeing on 
the extent of women’s liberation, and Cromer himself was a staunch opponent of the Suffragette 
movement in Britain, he strongly held that “the position of women in Egypt, and in 
Mohammedan countries generally, is, therefore, a fatal obstacle to the attainment of that 
elevation of thought and character which should accompany the introduction of European 
civilisation”.360 
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2.4 Reformist discourses: Elevation of woman central to elevation of the nation; 
woman as a primary cause of the nation’s backwardness 
 
‘Easterners’ for their part were not simply an isolated, passive object studied and 
presented by ‘westerners’; they were conscious of these representations and discourses. This is 
not to say that their own discourse is simply a reiteration of, or reaction to, the foreign discourse. 
Nevertheless, the two discourses are far from being isolated from or ignorant of one another. 
Ibr¥hÏm Al-Muwayli^Ï, in an article on reform published in Mi|b¥^ al-Sharq on 25 May 1899, 
wrote about the efforts of reformers who “will soon bring back to the East its most brilliant glow, 
and erase from its pages the word ‘barbarity’ which Western authors never leave out in their 
descriptions of Eastern nations”.361 This awareness of both the perceived decline of the Muslim 
world relative to its past and to the ascending West, and of the western discourses regarding the 
diagnosis and causes of that decline and of the West’s supremacy is evident in the reform 
discourse of the second half of the nineteenth century. While the East’s backwardness was 
generally a point of agreement between the internal and external discourses, the same is not true 
of the factors identified as causes of that state. 
Even though the discourse on women evolved over decades, the final decades of the 
nineteenth century saw the intensification of discussions of the ‘woman question’, as part of 
attempts to make sense of the changing conditions of Muslim societies, confront internal decline 
and external threats, and elaborate the image of the sought-after society. As Moghadam points 
out, this feature is common to various ‘discourses of change’, not just to turn-of-the-century 
Egypt, noting that “in examining revolutions and revolutionary states from France to Iran, one 
finds that the ‘Woman Question’ assumes a prominent position in revolutionary discourses and 
in the programmes of the new states”362 as “women frequently become the sign or marker of 
political goals and of cultural identity during processes of revolution and state building, and 
when power is being contested or reproduced”.363  
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Three prominent figures in the long list of reformers who were deeply conscious of the 
Muslim world’s decline, who analysed the causes of that decline and the way out of it are Jam¥l 
al-DÏn al-Afgh¥nÏ, ¢Abdurra^m¥n al-Kaw¥kibÏ and ¢Abdull¥h Al-NadÏm. The first is known to 
have had a major influence on ¢Abduh’s thought, the second was one of his contemporaries, who 
was part of his circle while in Cairo where he settled in 1898,364 while the third was a close 
associate particularly through the years of political activism. 
 
2.4.1 Al-Afgh¥nÏ: Reviving the East’s Glory & Mothers’ Mission 
 
The East’s decline, its causes, and the way to re-vitalise the East to regain its glory were 
the predominant themes in the writings of Jam¥l al-DÏn al-Afgh¥nÏ, known as ‘the awakener of 
the East’. While colonialist discourse often blamed religion for the Muslim world’s 
backwardness, al-Afgh¥nÏ sought to absolve Islam of that responsibility, arguing instead that it 
had, through the principles of liberating the mind and uniting its adherents by the bonds of faith 
and language, created a successful civilisation, that only declined when it abandoned those 
principles. Following that diagnosis, al-Afgh¥nÏ called for liberating and uniting Muslims and the 
acquisition of knowledge and modern sciences. He summarised how to acquire this knowledge: 
for men “and those beyond the age of learning”, to reform them through lectures, national 
associations, mixing between different religious communities and exploring ways of reforming 
the country through speeches, publications, and good examples. While women are not explicitly 
included in the reform programme directed at adults, they figure prominently in the reform 
programme relating to children: “As for children, first [you should] educate women well, and 
secondly, close state schools before them and open for them independent schools”.365 
The mother’s assigned mission is broad:  
As for the child, he/she needs to be looked after by the mother as a nursling, then as a 
toddler, providing perfect health care, so that they are healthy in their bodies and minds; 
then she must feed them the love of the homeland (wa~an), and gradually teach them the 
required sciences; and should not extinguish their natural rebelliousness by teaching them 
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to lie, and should make work beloved to them, train them to be active, while keeping in 
mind their age.366 
 
While it is not explicitly stated whether women are included in the educational 
programme directed at adults, and while al-Afgh¥nÏ does not discuss how the mother is to 
acquire the education to enable her to fulfil the mission assigned to her, he does elsewhere warn 
against limiting education to men – primarily because of women’s role as mothers:  
Gentlemen, I warn you against believing that you will gain the benefits of civilisation, 
obtain knowledge and sciences, acquire the tools for advancement and happiness, and 
reach the height of glory and honour, if knowledge amongst you is limited to men. I seek 
refuge for you against ignorance of the fact that we cannot come out of the lowliness of 
unawareness and ignorance, from the prison of humiliation and poverty and from the trap 
of weakness and stagnation as long as women are deprived of their rights, not knowing 
their obligations, for they are the mothers who will produce the primary education and 
the basic morals.367 
 
On the question of equality, al-Afgh¥nÏ did not explicitly address the matter. However in 
a gathering where he was asked to give his opinion, he seemed to approach the matter in the 
reformists’ “utilitatarian” logic, i.e. by focusing on the associated practical benefits or harms, 
noting that he has “not found in all that an explicit opinion, or a definition of the demand for 
equality, or the benefit that may result.”368 
Al-Afgh¥nÏ held that in men’s and women’s “make-ups, there are things that are lacking 
and others that are abundant, and neither is considered a fault or a perfection”, which indicates 
“the necessity of difference in their actions”. Woman’s function is to “manage the kingdom of 
the home … raise the children ... and draw on their pure slate the images of courage, virtue and 
bravery”. Thus women’s work outside the home “degrades the status of the woman” as it 
undoubtedly means that “there will undoubtedly be a loss that results from her abandoning of the 
home and its management, and of the child and his upbringing, that will be much greater than 
that benefit”.369 In contrast, the mother’s role is glorified, as “Man, in his features, his nutrition, 
and the first teachings imprinted onto him, is the creation of the mother-woman, indebted to the 
mother-woman, a pupil of the mother-woman, whether he grows up to be virtuous or corrupt”. 
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By fulfilling her duty and role as “the educator of men, who feeds them virtue”, women “would 
have excelled the greatest of men in his knowledge and work”.370  
Similarly with seclusion, al-Afgh¥nÏ could not see “in the sayings and writings of those 
who call for it, that they ever mentioned the least benefit from it”.371 And while he believed that 
“the ^ij¥b is a veil which, if lifted suddenly, will mostly reveal evils of corruption and 
immodesty, acceptance of vice, and indifference to public surveillance”, he believed that “if 
women stopped at unveiling, and did not use it a means to corruption, the matter would not need 
any discussion.”372 Thus, as would be seen with later reformists following the same line, such as 
RashÏd Ri\¥, with respect to the question of “unveiling”, there is an ambiguous and inconclusive 
stance, that views the question not as a purely religious fiqhÏ one, but one whose benefits and 
harms are to be carefully assessed. Their stance can be summarised as non-opposition to 
“unveiling” (in the sense of ending the seclusion and complete invisibility of women), but a 
cautioning against “going beyond limits” and “sudden unveiling” which would lead to corruption 
and immorality. This would seem to be ¢Abduh’s view, although he avoided addressing the issue 
directly altogether. 
 
2.4.2 Al-Kaw¥kibÏ: Women’s liberation in a wider context 
 
¢Abdurrahm¥n al-Kaw¥kibÏ (1854-1902) was a Syrian reformer contemporary of Afgh¥nÏ 
and ¢Abduh, whose two main contributions, Umm al-Qur¥, first serialised in Al-Man¥r in 1900, 
and >ab¥i¢ al-Istibd¥d, first serialised in al-Mu’ayyad in 1900 “form a profound and brilliant 
analysis of the decrepitude of the Muslim world in general and of the Arab portions of it in 
particular, of its causes and of possible remedies”.373  
 Al-Kaw¥kibÏ’s treatment of women’s reform shares some of the characteristics of the discourse 
on women of other reformers, but departs from that discourse significantly in some other 
respects. In Umm al-Qur¥, Al-Kaw¥kibÏ details the various causes of stagnation (fut‰r), 
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enumerating religious, political, ethical, and other causes which include “failing to pay attention 
to the education of women”.374 
  Al-Kaw¥kibÏ legitimises the call to educate women by reference to the Muslim past 
“where amongst our women there were those such as ¢®’isha, Mother of the Believers, may God 
be pleased with her, from whom we have taken half of our religion, and hundreds of female 
companions and t¥bi¢iyy¥t [the generation after the companions] who were narrators of Hadith 
and jurists, as well as thousands of scholars and poetesses”. As a further argument in favour of 
women’s education, Al-Kaw¥kibÏ points out its practical benefits and the harmful consequences 
of women’s ignorance on the family: “on the morals of sons and daughters” and “on the morals 
of husbands” since “men, by nature, incline towards their wives, and women are definitely more 
able than men in the field of influencing morals”.375 
  However, out of all those causes, al-Kaw¥kibÏ identifies istibd¥d (despotism) as the 
principal disease affecting the Muslim world, or the East, which turns religion into a tool of 
control, prevents the circulation of knowledge, corrupts morals and human relations, and 
exacerbates social and economic inequalities. Thus he places gender relations within a wider 
socio-political context. This focus on the primacy of political change is one characteristic – 
among others – which sets al-Kaw¥kibÏ apart from his contemporary reformers, including 
¢Abduh. 
  Al-Kaw¥kibÏ analysed the effects of political despotism and absence of freedom on social 
relations – including gender relations –, holding that “each individual among the usar¥’ 
[captives/slaves] of despotism is himself a despot; if he was able he would make his wife, family, 
tribe and all humans and even his Lord Who created him, follow his opinion and his 
command”.376 The despotic ruler sits at the top of a chain of despotism and persecution of those 
weaker than himself: failing to direct anger towards the despot, “the usar¥’ … persecute a 
vulnerable group, or foreigners, or they oppress their wives, etc.”377 And since knowledge is 
liberating, it “does not serve minor despots either, such as arrogant religious leaders, ignorant 
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parents, foolish husbands, and all heads of weak groups”.378 Thus al-Kaw¥kibÏ goes further than 
any of his contemporaries in linking gender relations to power relations, and political despotism 
to gender inequalities, demonstrating an acute awareness of the value of freedom and its relation 
to society’s morals. 
While Al-Kaw¥kibÏ shares the belief of other reformers that education is one of the main 
solutions to the crisis of the Muslim world, he differs in his understanding of what constitutes 
tarbiya, what qualities it is hoped to instil in children, and who is responsible for it. He describes 
the sought-after new generation “who know that they were created free so they reject humiliation 
and slavery; who wish to die in dignity rather than live in humiliation; who work hard to earn a 
prosperous life, the life of a nation in which each is an independent authority ruled by nothing 
but religion”.379 One perceives a difference between the qualities of industriousness, obedience 
and discipline sought to be instilled into children in the discourse on motherhood and upbringing 
of nationalist reformers, and al-Kaw¥kibÏ’s emphasis on the qualities of freedom and 
independence. 
As for the process of tarbiya and who is to assume it, al-Kaw¥kibÏ defines it as  
the tarbiya of the body to the age of two, and that is the function of the mother or the 
custodian (h¥\ina), then the tarbiya of the nafs (soul) to the age of seven, which is the 
function of the two parents and the family altogether, then the tarbiya of the ‘aql (mind) 
until puberty, which is the function of teachers and schools, then comes the tarbiya by 
example – relatives and companions, until marriage - for which coincidence is 
responsible, then comes the tarbiya by companionship, which is the function of the two 
spouses until death or separation. And tarbiya after puberty must be accompanied by 
tarbiya by surrounding conditions, by society, by the law or political system, and by the 
person’s tarbiya of him/herself.380  
 
While reading al-Kaw¥kibÏ, it becomes evident that he was deeply aware of political and 
social dimensions and their importance and influence on the process of tarbiya. He stresses the 
comprehensive nature of tarbiya as a social process, in which parents and the family are 
important, but so are the school, society, the law, and the political system. This is unlike the 
emphasis on mothers as having full responsibility for forming the characters of their children, 
seen in al-Afgh¥nÏ and other reformers, and becoming more pronounced in nationalist discourses 
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on motherhood and women’s reform. This exclusive role of tarbiya bestowed on women and 
their restriction to a single model is, according to some, a modern alien phenomenon and differs 
from the traditional Islamic discourse which addresses fathers and mothers equally.381  
However, since al-Kaw¥kibÏ seems to differ from those who view women exclusively as 
mothers and carers, he also seems to expect greater social and economic contributions from 
women. In the context of discussing inequality in production and distribution, Al-Kaw¥kibÏ 
criticised the monopoly of the majority of wealth in the hands of those who contribute the least 
to production.382 In this context, by focusing on ‘productivity’ and ‘economic contribution’, and 
by holding that “moralists agree that a human cannot be truly free unless he/she has an 
independent occupation”, 383  Al-Kaw¥kibÏ ends up generalising and condemning the ‘non-
productivity’ of ‘women’, proposing that “one half of humanity – which totals one and a half 
billion – depends on the other half, and the majority of that dependent half is made up of urban 
women” – a questionable statistic, since the majority of women, certainly in Arab societies, were 
not urban. 384   
While it is not clear whether al-Kaw¥kibÏ is suggesting women should seek paid 
employment outside the home, his respect for working men and women is implied in various 
chapters of his two books. For instance in Umm al-Qur¥, he recommends that the father should 
“bring up his children, both male and female, with the view that each of them, upon reaching 
adulthood, can live independently, relying on his/her own earnings, even if outside their 
homeland”.385  
 
2.4.3 ¢Abdull¥h Al-NadÏm 
 
By the end of the nineteenth century, it was clear that the woman question occupied a 
central place in the modernising discourse in Egypt and was essential to the nationalist project. 
Nationalist papers of various trends discussed women’s education and proper mothering, which 
                                                
381  See for instance Umayma Abu Bakr, The image of Man in Islamic Writings Between Old and New 
Interpretations, in µAisha Taymur, Tahaddiy¥t al-Th¥bit wa’l mutaghayyir fi’l qarn al-T¥siµ µAshar, edited by Hoda 
El-Sadda, 2004. 
382 Al-Kaw¥kibÏ, Aµm¥l K¥mila, p. 475. 
383 ibid., p. 482. 
384 ibid., p. 474-5. 
385 ibid., p. 328. 
106 
 
acquired an important place in the project for the advance of the nation. The reform of 
motherhood and domesticity became a constituent part of the nascent national discourse. This 
transformation was promoted along scientific lines in accordance with modern, hygienic, and 
rational principles for developing “productive members of society”.386  
The orator, journalist and political leader ¢Abdullah al-NadÏm who – alongside ¢Abduh 
and others – had a prominent role in the ¢Ur¥bÏ revolution, shared ¢Abduh’s combined interest 
and involvement in both political and social reform. Following years of exile and hiding after the 
failed ¢Ur¥bÏ revolution, he published the paper Al-Ust¥dh.387 Al-Ust¥dh was best known for 
carrying satirical attacks on Lord Cromer and his policies, so much so that Cromer demanded al-
NadÏm’s expulsion from Egypt. A regular section was entitled “Madrasat al-Ban¥t” (Girls’ 
School) which was written in Egyptian dialect rather than formal classical Arabic, and often 
dealt with home management, hygiene, as well as religious education. A similar section called 
“Madrasat al-BanÏn” (Boys’ School) dealt with hygiene, religion and civic education. Al-Ust¥dh 
proposed that women should be educated, and that they should learn reading, sewing, and 
religion (particularly rights of the husband).388 Al-Ust¥dh also announced the publication of a 
weekly newspaper called “Al-MurabbÏ”, published in “normal language – the language of 
women and children” which would be “dedicated to them, having nothing to do with men and 
their matters, on the subjects of raising daughters and sons and talking about them from the day 
of their birth”.389  
Through his “Madrasat al-Ban¥t”, we see al-NadÏm’s promotion of a single model for 
girls, also seen in his opposition to calls for widening women’s roles, through his imaginary 
dialogues between Egyptian women published in his paper. Recalling al-Kaw¥kibÏ’s comments 
on women’s non-productivity, Al-NadÏm also argued that women did not work equally hard as 
men – not in order to propose that women should engage in more work outside the home, but in 
order to reject the notion of equality and to emphasise “the difference between men and women”: 
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Thus we know that the peasant woman works harder than the man; that the poor urban 
woman works equally as hard as the man who has an easy job, unlike the carpenter, the 
blacksmith or the builder, for instance; that the middle-class woman is the least hard-
working; and the wealthy woman has no concern except her gentle self… Therefore if the 
lady who asked the question reflected on this classification and this discussion she would 
know the difference between the man and the woman, and would see that the deceptive 
attempts of wealthy ladies to claim equality with men are unacceptable, according to 
those of knowledge.390 
 
Whilst admitting that peasant women work harder than men, the focus, as in most 
writings on women, is on the minority inactive “wealthy ladies”. In his characteristic satirical 
and “close to the man on the street” style, al-NadÏm published imagined dialogues between 
Egyptian women, in Egyptian dialect, concerning family life. A number of these focused on the 
suffering of women whose husbands engage in drinking, gambling and prostitution, how they 
were to deal with the disintegration of family life, and how they were to stop their husbands’ 
debauchery while their “going out is prohibited by shar¢ (Islamic law) and customs.”391 Al-
NadÏm, through these dialogues, rejected the possibility that women could reject their husband’s 
authority, even if their husbands were drunk or failed to maintain their families, insisting that 
husbands are to be treated with respect and humility regardless of their behaviour. 
In the face of colonial interference and influence, Al-NadÏm opposed any relaxing of the 
custom of seclusion of women. Al-Ust¥dh criticised the spread of prostitution calling for further 
restrictions in the face of the growing decline in public morals, “to strictly prevent women from 
going out and to close the doors in the face of any (female) entering the house other than their 
relatives and those they trust”.392 The spread of prostitution and other social problems were 
attributed to the disruption of the old order “when Europeans entered Eastern countries through 
trade and domination, they corrupted the morals of men and women by the so-called modernity 
of theirs which in fact is a return to animalism”.393 
Al-NadÏm represents a major trend in the nationalist movement, which took up the 
question of women as a symbol of resistance of foreign influence and dominance. Proponents of 
this discourse, on the whole, opposed any major change in the situation of women, particularly in 
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terms of access to the public space and any relaxation of “seclusion”, linking any such relaxation 
to the spread of corruption and immorality. Nevertheless, they did not oppose the cause of 
women’s education, but espoused it, as it became a matter of national consensus. However, they 
solely approached women’s education within the context of producing better mothers able to 
produce better sons for the good of the nation, focusing on “home management, hygiene, and 
religious education”. 
All three reformers – al-Afgh¥nÏ, al-Kaw¥kibÏ and al-NadÏm – shared the belief in the 
importance of educating women as a way of advancing the nation. Apart from that, in their 
different approaches, they represent 3 trends in Islamic reformers’ discourse on women: 
ambivalence towards changes in women’s conditions except in an instrumentalist way, and 
maintenance of clear division of gender roles; contextualisation of women’s subordination within 
political despotism and economic deprivation; and strong rejection of western influence and 
interference leading to a rejection of any discussion of women outside the context of equipping 
them for a better performance of ‘traditional’ roles. All three approaches are reflected in 
contemporary Muslim discourses. 
 
 
2.5 Direct Discussion of “Equality” and “the Liberation of Women” 
  
 While the above reformist discourses touched on the subject of women as part of 
their comprehensive reform projects, their discussion was often vague and inconclusive. The 
‘marginality’ of the question did not necessitate explicit clarification of what exact changes were 
to be adopted in women’s upbringing and education, their social role, and their relationship with 
men. However, several factors, among which the precipitation of socio-economic changes 
affecting traditional family structures and the desire to build a new ‘modern’ Egyptian nation, the 
western discourse on the backwardness of eastern societies and of eastern women in particular, 
and the thriving women’s press (discussed briefly at the end of this chapter) and discussion of the 
above questions in the newly formed press all prompted a number of authors to address directly 
such questions as: are men and women equal? Can they be equal, and should they be equal? Who 
is responsible for women’s ignorance and backwardness? How are women responsible for 
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society’s backwardness? What should women be taught? What other social changes are needed 
to ‘elevate’ women? What are women to be liberated from? What are the benefits of their 
liberation? The setting for most of these discussions was the emerging Egyptian popular press. 
 
2.5.1 ShiblÏ Shumayyil and Social Darwinism 
 
The generation of ¢Abduh was not exclusively influenced by the thought of Muslim 
reformers such as Al-Afgh¥nÏ. They were also, to various extents, influenced by the new 
concepts of progress and scientism. Social Darwinism was so much in vogue in late-nineteenth-
century Europe that its principles were greatly influential on both colonialist and the opposing 
nationalist discourses. This theory classified humans in a hierarchy at the top of which the white 
European male sat, having won the race for ‘survival’ by virtue of being the ‘fittest’. In 
Colonising Egypt, Mitchell highlights this influence, concluding that “Le Bon, in sum, was 
probably the strongest individual European influence in turn-of-the-century Cairo in the political 
thought of Egypt’s emerging bourgeoisie”.394 According to Le Bon, every nation had a “mental 
constitution” that was composed of its sentiments, ideas and beliefs, and was created by a 
process of slow, hereditary accumulation. ¢Abduh admired Le Bon’s book, and visited him in 
Egypt. He also read Herbert Spencer’s “On Education” and visited him in London. Likewise, he 
was familiar with the Egypt-based Syrian literary circles, seen for instance through his debates 
with Farah Antoun, or his letter read at the ceremony celebrating Salm¥n al-Bust¥nÏ’s translation 
of the Eliad.395  
One of the social Darwinism enthusiasts was ShiblÏ Shumayyil (1850-1917), a Syrian 
Protestant secularist doctor who studied in Paris and moved to Cairo. He was greatly influenced 
by social Darwinism which he promoted in his writings, particularly through his medical journal 
Al-Shif¥’, as well as through the main Syrian/Lebanese journal Al-Muqta~af, published in Egypt. 
In a lecture delivered at the I¢tid¥l (Moderation) Association in Cairo, published in Al-
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Muqta~af,396 ShiblÏ Shumayyil explicitly and exclusively addressed the question “Are women 
and men equal?” 
The question, Shumayyil tells us, is “a purely scientific matter” and should be simply 
resolved by recourse to science’s objective, conclusive, and universal laws. His choice was 
indeed an effective one, as can be seen in the acceptance of the “facts” he quoted from various 
sources, even by those (women) who wrote back to reject his conclusions. Referring purely to 
European scientists, philosophers, and anthropologists – seen as objective and infallible – 
Shumayyil applied to the above question the principles of social Darwinism. Just as the 
nineteenth-century ‘science’ of anthropology linked the ‘backwardness’ of non-white peoples to 
their physical features, Shumayyil sought to settle the long discussions regarding the equality of 
men and women by appealing to their physical differences. Thus he discussed at length the 
differences between men’s and women’s weights, heights, muscles, feet, movements, etc. to 
conclude that men are physically and intellectually superior, that “the male is more rational than 
the female by the consensus of all philosophers and scientists”.397 Furthermore, men are ethically 
superior, while women are “more cunning and treacherous”, “frivolous, unstable, extreme, more 
so than man, and are more inclined to fables and to stubbornness, imitation and clinging to old 
customs, and more talkative and cowardly than them”.398 
In addition, the superiority of men over women is held to be the characteristic of ‘higher’ 
civilisations: “Woman is further below man the more established man is in civilisation and 
urbanism, while she equals him or excels him the closer he is to primitiveness and savagery, 
physically and mentally”. Thus “the dominance of man over woman” is not only a fact, but 
“among the necessities of development and vice versa”. Hence, following this rule, all those who 
wish the good of their nations and aspire to be ‘modern’ and ‘civilised’ should avoid upsetting 
the current gender balance, and “we seek that in the future, our women would not be able to 
excel men or be equal to them… on the basis of the laws of progress”.399  
Although Shumayyil’s views may be seen as shocking, they represent perhaps the only 
coherent treatment of the question, and its conclusion is in fact no different from the conclusions 
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of all others who wrote on the subject, although their arguments were different. What grants 
Shumayyil’s discussion an air of respectability and ‘modernness’ that allows its entry into the 
‘modern’ discussion of the ‘woman question’ in Egypt’s modern press is its ‘scientific’ language, 
its reference to a European model and its insistence on the necessity of adopting such a course of 
action for ‘the greater social good’. Those two last points were often the motivations and 
justifications used by the various calls for the “liberation of women”. 
 
2.5.2 Q¥sim AmÏn & the Liberation of Women 
 
 If ShiblÏ Shumayyil’s article prompted a number of letters from female readers opposing 
his views and conclusions, Q¥sim AmÏn’s book “Ta^r Ïr al-Mar’a” provoked one of the most 
heated debates, with many books written, journals founded, and articles published in response. 
Since we have already seen that the issues of equality of men and women, women’s education, 
polygamy and seclusion were already discussed in the writings of men and women, the reaction 
provoked by the book may be puzzling when one reads its content. The difference, however, is 
perhaps not only the strong criticism of Egyptian social customs, the attack on their self-image, 
or the recommended changes, but also the status of the person who made them – a Muslim male 
upper-class Egyptian judge.  
While other reformers promoted women’s education (and a few miscellaneous rights) as 
one of the necessary steps towards ‘progress’ and ‘development’, and criticised women’s 
ignorance as one of the causes of backwardness and inferiority, Q¥sim AmÏn argued that 
“degradation in the status of women among us is the most important obstacle preventing our 
advance towards our reform”.400 In addition to their ignorance of hygiene and proper upbringing 
of children, we are told that “the Egyptian woman does not know the taste of love”,401 that she is 
“ignorant of the value of life”,402 and that “the Egyptian wife, whoever she may be, knows 
nothing about her husband, except that he is tall or short, white or black. As for her husband’s 
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intellectual or moral value, his behaviour, his honesty, his sensitivity of feelings, his knowledge 
or his work… her mind does not understand any of that”.403  
Here we get a glimpse of the effect of the various precipitated political, cultural, social 
and economic changes on Egyptian families, the instability of which is here attributed to the 
incompatibility between the ‘new Egyptian man’ of the upper and middle classes, western-
educated, “sensitive” and possessor of new “tastes”, who suffers because his wife is left behind 
and still does not belong to the new modern life. This highlights the link between the ‘new 
modern man’ and sought-after ‘new woman’ explored by a number of scholars of post-colonial 
studies who have linked the need for “civilised housewives” to the needs of male reformers who 
wanted to enhance their own enlightened image.404 
AmÏn singles out the status of women as the clearest symbol of degradation, and the most 
important cause of the nation’s backwardness. In addition to their failure as wives, Egyptian 
women’s failure as mothers is condemned for its production of children devoid of the valued 
characteristics of industriousness and sensitivity. AmÏn describes Egyptian women’s seemingly 
appalling state of ignorance, vulgarity and decadence. Interestingly, he does not compare 
Egyptian women to Egyptian men, but to European women – perhaps so as not to threaten 
gender relations, or perhaps in order to avoid the realisation that the causes of ignorance and 
backwardness affect both Egyptian men and women. This is in contrast to al-Kaw¥kibÏ’s 
treatment of women’s status within the context of social, economic and political conditions. 
In contrast, when discussing European women, AmÏn only speaks of them favourably. 
Here we see the remnants of al->ah~¥wÏ’s childish admiration for French women, but without the 
latter’s critique of some of their behaviour, highlighting the disappearance of all self-confidence 
under the influence of colonisation and its discourse: 
Do Egyptians think that the men of Europe, despite the fact that they have reached a 
degree of perfection of thought and feeling that enabled them to discover the power of 
steam and electricity… can neglect to know the way to protect women and their 
chastity?405 
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While the image of Egyptian women is painted in the bleakest of colours, the European 
woman is presented as living in a paradise of complete equality and freedom. Just as Cromer 
compared Egyptian and Muslim women to an imaginary ideal European Christian woman, it is 
difficult not to smile when reading about AmÏn’s imaginary perfect European society where 
“there is no difference between the two sexes” and the perfectly liberated European women who 
“will, in a short period, reach a status in which they attain all that they have been seeking in 
equality with men in all rights” and who may even soon “excel men in the field of progress and 
advancement”.406  
Of course, AmÏn made it clear that that perfect equality is not what he proposes for 
Egyptian women, for he did not deem education beyond the primary level to be necessary for 
girls. He also made it very clear that the cause of women’s liberation is primarily to serve the 
nation, or in other words, men, for “Can the perfection of man be attained if woman is lacking? 
And can men be happy except due to women?”407 Throughout, AmÏn addressed his “fellow 
brothers”, exhorting them to educate their daughters and wives, to build a modern family life 
based on love and free of polygamy, and to end the seclusion of women, since “^ij¥b as we have 
got used to it is a great obstacle that obstructs woman’s elevation and hence obstructs the 
nation’s progress”. 408  At the end of Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a, AmÏn recommends establishing an 
association open to fathers who wish to bring up their daughters according to this proposed 
method.409 
In addition to education and an end to polygamy, unilateral divorce and the practice of 
seclusion, AmÏn also touches on the issue of women’s work. Similarly to al-Kaw¥kibÏ, he 
focuses on the small minority of upper and middle-class Egyptian women who do not work 
outside the home, and attacks the indolence and non-productivity of “women”. While other 
writers – male and female – complained about the new phenomenon of men failing to maintain 
their families (for instance, al-NadÏm and Faww¥z), AmÏn appears not to recognise men’s 
financial responsibility for women, or women’s non-financial contributions, by holding that 
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“woman’s ignorance and her lack of education have resulted in her not using her rational 
faculties and physical abilities to be a living active being that produces as much as it consumes, 
as opposed to her current state of dependence, living by the work of others”.410 Furthermore, 
AmÏn seems to justify women’s deprivation of their rights by their lack of financial contribution 
to the family, ignoring the daily income contributions of most peasant women to their families: 
Exempting women from their foremost duty, that is qualification to earn herself the 
necessities of life, is the cause of her losing her rights, for since man is responsible for 
everything, he reserved the right to enjoy every right, and all that remains for women in 
his opinion is similar to the needs a pet’s owner grants his pet, out of his own grace, in 
return for entertaining him.411 
 
The controversy and attacks that followed Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a only made AmÏn more 
determined to repeat the same ideas and develop them in his second book, Al-Mar’a al-JadÏda,412 
published a year after Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a. Unlike Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a, which despite its criticism of 
social practices, had “remained squarely within the traditional religious framework”,413 in his 
later book, AmÏn was more explicit in his belief in the West’s superiority and the need to look 
towards it for inspiration. 
While the issues addressed by AmÏn were not novel and had previously been addressed 
by other scholars and writers, his dedication of two books to the topic earned him a pioneering 
position in any subsequent writings on the issue, and served to strengthen the topic’s position as 
“worthy of close inspection and of being called the mother of all matters, due to its close relation 
to all our vital principles”.414 It also initiated the heated discussion on the matter of “^ij¥b”, 
which continues to occupy a great part of discussions of “women’s liberation” from all sides. 
 
2.5.3 Mu^ammad FarÏd WajdÏ & The Muslim Woman  versus the New Woman  
 
Among those who wrote prompt responses to AmÏn’s books was Mu^ammad FarÏd WajdÏ 
who wrote Al-Mar’a al-Muslima: Raddan ‘al¥ Kit¥b al-Mar’a al-JadÏda,415 to contribute to this 
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important matter which he – and most of those writing about Egypt’s state and future at the turn 
of the century – deemed “the mother of all matters”. WajdÏ bases his arguments on “facts of 
natural sciences” and “precise sociological analysis”,416 and even argues against ending the 
practice of seclusion on the basis of the Larousse encyclopaedia and “the famous socialist 
philosopher Proudhon”, Auguste Comte, and other western thinkers.   
WajdÏ did not disagree with AmÏn’s premise that the elevation of women was essential to 
“the nation’s perfection and improving its social condition”, or that the current state of women 
was “unsuitable” and in need of “improvement that is suitable for this era” but “disagreed with 
anyone who believes in the necessity of following the model of any other nation in any of our 
vital issues, particularly that of women”.417 His main disagreement with AmÏn is on the latter’s 
apparent acceptance – more clearly so in his al-Mar’a al-JadÏda – that western civilisation was 
the highest model achieved by humanity, insisting instead that Islamic civilisation represents the 
perfect human civilisation, while at the same time employing the same tools of scientific 
positivism and theories of progress and development as AmÏn. Whereas AmÏn described the 
degraded state of Egyptian women in exaggerated terms in order to mobilise men to change it, 
WajdÏ, in his opposition to the proposed change, argued that “the only thing Muslim women 
need in order to reach the most perfect point possible for her kind is to learn the necessary 
principles of the sciences”.418 And while AmÏn idealised the position of western women, WajdÏ 
argued that “women in materialist civilisation are not perfect nor are they heading towards 
perfection despite their decorated appearance”.419 
WajdÏ referred to quotes similar to Shumayyil’s about the difference between men and 
women’s physical and mental abilities, emphasising men’s superiority. However, commenting 
on quotes regarding women’s preoccupation with beauty and indifference to injustice, WajdÏ 
argued that such attributes were not inherent, but were due to the lack of “true Islamic 
education”. He also argued that western thinkers quoted by AmÏn to support the identical natures 
of men and women are “the exception” while “woman remains there [in the west] the object of 
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the severe judgments of philosophers”.420 In fact, WajdÏ at times criticised the “extreme” 
harshness of western descriptions of women’s inferiority, although he still included such 
descriptions to strengthen his arguments. He argued that the only result of the calls for women’s 
liberation is the “mobilisation of the world’s scholars against those people [proponents of 
liberation] and making women a plaything in their mouths: One says she is in an infantile state, 
and another says she is not refined, and yet another says more, which pains us Muslims as our 
faith commands us to treat women well.”421 
Women’s “natural function” was summarised by WajdÏ as “preserving the human 
species”, i.e. “pregnancy, childbirth, breastfeeding, and upbringing”.422 Women’s work and 
political activism endanger that function and are thus “a rebellion against the laws of nature… a 
neglect of her natural function on which depend her perfection and happiness, and a 
preoccupation with what harms her and her society”.423 This argument is strengthened by 
numerous quotes from western thinkers about “the miserable and pitiful state” of working 
western women, and the social problems caused by their work.  
 Out of the book’s thirteen chapters, four are devoted to ^ij¥b, discussing whether it is 
necessary, beneficial, sustainable, and an obstacle to women’s accomplishment. ¤ij¥b – by 
which WajdÏ means segregation - is strongly defended as “the only guarantee for woman’s 
independence and freedom”.424 WajdÏ argued that women were “virtuous” and “more ethical”, 
but that ^ij¥b is necessary to protect them from men’s “evil” and “temptation”, which – 
responding to AmÏn’s argument – will not disappear even with education. WajdÏ also defended 
men’s right to maintain or end segregation, by virtue of their maintenance of women and 
provision for them, arguing – rightly – that even “women’s liberators, when they express their 
views or make their demands, only address men themselves”.425  
The primacy of the issue of segregation can be seen from the titles of the works of 
another of those who wrote prompt responses to Ta ^ rÏr al-Mar’a, the rising businessman and 
nationalist figure Talµat ¤arb, who wrote Tarbiyat al-Mar’a wa’l-¤ij¥b in 1899 and Fa|l al-
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Khi~¥b fi’l-mar’a wa’l ¤ij¥b in 1901. As is clear from the titles, what provoked men in AmÏn’s 
book was not the call for education, but the first explicit call for abandoning the custom of ^ij¥b 
or seclusion, and the feeling that social life and its hierarchy as they knew it was no longer 
secure. Secondly, it is also apparent that those who rejected and condemned Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a 
most strongly were figures from the Egyptian nationalist trend, whose priority was opposing 
British occupation first rather than weakening the current political or social structures. Both 
WajdÏ and ¤arb were associated with the nationalist leader Mu|~af¥ K¥mil, the editor of al-Liw¥’ 
which published critical reviews of the book. Thus, they presented a trend which shares Al-
NadÏm’s opposition to the ending of seclusion, but employs ‘modern’, ‘scientific’ western terms, 
rather than religious arguments.  
 
2.5.4 RashÏd Ri\¥, Al-Man¥r  and the New Muslim Woman? 
 
RashÏd Ri\¥, the Lebanese reformer who is most well known as Mu^ammad ¢Abduh’s 
biographer, collector of his works, and his closest disciple, was a regular contributor to debates 
in the Egyptian press, through his monthly journal Al-Man¥r, published between 1899 and 1935. 
Since its early years, Al-Man¥r, as a journal “the primary purpose of which is promoting the 
education of boys and girls”, 426  promoted girls’ education. Ri\¥, however, stressed the 
importance of the basis of such an education, which should be “in accordance with the guidance 
of Islam and the reform it has come with” rather than “as an imitation of the civilisation of 
Europe”.427  
Ri\¥ shared other reformers’ belief that a change in the state of women was necessary for 
the nation’s progress, and the belief in the importance of women’s education as a factor in the 
West’s progress: “When the people of Europe paid attention to the reform of their social matters 
and the advancement of their civil life, they paid attention to the upbringing and education of 
women, which had a great impact on their advancement and development”.428 The state of 
women had deteriorated because “Muslims did not give the principles established by Islam to 
elevate women the necessary attention to reach the level of perfection, just as they had done with 
                                                
426 Al-Man¥r, vol. 1, issue 1, Shaww¥l 1315, (February 1898) p. 11. 
427 ibid. 
428 Al-Man¥r,., vol. 2, issue 15 (24 June 1899), p. 332.  
118 
 
other general social principles… And what prevented them from that is nothing but the customs 
they inherited from their forefathers”.429  
The focus on re-organising homes and re-training mothers that became an essential part 
of the nationalist discourse in turn-of-the-century Egypt is found in Ri\¥’s Al-Man¥r which 
stressed the reformers’ belief that “current prosperity and the future happiness of the nation are 
achieved through the management and order of the home and the upbringing of the children, both 
of which are in the hands of women”.430 Al-Man¥r thus published numerous articles focusing on 
home management, health and hygiene, child psychology and education, including a serialised 
translation of Rousseau’s Emile. This was a common feature of publications of that time, which 
often had a section on “Woman and Family”, “Home Management”, “Woman & Child” which 
were often translations of entire articles or books from European sources. 
Considering the above views of Ri\¥’s, and his involvement in promoting girls’ 
education both in theory and in practice, as well as the fact that Q¥sim AmÏn was closely 
associated with Mu^ammad ¢Abduh, it is not surprising that he would devote many pages of his 
journal to the discussion of Q¥sim AmÏn’s books. Indeed Ri\¥ praised Q¥sim AmÏn as being 
among those who were closely associated with ¢Abduh, describing the three judges (AmÏn and 
Sa¢d and Fat^Ï Zaghloul) as “those of whom Egypt is proud and by whom one can demonstrate 
that Egyptians are worthy of governing themselves – who are among the Ust¥dh’s closest 
disciples”.431  
Although Ri\¥ praised AmÏn’s book, he appeared to sympathise with some of the book’s 
critics, particularly with regard to the issue of ^ij¥b, although it appears that he was more critical 
of AmÏn’s methods and arguments than with his conclusions. Ri\¥ agreed with AmÏn’s call for 
restricting the practice of ^ij¥b to the limits prescribed by the SharÏµa and for reducing the current 
social practice of seclusion – only after proper education. However, he disagreed with 
“expanding in elaborating on the harms of ^ij¥b, and on the behaviour of women after proper 
education, such as mixing with men and participating in their discussions and work”, not because 
he disagreed with those changes in principle, but because it “encouraged the westernised to 
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precipitate the imitation of western customs that they desire”.432  This mixed approach – 
supporting a gradual expansion of women’s rights, but fearing the “precipitation” and 
“exploitation” of that liberation and refusing to view the question of women outside of the 
conflict with “westernisation” is the one that still dominates most writings on “women’s rights in 
Islam”, where neither the colonialist or westernising project nor that of “resistance” to it have 
been willing to let go of the “liberation of women” as a weapon in their conflict. 
In contrast to AmÏn, Ri\¥ preferred that “whoever writes about reform should speak 
generally about matters which are not to be immediately implemented”,433 which is the way 
adopted by ¢Abduh. Ri\¥ wanted to downplay the controversial part of AmÏn’s book, and direct 
attention to the part that, to him, was more important. Thus he emphasised again that “the 
purpose of this book’s author cannot be rejected by any wise person who knows the position of 
his nation among other nations and is aware of its needs and of that which would revive it – that 
is the education of women”.434  
When AmÏn published his second book, which differed from his first in its emphasis on 
the superiority of western civilisation and the necessity of following its path, as well as basing 
his call on “scientific arguments” and “the laws of nature” rather than on a religious foundation, 
Ri\¥ still published a positive review praising the book and its author, and criticising its 
attackers. 435  He only disagreed with the emphasis on other causes of decline and the 
marginalisation of the role of religion in the process of reform.436 Ri\¥ again repeated the same 
criticism that “the author went to extremes in elaborating on the harms of strict application of 
^ij¥b and exaggerated greatly in making the success of Muslims dependent on removing the 
^ij¥b”.437  
The mixed praise, criticism, and justification with which Ri\¥ approached AmÏn’s books 
highlights the ambiguity of Muslim reformers vis-à-vis the calls for immediate radical changes, 
their preference of gradualism, of focusing on practical changes whose benefits are clear to all, 
and their avoidance of confronting the majority’s cherished customs. The relation between this 
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position and that of ¢Abduh, and the question of ¢Abduh’s alleged involvement in the writing of 
Ta^r Ïr al-Mar’a, will be addressed in later chapters.  
 
 
2.6 Women’s Discourses 
 
While I have, in the preceding sections, focused exclusively on “the woman question” in 
the writings of men – that is the discourse on women – I have done so not to marginalise the 
writings of women at the same time or preceding those of men – that is the discourse of women – 
but in order to position men’s writings in the context in which they were written and read at the 
time. In fact, despite the integration of the two discourses, particularly through the involvement 
of female figures in the nationalist movement, the writing of the history of ‘women’s liberation’ 
continued till very recently as a primarily male achievement. It was not until recently that 
historians and feminists studying the history of Middle-Eastern women’s movements started 
questioning the undisputed position of men like Q¥sim AmÏn as “the father of Arab 
feminism”.438 These criticised the exaggeration of the role of men, at the expense of women who 
wrote at the same time, preceding, and succeeding AmÏn, both on the reform of women and 
social reform in general, and who were critical of both those who wished to maintain old social 
customs despite their lack of religious legitimacy and harmful effects on women and on society, 
and those who took western women as the model of the required change. They also replaced the 
uncritical reading of the writings of male “liberators of women” as motivated by selfless 
sympathy with women, exposing instead their male-centredness, their expression of a male 
insecurity at a time of rapid change and foreign domination and a desire to reconstruct a modern 
man like AmÏn’s “modern man with modern tastes and aspirations” while projecting the old 
negative characteristics of “backward”, “ugly”, “disorderly” and “ignorant” on women, and their 
re-iteration of colonialist discourses on Muslim society and Muslim women. Some, like Leila 
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Ahmed, went as far as to call AmÏn the “son of Cromer and colonialism” rather than the “father 
of Arab feminism”.439 
Women’s writings were in the form of books – mostly collections of poems and 
biographical compendia – but particularly articles published both in newspapers (men’s press, as 
they were still owned, managed, edited and contributed to almost exclusively by men) - 
throughout the 1870s and 1880s, and later, starting from the 1890s, in women’s magazines. Just 
as the press in general developed rapidly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, so did 
women’ journals, catering for a growing number of literate women, and mostly covering, as well 
as biographies of women role models and news of women around the world, the new priority of 
the turn-of-the-century middle classes – the transformation of the Egyptian home, through 
instructing women on how to be modern, educated, hygienic mothers.  
Unlike men’s writings on the ‘woman question’, which typically addressed other men, 
women mainly wrote for each other, as their articles were mostly published in women’s 
magazines, but they did also write for men by submitting their articles to other papers. While 
male writers condemned the “appalling backwardness and ignorance” of Egyptian women, 
women generally did not dwell on the notion of female backwardness. Instead they lamented the 
restrictions imposed on women and their shared suffering. They generally discussed women’s 
happiness and suffering, while men like AmÏn focused on what causes men’s or the nation’s 
progress or decline. However, while women writers focused on the state of women, they did not 
limit themselves to promoting women’s rights as a “minority group”, but linked their state to 
social reform – particularly in later writings such as those of Malak ¤ifnÏ N¥|if and Nabawiyya 
M‰s¥. They also criticised the imitation of foreign women in superficial matters, rather than 
occupying themselves with practical reform matters, and criticised men’s admiration of 
European culture and European women, manifested in their marriage to European women, which 
women like Malak ¤ifnÏ N¥sif strongly criticised and wished to limit. Women writers like N¥sif 
expressed suspicion and exasperation with men’s criticism of and sometimes attacks on women, 
both traditional and modern: “Men should let us scrutinise their views and select those that are 
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most appropriate, rather than be as despotic about liberating us as they have been about enslaving 
us. We are weary of their despotism”.440 
Nevertheless, female writers did not explicitly call for equal economic and political rights 
with men, nor for identical roles. They affirmed basic gender differences, while arguing against 
women’s mental inferiority. They did not challenge men’s authority, preferring to appeal for 
men’s assistance.441 
Interestingly, while the issue of segregation or ^j¥b received the greatest attention of men 
in their discourse on women, women generally did not discuss unveiling – although in practice 
some of them uncovered their faces. Although they condemned restricting women to their homes 
and preventing them from access to education and “public women’s gatherings”, women writers 
generally did not discuss the matter of dress. This difference shows how while men’s discourse 
was more polarised between those who took the western woman as a model and those who 
wished to keep Egyptian women in their unchanged state, women’s discourse was more flexible 
and diverse. Later writers, such as Malak ¤ifnÏ N¥|if explicitly criticised men’s obsession with 
veiling and unveiling, advising women to be suspicious of men’s calls and their motivations.442  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
WOMEN, CREATION AND EQUALITY 
 
 
In this chapter I discuss the view of woman as an independent being and how the concept 
of “woman” is formed in relation, or opposition, to “man” in Mu^ammad µAbduh’s writings. 
This will be achieved primarily through an exploration of tafsÏr of al-Man¥r, with emphasis on 
the origins and nature of “woman” and to whether any “innate feminine qualities” are assumed. 
 
 
3.1 Creation: Equivalence and partnership, or inferiority and dependence? 
 
Several underlying perceptions of women that are strongly and deeply entrenched in the 
popular imagination can be traced to, or at least strongly reflect, some of the interpretations of 
the Creation Story.443  
Al-Baqara contains the longest passage in the Qur’an dealing with the creation of ®dam, 
his presentation along with his wife with the test of the Tree, and their subsequent exit from the 
Garden. It is primarily through these verses on the Creation, the Test, the Fall and the Exit that I 
analyse µAbduh’s interpretations as relates to the view of women.  
Just as the verses of the Qur’an go from the scene of the creation of ®dam, the dialogue 
with the angels and IblÏs’ (Satan’s) refusal to prostrate to ®dam, to another scene of ®dam and 
his wife in the Garden, Mu^ammad µAbduh goes from his discussion of the former to a 
discussion of the latter scene, without speculation on when, where and how ®dam’s wife was 
created. µAbduh, true to his exegetical methodology does not focus on historical details, but 
rather on the “moral” or “lesson” intended from the Qur’anic story, which in this case is that “the 
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happiness of this species was made dependent on following the guidance of God and its misery, 
on abandoning it”.444 
On the creation of ®dam’s wife, ¤aww¥’, µAbduh quotes verses that refer to the creation 
of spouses in a gender-neutral manner and with an emphasis on the creation of mutually-
dependent spouses from one another: 
As for His [God’s] saying in s‰rat Al-Nis¥’ ‘O mankind! Be careful of your duty to your 
Lord Who created you from a single soul and from it created its mate and from them 
twain hath spread abroad a multitude of men and women’, and in s‰rat Al-Aµr¥f ‘He it is 
Who did create you from a single soul, and therefrom did make his/her mate that he 
might take rest in her’, more than one of the mufassirÏn (exegetes) have said that the 
meaning is ‘from/of its own nature/species’, as He said in s‰rat Al-R‰m ‘And one of His 
signs is that He created mates for you from yourselves that you may find rest in them, and 
He put between you love and compassion’.445  
  
µAbduh then explicitly rejects common misinterpretations of the above verses, insisting 
instead that  “the meaning here is that He created spouses from the same nature as ours; it cannot 
be that what is meant is the creation of each wife from her husband’s body”. He further stresses 
that “there is no text in the Qur’an that obliges us to understand ‘And He created from it (minh¥) 
its spouse’ in that way, in order to be identical to Genesis”. The difference is that “the story in 
the Qur’an is not an historical narration as in the Torah that is in the hands of the people of the 
Book. Rather the Qur’an mentions it as a moral”.446  
µAbduh rejects the taf¥sÏr which, speculating on the creation of ¤aww¥’, and, finding 
details to satisfy their curiosity neither in the Qur’an nor in the Hadith, resorted to including 
biblical reports. Almost all traditional taf¥sÏr, even those that were free of any reports placing 
blame on ¤aww¥’ for ®dam’s fall from the Garden, nevertheless fell into the assumption of her 
creation out of ®dam’s rib. What is remarkable is that while most of the classical exegetes 
criticise isr¥Ïliyy¥t,447 that did not prevent them from all falling into the use of the same sources 
they had criticised in their introductions to their works of tafsÏr when it came to the Creation 
story, even if, at times, they commented that what they had included is baseless. This failure to 
refrain from avoiding such narrations both reveals the strength and wide acceptance of such 
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interpretations at the time, and explains the lasting influence of such images on popular 
conceptions of Eve and “her progeny”. It also reveals the harmful consequences of the 
distinction adopted by scholars between the precise scrutiny required with a^¥dÏth used for 
deducing a^k¥m (religious rulings) and the lack of strictness tolerated in relation to the use of 
Hadith in other areas such as tafsÏr and raq¥’iq (spiritual admonition), although the influence of 
the latter can be extremely harmful and lasting. 
The more or less ubiquitous nature of this assumption in classical tafsÏr, and the fact that 
µAbduh clearly relies on, and refers to, the classical tafsÏr authorities in his own work, imply that 
his decision not to include such a reference is a conscious one.  
As the author of The Qur’an and Women: a Liberation Reading notes, “universal history 
and the popular imaginary are marked in an indelible manner by the same belief that transcends 
time, cultural space, religious dogmas and the history of civilisations – this belief stipulates that 
Adam – as a man – was the first creation by God, and that Eve, the woman, was created from 
one of his ribs”.448 Moreover, the pervasive and lasting nature of this influence can be seen in the 
presence of such an image even in the writings of Egypt’s “Father of women’s emancipation”, 
Q¥sim AmÏn, who wrote that 
It is said in the religious narrations that are recorded in revealed books that God created 
Eve from ®dam’s rib, and that, I think, is a gentle symbol [pointing to the fact] that man 
and woman form one whole which can only be complete through their union. It is from 
this meaning that westerners took their naming of woman as man’s half, which is an 
eloquent expression clearly implying that woman and man are two parts of one body, 
each needing the other, in order to achieve completeness through union.449 
 
Whether this demonstrates AmÏn’s focus on practical changes rather than deeply-rooted 
psychological change, or whether it is a consequence of his unlimited admiration of everything 
western, such that he is less critical in his approach to western discriminatory notions than to 
‘eastern’ ones, requires a more complete analysis of his writings. However, AmÏn’s quote 
highlights the significance of µAbduh’s unprecedented emphasis on women’s independent origin 
and explicit rejection of her “derivative” origin. 
µAbduh’s recommended methodology in interpreting the Qur’an is  
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not to look at the different exegeses except to understand a single term the meaning of 
which among Arabs is unclear to you, or the connection between one term and another 
where the connection is lost to you; then go for what the Qur’an directs you to, and 
commit yourself to what it implies, and add to that seeking the Prophetic SÏra, restricting 
yourself to the reasonable (maµq‰l) and authentic, turning away from what is weak and 
rejected.450  
 
Thus his chosen interpretation of the verses on the creation of men and women agrees 
with his methodology of not relying on exogenous sources and restricting himself to the Qur’an 
as a first point of reference, followed by the authentic Hadith.451 Also, based on Charles ®dams’ 
conclusion that µAbduh’s two principal themes are the compatibility between reason and religion 
and between science and Islam,452 it is likely that one of his motivations in adopting this 
interpretation is “eliminating any fixed interpretation of the text, thus opening a vast space for 
freedom of enquiry and thought for the mind and scientific development, in such a way that the 
religious person does not fall into reservation, tension, rigidity or inflexibility”.453 
µAbduh’s explicit rejection of the traditional position with regards to the origin of women, 
and his appeal to other verses in the Qur’an and to rational arguments to reject such a view may 
point to an awareness of the importance and wider significance of this point. We also see signs of 
such an awareness in his chosen interpretation of the command to ®dam and ¤aww¥’ to dwell in 
the Garden: “And We Said: O ®dam, dwell you and your wife in the garden.”454 Most classical 
mufassirÏn commented on the ‘redundant’ “you” used in the command expression “dwell you 
and your wife”, emphasising that it is a grammatical necessity, since it is not correct to add 
“dwell and your wife” without the inclusion of “you” after the verb of command, and that “He 
[God] did not address them [women] at first to highlight that he [‘®dam’] is the one addressed 
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by the ruling, and that the ‘auxiliary’ follows it/is dependent on it”, according to Al-Bay\¥wÏ (d. 
1280), a classical 13th century scholar whose work was one of those taught at Al-Azhar.  
In contrast, µAbduh interprets this verse as a deliberate emphasis on the partnership 
between men and women. Having commented that “it is correct that ‘®dam’ may be a reference 
to the human species, just as the name of a tribe’s forefather is used to refer to the whole 
tribe”,455 he then explains why ®dam and his wife are both mentioned, even though such an 
interpretation would make the mention of ‘®dam’s wife’ unnecessary, 
It is to highlight comprehensiveness, and that woman’s capacity is like man’s capacity in 
all human matters; thus ordering ®dam and ¤aww¥’ to inhabit is amr takwÏn (a command 
referring to God’s will rather than human action); that is God created humans as males 
and females like so, and ordered them to eat whatever they wish, indicating permissibility 
of all good things and intuition to know what is good, and the prohibition of the tree is an 
indication of intuition of knowing what is evil, and that human nature requires disliking it 
and avoiding it.456 
 
 
3.2 Eve and Essential Feminine Characteristics 
  
The creation narrative does not only have implications for the matters of woman’s origin 
and her dependence or independence, but clearly also for her essential nature or characteristics. 
Classical taf¥sÏr which relied on biblical narrations fell into essentialising her as a ‘temptress’, 
associating her with the characteristics of betrayal, deception, and cunningness; and others go as 
far as linking such qualities to her physical peculiarities, by adopting the biblical presentation of 
menstruation and child-bearing as a curse and punishment for her role in causing ®dam’s 
disobedience and Fall.  
In the verse which appears five verses before the creation story, God enumerates His 
bounties to the believers in Paradise, among them having “purified spouses” (Al-Baqara 25). 
While the word for spouses (azw¥j) could refer to both male and female spouses, and the word 
“purified” can be understood to mean both physical and spiritual purification from all imaginable 
defects, as the word ‘purification’ is understood elsewhere in the Qur’an, the majority of works 
of classical tafsÏr opted for interpreting the expression to mean the purification of wives for their 
                                                
455 µAbduh, Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 144.  
456 ibid., vol. 4, p145. 
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husbands from physical impurities – particularly menstruation, and from character defects – 
particularly deception and cunningness. 
We find that although µAbduh interprets the ‘purification’ to be comprehensive “that there 
is no blameworthy physical impurity, including what is natural in this world such as 
menstruation and post-natal bleeding, nor any emotional/psychological defect”, he seems to fall 
into associating women with particular ‘defects’ “such as cunningness (makr) and plotting (kayd) 
or any bad morals because they have been purified in every way”.457  
However, this is an example of the persistent ambiguity in attributing TafsÏr Al-Man¥r 
literally to µAbduh. The above wording is the one found in Ri\¥’s complete TafsÏr Al-Man¥r, 
according to the 1999 edition,458 and µIm¥ra accepts the attribution to µAbduh.459 However, going 
back to the original publication of the commentary on this passage, which appeared on 27 
December 1901 in Al-Man¥r, we find the more general statement without any specification of 
any particular physical impurities or characteristics: “that is extremely cleansed and purified, 
such that there is nothing blameworthy about them such as uncleanliness or impurities because 
they have been purified in every way”.460 
This highlights the warning I discussed in the literature review, regarding the need to 
approach µAbduh’s writings with caution, particularly TafsÏr Al-Man¥r. As I had warned, while 
the compiler of µAbduh’s complete works criticises Ri\¥ for unnecessarily confusing his words 
and those of µAbduh, µIm¥ra himself did not completely succeed in his quest to carefully extract 
what µAbduh himself had said/written. The uncertainty regarding the above commentary on 
“purified spouses” (probably added by Ri\¥) is a case in point, and other examples will be 
mentioned later. 
                                                
457ibid., p. 105. In contrast, in S‰rat ®l µImr¥n, where Maryam, mother of Jesus is told by the angels that she has 
been “purified”, µAbduh differs from TafsÏr Al-Jal¥layn’s interpretation of “purification” to mean virginity or 
“freedom from the touch of man” [some classical works of tafsÏr interpreted “purified” to mean freedom from 
menstruation and virginity]. Instead µAbduh says that “what I chose is to take it to have a more general meaning, that 
is purified from anything that is considered negative such as bad morals or undesirable characteristics, etc.” (Aµm¥l 
vol. 5, p. 32).   
458 Al-Man¥r 1999, vol. 1, p. 194. Interestingly the 1985 abridged edition of Al-Man¥r in 3 volumes by Q¥\Ï 
Mu^ammad A^mad Kanµ¥n, revised by Zuhayr Al-Sh¥wÏsh adds a further quality “such as cunningness (makr), 
plotting (kayd) and jealousy (ghÏra)” vol. 1, p. 42. 
459 Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 105. 
460 Al-Man¥r, Issue 20, vol. 4, p. 772. 
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The inserted chosen characteristics expose the common emphasis of cunningness and 
plotting as inherent characteristics of women which can be found in various contexts in Islamic 
literature. It is used both as a justification for why they must be kept under control, and a 
consequence of their inherent weakness and dependence – that is, because women are weak and 
dependent, they have resorted to cunningness and plotting, since these are the weapon of the 
weak;461 because they are weak and dependent, they must be protected and maintained; and 
because they are cunning, they must be kept under control. Ironically some of those who called 
for women’s education, in the second half of the nineteenth century, also justified such a call by 
appealing to women’s nature, by stressing that among the benefits of education is that it “helps 
woman to struggle against/push away (mud¥faµa) deviant desires that are rooted in her by 
nature”462 (secular author Bu~rus al-Bust¥nÏ d. 1883), since “woman, without knowledge, is a 
great evil in the world, if not the greatest evil one can conceive of”.463 Similarly the failure of 
many of those – predominantly men – who promoted women’s education to address deeply-
rooted conceptions of women as inferior and culpable beings, can be seen in another member of 
the prominent al-Bust¥nÏ family,464 a contemporary of µAbduh, SalÏm al-Bust¥nÏ who wrote that 
“the first woman to be mentioned in the oldest sacred histories is our mother Eve, who lost the 
Bliss of Eden by eating from the fruit and feeding our father ®dam from it. And most men are 
easily led like their forefather”,465 again emphasising women’s power to mislead and corrupt, 
despite their weakness. The quotes show that view was far from restricted to conservative 
religious scholars. 
Although we cannot entirely be sure about the attribution of the above interpretation, we 
find that elsewhere, µAbduh deliberately rejects other essentialising descriptions of women – here 
the assumption that women are associated with excessive desire and sexual degeneracy. While 
commenting on the command to divorced women to “maintain/hold themselves” (Al-Baqara, 
228), he rejects those who “claimed that the meaning of ‘tarabbu| bi’l anfus’ is to restrict them 
                                                
461 For instance, ShibilÏ Shumayyil wrote that “it is a matter of consensus that woman is … more cunning than man, 
and more deceptive, because she is weaker than him, and trickery and deception are the weapon of the weak” 
(quoted in Ha|¥d al-Fikr al-µArabÏ fÏ Qa\¥y¥ al-Mar’a, p. 97). 
462D¥ya, Al-Muµallim Bu~rus Al-Bust¥nÏ, Dir¥sa wa wath¥’iq, Beirut: Mansh‰r¥t Majallat Fikr, 1981, p. 74.  
463 ibid., p. 79. 
464 µAbduh was familiar with the Syrian literary circles in Egypt. An example is a letter written by him that was read 
at the ceremony to celebrate the completion of the Iliad’s translation by Salm¥n al-Bust¥nÏ. 
465 Quoted in ¤as¥d al-Fikr al-µArabÏ al-¤adÏth  fÏ Qa\¥y¥ al-Mar’a, p. 83. 
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and prevent them from falling under the control of forbidden desire, and who justified that on the 
basis that women are more ‘desirous’ than men. Some of them estimated this severity and 
excessiveness to be many times that of men and went into detail in measuring it”.466 He strongly 
condemns such claims as “rejected and among the worst of sayings, without any knowledge or 
proof, for men have been and still are the ones who seek after women and desire them, and then 
they wrong them further by controlling their natures and judging their feelings, and then they 
follow one another in such opinions”.467 Here we find µAbduh’s more critical side, which rejects 
widespread (but baseless) views, and criticises patriarchal interpretations that on the one hand 
exclude women, and on the other speak on their behalf. We also find his more sympathetic side 
to women, representing women as “wronged”, rather than “culprits” and “temptresses”.  
This exaggeration of women’s sexual ‘zeal’ has also manifested itself in Muslim writers 
and scholars’ social critiques which focus on social degeneracy/immorality and corruption, 
blaming these on women’s seductive powers. In contrast, overall, we find a more sympathetic 
attitude to women in Mu^ammad µAbduh’s writings, who often blames men for low standards of 
social morality.468 This departs from the tendency of some earlier, and later, writings which link 
woman to sexuality and desire, instead presenting her as a human being and social actor. The 
focus on women’s purity and sexuality is, according to Soha Abdel-Kader, manifested in 
practices such as female circumcision and ‘virginity tests’. However, she writes that, although a 
lot has been written on the former, not much has been written on the latter: 
Closely related to the strict code of purity and chastity of village culture is the virginity 
test whereby a bridegroom or midwife on the wedding night, using the finger or a sharp 
object, breaks the virgin bride’s hymen and then publicly, amid jubilation and cheering, 
displays the resulting blood on a white kerchief or scarf… If the practice of female 
circumcision is shrouded in secrecy, the virginity test rites are even more so. Not a single 
source, old or new, even makes brief reference to the practice.469 
                                                
466 Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 618. For instance, Al->abarsÏ in Majmaµ al-Bay¥n quotes from Kit¥b al-Nubuwwa that ®dam 
was created from mud and Eve from ®dam. Man’s zeal (himma) is for mud and water while the zeal of women is 
for man” (in Haddad & Smith p. 141, Hibri A. ed. Woman and Islam). See also ShiblÏ Shumayyil “Man eats more 
than the woman, but she is greedier, that is she has a greater appetite than his” in ¤as¥d al-Fikr al-µArabÏ  fÏ Qa\¥y¥ 
al-Mar’a, p. 93. 
467 Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 618. 
468 See for instance µAbduh, al-Aµm¥l al-k¥mila, vol. 2, p. 42. Also see µAbduh’s severe criticism of men’s habits and 
obscene discussions, p. 46. 
469 Soha Abdelkader, Egyptian women in a changing society 1899-1987, p. 37. Interestingly, Judith Tucker notes in 
her study of eighteenth-century fatawa that “the muftis were unanimous in their condemnation of the practice of 
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However, this ignores µAbduh’s strong and explicit condemnation of this practice in his 
discussion of wedding rites in Egyptian villages, where in fact he describes the practice of 
‘virginity tests’ as part of rural wedding rites, with extreme derision and condemnation.470 
Also, µAbduh departs from and explicitly disagrees with the link between ‘menstruation’ 
and ‘uncleanliness’ and other negative descriptions, established in classical interpretation of 
another verse of Al-Baqara. After defining menstruation as a natural healthy process, µAbduh 
explains the command in the verse to refrain from engaging in marital relations during the 
menstrual period because it can cause discomfort and harm particularly to the wife. He criticises 
the widely used tafsÏr of Al-Jal¥l for interpreting “‘adh¥’ as uncleanliness, following [the 
interpretation of] others, whereas its apparent meaning - \arar [harm] – is medically confirmed, 
hence there is no need to adopt another meaning.”471  
 
 
3.3 Testimony and Gender Difference 
 
An obvious issue that is directly relevant to the discussion of women’s characteristics is 
that of women’s testimony, and the various interpretations of the verse dealing with that issue, 
again in the chapter of Al-Baqara.472 Classical tafsÏr discussed two main points that are relevant 
to this discussion. The first is the meaning of “an ta\illa i^d¥hum¥ fa tudhakkira i^d¥hum¥ al-
ukhr¥”,473 almost unanimously understanding “ta\illa” to mean “forgetfulness” on the part of one 
of the two women, which is the cause of the need for the other woman to “tudhakkira” or remind 
her. The second point is that they speculated on the reason for women’s “forgetfulness”, which 
                                                                                                                                                       
testing a bride’s virginity on her wedding night and returning her to her family should she fail… Virginity or lack 
thereof on the part of the bride was irrelevant, according to the muftis, to the constituting of a marriage”, p. 67.  
470 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 99. 
471  ibid., vol. 4, 606. 
472 O you who believe! when you deal with each other in contracting a debt for a fixed time, then write it down; and 
let a scribe write it down between you with fairness; and the scribe should not refuse to write as Allah has taught 
him, so he should write; and let him who owes the debt dictate, and he should be careful of (his duty to) Allah, his 
Lord, and not diminish anything from it; but if he who owes the debt is unsound in understanding, or weak, or (if) he 
is not able to dictate himself, let his guardian dictate with fairness; and call in to witness from among your men two 
witnesses; but if there are not two men, then one man and two women from among those whom you choose to be 
witnesses, so that if one of the two errs/forgets, the second of the two may remind the other. (Qur’an, 2:282) 
473 “so that if one of the two errs, the second of the two may remind the other” (Qur’an, 2:282). 
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they attributed to her essential nature, which inevitably leads to forgetfulness. This of course 
raised the question of why, if it is so inevitable, could one expect that the testimony of two 
women, both so likely to forget, could be relied upon, a question which some ignored, and others 
justified by using the logic of probability – that two are more likely than just one to reach the 
required level necessary for completing the testimony.  
µAbduh departs from the classical interpretations in this case, in a way that is quite 
innovative, yet at the same time does not take his chosen logic to its ultimate conclusion. 
Although in tackling the second point – that of the reason for the need for two women – he 
differs from classical mufassirÏn, in his approach to the first (understanding the word “ta\illa”), 
he prefers to rely on the unusual interpretation of the classical mufassir al->abarsÏ. Here we find 
the characteristic feature of the reformist school after µAbduh – that of calling for ijtih¥d in 
reaching new interpretations unbound by those reached by previous scholars, but without 
rejecting all the rich heritage of Islamic sciences. This feature of the reformist school has been 
accused of selective taqlÏd or termed talfÏq (patching) by some, while the reformist school insists 
it is a conscious characteristic of their school that is in harmony with their view of tajdÏd not as a 
destruction of the past, but as an activation of the early freedom of ijtih¥d, and a ‘purification’ of 
Islamic heritage from ‘external influences’ that are not intrinsic to the text. µAbduh, thus, wrote 
 
Some said that it means: in case one of the two testimonies is lost (ta\illa) from one of 
the two women, so that the other woman reminds her; thus they took the first “i^d¥hum¥” 
(one of the two) to refer to the testimony and the second to refer to the woman. Al-
>abarsÏ supported this by holding that forgetting the testimony is not called ‘\al¥l’ 
because ‘\al¥l’ means ‘\ay¥µ’- loss – and a woman cannot be lost, and used as proof for 
the distinction between ‘\al¥l’ and forgetfulness (‘nisy¥n’) God’s saying ‘\all‰ µann¥” 
and “l¥ ya\illu rabbÏ wa l¥ yans¥’ (S‰rat >¥h¥, 52).474 
 
µAbduh’s student and compiler of his tafsÏr, Mu^ammad RashÏd Ri\¥, wrote as a footnote 
to this that “al-Im¥m approved this opinion by mentioning it”.475  
Having eliminated the issue of forgetfulness as essential to women, there remained the 
need to justify the need for two women. µAbduh’s interpretation has offered those wishing to 
reach a new interpretation of this verse decades after µAbduh, the basis and the logic to follow in 
                                                
474 µAbduh, Aµm¥l, vol.4, p. 752. 
475 Al-Man¥r, vol. 9, p. 408. 
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their quest. Although, as previously stated, µAbduh does not take his logic to its ultimate 
conclusion, it is significant because it has provided his successors with the necessary tools. 
µAbduh wrote: 
MufassirÏn spoke about this, and took its cause to be [women’s] nature/constitution (al-
miz¥j). Thus, they said the woman’s miz¥j is affected by cold causing forgetfulness, 
which is unproven (ghayr mu^aqqaq). The real reason is that women are not usually 
involved in financial transactions and other dealings, and hence their memory in this field 
tends to be weak, while it is not so in domestic matters which is their [principal] 
field/occupation where their memory is stronger than men’s. That is, it is the norm for 
humans, males and females, that their memory is stronger in matters that are part of their 
interest and in which they are often involved.476 
 
The contextualisation of the text and linking it to social and historical conditions, rather 
than to physical or psychological qualities, implies that it is changeable rather than fixed, 
universal and eternal. However, this important principle established here by µAduh is not only 
undeveloped by not insisting on its immediate application, but by further suggesting that, in fact, 
this historical and social norm – women’s exclusion from financial matters – though not 
inevitable or eternal – has not in fact changed at the time of µAbduh’s writing. The commentary 
adds: “This [women’s unfamiliarity with financial transactions] is not contradicted by the 
involvement of some foreign women nowadays in financial matters, for it is uncommon, and 
nothing can be based on it, since general rulings are based on the majority in things and the norm 
in them”.477  
It is not clear whether this stance is due to µAbduh’s caution about the use of 
‘contextualisation’ of the text and how far it can taken, his attachment to the status-quo and 
refusal to accept – or his inability to foresee – its change, or to his considered judgment that 
society had not in fact changed so much to require a change of ruling in this matter, though it 
may be the case at some point in the future. This caution and avoidance of immediate change are 
features not specific to µAbduh, but also shared by those who are closely identified with the 
women’s liberation movement such as Q¥sim AmÏn. 478  This further underlines µAbduh’s 
                                                
476 µAbduh, Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 752. 
477 ibid., vol. 4, p. 752.  
478 For example AmÏn is careful to stress that he is “not among those who call for equality between men and women 
in education”, Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a, p.90. 
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pragmatic and gradualist approach, and that in many ways, he was not always revolutionary, but 
a man of his time.  
However, again reflecting those who emphasised the latent effects of µAbduh’s thought 
and methodology, it is worth noting that those clearly influenced by µAbduh did eventually 
develop his analysis to argue that the testimony of women in financial matters should be 
accepted, in view of the fact that women have become more involved in financial matters, as 
Ma^m‰d Shalt‰t did half a century later.479  
Again, here, caution is recommended. The publication of this part of the tafsÏr appeared 
in Al-Man¥r in July 1906,480 that is after µAbduh’s death. Hence, although µIm¥ra accepts its 
attribution to µAbduh, it is not absolutely certain, given the fact that Ri\¥ added further 
comments on the issue (found in Ri\¥’s complete tafsÏr, but not in µIm¥ra’s edition), and the fact 
that the sentence “This is not contradicted by the involvement of some…” appears at the end of a 
paragraph which started with “Al-Ust¥dh Al-Im¥m said…” (to distinguish from the preceding 
paragraphs which were Ri\¥’s), and the paragraph following that sentence also started with “Al-
Ust¥dh Al-Im¥m said…”, which may indicate that the sentence was Ri\¥’s inserted comment in 
the middle of µAbduh’s words. Another possible indication is the fact that the only punctuation 
mark in the (long) paragraph at the end of which the sentence appears is the full-stop before the 
beginning of the sentence in question, possibly indicating that is separate from the rest of the 
paragraph. 
The image that emerges from the study of µAbduh’s tafsÏr of the selected verses is one of 
women as independent individuals, essentially possessing the potential to be equal to men in 
terms of human characteristics. However, that may not be the case in reality, due to various 
factors, notably among which in µAbduh’s view is education. Thus it is important to distinguish 
between µAbduh’s view of how women are, and how they could be. The distinction helps us to 
understand apparent contradictions between µAbduh’s statements which emphasise gender 
equality, and others – as we shall see in later chapters – that accept apparent discrimination. The 
former apply to an ideal situation while the latter apply to reality. This reminds us of his 
comment on the command to ®dam and his wife, where he emphasised the partnership between 
                                                
479 See Zebiri, Ma^m‰d Shalt‰t, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 64. 
480 Al-Man¥r, vol. 9, p. 407-409. 
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them on this earth, stressing that “woman’s capacity is like man’s capacity in all human matters”. 
However this partnership and equality may be more of an image aspired to than an actual reality. 
Nevertheless, what is clear is µAbduh’s desire to clarify principles and sound 
understanding of the text, alongside the promotion of specific practical rulings. While the latter 
must be gradual, realistic, prioritised, and with consideration for the context of its application, 
the former is fundamentally important because it is less constrained, yet no less important as it is 
the foundation of later practical developments. This is expressed explicitly in the following 
statement demonstrating µAbduh’s understanding of the relationship between the text and context 
in the process of reform: 
 
People, because of their ignorance of all dimensions of social interests, used to see no 
importance for women in the success or corruption of social life, until revelation taught 
them [about it]. However, people, in each era, take from the revelation as much as they 
are ready for. Indeed the rulings brought by the Quran for reforming the state of homes 
through good treatment of women have not been completely implemented by the umma, 
but it has rather forgotten most of it nowadays, and has gone back to the ignorance of the 
j¥hiliyya.481 
 
In the above context, one realises the importance of µAbduh’s confrontation of set 
prejudices and stereotypical views of women and social practices supported by those views, 
through his re-interpretation of verses related to the origins, essence, qualities and independence 
of women. His re-interpretations of these themes were often novel and daring, with a clear aim of 
challenging and discrediting the view of women as dependent beings possessing essential and 
unchanging negative and threatening qualities. That tendency is significant since it was not only 
rare in the context of tafsÏr – whether by classical scholars or µAbduh’s own contemporaries – but 
also seen in the context of other social, cultural, legal and political writings at the time, including 
by non-religious authors seen as liberal figures and pioneers of women’s liberation, who, 
nevertheless, failed to challenge some of these views or even reiterated them.  
Also interestingly, sensitivity to the profound roots of internalised, sub-conscious norms 
and degrading views of women based on specific interpretations of religious texts on women’s 
origin and nature is found more prominently in women’s writings in the 19th century. Writings 
by men, including reformists who criticised the situation of women and sought to “liberate” 
                                                
481  Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 644.  
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them, often focused primarily on education and to a secondary extent on legal reform, often 
paying little attention to religious and cultural bases for degrading views of women.  
This realisation and re-interpretation of such verses in order to challenge and change 
prevailing social norms based on religious and cultural perceptions, will become more prominent 
and visible in subsequent modernist tafsÏr,482 as well as feminist writings, based on a conviction 
that “even though a Qur’anic hermeneutics cannot by itself put an end to patriarchal, 
authoritarian, and undemocratic regimes and practices, it nonetheless remains crucial”. 483 
Abduh’s contribution to the reinterpretation of these verses, thus paved the way for later efforts 
to “contest readings of the Qur’an that justify the abuse and degradation of women” and to 
“establish the legitimacy of liberatory readings”.484 
  
                                                
482 For instance tafsÏr works by µAbduh’s student Mu^ammad Shalt‰t, Tunisian scholar Mu^ammad >¥hir Ben 
µAshour’s Al-Ta^rÏr wal-TanwÏr, Mu^ammad Husayn >aba~aba’Ï’s tafsÏr, and others. 
483 Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam: Unreading Patriarchal Interpretations of the Qur'ān, Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 2002, p. 2. 
484 ibid., p. 3. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT 
 
 
4.1 Marriage & the Islamic Family System in µAbduh’s Thought 
 
Since his earliest articles published in al-Waq¥iµ al-Mi|riyya, through his TafsÏr al-Man¥r 
and work as a judge, and his pronouncements as Grand Mufti, the issues of the family and its 
reform have figured prominently in µAbduh’s reform project. His interest in this field can be 
traced back to a number of factors. First, µAbduh’s rural upbringing – where family values are 
sacred and family solidarity is fundamental to social and economic life – certainly influenced his 
concern about the upholding of family values, and alarm at the disintegration of traditional 
family ties. Of course, this is not divorced from the traditional Islamic promotion of marriage 
and family building where the family institution is seen as the basic social building block and a 
bulwark against social discord and disorganisation.485 Moreover, µAbduh’s focus on education 
and social reform rather than political change clearly led him to focus on the family as the 
starting point for reform. Finally, µAbduh’s professional career, with his involvement in ift¥’ and 
Shariµa courts where a large number of cases were related to family law must have reinforced his 
belief in the primacy of this field. Of Abduh’s 944 recorded fat¥w¥, 100 are related to family law 
(while 727 were related to financial dealings, including inheritance, waqf, guardianship, wills, 
women’s financial independence, etc. which are also related to the family).486 
 
 
 
 
                                                
485 See Judith Tucker, In the House of Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine. 
486 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 485-6. Similarly Judith Tucker in her study of Ottoman court records notes the high percentage 
of court cases in Shariµa courts related to family law. 
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4.1.1 Definition of marriage 
 
The juristic definition of marriage in Islam – although not a controversial matter 
classically since classical books of Islamic jurisprudence do not always provide definitions and 
the emphasis is on legal rulings – has come under severe criticism for reducing marriage to a 
contract that resembles a sale or property exchange. As early as Q¥sim AmÏn, this criticism was 
raised by non-jurists against jurists who often defined marriage as “a contract through which the 
man takes possession of the woman’s sexual parts, not finding a single word implying that there 
is anything between the husband and wife other than enjoyment of the fulfilment of physical 
desire, and devoid of any reference to the moral duties that constitute the greatest expectations 
two cultured people could seek in one another”.487  
The criticism is based on the definition, adopted by some scholars, which uses the word 
“possession/ownership” (milk), specifically of “enjoyment of the woman”, as well as the 
consequent acceptance of the use of words implying possession, granting/gifting or sale in the 
contract of marriage. µAbduh’s discussion of marriage accepts that the physical aspect of 
marriage is a fundamental one, as he builds his arguments for the need for marriage on that basis, 
like all classical discussions of marriage, which all start from the need for procreation through 
the fulfilment of sexual desire.  
 However, he regards the identification between marriage and sale as having no relation to 
the Islamic view, as he identifies that to be a feature of the pre-Islamic Arabian view of marriage, 
which the Qur’an came to modify, in order “to contest the previous convictions of not taking the 
marital bond seriously, as they used to see it as a contract of slavery or sale or rent of cheap and 
precious commodities, or rather they used to regard it as even below that”.488 It is for that reason 
that “their habituation to such maltreatment and familiarity with it cannot be undermined except 
by glorifying the matter of marriage and emphasising its importance through promises of reward 
and warnings of punishment, for it is not easy for the man who used to regard his wife as a maid 
or below that, to make her equal to himself simply through a command”.489  
 
                                                
487 Q¥sim AmÏn, Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a,  included by µIm¥ra in Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 70. 
488 ‘Abduh, Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 639. 
489 ibid., p. 640. 
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4.1.2 Purpose of marriage 
 
As early as 1881 µAbduh published an article entitled “Humans’ Need for Marriage”. 490 
µAbduh starts from the recognition of the natural instinct “to seek association and procreation”, 
as a divinely instituted attribute in order to preserve the continuity of the human species, and 
facilitate cooperation to bring about benefit and avoid harm for one’s spouse and relatives. In this 
he does not differ from the traditional Islamic positive view of sexuality as a natural and 
legitimate human need that is to be fulfilled within the institution of marriage.  
µAbduh’s discussion of the need to build a family attempts to rationalise this need away 
from the textual sources and purely on the basis of reason and logic. To address the question of 
the invalidity of unrestricted fulfilment of sexual desires, µAbduh starts from the necessity of the 
“exclusivity of pleasure” and the “unique attachment that necessitates the unique pledge of 
cooperation”,491 for the ideal preservation and development of the human race.  
µAbduh concludes from the above arguments that “humans’ happiness in their life, and 
the preservation of their existence in this world, are dependent on the restriction of that desire 
through a rule that regulates its use, sets limits at which each individual must stop, and 
necessitates the exclusivity between the husband and wife, thus avoiding transgression, and 
demonstrating the exclusive commitment between each individual and his wife, and between 
each wife and her husband”. The result is that “each seeks the good of his spouse”, which is a 
social necessity, to which all “revealed laws” have devoted attention, specifying laws governing 
the contracting of marriages, enjoining good companionship between the spouses, and preserving 
the stability of the home through fulfilling “the obligations and needs of each member”. And 
since the aim is to form new bonds in society, marriage within the closest degrees of kinship is 
prohibited, and it is recommended that it be between two unrelated families, to form new 
common interests, making all individuals “turned towards the focus of unity and solidarity, 
freeing people from the pain of discord and evil of hatred”.492  
Clearly family solidarity, within the extended family, is recognised as a principal purpose 
of marriage and a social mechanism of the greatest importance. In his tafsÏr of verse 4:36, 
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491 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 66-67. 
492 ibid., p. 69. 
140 
 
µAbduh outlines how one’s responsibility extends, in a progressive way, from one’s duties to 
one’s parents, to duties to one’s extended family, all the way to needy members of society, in a 
way that unites and strengthens society as a whole: 
If a person fulfils his duties to God, such that his creed is correct and deeds are good, then 
fulfils the rights of parents such that his state and theirs are good, the unity of nuclear 
families – composed of parents and offspring – ensues, and as a result of its uprightness, 
this unit gains strength. Then, if it helps other units related to it through family ties, and 
they in turn help it, these mutually-cooperative households acquire a great strength 
enabling them to help those needy people who have no relatives who can spare them the 
need to (seek help from) those unrelated to them.493 
 
In a second article, on the “Benefits of marriage-based family ties”, µAbduh emphasises 
the equivalence of blood ties and marriage ties, necessitating the same rights, rulings and respect 
associated with blood ties. µAbduh does not regard this emphasis on marriage as a means for 
bond-building as specific to Islam, noting that this was a prominent feature of human societies. 
Thus µAbduh’s discussions of marriage tend to emphasise the social function of marriage, 
as leading to the building of a family and the provision of an environment in which children are 
educated, and a set of social ties that promote solidarity and cooperation in society. Thus, 
marriage is defined by “the trusting companionship between the two spouses, and their joint 
seeking of a single goal, that is preserving themselves and their progeny, and providing whatever 
is necessary for protecting them, developing them, and taking them to the point at which they can 
be independent”.494 As Judith Tucker noted in her study of Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman 
Syria and Palestine analysing the work of three prominent muftis, marriage is primarily seen as a 
means “to channel and fulfil the sexual drives of both men and women”495 which “institutes 
arrangements of shared nurture and rights of sexual companionship”.496 However, the social 
dimensions, although not so prominent in the classical discussions of marriage where “no larger 
purpose is made explicit”, are not completely absent, as “the consistent valuing of marriage for 
all members of the community, the emphasis on matches that respect social barriers, the close 
attention to the material details of the arrangements, and the recognition that marriage channels 
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powerful sexual drives all point to an institution that serves the needs not just of the two 
individuals but of a community”.497 
µAbduh repeatedly characterises the relationship between husband and wife as a 
‘partnership’ and a “pledge of co-operation”, to enable “pregnancy and procreation which is the 
purpose of marriage”,498 and the protection and perfect development of that progeny. Thus, while 
marriage legitimately fulfils the natural “need for pleasure and association”, “the purpose of 
marriage is not merely fulfilling the physical desire, but rather the purpose is the pledge between 
the two spouses to share all life matters and unite in everything.499 The function of marriage as a 
mechanism of cooperation and procreation is emphasised in the interpretation of the wisdom of 
creating humans in pairs “male and female, in order to achieve companionship and cooperation 
for a happy life, protecting offspring and perfecting their development”.500 
Alongside this ‘functional’ view of marriage emphasising its social dimension, µAbduh 
also highlights, particularly in the TafsÏr, its religio-ethical and emotional dimensions. Arguing 
that marriage is not only a purely juristic matter, but rather “a matter of religion and a means for 
reward and closeness to God”,501 he held – in contrast to the view of some classical scholars – 
that “the Muslim cannot leave marriage with the intention of worship and drawing nearer to God, 
because He, may He be glorified, has mentioned to us His blessing that He created for us from 
amongst ourselves spouses to find tranquillity therein, and has further instructed us to ask him, as 
in the verse, “‘O our Lord, bestow on us, from our spouses and our children, a coolness for our 
eyes’… Thus cohabitation, through legitimate marriage, in the way leading to procreation is 
among the greatest forms of worship”.502  
Moreover, for µAbduh, the relationship between husband and wife is not purely a physical 
one, nor is it merely a mechanical bond for specific social and economic purposes. Rather, “the 
marriage bond is the strongest bond and most deeply rooted in human nature”,503 through “the 
mercy that God has instilled between men and women”. 504  The intimate nature of this 
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relationship is such that “each shares all his/her secrets with the other, knowing all about them, 
and affection takes root between them”,505 to the extent that “the man unites with his wife, and 
the woman with her husband, through the amalgamation of souls and the unity of interest, until it 
is as if each has become the other”.506 This unity is reflected in the fact that “both the husband 
and wife are called ‘zawj’ [spouse], taking into account the fact that they are in essence a single 
‘zawj’ [pair] composed of two elements which were then joined to become one in essence, 
though in appearance they are two. Thus, a single term was used for both to imply that the 
plurality of form does not contradict the unity of essence”.507 
Linking marriage to one of his ever-present preoccupations and a principal tool for 
reform in his view, µAbduh associates the success of marriage with education. The benefits of 
marriage can only be realised if people understand the fundamental purpose of marriage and 
follow divine guidance in this regard, such that “each spouse believes with certainty that he/she 
only joins his/her spouse in order to be a pillar of happiness for him/her and an aid to fulfil the 
human function of preserving progeny and taking them to the level of perfection”.508 Such 
understanding can only follow from “the good upbringing of both males and females, their spirits 
adorned with virtues and their minds with true knowledge”509 which makes the focus of the 
spouses the preservation of their progeny and that of their relatives their support in that mission. 
With people’s minds unaware of divine wisdom and occupied with temporary pleasures, 
marriage ties have turned into a “cause for enmity and severe rivalry”510. The cause is the failure 
of education and the weakness of minds – as marital problems are either due to the woman’s 
ignorance, which is due to her lack of education, or the mistreatment of the husband’s family, 
due to their lack of good judgment.511 This disintegration of marital ties, at all social levels, has 
weakened society, as individuals seek their own interest and abandon any concern for the public 
good. 
µAbduh’s alarm at this breakdown of the social function of marriage and the 
disintegration of family ties is clear in the strong terms he uses in his criticism, going as far as to 
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accuse Egyptian practices in this regard of embodying nothing of the Qur’anic view of marriage 
and family.512 µAbduh believed this crisis was particularly alarming in Egypt: 
Natural ties – through marriage and all forms of relations – have become the weakest in 
Egypt, and the most deteriorated out of all countries. Whoever looks at their state, and 
observes the disputes, arguments and mutual harm between spouses, and their mutual 
plotting, thinks that these are not from among the people of the Qur’an, and even deems 
them all to be of no religion or law, but rather their gods are their whims, and their laws 
are their desires, and further notes that dealings between traders in business are better 
regulated and respected than is the case in marriage, and are stronger ties than the ties of 
marriage.513  
 
The “weakening and breakdown of the marital bond in our times” has, according to 
µAbduh “reached an unprecedented level unseen in any previous time in Islamic history” as a 
result of “the spouses’ corrupted nature and breaking God’s limits from the two sides”.514 
 
 
4.2 Arranging Marriage 
 
Marriage and family life in nineteenth century Egypt – and the rest of the Arab and 
Muslim worlds – have recently become the subjects of various studies, exploring the extent to 
which customs have changed upon the arrival of ‘modernity’ or remained ruled by ‘tradition’. 
While the pre-twentieth-century Arab family is often thought of as having been uniformly 
extended rather than nuclear, and arranged by family rather than based on spouses’ choice, more 
recent research, based on court records, by historians such as Judith Tucker, Beshara Doumani, 
Philippe Fargues, Kenneth Cuno, Afaf Marsot and others, questions the view of Arab marriage 
and family as uniform and unchanged until contact with Europe. 
Nevertheless, the end of the nineteenth century, as seen in an earlier chapter, did witness 
a thriving debate on “the woman question”, which touched on the subjects of marriage 
arrangements. Authors such as Q¥sim AmÏn called for more opportunities for prospective 
partners to meet and become familiar with one another in order for marriage to be based on love 
and friendship. As for µAbduh, who made numerous proposals for the reform of family courts, 
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and the reform of laws relating to marriage and divorce, little research has been conducted on his 
exact views on how marriage is to be arranged. The rare studies that go beyond general 
statements on µAbduh’s family reforms propose that “µAbduh recommended that the practice of 
arranged marriage be discarded”.515 However, such claims are in fact based on AmÏn’s writings, 
some of which have been attributed to µAbduh. Since that attribution is far from certain, it is wise 
to seek µAbduh’s view through analysis of other sources. This section seeks to shed light on 
µAbduh’s views on the principal and controversial principle of marriage guardianship, based on 
his tafsÏr, fat¥w¥, and other relevant writings. 
 
4.2.1 Verse 2:232 – Guardianship 
 
Though marriage is “among the greatest forms of worship” and “the strongest bond and 
most deeply rooted in human nature”,516 it is juristically a civil contract between consenting 
parties.517 As such, discussions of the marriage contract in fiqh involve the eligibility of the 
parties, their legal capacity, the conditions for the contract’s validity, continuity and dissolution, 
etc.  
The discussion of the marriage contract classically centred around two principal – and 
closely interlinked – matters: al-Awliy¥’ wa’l Akf¥’ – “Guardians and Suitable Partners”,518 two 
topics of wide differences between scholars. The divergence fundamentally begins with the 
interpretation of a number of verses and narrations, with one group concluding that a woman 
may in principle conduct her own marriage contract, and the second requiring her guardian to 
conduct the contract as a condition for its validity – while seeking the woman’s acceptance (if 
she is not a minor, and in the opinion of some, only if she has not previously been married). 
Kaf¥’a (eligibility of the suitor) is then introduced as a way of preserving the woman’s 
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guardian’s involvement in the matter of her marriage (as well as a way of limiting the guardian’s 
authority). 
In Egypt, where the Hanafi madhhab had become the official madhhab in the judicial 
system, the most common Hanafi opinion was officially adopted: that an adult woman may 
conduct her own marriage contract, but her guardian can demand that the marriage be annulled if 
the husband is of lower status, or if the mahr is below that due to her peers. This was the view 
adopted in QadrÏ Pasha’s proposed Code of Personal Status.519 Whether this opinion was 
followed in practice – i.e. whether women often married without their guardians’ consent, or 
whether social custom – and the prevalence of the Maliki and Shafiµi madh¥hib which were still 
followed in matters of ritual rather than the official madhhab – meant that the majority of 
marriages were contracted by the woman’s guardian, is another matter. Already in 1544, even in 
Turkey, where the Hanafi madhhab was prominent, an Ottoman decree forbade women in any 
circumstances to marry without the consent of a male guardian.520 
The complex diversity of juristic opinions on guardianship in marriage, with its 
differences and similarities, seems to be based on a view of guardianship as a duty of the 
guardian, a right, or as a synthesis of both. While the guardian has the right to conclude a 
marriage on his ward’s behalf and to give his consent or object to her choice, it is his duty to 
exercise that right in her best interests and he is enjoined to take her wishes into consideration. 
To fulfil this duty he must have the right to participate in the decision-making process. To merit 
this right, his ability to exercise it in the best interests of the ward must be demonstrated, since if 
he practices µa\l (unfair prevention of marriage), he is considered to have exceeded the limits of 
his right, or failed in his duty. Thus the crux of the disagreement between the Hanafis and the 
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majority of the jurists is that the majority restrict the freedom of choice of the woman and require 
her guardian’s opinion to be taken before the contract is made so that his wishes be fulfilled. Ab‰ 
HanÏfa gives the woman freedom in making the contract, but still protects the right of the 
guardian by allowing him to dissolve it if the marriage is to someone not her equal or if the 
dowry is less than that appropriate to her status.  
Although µAbduh does not explicitly raise the issue in his articles on marriage, he seems 
to express, in his tafsÏr of a number of verses, support for the view requiring the guardian’s 
conduct of the marriage contract. Commenting on verse 2:220, concerning marriage to a 
polytheist, µAbduh remarks that “the change from tankih‰ (active form of the verb of nik¥h, with 
the subject being men) and tunkih‰ (the action of marriage attributed to men, with the object 
being women) gives the impression that men are the ones who contract their own marriages and 
those of women of whom they are guardians, and that a woman does not contract her marriage 
independently, but rather there must be a guardian”.521 
µAbduh’s commentary on verse 2:232 begins by recognising that the aim of this verse is 
“prohibiting µa\l, that is the prevention of women from marriage”, based on the pre-Islamic 
control of women’s affairs by men, as “in the customs of J¥hiliyya, men controlled the marriage 
of women, such that only the woman’s waliyy could enact her marriage, and he may give her in 
marriage to a man she hates or prevent her from marrying the one she loves, simply according to 
his own whims”.522 However, it seems from a later statement, that what is condemnable in those 
customs according to µAbduh, is not the guardian’s right to enact the woman’s marriage, but 
rather the absence of women’s consent, for – he added – “Islam recognised the wil¥ya 
(guardianship) of close relatives, and prohibited µa\l, that is prevention from marriage, and the 
waliyy’s marrying a woman without her consent; thus fulfilling both interests”.523  
If the above two comments were indeed µAbduh’s – which is far from certain – he would 
appear to adopt the view that marriage is a matter of concern to both the woman and her 
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guardian, in which neither can take sole charge and make an independent decision. The consent 
of both the guardian and the woman is necessary. In this, he differs from the view of M¥likÏs and 
Sh¥fiµÏs who accept the concept of “coercive guardianship” or wil¥yat al-jabr, which entitles the 
father or grandfather of a woman, minor or adult, so long as she has not been previously married, 
to give his daughter (or granddaughter) in marriage, without her consent, although they consider 
it recommended to obtain her consent. He also differs from the dominant official Hanafi view 
that an adult woman may contract marriage herself, although the guardian may object if the 
suitor is considered of unequal status. This view is similar to that of early schools such as that of 
al-Awz¥µÏ who permitted women to contract marriage, although the guardian’s permission was 
required to make it binding, and of Ab‰ Thawr who permitted women to contract their marriage, 
if the guardian permitted it.524 
 
4.2.2 Restricting the Woman and Guardian’s Rights: Kaf¥’a  
 
The second part of the verse “do not prevent them from marrying if they reach agreement 
according to maµr‰f” has also been used by those who uphold women’s right to contract marriage 
in order to restrict that right, and enable guardians to “prohibit” certain marriages, that is to 
minimise the scope of what is considered wrongful prevention of marriage – µa\l. µAbduh 
commented on the phrase, that 
He said ‘if they reach agreement according to maµr‰f’, i.e. if those seeking marriage, both 
men and women, consent, that is if the man and the woman accept one another as a 
spouse. He said “between them” implying that there is no harm in the man’s proposing to 
the woman herself, and agreeing with her to marry her, in which case it is forbidden to 
practice µa\l, that is prevent her from marrying him [the chosen husband] if that mutual 
consent in the proposal was through acceptable ways, according to the SharÏµa and 
custom, such that there was nothing prohibited in it nor anything undermining honour or 
bringing disgrace to the woman or her family. Scholars used this verse as proof that 
preventing a woman from marrying her non-equal is not prohibited, for instance in the 
case of a noble woman wanting to marry a lowly man who would undermine her, and 
undermine her people’s honour and dignity, in which case she should be discouraged 
through admonition and advice. Some scholars also allow µa\l if the mahr is below mahr 
al-mithl [the mahr due to her equals].525 
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Al-Man¥r’s version then added that “al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m said: if a woman wished to 
marry for less than the mahr of her equals, and the motive is not immorality that undermines 
dignity nor the following of whims and desires, and instead the motive is seeking a man of good 
character likely to provide good companionship and a good life, although he cannot pay a high 
mahr in addition to the other marriage expenses, then µa\l is not permitted, and the marriage 
should be allowed.”526 It is not clear whether or not in the above comment, µAbduh is giving 
credence to the concept of kaf¥’a in marriage, considered of principal importance by HanafÏs in 
particular, since there is no explicit approval by µAbduh of this concept, apart from the mention 
that it is the opinion of “scholars”. The fact that µAbduh’s tafsÏr generally seeks the meaning and 
implications of the words in the verses more so than what other scholars had understood those to 
be, and the fact that his own explicit comments on the above verses focused on the prohibition of 
preventing marriage rather than the justification of that prevention, lead us to question whether 
the above commentary is fully attributable to µAbduh. The fact that µAbduh’s explicit opinion is 
that the mahr al-mithl is not necessary and that waiving it does not justify µa\l logically support 
the suggestion that the references to other scholars’ opinions justifying µa\l for certain conditions 
were not µAbduh’s but Rid¥’s. 
The lengthy commentary on the second part of the verse, containing no rulings, but rather 
admonition, follows the pattern of µAbduh’s emphasis on the Qur’an’s spiritual message, beyond 
the purely legalistic. This further emphasises the essential aim of the verse, that is to change 
men’s attitudes towards women, from J¥hiliyya customs, to God-consciousness: 
admonition is giving advice and reminding of goodness and truth, in a manner that 
softens the heart and urges towards action… As for those who do not have that true 
faith… then admonishing them is of no benefit, because they follow their own whims in 
the treatment of women, and imitate what they found their fathers and associates 
doing.527 
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µAbduh further underlines the verse’s emphasis on the evils of µa\l, and the merits of 
respecting women’s wishes, showing greater concern over the evil consequences of µa\l, than for 
the circumstances which can justify it: 
The Qur’anic injunctions concerning the prohibition of preventing women’s marriage and 
their good treatment in all situations are conducive to the growth of its followers and the 
perfection of their state, and that it is purer for their honour and their lineage, and more 
protective of their honour and prestige, because preventing women from marriage and 
restricting them can be a cause for their disobedience and a corruption of their characters, 
as well as a cause for the corruption of the order of homes and the misery of children… 
as in the case of a guardian who prevents his ward from marrying the one she loves and 
marries her to the one she hates, following his whims or the customs of his people, as the 
Arabs used to do. Would you then expect that their life would be successful or that they 
would respect God’s commands in their relationship?528 
 
The later version of this (published in the compiled volumes of TafsÏr Al-Man¥r by Rid¥) 
differs slightly, but significantly, from the one originally published in al-Man¥r journal. The 
modified version is surprisingly the one adopted in µIm¥ra’s compilation of µAbduh’s works, 
rather than the original version above. In this version, the prohibition of preventing women’s 
marriage to their chosen partners is followed by a condition: “what is meant by “that” is 
forbidding the µa\l of women – according to limits and conditions”.529 The difference is the 
omission of the general intent of the verse “the good treatment of women in all cases” alongside 
“the prohibition of preventing women’s marriage”, but more significantly, the addition of 
“according to limits and conditions”, which restricts the scope of the prohibition, allowing for 
preventing women’s marriage for considerations of kaf¥’a. This, and µAbduh’s detailed 
elaboration on the evils of µa\l – without any qualification – supports the attribution of the above 
comments on “bil maµr‰f” taken to mean what does not “bring disgrace to the woman and her 
family” to Rid¥.530 
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Far from being merely a theoretical concept constructed by jurists in the contexts of their 
discussions of marriage and guardians, it is clear, from fatw¥ requests received by al-Man¥r from 
as far as Malaysia, that the importance of kaf¥’a had not disappeared, although its applicability to 
certain aspects was contested.531 Rid¥’s answer showed that his opposition to kaf¥’a was not 
absolute; he focused only on weakening the arguments for kaf¥’a based on nasab – noble lineage 
– and emphasising that the concept of kaf¥’a on the basis of lineage is not based on texts (from 
the Qur’an and Sunna), but on considerations of interest and harm, and are hence related to 
customs, and hence open to change.532 Also far from being a matter concerning far-away lands, 
the contemporary case of the marriage of ßafiyya al-S¥d¥t, daughter of Sheikh al-S¥d¥t, from a 
prominent family of Ashr¥f (descendents of the noble prophetic line) and head of a Sufi order to 
the owner and editor of al-Mu’ayyad Sheikh µAlÏ Y‰suf, a wealthy writer with close links to the 
Khedive but of humble origins, demonstrated that kaf¥’a was still a potent weapon in disputes 
over marriage guardianship. Although µAbduh and Rid¥ did not explicitly side with either 
party,533 Al-Man¥r took the occasion to clarify again that kaf¥’a was a matter of muµ¥mal¥t 
(worldly dealings) that depends on changing social perceptions of what constitutes an honourable 
or disgraceful match. 534  Although this was written by Rid¥, the latter insisted that his view was 
approved by µAbduh who had read the fatw¥ “regarding kaf¥’a and awliy¥’ and have found it 
agreeable”.535 
 
4.2.3 Context & Considerations for the Above Views 
  
        Notwithstanding the doubts raised above regarding the attribution of views on guardianship 
and kaf¥’a to µAbduh, a few considerations are to be kept in mind regarding the context and 
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al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m, Rid¥ wrote: “I told al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m that the greatest cause of Sheikh µAlÏ’s displeasure vis-à-
vis him is his belief that he [µAbduh] was behind his friend Judge Sheikh Ahmad Abu Kh~twa’s ruling in his case 
that he [Yusuf] was not kuf’ for the daughter of Sayyid Abdel-Kh¥liq al-S¥d¥t. He replied: You know that I agree 
with what you had written in al-Man¥r, which was re-published in al-Mu’ayyid, on kaf¥’a. As for my opinion of 
Sheikh µAlÏ and al-S¥d¥t as individuals, they are eligible for one another, but in disgrace rather than honour!” T¥rÏkh, 
vol. 1, part 2, p. 595. 
534 Al-Man¥r, No. 10, 30 July 1904, vol. 7, p. 347-348. 
535 Al-Man¥r, No. 15, 3 September 1905, vol. 8, p. 584. This reported approval is printed after µAbduh’s death. 
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possible motivations of the apparent lack of a clear support for women’s contracting of their own 
marriage. µAbduh was not as interested in theoretical discussions as he was in practical 
application, particularly through his experience in Shariµa courts which mainly dealt with family 
law cases. He was less interested in theoretical opinions which were rarely followed in practice. 
The question here is: how common were marriage contracts conducted by women 
independently?536 Al-R¥zÏ had suggested that verse 2:232 possibly commanded guardians not to 
prevent women from marrying, not because it was their right to assume this guardianship (as 
many jurists and exegetes had proposed), but because “women generally follow their guardians’ 
decision in the matter of marriage, even though they [guardians] are obliged to consult them, and 
because they are living under them, thus they [guardians] have the ability to prevent them as they 
have the ability to give them in marriage”.537 Similarly µAbduh probably knew that in practice, 
regardless of theoretical rights of women or guardians to contract marriage, guardians did 
assume this role and the social reality had to be managed by regulating and restricting that role, 
rather than categorically rejecting it regardless of practical applicability. 
µAbduh’s descriptions of marriage customs indicate that it was the groom’s parents who 
selected the bride and paid the mahr, indicating very little input from the groom, and presumably 
the bride.538 In fact, contemporary discussions of marriage practices – by women and men – did 
not seem too concerned about the legal issue of the waliyy or rejecting its necessity. What they 
did discuss and demand is the woman’s right to be involved in selecting her future partner, 
stressing that women had a greater – or at least – equal right to participate in marriage 
arrangements. For instance Q¥sim AmÏn simply criticised marriages where the bride – in 
                                                
536 Evidence from historical studies does not seem to be conclusive. Judith Tucker in her In the House of Law: 
Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine notes that “a woman thus needed to enter a marriage 
willingly; coercion invalidated marriage arrangements. Such a position did not, however, preclude a firm family 
hand in marriage arrangements… Women in their legal majority still had marriage walÏs, those people who were 
legally entitled to arrange their marriages for them, but the walÏ had to communicate fully all details of a proposed 
arrangement and honour a woman’s refusal of a marriage.” However, she added that “A woman in her legal majority 
also had the right, so far as the Hanafi jurists were concerned, to arrange her own marriage… All the jurists were 
careful to point out, however, that the legal wali could raise objections to a marriage if the groom were not suitable, 
or if the mahr were not fair.” pp. 50-51. In her Problems in the Historiography of Women in the Middle East: The 
Case of Nineteenth- Century Egypt, Tucker notes that “many women… enjoyed a wide degree of latitude in the 
choice of marriage partners”, p. 330. 
537 TafsÏr al-Fakhr al- R¥zÏ, vol. 2, p. 386. 
538Similarly, Judith Tucker, in her study of marriage contracts in nineteenth century Nablus, concluded that 
“agreement on the mahr, and, indeed, the decision to undertake marriage at all was, to varying degrees, a family 
affair”. Tucker, Judith, In the House of Law, p. 51. 
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particular, but in many cases also the groom – did not even see the prospective partner, or only 
saw a glimpse of them, without being given a chance to get to know them sufficiently to make an 
informed decision.539 In fact, the issue of guardianship, far from being a disappearing concern, 
has survived and continues to operate, in a modified way, in modern Middle Eastern and North 
African societies and laws.540 
Thirdly, as is clear from µAbduh’s articles on marriage and family, he was concerned 
about the break-up of families and loosening of family ties. Preserving the partnership between 
women and the guardians as both having a say in the matter of marriage could be seen as more 
conducive to family harmony and stability, rather than insisting on theoretical rights than could 
in practice endanger that harmony and stability further. Moreover, the preservation of the 
guardian’s involvement can be seen – as it has traditionally been seen – as being in the interest of 
women themselves. As shown by historical studies of Ottoman marriage contracts, support from 
the woman’s family of birth was instrumental in strengthening the woman’s position when 
negotiating conditions in the marriage contract, in alleviating the interference of the husband’s 
family, in resolving marital conflict, etc.541 The greater involvement of the family in arranging 
marriage, according to Judith Tucker’s study on marriage contracts in Nablus, seems to ensure 
the stability of marriage – which is one of µAbduh’s concerns – since “the contracts thus suggest 
that marriage was a more permanent relationship in affluent circles” in which families tended to 
be more involved in the negotiation of the conditions of marriage.542  
 
                                                
539 TahrÏr al-Mar’a, p. 143. 
540 See Nasir 1990, pp. 51-53, El-Alami 1992, Welchman, Women and Muslim Family Laws in Arab States, 2007, 
pp. 768-75.  The Islamic Family Code (proposed by a number of Egyptian jurists) proposes, under Article 52 on the 
conditions for the validity of marriage: “The marriage contract must be in the presence of two witnesses, and the 
contract should be conducted by the bride’s guardian if she is previously un-married and below the age of majority; 
if she is above that age, it is recommended that her guardian conducts the contract; the previously married woman 
may conduct her own contract”. p. 37-38. In the explanatory notes, various ahadith and rational arguments are 
brought to support the validity of the adult woman- whether or not previously married- contracting marriage. 
However, they added that “they [those of the above opinion] still recommend that the bride authorises her guardian 
to conduct her contract in order to preserve her modesty before people, and so as not to act outside what people are 
accustomed to in marriage”. P. 183 MÏth¥q al-Usra fi’l Isl¥m, International Islamic Committee for Women and 
Children, D¥r al->ib¥µa wa’l-Nashr al-Isl¥miyya, 2006. www.iicwc.org 
541 See, for instance, Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, “Women, Law, and Imperial Justice in Ottoman Istanbul in the Late 
Seventeenth Century” in Amira Sonbol (ed.), Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, Syracuse 
University Press, 1996, p. 84. 
542 Tucker, “Ties that Bound: Women and Family in Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Century Nablus", in Beth 
Baron and Nikki Keddie, eds., Shifting Boundaries: Women in Middle Eastern History and Theory, 1991. 
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4.3 Mahr  
 
Apart from the guardian and witnesses, the contract generally included the mahr. In his 
tafsÏr of verse 4:3, µAbduh strongly criticised the linking of mahr to the sexual capacity of the 
woman by some scholars – following their definition of marriage as ownership or exclusive 
powers over the wife’s sexual capacity. µAbduh defined mahr, also known as |ad¥q, as “that 
which is willingly given to the woman before the consummation of the marriage”, adding that “it 
must be noted that this gift has a meaning that is higher than the one perceived by those who call 
themselves scholars, that |ad¥q and mahr are in lieu/compensation of/for the sexual 
organs/capacity or a price for it”. Strongly rejecting that suggestion, µAbduh emphasised that 
“rather the relationship between the two spouses is higher and more honourable than that 
between a man and his horse or his maid”. He supported this by the linguistic meaning of the 
word “ni^la”, which is another Qur’anic term used for mahr, signifying a gift without expected 
return. He also went back to the Qur’anic definition of marriage as “love and mercy”, linking it 
to mahr, which therefore must be understood as “a sign of love and establishment of kinship and 
strengthening of the bonds of love and mercy”.543 Distancing marriage further from a material 
exchange, he highlighted the fact that mahr “is obligatory and not optional like the case of sale or 
rent (where payment can be waived). Hence, the µurf of people has been not to stop at this gift, 
but the husband follows it with further gifts and honours.”544 
The view of mahr as compensation, however, continues in the writings of other 
reformists, who, although they rejected its view as compensation for sexual services, in their 
quest to justify everything through rational arguments, proposed that women’s enjoyment of 
marital financial rights (maintenance and mahr) could be used as a further justification for the 
man’s leadership of the family. For instance, Ri\¥, in the context of justifying men’s leadership 
position suggests that 
There is also another acquired reason, that supports the natural reason (for superiority), 
that is men’s spending out of their wealth on women; for mahr comprises a compensation 
for women and a reward for entering – through the marriage contract – under the 
                                                
543 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 183. 
544 ibid., p. 184. 
154 
 
leadership of men. Shariµa has honoured women by granting them a reward for something 
required by nature and the system of life.545 
 
As for the amount of mahr, µAbduh clarified that there is neither textual basis for limiting it to a 
particular minimum or maximum, nor did “the early predecessors limit the mahr to a specific 
limit”.546 However, the burdening of the groom – or his parents – with high mahrs is something 
that µAbduh criticised in his article on wedding customs, in which he regrettably described how 
the groom’s parents “pay – for the |ad¥q – what satisfies her [the bride’s] parents, even if that 
burdened them with a great debt and a heavy burden”.547 
Following from the above discussion on marriage guardianship, kaf¥’a and mahr seemed 
to be considered the family’s – rather than the bride’s – right, such that guardians could object to 
a marriage arranged by a woman to a groom who was not suitable, or where the mahr was lower 
than that due to a woman of her status. This juristic view agrees with the prevailing practice, 
where “agreement on the mahr, and, indeed, the decision to undertake marriage at all was, to 
varying degrees, a family affair”.548 µAbduh, in contrast, clearly considered the mahr and the 
determination of its amount to be the bride’s right, such that she can waive that right if she so 
wishes: 
If a woman wished to marry for less than the mahr of her equals, and the motive is not 
immorality that undermines dignity nor the following of whims and desires, and instead 
the motive is seeking a man of good character likely to provide good companionship and 
a good life, although he cannot pay a high mahr in addition to the other marriage 
expenses, then µa\l is not permitted, and the marriage should be allowed.549 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
µAbduh’s views on the elements of the marriage contract, including guardianship, kaf¥’a 
and mahr are in harmony with his conception of the function of marriage and family. His 
criticism of guardians’ abuse of their position to prevent women from marrying their chosen 
spouse and rejection of justifications of that prevention on the basis of kaf¥’a or mahr concord 
                                                
545 Ri\¥, Nid¥’ lil Jins al-La~Ïf, p. 27. 
546 ibid., p. 199. 
547 ibid., vol. 2, p. 98. 
548 Tucker, In the House of Law, p. 51. 
549 Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 643. 
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with his emphasis on the aspects of partnership and spiritual union of marriage. On the other 
hand, his apparent lack of clear support for a woman’s right to contract marriage independently 
agrees with his view of marriage as a cooperative function for the creation of stable families and 
strong societies. 
A lot has been said about the change in the view of marriage and family with the advent 
of modernity. A number of studies focus on the modern Egyptian adoption of the bourgeois 
companionate view of marriage focusing on the nuclear family, compatibility of husband and 
wife, and their defined complementary roles as spouses and parents. Many studies have focused 
on the methods – state policies, education curricula, press debates, nationalist discourses – 
employed to establish this modern view. Although some, such as Samira Haj, suggest that 
µAbduh’s writings on marriage and family are part of this debate displaying his adoption of the 
modern companionate view of marriage as opposed to traditional family-based arranged 
marriage, such suggestions tend to be exaggerated and not based on any explicit statements by 
µAbduh. For instance, Haj relies fully on quotes (on choice of spouses) from Ta ^ rÏr al-Mar’a – 
without any clarification of, at least, the ambiguity of the attribution.550   
On the basis of his confirmed own writings, µAbduh’s view of marriage has elements that 
are indeed common to the modern concept of companionate marriage: emphasis on emotional 
intimacy, compatibility, selection of spouse and his/her education to be a good parent, social 
function of marriage, etc. However his writings display an acceptance of – or ambivalence 
towards – other aspects of “traditional marriage” such as the role of the bride’s guardian, the 
principle – although restricted – of kaf¥’a, and the importance of the extended-family system, 
seen by µAbduh as a cooperative solidarity network that is the basis for social stability and 
prosperity. Moreover the above elements associated with modern companionate marriage 
apparent in µAbduh’s writings are not alien to traditional Islamic literature. The family’s function 
in relation to education and character development is well-developed in Islamic literature, from 
Ghaz¥lÏ to Ibn Khald‰n.551  
Also, although µAbduh does describe the family as a basic building-block of society the 
reform of which is essential for the reform of society, it is not clear how much this is to be read 
                                                
550 Samira Haj, Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition, p. 128-131. 
551 See, for instance, Fuad Baali, Social Institutions: Ibn Khaldun's Social Thought. 
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as part of the modern discourse on the adoption of the state-promoted modern family model, 
since the family as building-block of society is not entirely a novel concept in Islamic heritage. 
As we had seen, many fiqh rulings were conceived with the view of the family as a social 
institution worthy of the greatest protection. One third of the Qur’an’s legal injunctions relate to 
the family and its regulation. Judith Tucker had noted how, in the eyes of the Levantine muftis in 
her study, “Marriage was key to social harmony … a basic social building block, a bulwark 
against social discord and disorganisation”.552 In traditional literature and fiqh, the nuclear family 
is a recognised unit – within an extended system. Although it is commonly believed that Middle-
Eastern societies were principally composed of extended-family households until the twentieth 
century, there are no complete statistics to determine whether nuclear or extended family was the 
norm at the turn-of-the-century – for instance, the mid-19th century census under Mu^ammad 
µAli, suggests that, at least in Cairo, the majority of households were nuclear families.553 Judith 
Tucker’s study of Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt also noted that “it was the nuclear 
family, the husband and wife unit, that formed the basis for much business and property holding, 
not the larger extended family of received wisdom and inheritance law logic”.554 Abduh’s 
concern about the weakening of the values of mutual cooperation within extended families could 
thus be a result of the contrast between his rural upbringing and his urban reality – but also 
concern about the effects of Mu^ammad ¢AlÏ’s policies on family stability. There could also be 
an influence of European concerns about changes in family structure following industrialisation. 
µAbduh emphasised education as key to the success of marriages and highlighted the 
spouses’ and their wider families’ lack of understanding of the purpose of marriage as a principal 
cause of marital problems. This is again similar to the modern preoccupation with “teaching” 
parenting skills – particularly focusing on the mother – and decrying “ignorance” – particularly 
women’s – as a principal cause for marital problems, children’s problems, and even men’s 
reluctance to marry. However, µAbduh’s view on education and marriage differs in its emphasis 
on religious education to learn each spouse’s and family member’s rights and duties and to 
motivate them to fulfil them, rather than the modern preoccupation with skills. It also differs on 
                                                
552 Tucker, In the House of Law, p. 40. 
553 Philippe Fargues, “Family and Household in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Cairo”, in Family History in the Middle 
East: Household, Property, and Gender, Edited by Beshara Doumani, p. 38.  
554 Tucker, Women in Nineteenth-Century Egypt, p. 100. 
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decrying both men’s and women’s ignorance of the real nature of marriage, and the need to 
educate both for a better understanding of marriage.  
Thus µAbduh’s discourse on the family combines both reformist Islamic elements which 
can be seen as a continuation of classical reformist discourses (re-reading the sources to re-
interpret them and to motivate Muslims to understand divine injunctions and apply them) and a 
modernist nationalist discourse influenced by modern concepts of family, society and 
governance. Or in other words, this points to the overlap between the various discourses in Egypt 
– and the rest of the Muslim world – and their various inspirations, as opposed to the tendency to 
place figures into distinct camps. Where µAbduh was critical of prevailing rulings and practices 
in the contracting of marriage and where he promoted reform, he did so generally in a cautious 
measured manner, finding grounds from orthodox sources and being careful not to seem to break 
too radically from accepted practice. This tendency (which will also be apparent in µAbduh’s 
views and proposals for reform in other areas) is due to his pragmatism and reliance on social 
acceptance and readiness rather than pure legal reform, which require gradualism and avoidance 
of alienating the majority of the population. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE MARITAL EQUATION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES 
 
 
Marriage in Islam is a contract entailing a number of provisions from the contracting 
parties. Those provisions are open to negotiation and agreement, and conditions are often 
inserted, which if not abided by can result in the contract being breached.555 This ability to 
negotiate the terms of the marriage contract, as attested to by historical records of marriage 
contracts in Shariµa courts in pre-modern times, offered the possibility of altering the balance of 
the marital relations, reducing the powers enjoyed by husbands and handing wives greater 
maneuverability by offering them the option of leaving unsatisfactory marriages for a wide range 
of reasons.556  
This situation differs greatly from the view of the marital relationship as consisting of 
pre-defined and fixed rights and duties and the view of husbands’ authority over their wives as 
absolute. As Sonbol argues, this view has, to a great extent, resulted from the codification of fiqh 
in the modern era, based on the Hanafi madhhab, under colonial influence, and informed by the 
modern patriarchal state, which deprived Shariµa courts of the flexibility that characterised them 
in pre-modern times.557 Thus, scholars, such as Amira Sonbol, Lama Abu-Odeh and Ziba Mir-
Hosseini, suggest that the modern view of marriage, unlike commonly believed, does not re-
articulate classical Islamic approaches. The standardization of marriage restricted the possibility 
of a future wife’s negotiation of the terms of the marriage. The wife’s principal enforceable right 
                                                
555 In theory, this is specifically true for the Hanbali madhhab, although court records show the use of conditions to 
be widespread throughout various ages of Islamic history. See, for instance, Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, “History of 
Marriage Contracts in Egypt”, Hawwa, vol. 3, no. 2, July 2005, 159-196,.For the views of the various madh¥hib,on 
stipulations in the marriage contract see Mu^ammad Ab‰ Zahra, Mu^¥\ar¥t fÏ µAqd al-Zaw¥j wa th¥ruh, p. 198-203. 
556 See, for instance, Amira al-Azhary Sonbol Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws in Islamic History, Judith 
Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine and Women in 
Nineteenth-Century Egypt. 
557 Sonbol, “History of Marriage Contracts in Egypt”. 
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remained that of financial maintenance. Thus, marriage became a simple equation of 
maintenance in return for absolute obedience. 
19th-century writings – whether by nationalist reformers, social commentators or women 
authors –558 addressed these aspects of the marital contract through the following dimensions: the 
scope and limits of the husband’s duty of financial maintenance in marriage, the extent of the 
wife’s financial independence, the extent of the husband’s right of “obedience” and discipline”, 
spousal and parental duties and the modern division of labour within the family, and the ‘modern 
training’ of wives and mothers. In these discussions, marital rights and duties, religion, morality, 
law, politics and national aspirations were tightly interwoven. Women’s rights and duties in 
marriage became “tropes” for larger national concerns. 
In this chapter, I discuss µAbduh’s view of the “marital equation” and its twin duties of 
maintenance and obedience. I compare µAbduh’s views to classical scholars and his 
contemporaries, and assess the influence of his approach on subsequent legal reform. 
 
 
5.1 Nafaqa – an Absolute Right/Obligation? 
 
Although the provision of nafaqa is considered one half of the marriage equation,559 
husbands were not always committed to the fulfillment of that duty, while insisting on the 
continuation of the marriage and of their authority. This seems to have been a principal cause of 
marital disputes – Tucker asserts that “the greatest proportion of court records that were related 
to marriage, outside of the contracts themselves, were those concerned with the nafaqa that a 
husband owed his wife.560 This question was also raised in the Egyptian press in the late 
                                                
558 Clearly all three are not mutually exclusive. 
559 Maintenance is due the wife if she "places, or offers to place, herself in the husband's power so as to allow him 
free access to herself at all lawful times" and if "she obeys all his lawful commands for the duration of marriage." 
Jamal J. Nasir, The Islamic Law of Personal Status, p. 98. In Hanafi fiqh, nafaqa is in view of i^tib¥s or exclusive 
confinement: "According to the Hanafis, when a wife confines herself to her husband's house and does not leave it 
except with his permission, she shall be regarded as 'obedient'.... Thus the cause which entitles her to maintenance, 
according to the Hanafis, is her confining herself to her husband's home." The Five Schools of Islamic Law, 
Mu^ammad Jaw¥d Maghniyya, p. 357-58. 
560 Tucker, In the House of Law, p. 74. 
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nineteenth century by both female and male writers, such as µ®’isha Taym‰r and µAbdull¥h al-
NadÏm.  
In her book Mir’¥t al-Ta’ammul fÏ al-Um‰r (“A Reflective Mirror on [some] Affairs”) 
published in 1892, prolific writer and poet Taym‰r expressed her concern over the emergence of 
what she saw as “problematic behaviour and strange social practices”. Islamically, men were 
required to provide for women by giving them a mahr, providing for women’s food, clothing and 
housing in accordance with the status of the wife and the husband, and providing for their infant 
children. Taym‰r stressed that “these obligations were required by Qur’anic verse (al-na||) and 
community consensus (al-ijm¥µ)”. However, the “modern Egyptian husband” not only neglected 
those duties, but “was intent on enjoying himself and avoiding any kind of exertion or work… 
He spent his time in bars in the company of friends where they listened to music, gambled and 
drank”. Such excesses led to the breakdown of respect between husband and wife, as well as 
severe economic hardships for the family. Taym‰r believed that such behaviour by modern men 
and their failure to fulfill their financial obligations forced women to “take over the 
responsibilities of their households” and hence, “authority passed to the wives as the goddesses 
of management and the source of utility. Men gave up their leadership position that entitled them 
to respect and dignity.”561 
We had already seen in a previous chapter how the famous journalist and orator 
µAbdull¥h al-NadÏm frequently and strongly condemned problems which he believed were 
brought by “the European contamination of Eastern lands” such as drinking, gambling and 
prostitution. However, what al-NadÏm was adamant about was that, condemnable as such 
behaviour was, it could not in any way justify the reversal of marital roles or the refusal of wives 
to respect and obey their husbands.562 
 
 
 
 
                                                
561 Quoted in Mervat Hatem, The Nineteenth Century Discursive Roots of the Continuing Debate on the Social-
Sexual Contract in Today’s Egypt, p. 73, Hawwa, vol. 2, No 1, 2004. 
562 Similarly, in a less direct and explicit way, AmÏn upheld masculine authority by addressing men rather than 
women, by presenting women as passive, and by turning a blind eye to men’s excesses, focusing instead on the 
‘suffering of modern men’ and on women’s ‘degradation’. See Chapter 2. 
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5.1.1 µAbduh’s proposals for the enforcement of husbands’ duties 
 
µAbduh recognised the importance of the matter of maintenance as a duty of the husband 
and the complications resulting from the divergent views of the various madh¥hib on 
implications of the husband’s failure to fulfill that duty. In his comprehensive review of the state 
of Shariµa courts and proposals for their reform, µAbduh repeatedly referred to problems in 
dealing with the issue of marital maintenance, highlighting in particular problems associated 
with the refusal/inability to provide maintenance in the case of poor, absent or imprisoned 
husbands.563 µAbduh expressed great concern for such “common misfortunes and frequent 
complaints seen all around the country”, where the failure of the Hanafi-based Shariµa courts to 
resolve such matters was leading to grave consequences for those women and for social stability, 
as “many women are pushed to sell themselves out of fitna or need”.564   
While the Hanafi madhhab recognised the husband’s duty of maintenance, it did not offer 
an easy way out for those whose husbands persistently refuse to fulfill this duty, offering 
measures that were no longer practical, enforceable or effective. Not only were the maintenance 
laws in the Hanafi madhhab inadequate for dealing with new nafaqa-related problems, but the 
modern state’s drive to standardise court procedures and codify fiqh, without regard for 
protecting people’s interest or ma|la^a, had led to restricting options that had been open to 
women under the more flexible traditional Shariµa judicial system. For instance, in his comments 
on the new code of procedure, µAbduh noted that the new law requiring cases to be brought 
before the court in the district where the defendant resides had caused difficulties for women 
whereas “before the Code, matters were easier, in the case of a wife filing against her husband 
who has left her without nafaqa... Previously, the case was considered by the court of the district 
where the wife resides, and a verdict was issued in her favour... That facilitated matters for poor 
wives, while that facilitation has now been prohibited by the new Code”. µAbduh recommended 
that “matters should remain as they were before the Code”.565 µAbduh’s detailed review of the 
effects of changes in court procedures towards the end of the nineteenth century on women’s 
lives highlights the fact that procedural law reform is as important as substantive law reform. 
                                                
563 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p.  653. 
564 ibid., p. 275-6. 
565 ibid. vol. 2, p. 244. 
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µAbduh believed that the principal cause of the above problems was restricting jurists to 
the Hanafi madhhab, and failing to look beyond the rulings to their intent and to the interests of 
people and justice. He proposed following the opinion of Im¥m M¥lik which recognises court 
rulings in absentia, without repeated summons of the defendant and without a representative, 
instead summoning the former after the verdict. If matters remained as they were, the expenses 
should be shouldered by the recalcitrant absent defendant, not the wife, as a deterrent and 
punishment, as was the opinion of al-SarkhasÏ and al-Turjum¥nÏ. µAbduh here was criticising a 
situation where the reform of Shariµa Courts and codification of fiqh, while being developments 
he had supported and promoted, were led by the new modern educated elite of technocrats rather 
than the traditional scholars who had the best understanding of the fiqh system. This paradox 
would continue to cause a certain degree of tension between reformist scholars and the modern 
state to the present day. 
Implicitly bemoaning the secularisation of the justice system which gradually led to the 
restriction of the powers of Shariµa courts in Egypt,566 µAbduh criticised the system which 
delegated the execution of verdicts to a separate executive system unrelated to the courts, leading 
to the non-execution of a large proportion of verdicts.567 Moreover, even where a verdict could 
be successfully executed, µAbduh lamented the difficulty of ensuring the continuity of 
compliance, due to the many “tricks resorted to by defendants in order to evade the execution of 
verdicts, without any mercy towards their children or any concern for their wives”.568 Even if the 
authorities succeeded to confiscate the husband’s salary, it is not sufficient in the case of 
“government clerks with low salaries and numerous children”.569 Here the dominant opinion in 
Hanafi fiqh was fully exploited by husbands who realised that the law offered no solution to a 
woman whose husband is unable to provide maintenance. The law only went as far as assisting 
                                                
566 On developments in the court system in Egypt see N. Anderson, “Law Reform in Egypt: 1850-1950”, in Political 
and Social Change in Modern Egypt, P. M. Holt ed., p. 217-24; N. Anderson, Law Reform in the Muslim World; N. 
J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law; B. Cannon, Politics of Law and The Courts in Nineteenth-Century Egypt; F. 
J. Ziadeh, Lawyers, the Rule of Law and Liberalism in Modern Egypt; R. Shaham, Family and the Courts in Modern 
Egypt. 
567 Among other aspects of the new code of procedure of Shariµa courts criticised by µAbduh, “the new code of 
procedure stipulates that implementation is by the administrative authority, in order to facilitate matters and reduce 
expenditure. However, that undermines the Shariµa courts… The resulting harm is unlimited, most importantly that 
rulings are not implemented, such that not more than 10% of rulings are implemented.” Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 274. 
568 ibid., p. 277 
569 ibid. 
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the complaining wife to gain access to the “visible assets” of her husband, without allowing for 
the possibility of an exit from such a marriage where the husband claims inability to maintain his 
wife, and does not allow her to claim back from him any money borrowed for maintenance, 
unless there had been a previous court ruling or certified mutual agreement setting the level of 
maintenance.570 
As regards penalties for husbands who refuse to pay nafaqa, while able to do so, the 
Hanafi madhhab allows for their imprisonment, after a number of warnings by the judge. 
However, µAbduh lamented the fact that judges were not making use of that opinion. In the case 
of such husbands who “push their children towards demise and their wives towards committing 
sins, and bring through their [these men’s] evil actions corruption to the country”, µAbduh called 
for their imprisonment “as Shariµa – as well as reason – dictate” as the mere threat of 
imprisonment would act as a very effective incentive, inducing prompt compliance of 
husbands.571 
However, while µAbduh suggested ways to ensure compliance by husbands or to punish 
or deter recalcitrant ones, he believed such methods to be only partial solutions, which are not 
only difficult to enforce, but also fail to guarantee a return to normal family life, often leading to 
women being trapped in an endless cycle of misery. µAbduh was convinced that the only 
effective solution in the case of continued refusal – or inability – to provide maintenance was 
divorce. In contrast to the Hanafi opinion, µAbduh insisted on provision of nafaqa as a principal 
condition for the validity and continuity of marriage, as “it is known in the rulings of Shariµa that 
whenever it is certain that the husband is unable to maintain his wife, and that marriage is 
harming his life and leading him to contravene God’s limits, then marriage becomes prohibited 
for him”.572 
                                                
570 If the amount of monthly maintenance had been decided by a judge or by a mutual agreement, the arrears of 
maintenance stand and are payable by the husband whenever asked to unless exempted by the wife. However, if no 
such agreement or judgment exists, the right of the wife to demand unpaid maintenance lapses if she fails to demand 
it for more than a month. Moreover arrears of maintenance, even when set by agreement of judgment, lapse by the 
death of either spouse, divorce, or nush‰z. The difference between the Hanafis and the other Sunni schools 
regarding the question is that the other schools regard maintenance as µiwa\ al-i^tib¥s (consideration of the wife’s 
exclusive confinement) with no gratuitous element at all unlike the Hanafis, hence it is considered a debt and the 
wife has the right to sue for arrears. El Alami & Hinchcliffe, Islamic Marriage and Divorce Laws of the Arab World, 
London: Kluwer Law International, 1996, p. 21-22. 
571 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 280. 
572 ibid., p. 278. 
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For µAbduh, disregard for this principal responsibility was evident in – and responsible 
for – “the large number of poor men who marry more than one wife, and many of them have 
four, three, or two wives, while they are not able to maintain them”.573 He suggested as a 
solution that  
each marriage registration clerk should ask any person whose wealth is unknown, 
whether he is already married. If he is, how will he provide for his wives and children? 
All that must be noted in the contract, and a specific amount of income must be 
determined for anyone who wishes to marry more than one wife… in order to limit the 
scope of harm, since nothing in Shariµa prohibits that, but it is rather an example of 
enjoining the good and forbidding the evil.574  
 
The reaction to a similar proposal in 1920 to restrict a man’s right to marry a second wife 
on the basis of his inability to fulfill his duty of maintenance indicates the great opposition 
µAbduh’s suggestion must have been met with two decades earlier. Opponents argued that no 
classical scholars considered the ability to provide equally for all wives to be a condition to be 
assessed by the judge prior to the marriage contract, and rejected the claim that a consensus 
existed on the prohibition of marriage for he who is unable to provide maintenance, concluding 
that “the proposal to outlaw polygamy, in all its three articles, contravenes religion, opposes 
Shariµa and contradicts logic, and people should not be forced to abide by it through any 
punishment legislated by the ruler, as it would be enforcing the following of an illegitimate 
order”.575 What concerns us here is not polygyny which will be dealt with in a later chapter, but 
the strong rejection of any attempt to limit the husband’s absolute authority and rights and the 
clear discounting of any reciprocal duty, including the supposed other half of the equation – the 
provision of maintenance.  
Similarly, Aisha Taym‰r’s analysis of the causes of breakdown of the old marital balance 
was vehemently rejected in a long rebuttal published in al-NÏl newspaper (later collected and 
published in a booklet entitled Lis¥n al-Jumh‰r µal¥ Mir’¥t al-Ta’mmul fÏ al-Um‰r) by Azhari 
                                                
573 ibid. 
574 ibid. 
575 Mudhakkira bi’l-Radd µal¥ Mashr‰µ al-Q¥n‰n al-Kh¥| bi baµ\ A^k¥m al-Ahw¥l al-Shakh|iyya, wa maµah¥ maw¥d 
al-mashr‰µ al-mush¥r ilayh. Response to the Proposed Amendments of Certain Personal Status Laws, with the Text 
of the Said Proposal, Cairo: Ma~baµat al-ta\¥mun al-AkhawÏ, p. 14-23. Although the document does not carry a 
publication date, it is a commentary on the proposed 1920 law. There is no author mentioned on the booklet, but the 
introduction is signed by Ma^m‰d al-DÏn¥rÏ, Mu^ammad al-µAn¥nÏ and Husayn al-Bayy‰mÏ. All three are Azhar 
scholars; the second was the head of the M¥likis. 
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scholar shaykh µAbdallah al-Fayy‰mÏ. Al-Fayy‰mÏ rejected Taym‰r’s entire analysis, to the 
extent of challenging the notion that the word “right” appeared in the Qur’an. His extremely 
masculine reading of the Qur’anic verses and the prophetic tradition justified the abuse of the 
marriage contract by men of the younger generation which Taym‰r had criticised. He denied that 
men had any obligations vis-à-vis women in marriage. If women consent, their husbands do not 
even have to pay them any mahr. Men do not have to support their wives if it was understood 
from the very beginning that they did not have the capacity to do so. A man/husband’s inability 
to bear economic responsibility did not make a woman/wife equal. If she was unhappy with the 
marriage contract, she could file for divorce, but she could not usurp his leadership right.576 
In the case of a marriage that has already taken place, and where the wife complains of 
the husband’s non-fulfillment of the duty of maintenance, µAbduh’s proposal again contravened 
Hanafi fiqh. He argued, on the basis of a variety of principles and arguments, for the validity of 
his proposal, and for the urgent need for it in view of the failure of the current system. µAbduh 
saw the problems related to maintenance as an example of the “preponderance of errors in 
verdicts” caused by the inability of insufficiently qualified judges to extract rulings from original 
texts, particularly on controversial and complex issues. Such matters are not explicitly and 
definitively defined in the sharµÏ texts, but are “questions that require one to investigate and 
arrive at rulings that avoid harm and establish justice, while not contradicting Shariµa but being 
rather from its essence”.  Such unqualified judges were not able to arrive at an appropriate ruling 
using their own ijtih¥d. Nor were they able to easily find the appropriate opinion in the vast 
heritage of fiqh, because of the complex and changing nature of such matters according to time 
and place. 
However, in his official proposal on the subject of maintenance of the wives of prisoners, 
absent husbands, or husbands who are unable or unwilling to provide maintenance,577 µAbduh did 
                                                
576 See Mervat Hatem, “The Nineteenth Century Discursive Roots of the Continuing Debate on the Social-Sexual 
Contract in Today’s Egypt”, Hawwa, Volume 2, Number 1, 2004, pp. 64-88(25). 
577 “Concerning the question from the interior ministry regarding the Shariµa solution to the complaints of women 
whose husbands are sentenced to long prison sentences, and have left them without any nafaqa or provider for them 
and their children…This, and similar, issues are the subject of frequent complaints and widespread misfortune, such 
that the ministry (^aqq¥niyya) regularly receives, from around the country, requests to find a solution for the 
misfortune of these needy women who are harmed in their religion and living, and their children who suffer 
corruption of characters and deeds, as well as the consequent chaos and confusion for the umma as a whole… Thus I 
decided to look into the following matters: 
1. The issue of prisoners as mentioned in your letter. 
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not present his solution as one arrived at through consideration of ma|la^a, but rather as one 
based on \ar‰ra – necessity:578 
What is seen and cannot be doubted is that women in any of the above cases resort, by 
necessity, to indecency and committing what contravenes religion and morality, 
otherwise they would perish. There is no way to save them from those two harmful ends 
except by divorcing them from their husbands. This is what has been made necessary by 
the state of people’s corruption in belief and character. Any other attempted solution 
other than divorce is imaginary and cannot be realised… Whenever necessity is proven, it 
must be taken into consideration, according to the Qur’an, Sunna and the consensus of 
the im¥ms and the umma.579 
 
µAbduh’s appeal to the concept of \ar‰ra580 shows further how extremely serious and 
urgent he considered the issue to be. Furthermore, perhaps in an attempt to gain greater 
acceptance for his proposal, he explicitly distanced it from the contested and controversial 
“ijtih¥d”, stressing that “ruling in consideration of necessity is not ijtih¥d, for ijtih¥d is used in 
matters that are open to a variety of opinions, whereas in the case of necessity, there is no such 
scope”. As a form of reassurance for those who only take the most dominant and strongest 
opinion in the madhhab to be valid for judicial verdicts, which was in fact officially required of 
judges by the Code of Shariµa Courts, µAbduh reminded that “fuqah¥’ have explicitly said that 
                                                                                                                                                       
2. The issue of the husband’s inability, or reluctance, to maintain his wife, as is the case in the majority of the 
lower classes, and a large number of the middle and upper classes. 
3. The issue of the absent husbands who send no news or whose absence is prolonged, and who had not left 
any money for their wives and children, or have left money, but the wives are unable to take possession of 
it. The wives naturally need a way out of this situation, particularly if they are young. 
4. The issue of husbands who cause difficulty and harm to their wives such that there is no way to a marital 
life together. Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 653-4. 
578 Ma|la^a literally means an interest or benefit, usually translated as public interest or welfare. The concept is 
found in legal works since the 8/9th century, but was developed by al-Ghaz¥lÏ in the 11th century who argued that 
ma|la^a was God’s purpose (maq|ad) in revealing divine law, more precisely to preserve for mankind the five 
essential elements of their wellbeing (religion, life, intellect, offspring and property). Whatever protects these 
elements and averts harm from them is a ma|la^a. Later scholars such as al-R¥zÏ and al-Qar¥fÏ developed the 
concept and widened its use as a method for deriving rulings. From a subsidiary legal principle within the rubric of 
legal analogy, ma|la^a was developed, particularly by 14th century scholars al->‰fÏ and al-Sh¥~ibÏ into an 
independent criterion for deriving rulings. This later model of maslaha was most enthusiastically received in the 
modern period. Ri\¥ published al->‰fÏ’s work in al-Man¥r. 
579 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 655. 
580 ™ar‰ra, literally meaning necessity, is an indispensable necessity which, if not met, may cause severe hardship 
resulting in loss of life – known or suspected. ¤¥ja on the other hand, is a need which, when unsatisfied, affects 
convenience and efficient performance of an act. Relaxation of rulings is allowed under the rule: "necessities 
(\ar‰r¥t) justify that which may be unlawful". If a ^¥ja becomes general or universal and the entire society or a 
group of the society is confronted with hardship, this would call for relaxation. See Felicitas Opwis, “Islamic Law 
and Legal Change: The Concept of Ma|la^a in Classical and Contemporary Islamic Legl Theory”Shari'a: Islamic 
Law in the Contemporary Context, Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel (eds.), pp. 62-82. 
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ruling according to marj‰^ (weaker) opinions is prohibited when there is no necessity, but where 
there is, then the judge may rule according to it, without permission from higher authorities. 
Hence judges who follow the Hanafi madhhab could rule on the basis of \ar‰ra, once it is 
proven, without having contravened the Hanafi madhhab; yet they avoid doing so”.581  
Previously there had been courts belonging to the various madh¥hib, and a ruling by one 
judge was accepted by another judge from a different madhhab, allowing litigants freedom to 
choose which court to take their case to, in order to favourably resolve their problem.582 
However, the rise of the Hanafi madhhab as the official Ottoman madhhab led to a situation 
where judges were either not allowed – or deemed it unacceptable – to accept a ruling on the 
basis of a madhhab other than the Hanafi one. µAbduh stressed that “fuqah¥’ have permitted 
fat¥w¥ according to the Maliki madhhab when there is \ar‰ra; and there is no greater \ar‰ra than 
what we are currently witnessing”. As a further reassurance to hesitant judges, µAbduh added that 
“if a ruling [according to a different madhhab] is by the order of the ruler who appoints judges, 
then there is no dispute over its permissibility”.583 Thus, instead of challenging the leading 
position of the Hanafi madhhab or urging the use of ijtih¥d (through use of ma|la^a) – both of 
which he had done elsewhere in his writings – µAbduh preferred to employ the more pragmatic 
strategy of seeking approval of his proposal through appealing to familiar arguments from within 
the Hanafi madhhab in order to reassure judges. This shows his awareness of the dominance of 
the mentality of the taqlÏd era, where the view most likely to receive wide endorsement and 
application was the one shown to comply with the position of the madhhab; “no longer was it the 
case that a view was rendered orthodox merely by the fact that it issued from an authorised jurist; 
it was now the madhhab as a whole that conferred this status upon a view”.584 In addition, 
µAbduh felt, as already expressed in his analysis of the problem, that the use of ijtih¥d itself, even 
if accepted, was probably not possible, as the judges lacked the necessary training, having 
become used to following fiqh manuals.  
                                                
581 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 655. 
582 See Amira Sonbol, “Women in Shari’ah Courts: A Historical and Methodological Discussion”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, vol. 27, issue 1, 2003. 225-, p. 234.; Nelly Hanna, “Marriage Among Merchant 
Families”, in Women, the Family and Divorce Laws, Sonbol, ed., p. 146. 
583 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 656. 
584 Sherman Jackson, Islamic Law and the State: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of Shihab Al-Din Al-Qarafi, 
Leiden: Brill, 1996, p. 82-3. 
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In his discussion of strategies for gender reform,585 Mohammad Fadel stressed the need 
for reformers to “first exhaust possibilities for reform implicit in traditional methods before 
introducing arguments outside of that tradition… that are capable of winning over a critical mass 
of Muslim support”. Andrew March has called this “the Reformer’s Dilemma”, where an 
“effective reformer” is likely to exhaust  “revisions to applied doctrine” before resorting to 
changes in “methodological or foundational doctrines”.586 µAbduh’s approach demonstrates this 
pragmatic strategy, focused more on acceptance of his reform proposal than constructing a 
radical coherent methodology. 
On the above basis, µAbduh then argued that “it is necessary to follow the Maliki 
madhhab’s rulings on nafaqa, absent, disappeared, or imprisoned husbands or those who cause 
harm to their wives”.587 With consideration of “what \ar‰ra in our country calls for”,588 µAbduh 
extracted eleven articles from Maliki fiqh, and as a final reassurance, he obtained the approval of 
Sheikh al-Azhar and the Maliki Mufti of these articles. Five of these were related to nafaqa: 
1. If the husband refuses to maintain his wife, then if he has visible assets, and does not 
claim inability, but insists on refusing to pay nafaqa, the judge orders immediate 
divorce. If he claims inability, then if he does not prove it, divorce is ordered 
immediately. If he does prove inability, he is granted a maximum of one month, 
within which to provide nafaqa, otherwise divorce is ruled. 
2. If the husband is ill or imprisoned, and refuses to pay nafaqa for his wife, the judge 
grants him a period within which he may recover or be released from prison. If the 
period of illness or imprisonment is prolonged, such that harm or fitna is feared, the 
judge orders divorce. 
3. If the husband is absent, in a nearby place, and does not leave nafaqa for his wife, the 
judge sends him a warning through the known methods, and sets him a deadline. If he 
does not send nafaqa for his wife or return to provide nafaqa, the judge orders divorce 
after the deadline. If the husband is away in a distant place, a distance of ten days or 
over, or in an unknown location, and it is proven that he possesses no money from 
which the wife may spend, the judge orders divorce. 
4. If the absent husband has money, or a debt or deposit with someone else, the wife has 
the right to demand the payment of nafaqa from that money or debt, after taking an 
oath that she deserves nafaqa from the absent husband and that he has not left her any 
                                                
585 Mohammad Fadel, "Is Historicism a Viable Strategy for Islamic Legal Reform? The Case of 'Never Shall a Folk 
Prosper Who Have Appointed a Women to Rule Them’", Islamic Law and Society, 18 (2011) 131-176.  
586 Andrew F. March, “Law as a Vanishing Mediator in the Theological Ethics of Tariq Ramadan” (September 26, 
2009). European Journal of Political Theory,10 (2):177-201, p. 169. 
587 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 656. 
588 ibid. 
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money or appointed anyone to provide for her. The absent husband can contest upon 
his return. 
5. The divorce by the judge on the basis of non-maintenance is revocable, and the 
husband may return his wife if his ability to maintain is proven and his willingness to 
pay nafaqa is expressed during the µidda. If his ability is not proven or he is not 
willing to pay nafaqa, revoking the divorce is not permitted.589 
 
Thus, on the basis of the non-negotiability of the fundamental right to nafaqa, µAbduh 
made a comprehensive proposal seeking to eliminate problems related to refusal or inability to 
provide maintenance and to give women a way out of the trap in which they often found 
themselves. While not implemented during his life, the spread of µAbduh’s ideas and 
appointment of several of his students in official positions, the weakening of the religious 
establishment and modernisation of the legal system, and the contemporary changes in the rest of 
the Muslim world (The Ottoman Family Rights Law of 1917 incorporated opinions from other 
madh¥hib as well as weaker opinions from the Hanafi madhhab) contributed to the adoption of 
most of µAbduh’s proposals through the Personal Status Laws of 1920 and 1929, which remain 
the basis of contemporary Egyptian personal status law. Moreover, “the Egyptian path to family 
law reform represents the rule rather than the exception in the Islamic world”.590 These reforms 
are particularly significant since family court records continue to show that “the grounds most 
frequently referred to by women to seek divorce are the lack of maintenance or the husband’s 
absence”.591 
 
 
5.2 Obedience and Nush‰z  
 
Whereas µAbduh emphasised the husband’s fundamental duty of providing nafaqa and 
considered marriage to be no longer sustainable in the case of its non-fulfilment, he seemed to 
uncritically accept the dominant Hanafi view which links nafaqa arrears to nush‰z. The dominant 
                                                
589 ibid., p. 657-8. 
590 L. Abu Odeh, “Modernizing Muslim Family Law, the Case of Egypt”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 
Vol. 37, Oct, 2004, p. 1050. 
591 Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron and Baudouin Dupret, “Breaking Up the Family: Divorce in Egyptian Law and 
Practice”, Hawwa, Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 6 (2008) 52–74, p. 56. See also 
Shaham R., “Judicial Divorce at the Wife’s Initiative: The Shariµa Courts in Egypt, 1920-1955”, Islamic Law and 
Society, volume 1, Number 2, 1994, pp. 217-257. 
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opinion not only holds that a wife can only demand payment for nafaqa unpaid over a long 
period (over one month) if the amount of maintenance had been previously set by a judge or by 
mutual agreement, but even in the presence of such an agreement or judgment, the arrears would 
lapse in the case of death of one of the spouses, divorce and – in the opinion of some scholars – 
the wife’s rebelliousness or nush‰z.  
Of particular interest is µAbduh’s fatw¥ in response to a question concerning a man whose 
wife brought him before the judge and asked the latter to set for her a daily nafaqa to be paid by 
the husband, which the judge did, after which she spent one year at her parents’ house. Her 
husband claimed she was n¥shiz, which she admitted before the judge, who issued a ruling on 
that basis. The question for µAbduh was, “Does this ruling then revoke her right to the nafaqa due 
to her for the previous year?”, to which he responded: 
They [Hanafi scholars] have said that the judicially set nafaqa is forfeited in the case of 
nush‰z, that is if the husband owes his wife a set nafaqa for a number of months, and then 
she becomes n¥shiz, the nafaqa for those months is no longer due, unless the judge had 
ordered her to borrow it, in which case it is still due. Thus the nush‰z of this woman after 
the setting of nafaqa, proven by her confession, and ruled by the judge, cancels the nafaqa 
of the previous period, since she had not borrowed money; hence she has no right to 
demand that previous nafaqa.592 
 
Although this fatw¥ was explicitly issued following the Hanafi dominant opinion,593 even 
in his above proposal for reforming laws regarding marital maintenance – largely based on other 
than the Hanafi madhhab – µAbduh avoided an explicit discussion of the issue of nush‰z. This is 
despite the availability of alternative opinions from the three other madh¥hib, providing that 
arrears of maintenance stand until payment or exemption by the wife.594 µAbduh’s proposal, 
moreover, in the case of an absent husband, required the wife to take an oath that “she deserves 
                                                
592 Fatw¥ 159, ibid, p. 666. 
593 Similarly, responding to a question regarding a poor husband who does not fulfill his duty of nafaqa, he 
responded that “as the husband is poor and unable to provide nafaqa for his wife, the judge orders him to borrow in 
order to pay, as they [Hanafi jurists] have said”. Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 663. 
594 The alternative opinion was adopted in the reformed law of 1920, where a wife is able to claim maintenance 
arrears without a previous mutual agreement or court ruling, and arrears stand until payment or exemption by the 
wife. Moreover the wife’s divorce or nush‰z, or the husband’s death, do not impinge on the wife’s right to recover 
arrears. However, Article 11-B (Article 11 bis 2) still declares that “If a wife refuses to live with her husband 
without having a right to do so, her maintenance may be stopped from the date of refusal. Refusal without right shall 
be taken into consideration if she does not return to the matrimonial home on her husband's demand”. Hence, 
although nush‰z does not lead to the lapsing of previous nafaqa arrears, it does lead to non-eligibility for 
maintenance from the time of nush‰z. Welchman, 2007, p. 171. 
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nafaqa from the absent husband”,595 which is vague and does not specify whether marriage on its 
own makes the wife “deserving” of maintenance – as suggested by his emphasis on it as a central 
duty of the husband’s – or whether other conditions apply.  
µAbduh’s response did not question the validity of the ruling on the wife’s nush‰z, nor 
look deeper into the case, although historical studies show that “maintenance and obedience suits 
were often a disguise for more profound marital disputes” and spouses often “used the court 
system as a means of inflicting damage on each other or on a third party through legal tricks”.596 
He did not ask what the ruling was based upon, while there are differences of opinion regarding 
what constitutes and what justifies disobedience or desertion of the marital home. He did not ask 
for instance whether or not the husband’s non-provision of maintenance preceded the wife’s 
leaving the conjugal home,597 or whether or not the husband had summoned his wife to return to 
the conjugal dwelling. Nor did he ask why it took one year for the husband to accuse her of 
nush‰z, while experience showed that “a few husbands took no initiative to return their wives to 
the conjugal dwelling either by reconciliation or by execution of an obedience decree through the 
state authorities. Moreover some deliberately prevented their wives from returning to their 
obedience in order to justify their non-provision of maintenance”.598   
While µAbduh proposed radical changes in the law to allow women access to divorce, in 
recognition of the fact that women, under the Hanafi-based law applied at the time, had little 
chance to leave an unhappy marriage, it is strange that he did not recognise here that such a 
situation could be a reason behind a woman’s desertion of the family home. In fact several 
studies have shown that a husband’s filing for ~¥µa (obedience) is a sign that the marriage has 
irreparably broken down, and is sometimes used as a strategy for the husband to avoid the 
financial repercussions of divorce (by repudiation) by pushing the wife to file for khulµ, forcing 
her to give up her financial rights.599 Perhaps this is a result of the brief nature of fat¥w¥, and the 
assumption that all such questions and possibilities had already been taken into consideration by 
                                                
595 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 657-8. 
596 Shaham, p. 97. 
597 ibid., p . 95. 
598 ibid., p . 83. In fact, µAbduh, in two other places, implicitly recognises these common practices or “tricks”: in the 
context of discussing the jurisdiction of Shariµa, he mentions, without further comment, “when a man claims his 
wife’s nushuz in order to cause her nafaqa and housing costs to be forfeited”, (Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 242), and similarly in 
two similar examples (ibid., p. 249, 274). 
599 See, for instance, Shaham, Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt, p. 83. 
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the court that ruled on the wife’s nush‰z. Or perhaps it is simply that µAbduh ruled on the basis 
of current laws which restricted grounds for divorce, whereas his proposal would make such a 
situation unnecessary, as an unhappy wife would be able to request judicial divorce rather than 
simply leave the marital home. Or perhaps it is a reflection of the persistence of the view of 
marriage as primarily based on the balance between the twin rights/duties of maintenance and 
obedience,600 such that µAbduh’s insistence on the primacy and necessity of the husband’s 
fulfillment of the duty of nafaqa (failing which leads to divorce) can only be maintained if the 
reciprocal duty of obedience is also strongly upheld.601  
This brings us to the central question of rights and duties in the marital context, which 
emphasises obedience as a wife’s duty and a husband’s right – an issue that entails a number of 
important consequences. While reformist scholars were keen to emphasise marriage’s 
companionate nature, as a partnership of love and mercy, and of cooperation between the 
spouses to produce useful and pious members of society, they were not willing to re-interpret the 
sources to do away with imbalances in the marital relationship or its view as a hierarchical power 
structure. This paradox persists in Islamic writings – that is, the question of “how to reconcile the 
message of fundamental equality in Muslim doctrine with the specific inequality that is the basis 
for the relationship of the believer-husband with his believer-wife”.602 
Here I analyse µAbduh’s discussion of Nush‰z, Qiw¥ma, Obedience and Discipline, with 
reference to classical and contemporary interpretations of verse 4:34.603 In medieval Islamic law, 
                                                
600 Nasir explains the jurists’ logic: "Since it is the tamkeen [being available], and not the marriage contract itself 
that makes maintenance the lawful right of the wife, this right shall be lost if the husband is denied access to the 
wife." Nasir, p. 99. Maghniyya summarises the requirements of obedience: "If a wife leaves her husband's home 
without his permission or refuses to reside in a house which fits her status, she shall be considered 'disobedient' and 
shall not be entitled to her maintenance according to all the schools" p. 359. 
601 Although the view of marriage as a contract where financial security is provided to the wife in return for 
obedience has been strongly criticised in feminist literature, Muslim feminists have themselves not escaped the same 
equation, as some have now resorted to calling for the elimination of “the right to obedience” only by forfeiting the 
right to maintenance and demanding that women should contribute equally to the family’s finances. However, Lama 
Abu Odeh argues that breaking the maintenance for obedience equation does not necessarily entail rejecting the 
husban’d duty of maintenance. “Egyptian Feminism: Trapped in the Identity Debate”, 16 Yale J.L. & Feminism 
145-191 (2004), pp. 188-191. As Lynn Welchman points out in “A husband’s authority: Emerging Formulations in 
Muslim Family Laws”, Moroccan family law is an example of a reformed view of marriage where obedience is no 
longer demanded while maintenance is. International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family (2011) 25 (1): 1-23. 
602 Mernissi, Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry, p. 68. 
603 “Men are the maintainers of women because Allah has made some of them to excel others and because they 
spend out of their wealth; the good women are therefore obedient, guarding the unseen as Allah has guarded; and (as 
to) those on whose part you fear desertion, admonish them, and leave them alone in the sleeping-places and beat 
them; then if they obey you, do not seek a way against them; surely Allah is High, Great”. 
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nush‰z meant primarily the wife’s refusal to respond to her husband’s sexual needs. In addition, 
the wife is required not to leave the house without her husband’s permission. Medieval scholars 
also debated whether working outside the house or refusal on the part of the wife to do 
housekeeping was a sign of nush‰z. The most immediate legal effect of nush‰z is suspension of 
nafaqa. In contemporary Islamic law, more elements are associated with nush‰z in addition to 
the medieval ones. The refusal of the wife to respond to her husband’s sexual needs without a 
justified reason is still considered the most prevalent cause of nush‰z. However, in addition to 
the contractual justifications of the husband’s right to istimt¥µ and the wife’s availability which 
prevailed in medieval Islamic law, we are now more likely to find quasi-psychological-medical 
explanations for the husband’s position as leader of the family and his right to obedience, as 
discussed below. 
 
5.2.1  Qiw¥ma  and Men’s and Women’s Shares 
 
“Men are qaww¥m‰n…” 
 
While al->abarÏ interpreted qiw¥ma as a position of responsibility within the family 
requiring care, patience, and tolerance on the part of the husband, later exegetes put increasing 
emphasis on the authority of the husband, which is presented in similar terms and of a similar 
nature to political leadership of the umma, emphasising obedience, right to discipline, and 
condemnation of rebellion. This leadership is, furthermore, not based on merely contingent 
socio-economic factors such as financial maintenance, but on intrinsic natural gender differences 
that make the male superior, and hence eligible for leadership in the spheres of politics, religion, 
and the family. 
Modernist interpretation continues this theme of parallels between political power 
relations and the family structure.604 As the basic building block of society, family is seen as a 
microcosm of the umma. Again the husband is viewed in a similar way to the caliph. However, 
                                                
604 This link between theories on government and marriage is not specific to Muslim authors: “Conjugal relations 
and the marriage contract were as central to political debate as the relation between king and subject and the social 
contract. The terms, or what were held to be the terms, of the two contracts were used to argue about the proper form 
of marriage and political rule”. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988, p. 90. See also 
Mary Lyndon Shanley, “Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth Century English Political Thought”, 
The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 79-91. 
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since the view of political leadership had itself changed in the modern era, µAbduh was keen to 
stress that this leadership is to be characterised by justice rather than authoritarianism: 
What is meant by ‘qiy¥m’ here is leadership (riy¥sa) by which the led (mar’‰s) acts 
according to his/her own will and choice, not that he/she is oppressed, deprived of 
willpower, not doing anything except that to which he/she is directed by his/her leader 
(ra’Ïs).605  
 
However, while the mar’‰s is presented as a free individual, the ra’Ïs preserves a wide 
scope of authority: 
The fact that a person is qayyim (in charge of/responsible for) over another, implies 
guiding him/her and watching over him/her in executing what he/she had guided him/her 
to do, that is to follow up his/her actions and education.606 
  
Mirroring the limited development in political thought in the region, µAbduh’s political 
ideals seemed to oscillate between the model of the “just benevolent despot” (al-mustabidd al-
µ¥dil) and constitutional democracy. While he abhorred absolute despotism and considered 
justice and the rule of law to be principal features of good governance, he was more concerned 
about developments in the fields of educational, intellectual and religious reform and rather 
ambivalent about the form of government that enabled such developments.  
Similarly, social equality was also a concept partially embraced by the reformists, who 
decried extravagance and social inequality and promoted social solidarity, while mostly 
addressing the benevolence of the middle and upper classes – to whom most of them belonged – 
to help the ‘less fortunate’, without radically attacking existing social hierarchies. Equally in the 
family context, the values of benevolence, cooperation and justice607 were emphasised, with no 
radical questions posed regarding the validity of the existing power hierarchy.608   
                                                
605 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 223. 
606 ibid. 
607 More recently Heba Rauf Ezzat further emphasised justice as the main characteristic of Qiw¥ma, by analyzing 
the use of Qiw¥ma in the Quran, not only to describe family relations, but to describe God, and as a characteristic 
that both believing men and women are commanded to strive for, in both cases qiw¥ma being linked to qis~ 
(fairness). See Heba Rauf Ezzat (p. 197). She identified Sh‰ra as a second ‘political value’ within the family, which 
is also mentioned in the Qur’an in different contexts in relation to Muslim society and the Muslim family (p. 200). 
Rauf Ezzat used similar terms to the one µAbduh used to characterise family relations “the leadership- riy¥sa – of the 
family is a consultative riy¥sa, not a despotic one” and explicitly stresses that “to a great extent, it resembles Im¥ma 
or Khil¥fa at the state level” (p. 201). 
608 It is helpful to remember that hierarchies are seen as an essential part of nature in social Darwinism, which was 
very influential at the time. Le Bon – whom Timothy Mitchell considers the most influential thinker in turn of the 
century Egypt- believed that “nature does not know such a thing as equality… Not only does nature not know 
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Moreover, the basis of this leadership is emphasised as natural rather than contingent, 
based on the ‘preference/superiority’ (fa\l) of the man. However, the unity of the structure is 
emphasised in order to limit this ‘preference’, since the two are like ‘organs of the body’, again 
borrowing an image originally used to describe the umma and its solidarity,609 here used to imply 
that unity and harmony do not contradict difference and a ‘soft hierarchy’: 
What is meant by “preferring some over others” is preferring men over women, and had 
He said “by that with which He preferred them (masculine) over them (feminine)” it 
would have been more concise and more explicit. However the wisdom in expressing it 
this way is related to “do not wish for that with which God preferred some of you over 
others”, that is to imply that the relationship between woman and man and between man 
and woman is like that between the organs of a body and the rest of the body, such that 
man is like the head and woman is like the body.610 
 
Comparing µAbduh’s [and most classical taf¥sÏr] interpretation of the verse, which 
focuses on ‘fa\l’ interpreted as essential superiority, and µ®’isha Taym‰r’s reading of the verse, 
one finds that the latter highlights the contingent justification of Qiw¥ma in addition to the ‘fa\l’ 
bestowed on men – that is “by that which they spend out of their wealth”. Taym‰r appears to 
accept that there is a male preference/superiority, according to the classical arguments that such 
privileges as im¥ma and khil¥fa were exclusive to them: 
The Qur’an explicitly identified the bases of the rights that men had over women and 
those that women had over men… A man provided for the needs of his wife striving to 
protect and look after her. God explained His judgment regarding male privilege by citing 
their access to affairs that enhanced reason and religion. It entitled them to the rights to 
guardianship (wil¥ya), religious leadership (im¥ma) and political rule (khil¥fa).611 
 
However, Taym‰r stressed that such privileges were justified by their “access to affairs” 
and were also balanced by the additional duties expected of men, that is providing for, 
protecting, and looking after their wives. This balance was important, because it demonstrated 
that, at least partly, men’s leadership was not natural, but contingent, and not absolute, but 
                                                                                                                                                       
equality, but since the beginning of the ages she has always realised progress by means of successive 
differentiations- that is to say, by increasing inequalities” (p. 296-7 of The Psychology of Revolution). 
609 Elsewhere µAbduh uses the same image to describe the relationship between the umma and the prophet, as a body 
and a head, again emphasising unity. Aµm¥l, vol. 3, p. 445. The same image/analogy is also common in Christian 
writings on the relationship between husband and wife, and also between Christ and the Church. 
610 Aµm¥l, vol.5, p. 223.  
611 Quoted in Mervat Hatem’s “The Nineteenth Century Discursive Roots of the Continuing Debate on the Social-
Sexual Contract in Today’s Egypt”, Hawwa: Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World, vol. 2, 
No 1, 2004, 64-88, p. 73. 
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conditional on fulfillment of their duties. Taym‰r’s acceptance of this balance agrees with what 
Deniz Kandiyoti describes as the “patriarchal bargain”,612 where women adhered to this marital 
balance, which may have disadvantaged them in certain ways, but also offered them a number of 
privileges. However, as we have seen, even such a reading was not acceptable to scholars such as 
Al-Fayy‰mÏ, who were adamant that men’s leadership was natural and absolute, and that their 
privileges were not affected by their fulfillment of any financial obligations. Al-Fayy‰mÏ was 
incensed by Taym‰r’s “innovatory” interpretation. He accused her of ignorance of the contextual 
meaning of the Qur’anic verses she cited.613  
Surprisingly, while one could say that µAbduh’s view of the marital relationship is not 
different from Taym‰r’s, since he also strongly emphasised men’s financial obligations, and the 
serious consequences in the case of their non-fulfillment, µAbduh’s interpretation of the verse 
pays no attention to its mention of “by that which men spend out of their wealth”, focusing 
instead on ‘fa\l’. This is particularly surprising since, as highlighted by contemporary feminist 
interpretations,614 this verse comes in the middle of verses that address financial issues and 
family relations, a context which µAbduh himself had stressed in relation to a preceding verse 
(see below). 
The TafsÏr then continues, making the popular link between Qiw¥ma and “not coveting 
that with which God preferred others” in a preceding verse of the s‰ra. However, going back to 
µAbduh’s comments on the “coveting” verse,615 we find that, unlike Ri\¥, he focused not on the 
occasion of revelation but on the relationship of the verse to the preceding verses, which seems 
to have little relation to gender-specific “coveting”. µAbduh stressed that the context is warning 
against “usurping other people’s wealth unlawfully” and guiding to “what would block the path 
to any violation of wealth, life or any rights, that is coveting instead of each using their talents to 
work hard and earn whatever good they wish for”.616 
                                                
612 Kandiyoti, “Bargaining with Patriarchy”, Gender & Society, September 1988 vol. 2 no. 3 274-290, p. 275. 
613 Hatem, “The Nineteenth Century Discursive Roots of the Continuing Debate on the Social-Sexual Contract in 
Today’s Egypt”, p. 76. 
614 See for instance Ghada Karmi, “Women, Islam and Patriarchalism”, in Yamani (ed.) Feminism and Islam: Legal 
and Literary Perspectives, Reading: Published for Centre of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law, SOAS, by Garnet, 
1996, p. 74. 
615 “And do not covet that by which Allah has made some of you excel others; men shall have the benefit of what 
they earn and women shall have the benefit of what they earn; and ask Allah of His grace; surely Allah knows all 
things” (Quran: 4:32). 
616 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 222. 
177 
 
Ri\¥, in contrast, mentioned various narrations regarding the cause of revelation, mostly 
attributing coveting to female companions who felt excluded from jihad and had a lesser share of 
inheritance. Ri\¥ then reported that µAbduh said:  
The reason for these various reports is confusion in understanding this verse, while its 
meaning is obvious: that God has set actions/roles for men and women, such that what is 
for men, they would have a reward for it that is not shared by women, and what is 
specific to women, they have a reward that is not shared by men, and neither of the two 
should covet what is specifically for the other.617  
 
However, after that general interpretation which leaves the action of “coveting” open to 
be attributed to either men or women, a more specific interpretation is elaborated focusing on 
“women’s roles” and admonishing women not to covet “men’s roles”: 
He further made the command general in addressing both groups, while men had not 
wished to be women nor to share in women’s job – that is birth, raising children and other 
such known acts – but it was rather women who had wished for men’s jobs. They had 
wished for the most specific of men’s roles – protecting the land and defending the truth 
by force… The wisdom in this is that such wishes, which are born out of noble spiritual 
life, should not exist, for wishing for such work is very alien to women, and is caused by 
the fact that the umma – in its early life – brings women and children together with men 
who all participate in all life’s aspects, and such spirit spreads through it. Thus whoever 
is familiar with the history of Islam and the Arabs’ renaissance through it, and the life of 
the Prophet and his Companions would see that women were side by side with men in 
every act and every ordeal, such that they used to come and take the oath of allegiance 
alongside men as reported in the chapter of Al-Mumta^ana, and they used to accompany 
men in their battles to treat the wounded, and fulfill many such duties. Then God wanted 
women to specifically care for the homes, and men to be devoted to hard duties outside 
the home, so that each would perfect his/her work, and fulfill it sincerely.618 
 
There is repeated emphasis in the above commentary, through reference to a number of 
unrelated verses and contexts, to stress women’s domestic role as a divinely ordained one. As 
seen in Chapter 2, there was a thriving literature on “skilled home management”, which Al-
Man¥r was no stranger to. The strict division of the “private” and “public” spheres, and the 
theoretical confinement of women to the former, ignored the fact that most Egyptian women, 
both rural and urban, could not afford such a confined role as a “home mistress”. Such concepts 
have continued to dominate discussions of gender roles, and have come to be seen as religious 
                                                
617 ibid., p. 220. 
618 ibid., p. 221 (Al-Man¥r, vol.13, p. 333).  
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and cultural norms, rather than a modern discourse associated with political, social and economic 
circumstances. Scholarship in Middle Eastern studies has shown how the normative bourgeois 
family structure is a product of recent historical processes — of the encroachment of colonial 
modernity, of eugenics discourses, of imperial nationalism, of capitalist modes of production, 
and of the influence of the discourses of liberal secularism (e.g. Najmabadi, 1998; Shakry, 1998; 
Tucker, 2002). Such studies argue that such discourses did not express a “reversion” to 
traditional values, but their re-invention within the sphere of Islamic thought. The above quote 
could be read in support of such arguments, as µAbduh – or probably Ri\¥ – qualified the early 
period of the Muslim community where women were involved in “every aspect of life” as 
something temporary before which they were required to return to the “originally intended” and 
“natural” division of labour, ignoring the fact that throughout history, Muslim women, to various 
degrees, continued to have various contributions to the fields of knowledge, business, literature, 
and even governance. Here reformists are seen as not calling for a complete return to the way of 
the salaf, but presenting a selective reading based on their contemporary situation.  
However, only a few paragraphs later, µAbduh again emphasised that the context of the 
verse is coveting wealth, rather than women coveting men’s roles/priviledges: 
The obvious meaning is that this is concerning wealth, such that He forbade usurping it 
unlawfully, then forbade one from wishing he/she had the wealth with which God had 
blessed the other, because coveting leads to violation…. Since inheritance is subject to 
coveting by some heirs – particularly those in whose hands wealth is, God enjoined 
giving each person his/her due right… so let not greed and jealousy of some heirs 
towards others cause them to usurp any of their share, be they male or female, old or 
young.619 
 
This repeated emphasis raises the question of whether the entire passage regarding men’s 
and women’s roles in early Muslim history and the emphasis on a strict separation of roles was 
in fact an addition by Ri\¥, particularly since above, he explicitly mentioned that the point about 
men not having wished for women’s specific roles was his own point and not one made by 
µAbduh.620 Also, the entire passage in the tafsÏr of “do not covet…” covering over seven pages 
only has two short paragraphs explicitly attributed to µAbduh, both of which link the act of 
                                                
619 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 222. 
620 As discussed in more details in Chapter 1, the manner in which TafsÏr al-Man¥r was compiled and written makes 
it impossible to distinguish with certainty between µAbduh’s and Ri\¥’s statements. This casts further doubt on the 
certainty of attributing the above statements to µAbduh. 
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coveting to wealth which is the cause of greed and of attempts to usurp the rights of the weak, 
something which would be more easily attributed to men than to women, men being the ones in 
possession of wealth, able to usurp it, and resentful of the radical Islamic change which grants 
property and inheritance rights to women and children, rather than men who are able to carry 
arms as was previously the case in pre-Islamic Arabia. Disregarding the context – wealth, greed 
and violation of the rights of the weak, particularly women – most taf¥sÏr have tended to attribute 
the act of ‘wishing’ or ‘coveting’ to women, directed at men’s supposed superiority.621  
However, the view on men’s essential superiority over women was, in a later verse, 
explicitly attributed to µAbduh: 
The cause of ‘fa\l’ – merit/superiority – is of two kinds, natural and acquired. The natural 
one comprises that man’s nature (miz¥j) is stronger and more perfect, more complete and 
more beautiful… We see that the males of all animal species are more beautiful and more 
perfect than their females, as you can see in the cockerel and the chicken, the sheep and 
the ewe, the lion and lioness. Facial hair, beard and moustaches, are also part of the 
perfection and beauty of men’s form, such that the hairless man is considered less 
complete and he wishes that there could be a cure that could grow hair, even if he is 
among those who regularly shave their beard. The strength of nature and perfection of 
form leads to strength of mind and good judgment on the essence and consequences of 
matters, such that scientists say: sound body, sound mind. That in turn leads to perfection 
in acquired actions, such that men are more able to earn, invent and manage affairs. Thus, 
for all the above, they have been ordered to provide for women and protect them, and to 
assume leadership in the community of the home, for each community must have a leader 
to refer to in order to unite the common interest. [with some additions and 
clarifications].622 
 
The linking of preference and superiority to “natural qualities” seems to agree with the 
view of µAbduh’s contemporary social Darwinist ShiblÏ Shumayyil’s view that “the question [of 
equality between men and women] is a purely natural/physical/biological one; that is it falls 
under the discipline of zoology, or rather the secondary discipline of anthropology”.623 As 
discussed in Chapter Two, Social Darwinism was popular throughout the turn-of-the-century 
period, and its linking of “natural” differences between species, races and sexes to power 
                                                
621 Al->abarÏ includes a long list of reports linking the verse to male or female companions wishing to have higher 
reward or lesser punishment from God because of their different rights and obligations. He does not comment on 
their authenticity, and concludes that “the (correct) interpretation is that do not, O you men and women, wish for the 
good and degrees of merit with which God has preferred some of you over others, but let each be content with the 
share God has set for him/her, and instead ask God of His bounty”, vol. 4, p. 31. 
622 Al-Man¥r, vol. 13, p. 406-7. 
623 Shumayyil, Ha|¥d al-Fikr, p. 91. 
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hierarchies was far from frowned upon. µAbduh’s comments could be read in this context, 
although they are also not alien to classical tafsÏr (where a long list of male signs of superiority 
were cited, including possession of the beard). It must also be noted that Ri\¥ informed readers 
that the passage included “additions and clarifications”, but we are unfortunately not able to 
distinguish between µAbduh’s words and Ri\¥’s additions. 
However, compare that with Abduh’s commentary on the verses of creation, “that 
woman’s capacity is like man’s capacity in all human matters”,624 or his assertion that: 
 
They [men and women] are equivalent/identical in rights and actions, just as they are 
equivalent/identical in self, feeling, emotion and reason; that is each of them is a 
complete human being with a mind that reflects on his/her interests, a heart that loves 
what is convenient and pleasing to it and hates what does not suit it and avoids it.625 
 
The marked contrast between the above passages is not unusual, and is in fact quite 
common in contemporary writings about “women in Islam”, where equality is emphasised when 
discussing the creation of men and women, their religious duties, and their relationship with 
God. However, in the context of marriage, the husband’s leadership is rationalised by recourse to 
arguments that wholly contradict the claims to equality.626 Interestingly, this accords with the 
perceived concern about power relations and gender hierarchies expressed by reformists as early 
as JabartÏ and >ah~¥wÏ in their descriptions of French women. While they were praised, French 
women were also considered to be in control of French men, and hence disruptive of the natural 
order. Liberated women – whether from contemporary Europe or from the glorious Muslim past 
– were admired from afar, but not something desirable in the modern family context. This 
assertion of women’s human worth and equality whilst also maintaining fixed hierarchies in the 
marital context is, moreover, not specific to Islamic thought. The legitimizing claim of equality, 
and the simultaneous assertion of gendered hierarchies (or “difference”) is characteristic of 
liberal discourse, in fact being “constitutive dualisms of liberalism”, argues Wendy Brown.627   
                                                
624 Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 145. 
625 ibid., p. 620. 
626 See Chapter 3 on “The Woman Question in Nineteenth Century Egypt”. 
627 Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity. See also Carole Pateman’s The Sexual Contract: 
Kant also rejects the suggestion “that there is something contradictory about postulating both equality and legal 
recognition of the husband as master. He states that the husband’s power over his wife ‘cannot be regarded as 
contrary to the natural Equality of a human pair, if such legal Supremacy is based only upon the natural superiority 
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In fact this twin assertion of equality and hierarchy is often expressed in the same breath 
when interpreting verse 2:228, which although in a different chapter and context, often appears 
in commentaries on verse 4:34 and vice versa. Commenting on the ending of the verse “and they 
have rights equal to the rights men have over them, according to maµr‰f, and men have a degree 
over them”, µAbduh observed that “the mention of God’s Might and Wisdom here has two 
indications: first giving women rights equal to men’s rights, after having been denied those rights 
by [pre-Islamic] Arabs and all other nations; and the second making man a ra’Ïs over her, such 
that whoever is not content with these wise rulings would be competing with God in His Might 
and sovereignty, and denying His wisdom in His rulings”.628 
Leadership in marriage is thus accepted as being based on essential superiority, although 
it should be characterised by justice and consultation.629 Hence µAbduh was keen to stress that 
the wife, although ‘mar’‰s’, maintains her independent will and rights. Ri\¥ went further by 
characterising marriage as a necessarily unequal relationship where the woman is ‘compensated’ 
through the mahr and maintenance.630  
 
5.2.2 Nush‰z  and Discipline 
 
‘So the good women are the devout, guarding in secret that which Allah has guarded’…  
‘Ghayb’ here means what one feels shy to reveal, that is they guard all that is related to 
the matters of marriage that are private between the two spouses such that no one else 
could know anything about the private matters of one’s spouse. Men cannot use the 
                                                                                                                                                       
of the faculties of the Husband compared with the Wife, in the effectuation of the common interest of the household; 
and if the Right to command is based merely upon this fact”, p. 172 
628 Al-Man¥r, vol. 8, p. 374 (published just after µAbduh’s death). Although this conforms to the common reading of 
this verse and its linking of “daraja” (the degree) and “qiw¥ma” (guardianship), some authors, both classical and 
contemporary have pointed out that the context of the “degree” verse is not the structure of marital relations, but 
rather divorce, since all the preceding verses deal with divorce procedures rather than marital life. See Wadud, 
Qur’an and Woman, p..68. Al-R¥zÏ’s tafsÏr, although it does not explicitly say the same regarding “the degree”, does 
stress that the mutual rights referred to (just preceding the “degree” in the same verse) concern divorce rights and 
not marital rights. TafsÏr al-Fakhr al- R¥zÏ, vol. 3, p. 101. 
629  Cf Locke’s use of “the equality between men and women in parenting to debunk only the despotic absolutist 
nature of paternal power between husband and wife. The husband still exercises power over his wife, but the power 
is less than absolute.” (Zillah Einstein, in Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 22) 
630 Whether or not Ri\¥ was influenced by contract theory, his portrayal of the marriage contract is compatible with 
contract theory where “all familiar arguments became unacceptable because the doctrine of individual freedom and 
equality entailed that there was only one justification for subordination. A naturally free and equal individual must, 
necessarily, agree to be ruled by another.” (p. 39-40, Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract). 
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authority of discipline against such women, but rather only against the second type, 
described in God’s saying “and those whose disloyalty you fear”.631  
 
Here, µAbduh’s interpretation of the description of “the good women” is again 
characterised by brevity, without going into the classical discussions of “q¥nit¥t” and whether it 
means devout obedience to God or to their husband. Instead, he concluded that what is implied in 
the description is that a state of complete mutual trust exists between the two spouses. However, 
he did not take the opportunity to link this to the description of the “opposite category” of 
women, who would, obversely, be characterised by untrustworthiness and disloyalty, rather than 
‘disobedience’ and rebellion against the ‘natural hierarchy’ as popularly understood. Instead, he 
states: 
Nush‰z literally means rising, for the woman who denies her husband’s rights, regards 
herself to be above him and attempts to be above her leader (ra’Ïs), and rises above her 
own nature and what is required by the laws of nature, such that she is similar to the 
n¥shiz ground which is no longer straight.632 
 
As for the – perhaps most – controversial point in the verse in question – the 
interpretation of the command “i\rib‰hunna”, µAbduh did not regard it as a practice that is 
“abhorrent to reason or nature” whose “legitimacy” needs justification or “(alternative) 
interpretation” – although his explicit denial leads one to ask whether he was responding to 
contemporary questioning of such a legitimacy. Looking at the writings of both Egyptian authors 
– male and female – and western ones, it is not clear whether this practice was questioned. In 
Malak ¤ifnÏ N¥|if’s writings, for instance, there are descriptions of various marital problems and 
causes of misery for women, but there is no mention of physical punishment. Similarly, Q¥sim 
AmÏn mentions many manifestations of “men’s disregard for women” and their “despotism” over 
women, but throughout his entire Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a, there is no mention of chastisement.633 It is 
possible that the reason could be that such a practice was believed to be very rare in the class 
they were concerned about (they complained more about the psychological neglect of wives by 
their husbands). Physical chastisement in marriage is often implicitly referred to as a habit 
                                                
631 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 223-4. 
632 ibid., vol. 4, p.  408-410. 
633 Judith Tucker also noted in her study of eighteenth-century court records and fatawa that “the muftis were mostly 
silent on the question of the rule governing a husband’s physical abuse of his wife”. In the House of Law, p. 65. 
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depending on the environment, implying that it is more common in lower classes.634 Similarly, 
Cromer does not mention this amongst his criticisms of Islam. Although, he wrote extensively 
about “the degradation of Muslim women”, he focused on polygamy, divorce, and veiling, and 
did not explicitly mention physical chastisement.635 This is perhaps because the issue was still 
being debated in Europe, and Cromer, being an anti-suffragette supporter, was perhaps not 
inclined to lend any support to feminist demands.636  
µAbduh does not appear to see any contradiction between the state of “love, affection, 
harmony and contentment” which should characterise marriage, and chastisement, which is 
justified as “a matter resorted to in the case of corruption of environment and the spread of 
corrupt characters”, permissible “if a man judges that his wife’s abandonment of her nush‰z 
depends on it”.637  
µAbduh envisioned that such a measure becomes unnecessary and unsuitable “if the 
environment is reformed and women become responsive to advice and admonition, or to hajr 
(desertion), in which case one must give up chastisement, for each state has a corresponding 
suitable ruling in SharÏµa”. Here µAbduh did not go as far as calling for an end to – or even 
suspension of – this practice as he had done with polygamy on the basis that the latter 
“contravenes the original state and the state of perfection, and contradicts the tranquility, 
affection and mercy that constitute the pillars of marital life”. Although µAbduh called attention 
to the Prophet’s commands, both through his statements and his own example “in all cases, to be 
gentle towards women and to avoid wronging them, and to keep them with dignity or release 
                                                
634 This continues to this day. As Lama Abu-Odeh reports, “The definition of harm tends to be elitist, and what is 
harm for a rich woman is not harm for a poor one. The Court of Cassation thus defined harm as “inflicting verbal or 
physical injury on the woman in a way that does not befit people of her social status.” (Cassation 18/4/1962, No. 28, 
29) The Court of Appeals likewise reasoned that "what a woman of a certain social class finds tolerable another of a 
different social class does not" Appeal 11/12/1965, No. 89, 82).” “Modernizing Muslim Family Law, the Case of 
Egypt”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 37, Oct, 2004, 1043-1146, p.  1135. 
635 Interestingly these were the same themes which received the greatest attention from reformists such as AmÏn. 
636 In Britain, in the same period [nineteenth century], it was widely believed that a husband had the right physically 
to chastise his wife provided that he used a stick no bigger than a man’s thumb. Frances Power Cobbe published an 
influential article in 1878, ‘Wife Torture in England’, and, in a speech in the House of Commons, supporting 
women’s suffrage during the debates on the Second Reform Bill, John Stuart Mill said that ‘I would like to have a 
Return laid before this House of the number of women who are annually beaten to death, kicked to death, or 
trampled to death by their male protectors”. (Mary Lyndon Shanley, Feminism, Marriage, and the Law in Victorian 
England, 1850-1895, Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 159. In 1895, in Britain, violence became grounds for a 
judicial separation with the payment of maintenance by the husband. 
637 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 224. 
184 
 
them with dignity”,638 he did not resolve the contradiction between this and the practice of 
chastisement by rejecting either recourse, but by limiting each to a particular case and situation.  
µAbduh also emphasised that the triple command was not to be executed simultaneously, 
but that the verse clearly implied gradual progression from the less severe to the more severe 
measure: “if they obey you after one of these disciplinary measures, then do not transgress by 
progressing to the next one, but start with what God started with, that is admonition, and if it 
does not work, then desertion, and if not then chastisement, and if this itself failed, then one 
resorts to arbitration.” This was not a novel understanding, although it was not unanimous, as 
some exegetes argued there was no implication of gradual progression. µAbduh further stressed 
that in the absence of nush‰z, there was no justification for any of the three measures: “one 
deduces from this that the q¥nit¥t cannot be disciplined even through admonition, let alone 
desertion or chastisement”.639  
The mixed justification, restriction, and contextualisation of the practice are again 
expressed in µAbduh’s comment on the ending of the verse: 
  
‘For God is Most High, Great’: He [God] added this statement following the preceding 
prohibition of transgression because the man transgresses against the woman due to the 
power he feels over her and the feeling of superiority to her, hence God reminded him of 
His Own Supremacy, Pride and Omnipotence, so that he would fear God and be 
admonished. And Know that men who oppress their wives in order to try to be masters in 
their homes are in fact producing offspring who would be slaves to others, that is their 
children would be raised witnessing the humiliation of oppression and grow up to be like 
slaves who humble themselves to those to whom they are in need.640  
 
The above comment seems to be quite a strong condemnation of physical punishment and 
its serious long-term consequences on the family and society, which leads one to ask how this 
sits with the above ‘tolerance’ and ‘justification’ of this practice and insistence that it is not 
‘abhorrent’ as expressed by µAbduh. Is it a sign of clear contradictions within his thinking or an 
example of µAbduh’s strong belief in ‘tarbiya’ and appeal to moral and spiritual motives rather 
than purely relying on legal reform? As discussed in Chapter 3, a distinction emerges between 
µAbduh’s view of women’s reality and of their potential, leading to apparent contradictions in his 
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discourse on women. Seeing µAbduh’s through statements on fundamental principles may cast 
him as a liberal, while some of his statements accepting discrimination portray him as a 
conservative. In fact, he is both.   
What is interesting is that, although µAbduh justified the – conditional – use of the above 
practice, he did so on the basis of necessity and the “corruption of the environment”, rather than 
on the basis of the husband’s right as the leader of the family and as part of his authority. This is 
in contrast with Ri\¥, who explicitly used the latter basis, confidently defending the husband’s 
authority to discipline his wife, just as the ruler has the authority to discipline his subjects.641 
Thus, while µAbduh did not reject the practice of physical discipline in marriage, he warned 
against its grave consequences, and restricted its applicability to particular times and 
environments, hence making it a temporary necessity that would become irrelevant once society 
is reformed, thanks to the magical wand of education. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
µAbduh’s reform of Egyptian family law was radical when dealing with one half of the 
equation – nafaqa. His proposals provided a way out for women who, under the old Hanafi 
system, were trapped in marriages where the husband was absent, imprisoned, unable or 
unwilling to assume his responsibility of providing marital maintenance. However, in his dealing 
with the second half of the equation, obedience, his tendency was to uphold the husband’s 
authority, while emphasising it was not absolute, but rather a conditional temporary necessity. In 
addition, µAbduh also highlighted the moral aspect that cannot be regulated by law – reminding 
spouses of God’s watching over them, admonishing them not to transgress against the weaker 
party. 
This same tendency has guided all subsequent reform in Egyptian family law. While the 
marital relation has not been made equal, "the transactional quality of the taqlÏd marriage 
contract has been legislatively rehabilitated” by limiting the husband’s power in the marital 
relationship by restricting the interpretation of the wife’s duty of obedience in the family, as well 
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as expanding rather drastically the grounds available for her to request a divorce.642 The result is 
that while under the Hanafi system, “women get much less and men much more than a 
transactional contractual arrangement would warrant… marriage is now simply obedience for 
maintenance; if one is not offered, the other is denied”.643 Lama Abu-Odeh’s review of family 
law reform in the twentieth century in Egypt indicates that the preservation of the ‘transactional 
quality’ of marriage while reducing and abolishing additional powers over and above this 
contractual relationship, through “an intervention in, and modification of, the Hanafi doctrine”, 
has persisted and guided legal reform in Egypt. This appears to be the very strategy proposed by 
µAbduh a century earlier. The emphasis on the moral aspect of the marital relationship, 
emphasising God’s oversight and enjoining mercy and God-consciousness in exercising male 
authority also continues in much of contemporary Islamic discourse, where, as discussed above, 
the hierarchy is maintained, while emphasising its limits. 
  
                                                
642 Lama Abu-Odeh, “Modernizing Muslim Family Law, the Case of Egypt”, p. 1050.  
643 ibid., p. 1131. 
187 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
POLYGYNY 
 
 
Whilst we have seen in the previous chapter that µAbduh’s proposals for the reform of 
family law in the area of nafaqa (and divorce) have, on the whole, been adopted, and indeed 
superseded by later reforms, his proposals for reform in another area of family law have proven 
to be more controversial, remaining unimplemented and facing unwavering resistance from 
various quarters. That area is the restriction of polygyny. 
 
 
6.1 Classical and Modern Discussions of Polygyny 
 
Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, polygyny had been discussed in 
Muslim literature. In law and jurisprudence, the discussion was focused on the additional 
obligation of the polygynous husband to divide his time and provision equally between his 
wives. Although, on the whole, discussions of polygyny in fiqh tended to assume the 
permissibility of polygyny, without discussions of whether it was an absolute right of the 
husband, divergence between the views of different schools and scholars on the issue of 
acceptable conditions to be inserted into the marriage contract showed a difference of opinion on 
the view of polygyny. Whereas the Hanbali madhhab regards the condition stipulated by a wife 
at the time of the marriage contract that her husband take no other wife as legally binding, 
leading to the ending of marriage in the case of breaching the condition, the Hanafi school 
considers it a condition of no consequence, since it is against “the nature of marriage”, thus 
holding polygyny to be a non-negotiable absolute right.644 
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While fiqh in general limited itself to discussions of the legal implications of polygyny, 
an insight into whether polygyny was seen as a natural, acceptable, or happy occurrence can be 
obtained from other literature, including marriage contracts and biographies. Amira El-Azhary-
Sonbol, in her study of Ottoman marriage contracts, found that “perhaps the most important 
condition wives included in marriage contracts concerned polygamy”.645 Leila Ahmed notes that  
Even though accepted practice among the ruling class, the plight of women who shared 
their husband with other wives or concubines nevertheless appears to have been viewed 
as unhappy. When contemporary authors reported of a particular woman that she was in a 
monogamous marriage, they regularly went on to note how fortunate she was in this. 
Similarly where families were in a position to stipulate monogamy for their daughters, 
they often did so… For women of the middle and lower classes, uncushioned by personal 
wealth or wealthy families, polygamy could bring destitution, not just emotional and 
psychological stress, should a new wife gain enough ascendancy to bring about the 
divorce of the first wife.646 
 
Thus, far from being a clear-cut legally permissible practice, as noted by Pearl and 
Menski, “polygamy is a controversial issue in Islam. This is not only so because of principled 
objections to polygamy as an institution, but because the classical Muslim position on polygamy 
itself is not as simple and uncomplicated as is often assumed.”647  
Discussions of whether polygyny itself was recommended could be found in the non-
legal writings of Muslim scholars. While it is true that marriage as such is generally viewed very 
positively in Islamic thought, scholars discussed the various circumstances when marriage can 
become an obligatory, recommended, permissible, or discouraged act. In his book Al-Murshid 
Al-AmÏn, Rif¥µa al->ah~¥wÏ quoted Im¥m al-Ghaz¥lÏ’s view of marriage, which disagrees with 
those who present marriage – monogamous or polygamous – as commendable and obligatory in 
all circumstances. Al-Ghaz¥lÏ warned that  
If there is no need for marriage, such as being unable to provide the mahr, or not being 
ready, or being unable to provide maintenance, then such a person should not marry… for 
whoever leaves that, he would have unburdened himself and avoided failing in his duties 
in his religion and honour, keeping himself proud among his peers.648  
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In the same book, Al->ah~¥wÏ expressed his personal belief that “it is recommended that 
one does not marry more than one wife without an obvious reason”.649 The reason could be the 
absence of children – although even then Al->ah~¥wÏ warned against the hardships of large 
families, and that “wives comfort their husbands, but children are their enemies”.650 Neither did 
he consider polygyny for the legal satisfaction of desires commendable. Al->ah~¥wÏ warned his 
readers against the dangers of venereal diseases and the evils of jealousy among wives. While 
recognising its permissibility, al->ah~¥wÏ, doubting that absolute justice could exist between 
wives, quoted the warnings of various scholars, poets and saints that one should not consider 
polygyny “unless you are ready for eternal misery”.651 Al->ah~¥wÏ’s personal view of polygyny 
is further clarified through his pledge of monogamy to his wife, in which he made “the 
continuity of her marriage dependent on not marrying other than her or taking a concubine, such 
that if he were to do so, his cousin would be definitively divorced upon the conclusion of the 
new contract”.652  
Al->ah~¥wÏ’s discussion of polygyny can still be viewed as a continuation of ‘pre-
modern’ discussions of polygyny. Whether they promoted or discouraged polygyny, those 
writings generally did so with more ease and less defensiveness than later discussions of the 
subject. Ironically, Q¥sim AmÏn, famous for his opposition to polygyny, demonstrates 
defensiveness and obsessiveness, both in his opposition to polygyny, and his earlier – less well-
known – defence of the practice. In his “Les Egyptiens”, written in response to D’Harcourt’s 
book criticising the backwardness of Egyptian Muslims, AmÏn wrote a full chapter to justify 
polygamy as more human an expedient than the repudiation of a first wife or the miserable life of 
a mistress. He defended polygamy as a remedy to solve the social problems caused by unwed 
mothers and illegitimate children.653  
While earlier reformers, such as al->ah~¥wÏ, wrote about polygyny as a practice whose 
legality was not questionable or in need of justification, while simultaneously able to discourage 
it and warn against possible abuses, later authors responded to European criticisms of polygyny 
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by defending the practice and justifying it on the basis of a variety of possible benefits. In µAlam 
al-DÏn (Alexandria, 1882), probably written between 1868 and 1872, µAlÏ Mub¥rak defended 
polygyny as being sanctioned by divine law, while carefully pointing out that most “Eastern” 
men had only one wife. He went on to explain the difference between marriage in “the West” 
and “the East” in terms of demography, claiming that while there were more men than women in 
France, there were more women than men in Egypt. Another defence of polygyny, against claims 
that it soured marital relations and upset the household regime, was published by the chief clerk 
of the Court of Appeals of Cairo in the newspaper al-Ahr¥m in 1881, who, after working his way 
through a juridical argument, added that many a man has had only one wife and his relationship 
with her soured. If that is to be the criterion for prohibiting plural marriage, then marriage should 
be prohibited altogether!654 
The notion that polygyny could be a perilous endeavour is not a recent one. The Prophet 
is reported to have cautioned against neglecting a wife, stating that a man who has two wives and 
favours one over the other will be resurrected at the final judgement with one side of his body 
drooping.655 For most of Muslim history, however, the concern for just treatment of multiple 
wives was seen as a matter to be left to the conscience of the individual Muslim husband. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, modern authors who disapproved of polygyny took a 
range of positions on whether it should be simply discouraged, legally restricted or prohibited, 
and what type of role, if any, the state should play in setting limits on polygamous marriages. 
Voices had already been raised criticising the practice of polygyny in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Fatma Aliye in Turkey had argued that polygyny was specific to the early 
Arab context and that the Qur’an promoted monogamy. Nevertheless, Aliye argued in her 1892 
book, Nisvan-I Islam (Muslim women), that the West held a prejudiced view of Muslim women 
and that the situation of Ottoman women within a polygamous marriage was more secure than 
that of mistresses and their illegitimate children in Western societies.656  
In turn-of-the-century Egypt, women writers began to gently critique polygyny in the 
pages of the women’s press. Rather than call for its direct abolition, these writers depicted the 
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hardships women experienced as victims of polygyny.657 While the reasons for these calls cannot 
definitively be attributed to one cause, it is unlikely that they were prompted by a rise in the 
occurrence of polygyny. In fact, even western critics of the practice noted its decline. Writing in 
the 1840’s, Edward Lane noted that “very few of the Egyptians avail themselves of the license, 
which their religion allows them”.658 Lane further observed that polygyny “is rarer among the 
higher and middle classes than it is among the lower classes; and it is not very common among 
the latter…. not more than one husband among twenty has two wives”.659 
Such observations are supported by the available statistics. Judith Tucker notes that “the 
Mansurah records of 1800 to 1820 suggest, however, that polygamy was by no means 
widespread among peasant families in the early nineteenth century. In the 14 families for which 
we have full data, for example, we find only one case of polygamy, one man with two wives”.660 
Based on a mid-nineteenth century Cairo census, Philippe Fargues concluded that “only 2.7 
percent of married men are recorded with two or more cowives in their households. 661  
In contrast to later colonial observations on the matter, Sir John Bowring’s Report on 
Egypt (1823-1838) spoke of polygyny in a practical and even appreciative way, noting that “in a 
country like Egypt, where the disproportion of females to males is very great indeed, polygamy 
no doubt assists to fill up more rapidly the vacancies left by the perpetual demand for young 
men… The disproportion of the sexes is incredibly great: The Government Return states the 
proportion of women to men to be as 135 to 100. I imagine it to be considerably higher”.662  
However, while the trend, according to most statistics, was towards a decline of an 
already rare practice, polygyny was gaining more attention in depictions of the east.663 Lord 
Cromer singles out two main phenomena of the “degradation of women in Mohammedan 
countries”664 – seclusion and polygamy. He considered polygyny to be among the principal 
markers of difference “between the position of Moslem women and that of their European 
sisters” and among the worst practices in Egyptian society, exemplifying “the degradation of 
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women in Mohammedan countries”.665  Cromer categorically proclaimed that “the East is 
polygamous, the west is monogamous”.666 Moreover, “Monogamy fosters family life, polygamy 
destroys it”.667 Despite this extreme alarm, Cromer conceded that “the practice of monogamy has 
of late years been gaining ground amongst the more enlightened Egyptians”, attributing this 
downward trend to “education and association with Europeans” and the fact that “polygamy is 
expensive”.668 However Cromer was adamant that “the movement in favour of monogamy 
cannot be as yet called general. The first thing an Egyptian of the lower class will do when he 
gets a little money is to marry a second wife.”669 Similarly, while Edward Lane’s observations on 
polygyny were reserved, his great-nephew Stanley Lane-Poole’s were much less so, ruling that 
“faithful devotion to one woman is not to be reckoned among ordinary Muslim virtues.”670 
This concern about the shape of the modern family partly reflects changes in British 
family culture, particularly the rise of the ideal of companionate marriage in Europe.671 Writers 
such as Ahmed (1988) Thornton (2001, 2005) and others have argued that equating modernity 
with an end to veiling, polygamy, female seclusion, and gender segregation resulted from 
Western influence on national reformers. Others hold that the concerns expressed by Egyptian 
writers cannot be entirely seen as a reaction to western criticisms. Various studies of such 
nationalist writings and calls point to a variety of motivations.  
Lisa Pollard has analysed how Egyptian calls for reform of conjugal practices through 
authentically religious and anti-colonial rhetoric represented their assertion of an indigenous 
identity, which was essential to the nation-building project to counter the colonial project. 
Appropriating the colonial discourse, the “relationship between the future of the nation and the 
transformation of the household became a topic in the press, in the classroom, and, later, in 
political parties, where otherwise disenfranchised nationalists could address the future of their 
nation”.672 Practices such as the marriage of minors, unilateral male-initiated divorce, and 
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polygamy, increasingly became viewed as incompatible with a strong and ‘modern’ Egyptian 
nation. Happy stable healthy families were needed to serve as a solid foundation for an 
independent Egyptian nation free of social ills.673  
Hanan Kholoussy asks why “certain state officials and press writers sought to curtail 
polygamy if it was not a common practice”.674 She concludes that one of the reasons for the 
monarchy’s desire to promote monogamy is “the state’s desire to promote and solidify single, 
nuclear households that would not be able to constitute a threat to its political and socioeconomic 
power”.675 The promotion of a nuclear monogamous family, led by nationalist writers and state 
officials “indirectly denounced large familial networks that could potentially encourage 
subversive activities against the authority of the state.”676 Hanan Kholoussy argues that “as in its 
attempts to legally restrict the marriage of minors and divorce, certain state officials, as well as 
many Egyptian nationalists and feminists, sought to discourage polygamy as yet another means 
to control, represent, and subordinate the marital habits of the population to the ordered 
supervision of the nation state.”677  
Mary-Ann Fay, studying the transformation of the upper classes from Mamluke to 
modern times, uses Deniz Kandiyoti’s concept of the “patriarchal bargain: women’s strategies of 
maneuver and resistance within systems of male dominance” to explain the changes in views on 
conjugal practices. She argues that efforts by upper-class women to introduce family reforms 
were “primarily an effort to rewrite the terms of the patriarchal bargain within the context of a 
new, emerging nation state in Egypt.”678 Women’s new opposition to polygyny, although it was 
not a novel practice, and although it was not on the rise, is attributed to political and economic 
changes in the lives of upper-class women: while “polygamy, concubinage, seclusion, veiling, 
and restraints on women’s sexual autonomy characterised the eighteenth-century upper-class 
household, its female members also enjoyed rank and status, access to wealth, and considerable 
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economic autonomy, influence, and power”.679 However, “the transformation of the warrior 
grandees of the eighteenth century into the Turco-Circassian ruling elite of the nineteenth 
entailed the relocation of power from the household to the institutions of the “modern” 
centralizing state. In effect, women were left to face polygamous unions, men’s easy access to 
divorce, and the inability to choose when, and what age, or even whether to marry, without the 
compensating factors of life in the eighteenth-century household”.680                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
6.2 µAbduh’s early concerns about Polygyny 
 
µAbduh’s writings on polygyny preceded the British occupation of Egypt. As early as 
1881, he wrote two articles on marriage, the second exclusively devoted to the question of 
polygyny. This is significant since it precedes Q¥sim AmÏn’s Les Egyptiens (1894) which 
contained a stronger defence of the practice, although five years later, AmÏn’s views on the 
matter seem to have undergone a complete change.  
 
First Articles: “The Need for Marriage” and “Polygyny”, 1881681 
 
Although µAbduh’s first article focuses on marriage in general, and not polygyny, his 
attempt to rationalise the human need for marriage seems to imply both the necessity of 
monogamy and the possibility of polygyny. To address the question of the invalidity of 
unrestricted fulfilment of sexual desires, µAbduh starts from the necessity of the “exclusivity of 
pleasure” and the “unique attachment that necessitates the unique pledge of cooperation”,682 for 
the ideal preservation and development of the human race. However, the arguments used – the 
danger of jealousy and the will to fight all other rivals (in this both sexes are referred to equally), 
women’s inability to provide for themselves, particularly during pregnancy and breastfeeding 
and men’s reluctance to provide for them unless they are exclusive to them, and the need to 
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preserve distinct lineage – rule out polyandry while implicitly allowing for polygyny, although 
the focus is on the general natural human need for marriage. 
µAbduh’s explicit conclusion, however, is that “humans’ happiness in their life, and the 
preservation of their existence in this world, are dependent on the restriction of that desire 
through a rule that regulates its use, sets limits at which each individual must stop, and 
necessitates the exclusivity between the husband and wife, thus avoiding transgression, and 
demonstrating the exclusive commitment between each individual and his wife, and between 
each wife and her husband”.683 The nuclear family’s interest is paramount in each spouse’s 
decisions, such that “each should see the family interest as his/her personal interest. That is, 
he/she does not consider any matter to be an interest unless it brings prosperity and development 
to his/her family”.684 
The above emphasis on exclusivity and unique commitment, with its clear preference of 
monogamy is also reflected in µAbduh’s use of the singular “wife”, rather than “wives” 
throughout the article. However, the ambiguity and contradiction highlighted above re-appear at 
the end of the article as µAbduh summarises that “this is what divine laws, the statements of 
religious scholars and elaborations of the wise have clarified regarding the wisdom behind 
marriage, regardless of whether it is to one or many (wives)”. 
As a logical progression, a second article soon followed, dealing specifically with 
polygyny. In this second article,685 µAbduh’s view on polygyny is clarified from the beginning, 
accepting that Shariµa has permitted the marriage of one man to up to four women, if he believes 
himself to be able to ensure fairness among them, otherwise it is not permissible for him to marry 
more than one. The general permissibility of polygyny is not justified on any natural or social 
basis, as found in some later writings defending the practice. It is simply taken as an established 
rule of Shariµa. It is the conditional prohibition of polygyny which is justified, “because if the 
man fails to give each [wife] her rights, the order of the home suffers and family life worsens, 
since the principal pillar for home management is the preservation of unity and affection between 
the family members”.686 
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There is no fundamental/general criticism of polygyny. Instead, there is explicit 
acceptance on the basis of historical practice, as “the prophet peace be upon him and the 
companions, God be pleased with them, the rightly guided caliphs, scholars, pious people of all 
eras until this era, married more than one, while respecting God’s commands of establishing 
justice between them”.687 The emphasis is on the condition of ‘adl – fairness/justice – as 
“scholars have said that justice is one of the rights of marriage, that is obligatory upon the 
husband just like the rest of the obligatory rights, with no difference between them”.688 
This condition of µadl – an essential obligation on the husband – and the associated divine 
warning, are – in this article and subsequent statements on polygyny – at the core of µAbduh’s 
views on the practice and its regulation. µAdl within polygyny is no novel concept or invention of 
µAbduh’s, being a common concept in juristic manuals, mostly as one of the rights of the wife in 
a polygynous marriage. However, in µAbduh’s analysis, the problem lies in the lack of adherence 
to this obligation and unawareness of the seriousness of its neglect: 
Thus, how – after this divine warning, and this precise necessary obligation which cannot 
be changed or interpreted away – could polygyny be allowed when there is doubt 
regarding inability to apply justice between wives, let alone when that inability is 
confirmed? How can we justify having multiple wives to whom marriage is motivated by 
the mere fulfilment of a passing desire, and the achievement of a temporary pleasure, 
indifferent to the consequent harms and the violation of sacred law?689 
 
In addition to the divine warning against violation of this divine obligation, neglect of the 
obligation of µadl has “consequent harms”, which µAbduh details at length: lies and plots by the 
multiple wives, leading to domestic conflict and violence; revenge and further quarrels and 
disputes day and night, preoccupying the wives and distracting them from home management; 
betrayal of the husband since the wives lose trust, as they expect to be divorced at any moment; 
sowing hatred and jealousy amongst offspring resulting in enmity rather than brotherly support; 
the husband losing respect; divorce and the suffering of the divorced wife and her children. 
In response to those who defend the practice arguing that even where divorce happens, 
the Shariµa has made provisions for the divorcee protecting her and her children from such 
suffering, µAbduh highlights the gap between law and reality:  
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688 ibid., p. 77. 
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Let one not say that such things do not happen since the noble Shariµa has imposed on the 
husband the obligation of supporting his divorcee and her children…. For the husband, 
even if the Shariµa does require that of him, does not submit to that command which 
demands large maintenance, except if compelled against his will.690  
 
From his experience in family courts, µAbduh demonstrates an awareness of the 
inadequacy of current legal provisions, and a sympathy with women whose experience is far 
from those theoretical reassurances, an awareness and sympathy that will be also manifested in 
his later proposals for the reform of Shariµa courts. µAbduh stated that in practice, women cannot 
demand their rights in court, whether for practical reasons, or out of shame, as in rural areas it is 
still considered shameful to demand maintenance.  
In response to those who argue that the above suffering of divorced women and their 
children as a result of the husband’s failure to maintain them or his mistreatment of them is only 
seen from the lowest of people, while respectable and wealthy men maintain their divorcees and 
children and their multiple wives well, so they should not be restricted from having up to four 
wives or divorcing them if they wish, µAbduh again refers to practice, responding: 
How can this be true when we see many wealthy men throwing their wives and children 
out, leaving their children to be brought up by others, not giving them any care or 
attention? And we often see fathers throw out their older children in order to please their 
new wives, and extremely mistreating their wives, to the extent that it is very common 
that the marriage to the second wife is motivated by nothing other than harming the first... 
In addition, the other harms we previously mentioned such as hostility among brothers 
and sisters and towards the father are present, and more so in the case of the wealthy than 
the poor. And it is no use obstinately denying this matter the effects of which are seen in 
all regions and the evil of which is spread throughout our country and other eastern 
countries.691 
 
µAbduh insists that the above description of polygynous marriages and their harms apply 
to “the behaviour of the majority of our people, rich and poor, when they have multiple 
wives”.692 The problem is not necessarily with polygyny itself, but the fact that these men behave 
“as if they did not understand the divine wisdom of its permission, instead using it as no more 
than a way of fulfilling desires and gaining pleasure, ignoring the real reason behind it”.693  
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Again there is no discussion of the “wisdom” behind the practice or “the real reason 
behind it” – which in later writings become essential parts of the discussion of polygyny and its 
defense. They are simply taken for granted. The problem is seen with the behaviour of the 
majority of polygynous men, not with polygyny itself. As a result, since most men at this 
particular time are clearly unable to ensure justice, which is a condition for the permissibility of 
polygyny, men should avoid it, since “the verse ‘then marry as many women as you wish’ is 
restricted by the verse ‘if you fear…’”694 
 There is no outright prohibition or condemnation of polygyny, but a strong warning that 
men “should, before engaging in polygyny, reflect on the justice legally required of them, and 
the need to preserve unity between offspring, and preserving women from conditions which can 
lead them to unbecoming actions”.695 Such care and avoidance of injustice and its harmful 
effects for the family is not seen as impossible, even in our current times “like the case of men 
who fear God, abide by the Shariµa of justice, preserve the rights and sanctity of women, treat 
them kindly and leave them only when necessary – such pious noble men are not blameworthy if 
they were to have multiple wives – up to the legal limit – and these, even if their number is small 
in all countries and regions, their actions are evident and deserving of praise.”696  
Thus permissibility of polygyny, for a certain divine wisdom, is followed by an emphasis 
on the condition of justice as an essential obligation on the polygynous man. This is followed by 
a warning that in current practice, this condition is broken by the majority of men, leading to 
harmful consequences for family life. The theoretical legal provisions for the preservation of 
harmonious family life or the maintenance of divorcees and their children are not considered an 
argument for defending polygyny since in practice they are not respected. Hence men are 
advised to restrict themselves to one wife and warned against going beyond that. However, this 
is followed by praise for an existing minority of polygynous men who do abide by the theoretical 
legal provisions, ending with a circular argument rather than a clear ruling. 
This clear-cut ruling is what is found in the second of µAbduh’s discussions of the 
question of polygyny.  
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6.3 Fatwa on Restriction of Polygyny697 
 
From the beginning of this text, it is clear that, unlike the first article on polygyny, it is 
more defensive and, at least in part, a response to critics – western or others – of polygyny. Such 
critics, like Lord Cromer, had insisted that the practice was an Islamic affliction. In response, 
µAbduh starts by a denial of that generalisation, instead insisting that “polygyny is not exclusive 
to the east, nor is monogamy exclusive to the west”.  The practice is associated with “leaders and 
the wealthy [who] tended to have several wives in countries where the number of women 
exceeded that of men, indulging in enjoyment”.698 Although there is no discussion of the Islamic 
reasoning for allowing the practice, one may assume that the above reasons – seeking of power 
and pleasure, particularly in circumstances where the number of women outgrew that of men, 
could still be valid in the Islamic context. What is different is presumably not the logic behind 
the permission, but the conditions and restrictions imposed in Islam, as “[W]omen were nothing 
but chattel for pleasure, with no rights, and no attention to justice, until Islam came and 
prescribed rights for them and made justice towards them obligatory”.699 
The context of the verse is clearly referring to marriage to orphan girls, but µAbduh does 
not discuss whether this specific occasion has any implications for the general rulings concerning 
polygyny (this has become a feature of more recent interpretations which wish to restrict 
polygyny through emphasis on the specific context of the verse).700 The only link mentioned is 
that “Arabs used to foster orphan girls, then, if they liked their beauty and wealth, they would 
marry them, while giving them less than the mahr they deserve, maltreating them, not 
maintaining them fairly and usurping their money. God forbade them from doing that... If the 
weakness of orphan girls leads you to wrong them, and you fear that if you married them you 
                                                
697 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 88-92. The fatw¥ was published in al-Man¥r in vol. 28 on 3 March 1927, where Rida wrote “I 
found these fat¥w¥ among the papers of our sheikh al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m, so I wished to publish them in view of the 
state’s efforts to restrict the permissibility of polygyny and the current debates on the issue”. Note 41 in Aµm¥l, vol., 
2, p. 692. Although there is no indication of when µAbduh wrote the fatw¥, a possibility – in line with my conclusion 
that µAbduh had not directly written the chapters from Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a but could have guided AmÏn in his writing, 
particularly in questions of fiqh – is that he had written this fatw¥ upon AmÏn’s request while the latter was writing 
his book in 1899. 
698 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 88. 
699 ibid., p. 89. 
700 See, for instance, Asma Barlas, Believing Women in Islam, pp. 190-192. 
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would not be fair to them, and that the power you have in marriage leads you to transgress and 
usurp their money and humiliate them, then you can marry other women instead.” 
The change brought by Islam to this already established practice is to make its 
permissibility dependent “on the condition that you be just towards them, such that it is not 
permissible to any Muslim to have more than one wife unless he is confident that he would give 
each her due right and treat them equally, not preferring one over the other in anything related to 
the rights of marriage which must be fulfilled. If he fears that if he were to marry more than one 
he may not be able to be fair, it would be incumbent upon him to restrict himself to one wife.” 
Although there is no discussion of whether polygyny in itself is necessarily harmful to 
marriage, µAbduh in this text makes it clear that “the matter of polygyny is expressed in such a 
way that merely implies permissibility, on the condition of justice. If he feared injustice, 
marriage to more than one is prohibited. Thus there is no encouragement of polygyny, but rather 
discouragement, as he also said (4:129).”  
Here we see the important inclusion of verse 129 while discussing verse 3, which makes 
no appearance in the previous article. This link is now an established part of arguments for 
restricting or altogether prohibiting polygyny. Although µAbduh does not explicitly write that the 
two verses imply any such prohibition, he strongly warns that “if justice is not within one’s 
ability, and fear of injustice necessitates restriction to one wife, then how serious is it to exceed 
that limit!” His understanding of the link appears to be that it emphasises the gravity of the 
warning to anyone considering polygyny, rather than imposing a legal prohibition. Although 
polygyny is not prohibited, “Islam has limited polygyny to a maximum of four, and has 
furthermore constrained the matter to such an extent which if it had been fully comprehended by 
polygamous men, they would not exceed more than one wife”. 
Although the verse does not refer to the issue of female slaves, the classical 
understanding had been that Islam had restricted marriage to a maximum of four wives, while 
allowing men to take an unlimited number of slaves. µAbduh mentions an alternative 
interpretation of the verse: 
 
Muslims had agreed that a man is permitted to take an unlimited number of slave women. 
However, one may understand the verse differently, for the words were in the context of 
permissibility of having up to four women, and that the condition for permissibility is 
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certainty of achieving justice. Hence the meaning would be: if injustice is feared, then it 
is obligatory to restrict oneself to one wife, while taking up to the mentioned number of 
slave women, i.e. in all cases, it is not allowed to have more than four women, while 
justice is required in wives but not slaves. 
 
The above interpretation, although not completely unprecedented, is significant, since it 
demonstrates the desire to interpret the text, in line with established ethical principles and 
linguistic considerations, regardless of historical practice. µAbduh lamented that the above 
understanding was not taken into consideration, and that, furthermore, the past practice of 
slavery went even beyond the limits classically adopted by scholars which placed certain 
conditions on the acquisition of slaves: 
Muslims misused these glorious rules of their religion, excessively indulging in slave 
girls to the extent their wealth permitted, thus corrupting their minds and those of their 
children... As for the slavery seen amongst Muslims in the past, it has nothing to do with 
religion... But is from the customs of the times of ignorance. 
 
Finally µAbduh deals with the central question, which was being debated at the time this 
text was published, and presumably at the time it was written too, that is, given these restrictions 
and warnings, but also given the legal and historical permissibility of polygyny, is it permissible 
to officially restrict or ban it? µAbduh’s answer is that “As for the permissibility of ending this 
custom – that is polygyny – then that is undoubted”. 
µAbduh does not base this conclusion on the link between verse 4 and 129, but rather on 
three main grounds which are all based on practical considerations. First, he points to the 
primacy of the “condition of being certain of achieving justice, which is necessarily absent.” 
There is no discussion of whether this condition is theoretically possible or impossible, rather the 
fact is that in practice, it is very rare, and that is a sufficient basis for the new rule, for “[E]ven if 
it is achieved in one case among a million, it cannot be used as the rule. And whenever 
corruption of spirits is widespread, and it becomes more likely that men will not be fair towards 
their wives, it becomes permissible for the ruler to ban polygyny and for the scholar to ban 
polygyny in an absolute way, in view of what is more probable.” 
In addition to the almost-general contravention of the religious obligation of achieving 
justice in the equal treatment of multiple wives, the second reason justifying the restriction of 
polygyny is again a practical one, based on experience, that is the fact that “men's mistreatment 
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of their wives in the case of polygyny has become widespread, and wives are deprived of their 
rights to maintenance and contentment. Thus, the ruler and the one in charge of the law may ban 
polygyny to prevent the widespread harm”. Thus the second justification is based on the fiqhÏ 
rule of ‘dar’ al-mafsada’ or “preventing harm”. 
Thirdly, a further justification is added, which can be considered a subsidiary of the 
above rule of “preventing harm”, in this case, harm to children in polygynous marriages, and to 
family and social stability, since “it has become clear that the root of corruption and enmity 
between offspring is their different mothers, as each is brought up to hate the other, such that by 
the time they reach maturity, they have become sworn enemies, and conflict between them 
continues until they destroy their homes. Thus the ruler or the religious authority may ban 
polygyny or having many slave women in order to protect homes from corruption.” 
It is important to note that the restriction of polygyny is not envisaged to be absolute, and 
in certain cases, the above reasons may not be sufficient to ban polygyny in certain cases, where 
‘fairness’ may require allowing this practice. µAbduh uses the frequently referred to case of the 
wife’s sterility as an example of one such case,701 where, notwithstanding the possible – or 
probable – harms of polygyny, “it is not fair to prohibit a man whose wife has given birth to no 
children from marrying another in order to have offspring”. Since the prohibition is not founded 
on an absolute opposition to polygyny, but mainly on the rule of “preventing harm”, a balance of 
possible “benefits” and “harms” needs to be considered in certain cases. Presumably in these 
cases, the condition of justice must still be fully met. 
Such cases, however, are seen as exceptions, while the general rule is that “it is 
permissible to have a general ban for all men banning them from marrying more than one, except 
for a necessity which is to be proven before a judge.” Although, there is no absolute ban on 
polygyny, this conclusion is still radical, moving from a situation where polygyny is considered a 
normal practice that requires no justification, and associated harms are seen as exceptional and 
avoidable, to regarding polygyny as a practice associated with probable harms, which may be 
permitted in exceptional cases, for a particular necessity which must be proven before a judge. 
                                                
701 It is interesting that the primary – and more or less sole – justification for polygyny was sterility, while in later 
justifications (twentieth-century Islamic discourse) and defence of polygyny, men’s wish to have another wife to 
satisfy their ‘uncontrollable’ desires, becomes a frequently used motive. This is particularly the case in polemical 
writings, whereas in law, the two legitimate justifications most commonly used remain infertility and inability to 
engage in sexual relations. 
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Such a change was seen as too radical, un-Islamic, and was relentlessly opposed. Aware of this 
opposition, µAbduh wrote that such a ban “is not prevented by religion, but it is rather customs 
that prevent such a ban". 
 
 
6.4 Polygyny in TafsÏr al-Man¥r 
 
As discussed in a previous chapter, TafsÏr al-Man¥r was published over a long period, 
during µAbduh’s life and after his death. The tafsÏr of the relevant verse (4:3) was published 
many years after µAbduh’s death, as the pace of the publication was slower that that of the 
lectures. However, since the last verse interpreted by µAbduh was verse 125 of al-Nis¥’, we may 
assume that the tafsÏr lecture of verse 4:3 was delivered in 1904-1905.    
µAbduh does not discuss the various opinions concerning the occasion of revelation and 
various interpretations of the link between orphans and permission of polygyny. He simply states 
that the context is admonition against usurping the wealth of orphans, even by way of marriage, 
“saying “if you feel that you fear usurping the wealth of orphan wives, then you should not 
marry them as God has given you alternatives allowing you to marry up to four women.” 
The focus again, like in previous discussions of the issue, is centred on the condition of 
justice, the fear of which leads to the command to restrict oneself to one wife: 
Fearing injustice would be present whether it is expected or suspected, or even if it is 
imagined, although the Shariµa may forgive illusion for it is seldom absent in such 
matters. Thus the one who is allowed to marry more than one is the one who is confident 
in his ability to be just, such that he has no hesitation or doubts, or when hesitation is very 
weak. 
 
Again, he stresses the condition of justice and the difficulty of satisfying it in practice,and 
highlights how the verse itself contains the grounds for its own restriction: 
Having said ‘if you fear that you may not be just’, He justified that saying ‘that is more 
likely to prevent injustice’, that is, closer to avoidance of injustice and unfairness, thus 
making avoidance of unfairness a cause of the ruling. This affirms the condition of justice 
and the obligation of abiding by it, and a warning that justice is rare. 
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The difficulty and rarity of ensuring justice is proven by recourse to the later verse 
129:702 
And He said in another verse (4:129). Fairness here may be understood as referring to the 
heart’s affection, for otherwise the two verses taken together would imply the 
impermissibility of polygyny in any case. And because of that apparent meaning, He 
added ‘so do not lean altogether leaving her hanging’, for Allah forgives what is not 
within a man’s ability, such as his heart’s preference.703 
 
The above is an example of the difficulty and complexity of any strategy employed to 
restrict polygyny on the basis of the condition of justice. Classical scholars did discuss the 
obligation of justice, but where they were simply concerned with the linguistic meaning, they 
interpreted “fairness/equal treatment” which is to be sought and the absence of which would be 
feared in polygyny in an all-encompassing way. For instance, the early tafsÏr scholar al-™a^^¥k 
said that “that you may not be fair” refers to marital relations and love. In another report he said 
that the meaning was that you may not be fair in preference, love, marital relations, or good 
company, between four, or three, or two women”.704 
This general meaning is then consistent with the interpretation of the later verse 129 
which uses the same word “being fair/just”, the possibility of which is denied. Thus, there is no 
need to distinguish between the meanings of the same word, taking the first to refer to justice in 
everything, except feelings, and the second to mean justice in everything including feelings. 
Interpretations which place a central emphasis on justice, using it as a justification for restricting 
polygyny to a great extent, need to make this distinction between the meanings of the same word 
used in the two different verses in the same chapter. This distinction is unnecessary in classical 
tafsÏr as the two verses are treated separately. Moreover, the emphasis on ‘fairness’ in such 
interpretations is not so central or restrictive of polygyny in a legal sense, as there is generally no 
concern with the question of whether monogamy is preferable or whether polygyny is 
necessarily to be avoided. 
                                                
702 There is no separate tafsÏr of verse 129 as the last verse interpreted by µAbduh before his death was verse 126 of 
S‰rat al-Nis¥’. 
703 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 181. 
704 Reported in >abarÏ’s tafsÏr, TafsÏr al-™a^^¥k, p. 274. See also tafsÏr of Ibn µAbb¥s, p. 285 “narrated from Ibn JarÏr 
on the authority of µAlÏ Ibn AbÏ >alha from Ibn µAbb¥s, regarding the verse “and you will not be able…” that it 
means love and marital relations. 
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One rare tafsÏr which does directly address the above paradox and explicitly addresses the 
link between the two verses is Ab‰ ¤ayy¥n’s TafsÏr al-Ba^r al-Mu^Ï~:: 
These are two conditions, with two separate consequence of the condition (jaw¥b al-
shar~). The first is “if you fear that you will not be just towards orphans”, and the 
consequence is “then marry..”. The second is “if you fear that you would not be just”, the 
consequence is “then one only”… Some said that these sentences only included one 
condition, and one parenthesis (jumlat iµtir¥\), the condition being “if you fear that you 
would not be just” and the consequence being “then one only” and the jumla iµtir¥\iyya 
being “then marry women who please you, two, three or four”. The condition “if you fear 
that you may not be just” was repeated because the flow was interrupted by the iµtir¥\... 
The meaning would then be if you fear that you may not be just, then marry only one. He 
further said that it has been confirmed that justice is not within their ability in his saying 
(4:129).  
 
However, Ab‰ ¤ayy¥n then questions the validity of this view which suggests the 
prohibition of polygyny on the basis of the two verses: 
This view is attributed to AbÏ µAlÏ, and perhaps it is not authentic, as Ab‰ µAlÏ was highly 
knowledgeable of the science of na^w, while this understanding corrupts the na·∙m tarkÏbÏ 
(compositional structure) of the Qur’an and implies the invalidation of juristic rulings, for 
if he concluded the above from this verse and the “you will not be able” verse, it would 
mean the prohibition of marrying more than wife, or the restriction to concubines, and the 
separation between the condition and its consequence would be a tautology with no 
consequence, according to this. The justice whose possibility is denied here is not the 
same as the justice referred to here, the former is justice in the heart’s preference, for 
which man is not accountable, and the latter is justice in number of nights spent and in 
maintenance, and that is why the possibility of the former was denied, while the absence 
of the latter was used as a condition.”705  
 
Thus µAbduh’s interpretation is not different from the classical tafsÏr and fiqh literature in 
that it recognises the obligation of justice in treatment of multiple wives, focusing on what is 
measurable, like time spent with, and maintenance spent on, the different wives, and excluding 
what is immeasurable like feelings. The difference is that µAbduh sees the lack of justice in the 
former sense as a basis for the restriction of polygyny due to the difficult condition of justice and 
the serious warnings against injustice. This leads him to the conclusion that polygyny is a type of 
exception or necessity (presumably to be evaluated and licensed by a judge): 
Anyone who reflects upon the two verses would know that the permissibility of polygyny 
in Islam is an extremely constrained matter, in a way similar to necessities which are 
                                                
705 TafsÏr al-Ba^r al-Mu^Ï~, vol. 3, p. 172. 
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permitted to the one who needs them, on the condition of confidence of establishing 
justice and avoiding injustice.706 
 
What characterises µAbduh’s discussion of the question of polygyny is its reliance on two 
pillars: the first is theoretical and text-based, that is the condition of justice; and the second is the 
negative consequences of polygyny seen in practice, which are always discussed in detail, and 
with reference to practical cases: 
If one, in addition to this restriction, reflected on the harmful consequences of polygyny 
in this age, he would conclusively say that no one can educate a nation in which 
polygyny is widespread, for the home which has two wives never achieves stability or 
order, instead the man and his wives cooperate towards corrupting the home, as if they 
were enemies to one another, and children end up as enemies. Thus the corruption of 
polygyny is transferred from individuals to homes, and from homes to the nation.707 
 
The harms of polygyny µAbduh is most concerned about are those related to family 
stability and consequently social stability and progress, rather than consequences for the wives 
concerned. In fact, he often goes back to the past to insist that such grave social harms did not 
always accompany the practice of polygyny: 
In Islam’s early periods, polygyny had benefits, most importantly family and marriage 
ties which strengthened ties of belonging, and did not cause as much harm as it does 
today, because religion was well established in the hearts of women and men, and a 
wife’s harm did not go beyond her co-wife. In contrast today the harm goes from each 
co-wife to her children, then to their father, and the rest of the relatives, sowing enmity 
and hatred… If you wish to go into the details of the disasters and catastrophes resulting 
from polygyny, I could cite what would cause skins to shiver, including theft, adultery, 
lying, treason, cowardice, fraud, and even murder, a son killing his father and vice-versa, 
or a wife killing her husband and vice-versa. And all these take place and are recorded in 
courts.708 
 
The above could – in addition to µAbduh’s interest in the question of polygyny and its 
restriction very early on – indicate that his proposals were not primarily influenced by colonialist 
criticisms of the practice, but rather by the needs of the reform urgently needed in the Muslim 
world. 
µAbduh’s final verdict is explicitly based on the second of the above mentioned pillars of 
the discussion of polygyny. Its restriction is not to be based on any re-interpretation of the verses 
                                                
706 Aµm¥l, vol. 5, p. 182. 
707 ibid. 
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(perhaps out of awareness that it can always be rejected or challenged, particularly since there 
appeared to be ‘consensus’ on classical understanding of the issue). Instead, it is based on 
practical matters, on the concepts of ma|la^a and prevention of harm: 
Thus scholars must look into this issue, particularly Hanafi scholars who control courts 
and whose madhhab is the official one. Since they do not deny that religion was revealed 
for people’s interest and welfare, and that among religion’s principles is the prevention of 
harm, if a matter leads to harms at a particular time while they did not result from it 
previously, there is no doubt that the ruling should be changed and applied to the present 
time, according to the rule: prevention of harms supersedes seeking of interests. Thus it 
becomes clear that polygyny is absolutely forbidden where injustice is feared.709 
 
As seen in the previous chapter dealing with µAbduh’s reforms of the court cases of 
marital maintenance, µAbduh’s final proposals are often supported by well-established juristic 
rules, rather than radical re-interpretations, out of µAbduh’s pragmatism and understanding of the 
mindset of the ulama-class and the society around him. 
 
 
6.5 The question of Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a   
 
The above analyses all that was written by µAbduh on the question of polygyny. 
However, a number of authors also attribute a further text on polygyny to µAbduh – according to 
those authors, the chapters on marriage, polygyny, divorce and hijab of Q¥sim AmÏn’s Ta^rÏr al-
Mar’a were written by µAbduh.710 In fact this is the view of the editor of µAbduh’s complete 
works, Mu^ammad µIm¥ra, and is taken as a fact by many other books on µAbduh and on the 
history of gender reform in Egypt.  
µIm¥ra argues that the book was “the fruit of joint work between Sheikh Mu^ammad 
µAbduh and Q¥sim AmÏn, that a number of chapters were written by al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m 
separately, and other chapters were written by Q¥sim AmÏn, then al-Ustadh al-Im¥m formulated 
the whole book in its final form”.711 µIm¥ra argues that it was common at the time to write under 
                                                
709 ibid., p. 183. 
710 See, for instance, Dorria ShafÏq and Ibr¥hÏm µAbduh, Ta~awwur al-Nah\a al-Nis¥’iyya fÏ Mi|r, Cairo 1945, p. 
252, 274, 275; Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid, Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1969, p. 187; Leila 
Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, p. 159-161. 
711 µIm¥ra, Aµm¥l, vol. 1, p. 257. 
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pseudonyms or other authors’ names, as was the case with writing books as a joint venture.712 He 
further points to “the identical ideas one finds in Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a and what sheikh Mu^ammad 
µAbduh had written in al-Waq¥’iµ al Mi|riyya”. In fact, the similarity of ideas, while undeniable, 
can only point to µAbduh’s influence on AmÏn, and is no proof of his writing the book. What 
µIm¥ra neglects to analyse are the differences – alongside the similarities – between the ideas 
expressed by the two authors on the same issues, something I will attempt below. 
Another argument µIm¥ra uses is µAbduh’s “stance towards the book after its publication, 
as he supported and defended it indirectly, and abstained from directly commenting on it or 
participating in the battles around it, particularly when his rivals wished to embarrass him by 
requesting a fatw¥ on the issue”.713 What he called indirect defence was the support given by 
RashÏd Ri\¥ in al-Man¥r. Al-Man¥r’s stance vis-à-vis the book is discussed in a previous 
chapter, illustrating Ri\¥’s support of the book and AmÏn. However, that could simply be a result 
of the fact that AmÏn was – as Ri\¥ wrote – “among the Ust¥dh’s closest disciples”, and because 
most of the ideas expressed were similar to, and in part influenced by, µAbduh’s ideas – some of 
which were published by Ri\¥ in al-Man¥r. Moreover, Ri\¥’s discussion of the book was not all 
positive, as he disagreed with some of the arguments and conclusions of AmÏn, particularly in 
relation to the most controversial part on ^ij¥b/seclusion. Finally, Ri\¥ also published an initially 
positive review of AmÏn’s later book al-Mar’a al-JadÏda, which is undisputedly AmÏn’s. 
µIm¥ra’s “conclusive evidence” that the four chapters were – in content and format – 
µAbduh’s is, “in light of the well-known intellectual and cultural features and nature of interests 
characterising the two men”,714 that “in Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a, particularly in the chapters dealing with 
the view of Shariµa and religion, we find a number of fiqhÏ views and discussions which cannot 
be analysed nor concluded by an author like Q¥sim AmÏn”.715 µIm¥ra notes that: 
The abundance of references to fundamental texts of Islamic jurisprudence, whose names 
and authors we do not believe Q¥sim AmÏn’s religious knowledge would have enabled 
him to know, let alone study them, quote from them, with reference to the title, volume 
                                                
712 µIm¥ra refers to A^mad ShafÏq Pasha’s report that Q¥sim AmÏn had proposed to write the book jointly with him, 
and to Dorriyya ShafÏq’s statement that “in 1897, al-Ust¥dh al-Im¥m, Saµd Zaghloul, Lu~fÏ al-Sayyid and Q¥sim 
AmÏn met in Geneva, and the latter began reading to the imam some chapters from his book Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a and he 
agreed with their content. It has even be said that some parts of the book seem to be closer to the style of sheikh 
Mu^ammad µAbduh.” Aµm¥l, vol. 1, p. 258.  
713 ibid., p. 260. 
714 ibid., p. 263. 
715 ibid. 
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and page number… If we move to the book of al-Mar’a al-JadÏda which is undisputedly 
Q¥sim AmÏn’s, we do not find these Islamic juristic questions, but instead of the names 
of Muslim thinkers and models of Arab Muslim women, we find the names and titles of 
western authors and books… names which reflect Q¥sim AmÏn’s culture and interests, 
and distinguishes them from al-ust¥dh al-im¥m’s.716 
 
While it is true that Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a, particularly the chapters in question, are full of 
juristic references, that does not constitute sufficient evidence for the claim that they were 
written by µAbduh. This is because it is a known fact that AmÏn was a close disciple of µAbduh’s 
and hence, even if it were true that µAbduh was the source of the arguments or references, it is 
conceivable that they were provided at AmÏn’s request during their private meetings, in addition 
to public lectures of tafsÏr etc. which would have influenced AmÏn. The fact that al-Mar’a al-
JadÏda is different from Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a – which is an established fact – does not indicate that 
they were written by two different authors, just as the fact that there is considerable difference 
between AmÏn’s earlier book Les Egyptiens and the later Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a merely points to the 
evolution of AmÏn’s thought as a result of internal and external developments. 
I will now focus on the chapter on polygyny, attributed by µIm¥ra to µAbduh, and discuss 
the similarities, and many differences between the ideas and views expressed in this chapter, and 
those expressed on the same topic by µAbduh in the three texts discussed above. 
The chapter begins with the same insistence on the fact that polygyny is not exclusive to 
Muslims, being rather “an ancient custom, known before the emergence of Islam, and 
widespread in all regions, when women were considered a unique species between humans and 
animals”. However, the clear difference is that when µAbduh makes the same point, he makes no 
judgement on polygyny per se, whereas Q¥sim AmÏn’s view is that “it is one of those customs 
which historical analysis has shown to follow women's position in society. Thus it is found to be 
widespread when the status of women is low, and it is rare or nonexistent where their status is 
elevated – unless perhaps where polygyny is due to specific reasons for a specific individual or 
individuals, not going beyond them.” Moreover, AmÏn links the practice of polygyny not only to 
a historical phase where women’s status is low, but even in the same society, he links the 
practice or abstention from polygyny to each man’s elevation of mind and view of women: 
                                                
716 ibid., p. 265-6. 
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Even in nations that are familiar with polygyny, one finds that a man who reaches 
perfection of mind such that he values his wife within his family and knows, on the basis 
of her rights, the status she deserves by virtue of religion and nature, such a man tends to 
restrict himself to one wife.717 
 
AmÏn repeats the same ‘common wisdom’ that the ‘problem’ of polygyny had recently 
declined, ignoring the statistical indication that it had always been low, judging that “this custom 
has reduced in certain classes in our country, compared to how it was twenty or thirty years ago”, 
attributing this reduction to “the elevation of men’s minds and the refinement of their spirit”.718 
While µAbduh focuses on the practical problems caused by polygyny, while allowing 
room for the possibility – though rare – both historically and at the time he was writing, of 
achieving justice between multiple wives, AmÏn focuses on polygyny itself, proclaiming that 
 
It is evident that in polygyny there is great contempt of women, for one cannot find a 
woman who is pleased to share her husband with another woman, just as one cannot find 
a man who accepts that anyone shares his wife’s love.719 
 
While µAbduh’s own evaluation agrees with AmÏn’s assertion that, in general, “polygyny 
is a cause for strife between women and their co-wives, and their husbands, and a cause of 
misery for the family and relatives”, the rare cases where men are fair to their multiple wives are 
praiseworthy in µAbduh’s view. In, contrast AmÏn stresses that even then, “that rare satisfaction 
is due to the fact the women see themselves as possessions of men, who have the right to keep 
themselves exclusive to them or take another as they wish... Just as men in our country regarded 
themselves as possessions of rulers not so long ago”. 
Polygyny appears to be primarily not a contravention of the religious obligation of justice 
and a cause of family and social instability as it is for µAbduh, but – for AmÏn – an indication of a 
degrading view of women, and lack of education and refinement of men, for “a refined man who 
knows what the Shariµa and justice require of him would not bear the burden of having more than 
one wife”. We have discussed in a previous chapter how nationalist writings on women, by 
                                                
717 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 82. 
718 ibid. 
719 ibid., p. 83. 
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AmÏn and others, were reflections of the aspirations and self-image of the “new man”, expressed 
in criticism of the state of women. 
In AmÏn’s discussion of polygyny, there is also reference to women’s perspective, which, 
although touched upon by µAbduh, is not considered an essential and necessary problem. In 
contrast AmÏn vividly describes the emotional effect of polygyny:  
 
There is in women’s nature a tendency to dominate over a man's heart. If a woman saw, 
by the man’s side, another woman who has the same tendency in her nature, who would 
use all means to fulfil that tendency, she would be haunted by anxiety and worry, 
deserted by tranquility, and her life becomes a painful agony. That state is not hidden 
from a refined man, so how can he be pleased with such painful punishment? 
 
While µAbduh’s focus on justice as a condition for polygyny leads him to include the 
usual concession mentioned in classical tafsÏr and fiqh, excluding feelings from the obligation of 
justice, AmÏn sees no reassurance in that, holding that instead, “women’s worry and anxiety are 
exacerbated by the jurists’ affirmation that the husband’s justice among his wives does not 
require equal love, but they only required fairness in maintenance and the like”. µAbduh’s focus 
remains restricted to “maintenance and the like”. 
AmÏn includes the same concern about the effects of polygyny on children and on social 
stability, as “children by different mothers grow up within storms of disputes and hostility”, 
contrasting that to “the spectacle of a united family, where children live in their parents’ 
embrace, united by true love... linked through a sacred pledge like the organs of a single body”.  
While µAbduh considers it unfair to make the ban on polygyny general and absolute, 
passing no judgement on a man who seeks a second wife out of ‘necessity’, AmÏn recognises the 
possibility of such cases, but still emphasises the moral superiority of monogamy even in those 
cases: 
 
There is no excuse for a man to marry more than one, unless perhaps in the case of 
absolute necessity, such as his first wife suffering from a chronic disease preventing her 
from fulfilling her marital duties… I say that, although I do not deem it preferable for a 
man to marry another wife even in such a case or similar cases, for it is no fault of hers, 
and valour requires him to bear his wife's misfortunes, just as he considers it her duty to 
bear what could befall him…There is another case which could justify a man's marrying 
a second wife, while keeping the first if she accepts it or release her if she so prefers, that 
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is in the case of her being sterile and unable to produce children, for many men cannot 
bear the ending of progeny in their family.720 
 
The practical conclusion is nevertheless identical to µAbduh’s, that is the possibility of 
legally restricting polygyny based on its practical consequences. AmÏn sees the two verses on 
polygyny to imply – at the most – permissibility. Then he continues: 
 
This ^al¥l, like all other ^al¥l matters, can be affected by other legal rulings such as 
prohibition, discouragement (kar¥ha), etc. depending on the consequent harms and 
benefits. If there is preponderance of injustice to wives, as is seen in our times, or 
polygyny resulted in corruption of families, contravention of Shariµa obligations which 
should be fulfilled, and enmity between members of the same family, and such 
phenomena being widespread to the extent of almost being the general rule, it is 
permissible for the ruler, in consideration of the public interest, to ban polygyny, with or 
without conditions, as he sees fit for the nation’s interest.721 
 
The above is the view most similar to µAbduh’s. It is however, not sufficient for AmÏn, as 
it does not stress the superiority of monogamy, on the basis of its fulfilment of the emotional 
aspects of marriage, which – as expressed in the chapter on marriage from the same book – are 
neglected in juristic discussions of marriage. AmÏn thus further adds: 
 
It would be better for men of this age to abandon this custom themselves, and I do not 
believe that anyone in the future would regret abandoning it. For the enjoyment of 
women, although it would reduce from the physical point of view, it would increase from 
the emotional/moral point of view, which should be the aim of anyone seeking 
marriage.722 
 
Hence, although the conclusion that polygyny should be restricted may be the same for 
the two authors, there are clear differences, between their evaluation of the practice in itself and 
the arguments they use. While µAbduh, as a jurist, focuses on the practical obligations in 
marriage, and the practical consequences of polygyny, AmÏn focuses on the view of women 
implied by such a practice, as well as its reflection of the nature of men and of marriage. 
µAbduh’s criticism of the practice stops at its practical harmful consequences, attributing them to 
non-adherence to the Qur’anic obligation of justice and to lack of education, while insisting on 
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exonerating polygyny and polygynous men who do adhere to the limit of justice. AmÏn’s 
criticism goes further, passing judgment on the practice of polygyny and those who practice it. 
µAbduh’s view is dictated by the model of the sunna and the salaf, while AmÏn’s is linked to his 
view of the “refined man” and the “ideal marriage”. It is not clear how that sits with his 
insistence in his chapter on marriage, that “we only have to listen to the voice of our Shariµa, and 
follow the rules of the noble Qur’an and the authentic Sunna of the prophet peace be upon him 
and the actions of his companions, in order to achieve happiness in marriage”. 
Thus, my conclusion, in contrast to µIm¥ra, is that there is no compelling evidence for the 
claim that Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a was written by µAbduh, and that a comparison of the writings of the 
two authors on the issue of polygyny reveals similarities, but also clear differences. There is 
clearly an influence of µAbduh on AmÏn, but each man remains distinct in their arguments and 
views, although their practical conclusions may converge.  
µIm¥ra concludes by highlighting and giving examples of the persisting confusion of the 
writings of µAbduh’s with others such as Afgh¥nÏ or Ri\¥, that “this is the first time in the history 
of this school of thought of great influence in the east’s intellectual nature and composition, that 
a conclusive answer is given to the questions surrounding the attribution of texts produced by 
Jam¥l al-DÏn al-Afgh¥nÏ and Mu^ammad µAbduh, then by RashÏd Ri\¥ in relation to the Qur’anic 
tafsÏr, as well as Saµd Zaghloul and µAbdall¥h al-NadÏm… giving each his original features… and 
ending the confusion and mixing in which many researchers have fallen over a period of almost a 
century.”723 
However, as pointed out in previous chapters dealing with TafsÏr al-Man¥r, and as 
discussed above regarding µIm¥ra’s arguments in relation to Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a, the confusion 
persists, and more needs to be done to distinguish µAbduh’s writings from those of others – while 
accepting that some confusion will inevitably never be resolved. 
Nevertheless, µAbduh’s influence on AmÏn is undeniable, and this influence is perhaps 
what µIm¥ra wished to highlight, as his motivation in arguing that the book was the product of 
µAbduh’s thought appears to be the book’s fame as a pioneer in the “liberation of women”: 
While the advanced status reached by Egyptian women today could be attributed to 
Q¥sim AmÏn, we hope that the clarification of the relationship between al-Ust¥dh al-
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214 
 
Im¥m and the book of Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a could be a beginning towards turning our attention 
to the contribution of this man to this field.724 
 
That indication is indeed a significant one and one to be kept in mind, particularly since 
some authors emphasise a rupture between “religious” figures such as µAbduh and “secular” 
thinkers like AmÏn, neglecting the common backgrounds, links, ideas and struggles.   
 
 
6.6 Polygyny in Twentieth-Century Egyptian Legal Reform 
 
Calls for the restriction of polygyny became recurrent in early twentieth-century Egypt, 
but any attempt at official legal reform to that end – many at the hands of µAbduh’s disciples – 
was often faced with strong opposition. In 1911, Malak ¤ifnÏ N¥|if put forward a list of demands 
to the Egyptian Congress, including the restriction of polygyny, but it was faced with great 
opposition and the motion was suppressed. In 1920, the first personal status law included the 
opinions of other madh¥hib, allowing for stronger enforcement of nafaqa and wider grounds for 
divorce. However, a proposal to restrict a man’s right to marry a second wife on the basis of his 
inability to fulfil his duty of maintenance was rejected.725  
In 1926, a government-appointed committee tried to introduce further reforms that aimed 
at restricting polygamy by proposing the inclusion of stipulations in marriage contracts and 
granting a judge the power to refuse registering a marriage to a second wife if the man was 
deemed unable to provide maintenance. However, the proposals were rejected by the King in 
1927, presumably as a result of widespread opposition.726 In 1929, PSL No. 25 was passed, 
including further reforms, but polygyny was left unrestricted. Women’s groups and writers 
continued to call for the restriction of polygyny, often framing their calls within a discourse of 
modernity and nationalism, presenting monogamy as a necessary characteristic of the new 
modern Egypt, and a pathway to progress and independence. However, it can be argued that 
campaigns against polygyny, such as Doria Shafiq’s call for the complete abolition of polygyny 
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725 Mudhakkira bi’l-Radd µal¥ Mashr‰µ al-Q¥n‰n al-Kh¥| bi baµ\ A^k¥m al-Ahw¥l al-Shakh|iyya, wa maµah¥ maw¥d 
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may have resulted in greater defensiveness of a declining practice. Even Shaykh Mu^ammad 
Mu|~af¥ al-Mar¥ghÏ, who had headed the 1926 commission that had proposed the restriction of 
polygyny, later wrote in defence of the practice in the Egyptian press in 1935. Such differences 
and contradictions demonstrate how discussions of marriage often provide “convincing evidence 
of the cultural and political anxieties that often underwrote experiments in anticolonial 
nationalism”.727  
Legal reform was primarily led by the secular nationalist juristic elite whose work was 
guided by two strategies they consistently adopted. The first is what Lama Abu-Odeh calls 
“difference-splitting” between the religious µulam¥’ class and the feminist and liberal trends, 
always attempting to satisfy both camps and maintain their support of the legal order, the course 
of legal reform and the authority of the juristic elite.728 The second is the persistence of the 
nationalist paternalist vision where all subjects were invested in the nationalist project and 
nation-building, but where men maintained a privileged position as protectors of the nation and 
of the family, entailing privileges rather than absolute equality. These two strategies explain the 
failure of the juristic elite to fully implement clear juristic restrictions of polygyny as proposed 
by µAbduh a century earlier.  
Efforts to restrict polygyny through legal reform in Egypt continue, achieving some 
success, in 1985, through the requirement that the husband must declare his marital status upon 
the registration of any marriage and the notification of any current wives. However the time it 
took to achieve such partial success as well as the continued opposition to any radical reform and 
the defensiveness displayed in discussions of the topic (which increase in proportion to perceived 
attacks on the practice) may explain the cautiousness with which µAbduh had approached the 
subject over a century earlier and his preference to acknowledge the practice while criticising its 
modern negative consequences, rather than attacking it and rejecting any historical legitimacy for 
it.  
Even when partial restrictions of polygyny were adopted, such as notification of the first 
and second wives, or allowing the first wife to sue for divorce on the basis of harm (which must 
                                                
727 Hanan Kholoussy, “The Nationalisation of Marriage in Monarchical Egypt”, in Re-Envisioning Egypt 1919-
1952, p. 340. 
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be proven, rather than automatically assumed to result from polygyny as had been stipulated in 
the later-abrogated 1979 law),729 when they were contested by men on the basis of denying men 
their religiously-mandated right to polygyny, legislators were careful to reject such an accusation 
by insisting the restrictions do not deny the man’s right to polygyny, but only regulate it to 
ensure protection of women.730 This demonstrates the shortcomings of legal reform within the 
framework of accepting and maintaining marital inequality and male privilege. It seems that with 
the widening of women’s access to divorce and restriction of male repudiation, “the threat of 
repudiation has lost its value as a central tenet of patriarchal authority”.731 As a result, polygyny 
acquired an even greater position as a symbolic indication of male privilege and a threatening 
tool to maintain the husband’s diminishing authority, which men are unwilling to concede.  
 In contrast, polygyny was banned in Tunisia in 1956, following similar arguments to 
those used by µAbduh – the impossible (or extremely rare) fulfillment of the condition of justice 
in the case of marriage to more than one wife. Bourguiba insisted that he was not contravening 
Islamic principles, and the prohibition was presented within an Islamic jurisprudential 
framework. The success of the Tunisian polygyny ban in contrast to the failure of successive 
attempts in Egypt to ban or severely restrict polygyny can be attributed to two factors. The first is 
the nature of family law reform in Egypt, which has generally been restricted to opinions of 
known madh¥hib and scholars, with very rare instances of use of original ijtih¥d. The second is 
the “difference-splitting” strategy characterising reform efforts in Egypt as described above, with 
the constant need to satisfy diverse influential constituencies. In contrast, the Tunisiann ban took 
place in a context where Bouguiba – empowered by the newly-acquired national independence 
and the successful marginalisation of rivals – had no such constraints, and moreover, used the 
slogan of “women’s emancipation” as a further tool to bolster his legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
DIVORCE 
 
 
Just as the restriction of polygyny was a frequent theme in turn of the century writings on 
Egypt – by European visitors or colonisers, religious and legal reformers and women writers – so 
was the issue of divorce. However, whereas the discussion of polygyny – the extent of which 
was often exaggerated – had the clear end-goal of restriction, that of divorce was more complex. 
The common perception (which still persists, and the veracity of which will be discussed below) 
was that divorce was very frequent and on the rise, but discussions centred around the twin 
concerns of the ease of divorce for men and its very restricted access for women. These two 
concerns appeared differently in the various contexts indicated above – groups that wrote about 
divorce had different approaches to those two issues. I will briefly discuss those differences and 
how discussions of divorce fit within the various religious, feminist, nationalist and colonialist 
discourses of the time. 
 
 
7.1 Divorce in Turn-of-the-century Egypt: Perceptions and Realities 
 
7.1.1 Statistics & Trends 
 
A discussion of perceptions of divorce at the end of the nineteenth century in Egypt 
should begin by asking about its level of prevalence and whether it was rising or declining. 
Although answering such questions fully and definitively is not an easy – or possible – task 
given the lack of comprehensive data, there are a number of partial studies that have examined 
this question. Judith Tucker, who has extensively researched Women in Nineteenth-Century 
Egypt, holds that “[I]f polygamy remained rare throughout the nineteenth century, divorce was 
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commonplace”.732 While, as frequently mentioned, men had a theoretically unrestricted right to 
unilateral repudiation, she maintains that this “male right to divorce his wife without cause or 
court process was limited, in practice, by economic relations within the family”.733 While 
women’s access to divorce was much more restricted, “the khulµ form of divorce was frequently 
used by women”734 where they bargained their financial and other rights in return for divorce. 
While repudiation is often seen as arbitrary and harmful to women, and – as we will 
discuss later – the reform discourse on divorce aimed at restricting it, it was in fact seen as 
preferable to khulµ by many women. As Tucker explains, “recognising, on balance, the material 
advantages of ~al¥q, many women who wanted a divorce preferred that their husbands repudiate 
them”.735  
There are no accurate statistics for divorce rates in the period concerned. However, the 
Cairo census of 1848 represents a very important source for understanding demographic trends. 
On the basis of this census, Bishara Doumani concludes that divorce was widespread and 
Cairene Muslims “seem to have made a frequent use of it at this time”.736 This is supported by 
Q¥sim AmÏn’s own estimate, based on court records, that ¾ of marriages in Cairo ended in 
divorce – although the national figure is lower, and estimated at ¼.737 Cuno, who studied the 
pattern of divorce rates in Egypt during the twentieth century, includes the following crude rates 
of divorce (measured as the number of divorces per 1,000 population): Year 1898: marriage rate 
12.1, divorce 3.30; 1903: marriage 16.6, divorce 5.00; 1935: marriage 13.5, divorce 3.60.738 He 
comments that “a crude rate of 3.3 in 1898 based on AmÏn’s data is plausible, and a rate of 5.0 in 
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1903 based on Cromer’s report appears high but not impossible, in light of combined (including 
revocable) divorce rates of anywhere from 3.2 to 4.7 during the late 1930s and 1940s”.739  
Thus, the data and estimates indicate that divorce was frequent. Was that a new 
phenomenon, associated with the advent of modernity? Or was it the continuation of previous 
trends? Again, no comprehensive statistics are available, but partial studies for previous eras 
provide interesting indications. Rapoport who studied divorce in Mamluk Cairo concluded that 
“the incidence of divorce in Mamluk society was remarkably high”. Based on two contemporary 
sources, from Damascus and Cairo, Rapoport concludes a “pattern of repeated divorces and 
remarriages by Mamluk women”. In the case of Mamluk Cairo, “at least a third of all the women 
mentioned by al-Sakh¥wÏ married more than once, with many marrying three times or more. The 
reason for the high rates of remarriage was mainly the frequency of divorce; according to al-
Sakh¥wÏ's records, three out of ten marriages in fifteenth-century Cairo ended in divorce”.740 
Although re-marriage was common, “Mamluk cities always had a large population of widowed 
and divorced women, who did not remarry but lived on wages they received for their work as 
spinners and seamstresses”.741 
As for the mechanism of those divorces, and whether they were male- or female- 
initiated, Rapoport noted that “the majority of divorces in Mamluk society were neither unilateral 
repudiations nor judicial dissolutions, but consensual separations (khulµ) in which wives gave up 
their rights to some, or all, of their financial rights in return for a divorce”.742 Although men still 
held the unilateral right of repudiation, “women appear to have initiated divorces as often as 
men”.743 
Hence, historical research into divorce, although not providing comprehensive or 
continuous data, paints a picture where divorce was far from rare, where it was initiated by wives 
as well as by husbands, where khulµ was the most common course undertaken by the divorcing 
couple, although repudiation was theoretically men’s unrestricted right – in practice restricted by 
the consequent financial obligations and for that reason sometimes preferred by women. Re-
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marriage seems to have also been common, although there were also significant numbers of 
divorced women living independently.  
 
7.1.2 Modern Concerns about Divorce 
 
While divorce appears to have been prevalent in Egyptian society based on evidence 
from Mamluk and Ottoman eras, the turn-of-the-century discourse on divorce reveals increasing 
concern about divorce as a social problem: focusing on unrestricted unilateral divorce misused 
by men, the financial, social and psychological plight of divorced women, and the plight of 
women trapped in undesirable marriages with no recourse to divorce. This dichotomy between 
reality and perception could be attributed to two possible explanations, one objective and the 
other ideational. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the reformist and nationalist discourses adopted the 
questions of women and the family as essential fields of reform central to national progress and 
liberation. A strong stable family came to be seen as the essential building block for a strong and 
developed nation. Thus, ignoring the principle that, as noted by Doumani’s analysis of the 1848 
Cairo Census, “the family is as stable an institution as it is ephemeral as a grouping”,744 the 
breakdown of a marriage through divorce came to be seen as indicative – or a potential cause – 
of the breakdown of the institution of family and the breakdown of society as a result. Cuno 
believes that “Q¥sim AmÏn was the first Egyptian writer to argue that the prevalence of divorce 
indicated that something was wrong with family life”.745 This can be explained by the fact that 
“where the nuclear-family household and companionate marriage come to be regarded as 
normative, a relatively high divorce rate is seen as a social problem”.746 
The idea that divorce is high, rising, and a problem can be partly understood as a 
reflection of western perceptions. Just as polygyny was a focus of western criticisms, while it 
was rare and decreasing, because it was ‘high’ relative to its existence in Europe, similarly, 
divorce in nineteenth-century Egypt was also high – relative to Europe. As Cuno notes, “the 
contrast with nineteenth-century Europe could not be more stark. In the Catholic countries 
                                                
744 Fargues, “Family and Household in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Cairo”, p. 45.  
745 Cuno, “Divorce and the Fate of the Family in Modern Egypt”, p. 208. 
746 ibid, p. 209. 
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marriages were indissoluble, and most Protestant countries permitted divorce only on limited 
grounds”.747 
Concerns about divorce fit within the Euro-centric model, where divorce had been very 
restricted, followed by constantly rising rates of divorce and decreasing rates of marriage, seen as 
consequences of modernity and increasing women’s rights. As Rapoport notes, “the outpouring 
of scholarly and popular works dealing with the rise of divorce in the West all but disregards the 
historical examples of past societies in which divorce rates have been consistently high”.748 Such 
models do not fit the pattern of divorce in Egypt. In the first half of the twentieth century, Egypt 
was one of several societies having what William Goode labelled a “stable high divorce-rate 
system”. Goode described these systems as follows: 
Although the instability of the individual marriage was very high, the system itself could 
be relatively stable because – unlike our various modern high-divorce systems in the 
West – by following tradition and custom, they did take care of the problems created by 
divorce, with rules for custody, child care, support, and remarriage of the mother, and so 
on.749 
 
To western observers – as well as nationalists and reformists – high divorce rates were a 
noticeable paradox, for another reason, in addition to comparisons with the situation in Europe. 
The paradox also existed because it did not conform with their own model of Muslim patriarchy. 
As Rapoport explains: 
Though inscribed in Islamic law as a patriarchal privilege, divorce undermines the 
patriarchal social order by destabilising households, increasing the number of female-
headed households and debasing the ideal of marriage. If the family was indeed the 
central building block of pre-modern Muslim society, and an institution that was to be 
protected from the penetrating eyes of the public gaze, then we would expect the 
incidence of divorce to be as low as possible.750 
 
To nationalist writers, although the idea that marriages were more durable in the past was 
belied by the data, “the nostalgic constructions of the past legitimate the ideal “modern family” 
as authentic and reinforce disapproval of divorce”.751 Ignoring data and historical practice, 
writings multiplied (and continue a century later) on the alarming breakdown of the family and 
                                                
747 ibid., p. 211. 
748 Rapoport, p. 2. 
749 William Goode, World Changes in Divorce Patterns. Yale University Press , 1993. , p. 16-17.  
750 Rapoport, p. 4. 
751 Cuno, “Divorce and the Fate of the Family in Modern Egypt”, p. 210. 
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its possible eventual extinction as a result of perceived increasing irresponsible resorting to 
divorce, compared with a mythical past where marriages were more lasting. 
Although the perception that divorce was high, rising and problematic can be understood 
in the context of a developing nationalist discourse promoting the ideal of strong stable families, 
could there have been some real changes that were taking place, legally, economically and 
socially, that could have made divorces more problematic? A number of possible factors can be 
briefly explored.   
Studies of marriage and divorce in Mamluk and Ottoman eras indicate that access to a 
variety of fiqh opinions and structures (muftÏs, q¥\Ïs of different madh¥hib) provided some 
flexibility which was used by women to facilitate their access to divorce – without necessarily 
losing their financial rights. It is possible that the standardisation and codification of fiqh in the 
nineteenth century may have limited women’s options, particularly with the adoption of the 
Hanafi madhhab as the official state madhhab, which has very restricted grounds for divorce. 
This is supported by a number of studies on divorce legal reform (e.g. Sonbol (1995), 485-496; 
Shaham (1997), 101).752 
As analysed by scholars such as Judith Tucker and Afaf Marsot, Mu^ammad µAlÏ’s 
policies – military conscription, forced labour, centralisation of the textile industry, increased 
male waged labour – placed great strain on peasant families. This may have played a role in a 
rise in divorce as well as reducing women’s ability to negotiate divorce, to live independently 
after divorce and their chances of re-marriage, which would have all contributed to a 
problematisation of divorce.753 As noted by Rapoport, “high rates of divorce swell the ranks of 
women who are not married at any given time, numbers which were already high under the 
existing mortality rates. This demographic trend can only be sustained when women can find 
work and space of their own”.754  
                                                
752 For instance, while µAbduh repeatedly lamented the situation of abandoned wives (a problem which could have 
been related to the socio-economic consequences of Muhammad µAli’s policies), Rapoport described how Mamluk 
"wives could appeal to a Hanbali or Maliki q¥\Ï for a judicial divorce on the grounds of abandonment”, pp. 76-77. 
753 See for instance “Decline of the Family Economy” in The Modern Middle East. Ed. Albert Hourani et al. 
(Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1993). 
754 Rapoport, 44-45. He also indicated the decline of another institution which had supported women wishing to live 
independently: "The primary function of these rib¥~s was to provide shelter for widows, divorcees and abandoned 
women", p. 40. "The fifteenth century witnessed a decrease in the number of female religious houses. The rapid 
inflation that accompanied the collapse of the monetary system had a detrimental influence on religious endowments 
in general, since salaries were fixed by preexisting documents", p. 43. 
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The problematised perception of divorce in Europe was not solely due to the religious 
ban on divorce, but the absence of a system regulating post-divorce consequences. Goode had 
noted that in contrast, in the Islamic family model, “they did take care of the problems created by 
divorce, with rules for custody, child care, support, and remarriage of the mother, and so on”.755 
Nineteenth-century socio-economic changes may have affected this system, contributing to the 
problematisation of divorce. This could be reflected in concerns about refusal or inability to 
provide divorced wives with post-divorce maintenance, a concern expressed many times by 
µAbduh. 
While the above changes applied particularly to the majority of Egyptian families – the 
peasant or poor urban classes – upper-class women also found their options reduced as a result of 
modernisation, in a different way. Studies focusing on this class, such as Mary-Ann Fay’s study 
of Mamluk women, argued that upper-class women had their power, status and choices reduced 
by modernisation. This affected the “patriarchal bargain” and hence male privileges, including 
easy divorce, became more problematic for women of this class. This may be reflected in 
women’s discourse, expressed in the women’s press and in the demands of the Egyptian 
Feminist Union which criticised frivolous male divorce, more so than restricted access to divorce 
for women.756  
The perception of divorce in turn-of-the-century Egypt as rising, and a serious problem to 
be addressed, is interesting in view of the statistics and studies that reveal that divorce had 
always been traditionally high, and possibly higher than contemporary divorce rates. This 
perception appears to be a product of a combination of ideational changes in thinking about ‘the 
family’ and real changes affecting access to divorce and post-divorce consequences. In fact, 
these factors are not separate but rather inter-linked. The above possible explanations deserve 
further exploration to produce a fuller picture of the evolution of divorce patterns in Egypt, 
which should prove to be useful not only for understanding divorce and the discourse on divorce 
in turn-of-the-century Egypt, but also current debates on divorce in Egypt (and the rest of the 
Arab and Muslim worlds) which are characterised by strikingly similar concerns. 
                                                
755  Goode, p. 16-17. 
756 “The EFU demands of 1923 included... regulating ~al¥q by permitting it only in serious cases and in the presence 
of a q¥\Ï who would oblige arbitration”, Mary Ann Fay, “International Feminism and the Women’s Movement in 
Egypt, 1904-1923”, Family in the Middle East, Yount & Rashad, eds., p. 50,  
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7.2 µAbduh’s writings on divorce 
 
7.2.1 Concern about Family Breakdown & Consequences for the Nation 
 
µAbduh did not write any articles specifically on divorce as he had on polygyny, which 
seems to have pre-occupied him since his early days of writing. However, his early writings on 
marriage reveal a concern about ‘family breakdown’ due to deteriorating morality and lack of 
Islamic education and real understanding of marriage. Yet, it seems to be not the rate of divorce 
itself that was the main cause of concern for µAbduh, but rather the way spouses dealt with each 
other before and after divorce. Perhaps this supports the suggestion, proposed above, that 
concern about divorce was partly related to socio-economic changes that affected the set of 
regulations which traditionally made divorce more accessible and sustainable. 
µAbduh appears to have been alarmed by what he saw as signs of the breakdown of 
marital trust, leading to the weakening of family ties and increase in family conflict. Seeing 
marriage as a covenant of trust and cooperation, and one entailing rights and obligations, µAbduh 
saw family problems as a result of the non-fulfilment of marital rights and obligations – and as 
indicative of the decline in trust and morality in wider society: 
Look at the state of a nation that has not respected fulfilment of pledges nor cared about 
commitment to contracts; you would see how God's punishment has befallen it – 
humiliation  losing guidance, and loss of trust even amongst families and offspring. They 
live as individuals, rather than nations: moving images and devouring beasts, each 
awaiting an attack from the other if it is within his power. Thus, each is obliged, 
whenever entering into a contract with another from one's nation, to include as many 
guarantees as possible and protect oneself against betrayal as much as possible. There is 
no cooperation, no solidarity, no help or support. Rather they replaced those qualities 
with jealousy and hatred, enmity and conflict... I have counted the number of cases of 
conflicts in the court of Banha in one year and found 75 percent of cases to have been 
amongst relatives, and the rest with others. Had people been loyal, they would have been 
spared all this affliction.757 
                                                
757 Aµm¥l, vol. 4, p. 430. 
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Here µAbduh displays the nostalgia characteristic of nationalist writings on the family, 
where comparisons are made in relation to a mythical past where family relations were 
characterised by trust and cooperation. This ignores the fact that historically, as court records 
show, it has always been the case that most court cases were between relatives. It also ignores 
the fact that detailed marriage contracts were common historically, in which those able to 
negotiate favourable terms ensured they were documented and legally enforceable. Indeed it can 
be argued that this was a common feature of the Islamic understanding of marriage as a contract 
whose terms are partially open to negotiation, and the Islamic understanding of contracts as 
something encouraged in order to avoid future disputes (e.g. the longest verse in the Qur’an, 
2:282, dealing with the documenting of debts). 
µAbduh’s alarm at this apparent breakdown of the social function of marriage and the 
disintegration of family ties is clear in the strong terms he uses in his criticism. The “weakening 
and breakdown of the marital bond in our times” has, according to µAbduh “reached an 
unprecedented level unseen in any previous time in Islamic history” as a result of “the spouses’ 
corrupted nature and breaking God’s limits from the two sides”.758 
 
7.2.2 Facilitating Divorce and Ensuring Financial Rights 
 
While making such general sweeping statements about the spread of divorce and 
weakening of family bonds, µAbduh wrote in detail about the Islamic rulings on divorce and post-
divorce obligations, emphasising the wisdom behind them and presenting the ideal form of 
divorce as one that does not destroy the ties of kinship and affection between the spouses and 
their families and one where financial obligations are carefully met, avoiding any injustice or 
continuous hostility. Indeed, most of µAbduh’s writings dealing with divorce focused on 
facilitating divorce for women and protecting their post-divorce financial rights, rather than the 
restriction of divorce. The passages expressing alarm at divorce indeed seem rather contradictory 
and do not fit into the general view of divorce, throughout his tafsÏr and fat¥w¥. This may 
suggest that the alarmist passages were influenced by the family-preoccupied nationalist 
discourse of the time. In such passages, one finds µAbduh closer to male nationalist writers, while 
                                                
758 ibid., vol. 4, p.631. 
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in other passages dealing with legal reforms to increase women’s access to divorce and improve 
their post-divorce situation, one finds a discourse that is closer to a jurist’s discourse, and indeed 
closer to feminist writings. 
The main contribution by µAbduh to the discourse on divorce deals with criticising the 
legal processes available to women seeking divorce and seeking their post-divorce rights. µAbduh 
wrote at length regarding the plight of the wives of imprisoned and disappeared husbands, and 
husbands unable or unwilling to provide maintenance.759 Supporting the suggestion mentioned 
above about one of the factors contributing to the changing effects of divorce, µAbduh criticised 
legal reforms that made divorce less accessible and maintenance less enforceable for women. 
While reviewing conditions in Egyptian Shariµa courts at the end of the nineteenth century, 
µAbduh proposed reforms that would make maintenance more enforceable. However, with the 
multiplication of such cases, and the clear inability of the courts to resolve them, µAbduh 
concluded that better access to divorce was needed for women in such situations. He put forward 
a number of proposals to facilitate divorce for wives of imprisoned, disappeared husbands and 
those unable/unwilling to provide marital financial maintenance, and divorce based on harm 
through adoption of Maliki rulings. This seems to have been in response to pressure from 
women, as µAbduh reports in his answer to the “question about how judges can rule on the cases 
of prisoners’ wives whose husbands have not provided maintenance nor divorced them”, that 
there had been “complaints first reported by the inspector of prisons to the interior ministry, later 
referred to the ^aqq¥niyya”. In view of this growing problem and the associated social 
consequences, as official muftÏ, µAbduh tried to clarify “the way of Islamically ruling on the 
matter to resolve the cases of these women”.760 He decided to address the following in one fatw¥ 
(See Appendix A). 
µAbduh had shown how laws in force at the time failed to deal with the above problems, 
as discussed in detail in the chapter on Duties & Obligations in Marriage. New laws were 
needed, and µAbduh proposed several changes to laws dealing with reform. As discussed in a 
previous chapter, µAbduh justified his proposals on the basis of necessity – \ar‰ra – rather than 
                                                
759 Although “maintenance” in English usually denotes post-divorce payments, I will use throughout this chapter to 
refer to marital financial maintenance. In the case of divorce, I will explicitly refer to post-divorce maintenance. 
760 Answer written on 5 Rabiµ II 1318, [1 August 1900] in vol. 2 of D¥r al-ift¥’ 178, p. 76-79. Approved on 6 Rabi II 
by Maliki muftÏ Sheikh al-Azhar SalÏm al-BishrÏ. 
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ijtih¥d, and based them on the Maliki madhhab, getting the approval of the official Maliki muftÏ 
of Egypt. He presented the proposed reforms as being necessary in order to save women from 
“perishing” and falling into “indecency” and to protect society from any possible consequences; 
“any other attempted solution other than divorce is imaginary and cannot be realised”. 
 
7.2.3 Post-Divorce Compensation: Mutµa  
  
Following the same logic of focusing on financial responsibilities and material needs, 
µAbduh wrote – in addition to the legally established rights to ‘idda and child maintenance – 
about the right to mutµa, or post-divorce compensation. In the tafsÏr, he wrote at length about this 
controversial point, out of a belief in its material as well as psychological importance. 
Traditionally, there has not been clear agreement on which divorced women were eligible for 
mutµa, whether this mutµa was obligatory or mandatory, and the amount of that mutµa. Mutµa is 
referred to in 2 verses: 
 
There is no blame on you if you divorce women before consummation or the fixation of 
their dower; but bestow on them (A suitable gift), the wealthy according to his means, 
and the poor according to his means;- A gift of a reasonable amount is due from those 
who wish to do the right thing. 761 
 
 For divorced women maintenance (should be provided) on a reasonable (scale). This is a 
duty on the righteous. 762 
 
Commenting on verse 2:236, Abduh wrote that “mutµa varies according to the man’s 
wealth and situation. That is why it was not specified but was left for the individual to determine 
as he is more familiar with his situation”. However µAbduh went on to emphasise that the 
husband should determine the amount “knowing that God has made it obligatory upon him and 
stressed it by saying ‘mat¥µan bil maµr›f ^aqqan µal¥ al-muhsinÏn’”. µAbduh interpreted “maµr›f” 
as “what people are used to and what is appropriate for them according to their classes, living 
conditions and status”. He saw the added description of mutµa as “being ‘^aqqan µala’l 
muhsinÏn’” to indicate “that it is an obligation while also being an act of benevolence, and not a 
punishment, as the wisdom behind it, as has been said, is to compensate for the loneliness of 
                                                
761 Qur’an, chapter 2, verse 236.  
762 ibid., verse 241.  
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divorce. The meaning is thus: if you are believers, with i^s¥n, perfection, in God’s obedience, 
then you should make this mat¥µ appropriate and conducive to this purpose.”763 Hence, µAbduh 
considered mutµa to be an amount obligatory on the husband to pay his divorcee, with the aim of 
compensating her for the divorce, the amount of which is unspecified, but left to the husband to 
determine, but should be considerable so as to fulfil the purpose for which it was prescribed. 
The first verse dealing with mutµa refers to the case where the wife is divorced before 
consummation, in which case most jurists believed the wife would be due mutµa and not the full 
mahr. µAbduh explained the reasons for this compensation, again emphasising the moral 
purposes of material obligations: 
This type of divorce is disliked and can lead people to think that the husband divorced his 
wife because he suspected something, hence when he compensates her well, this potential 
undermining (gha\¥da) disappears, and this good compensation becomes a sort of 
testimony to her honour and an admission that the divorce was due to him, for his own 
reasons, and not due to her, because of some fault in her, because God commanded us to 
protect honour as much as possible.764 
 
µAbduh believed that “maµr‰f”, “i^s¥n” and “taqw¥” were used in the context of 
prescribing mutµa, not to indicate that it is recommended rather than obligatory, but rather to 
encourage the husband to be generous in determining the amount, “simply mentioned here 
because the obligation had no specific limit, and God loves for one to be generous therein, hence 
He mentioned i^s¥n as a reminder, and to indicate that mutµa is not a punishment.” µAbduh 
believed that taken at face value, “that is what is understood from the verse” – that mutµa is 
obligatory. In contrast “however, fuqah¥’ said that mutµa is recommended and not obligatory, 
because it was only made a ^aqq (obligation) on the mu^sinÏn (the benevolent)”. He argued that 
this reasoning is not valid, referring to several examples where “God mentions the word i^s¥n 
and mu^sinÏn while talking about obligatory deeds”. He insisted that “it is sufficient to prove its 
obligation by God’s saying ‘the wealthy have an appropriate amount and the poor an appropriate 
amount to pay’ and His saying ‘^aqqan µal¥’ (an obligation upon)... Furthermore, the verse of al-
A^z¥b commands tamtÏ’ (the paying of mutµa) without using the term mu^sinÏn.”765 
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While generally fuqah¥’ did not consider mutµa to be obligatory, µAbduh pointed out that 
“among those who took mutµa to be obligatory amongst the early scholars are µAlÏ, Ibn µUmar, al-
Hasan al-BasrÏ, SaµÏd Ibn Jubair, Abu Qul¥ba, al-ZahrÏ, Qat¥da, al-Da^^¥k and others”, although 
“they differed over its amount, and over whether it is prescribed for other than the wife divorced 
before consummation”. Again in the tafsÏr of the second verse related to mutµa, µAbduh argues 
that “this indicates that mutµa is prescribed for every divorced woman”.766 However, after 
arguing for the obligatory nature of the mutµa, the conclusion tried to reconcile the various 
interpretations of the relevant verses by suggesting that “the most cautious and middle opinion is 
that mutµa is different from mahr, and that it is a right for the one who is not eligible for a mahr 
[divorced before consummation] and recommended for others.” This was possibly a comment 
added by Ri\¥, who often tried to reconcile µAbduh’s opinion with the majority opinion. 
As a further attempt to convince men of the importance of mutµa, µAbduh focuses on the 
importance of the act through the divine wisdom behind it, in order to encourage men to abide by 
the ruling, clarifying that  
God then concluded these rulings by saying ‘thus God clarifies His verses to you so that 
you may understand’, that is God’s way is to explain the wisdom behind His rulings in 
this way, i.e. by mentioning the ruling and the benefit from it, and link it with His 
remembrance and good counsel which help to abide by it.767 
 
Whether µAbduh believed that it was more effective to motivate men to abide by this 
obligation through reminding them of the divine wisdom and the benefit to be achieved, or 
whether he believed that it was not possible at the time to go against established consensus, his 
view on mutµa seems to fall under rulings which he discussed in his tafsÏr, while no trace of that 
view (its obligatory nature) can be seen in his fat¥w¥ where he continued to apply the official 
hanafi ruling. Persisting disagreement about whether mutµa is obligatory for all divorced wives, 
and the absence of a specific amount meant that it could not be legally enforced. It was not until 
1985 that mutµa was made obligatory and specified.768 Law No. 100 of 1985 “Amending Certain 
Provisions of Egypt’s Personal Status Laws” stipulated that “in addition to maintenance for her 
waiting period, a woman whose marriage has been consummated and whose husband divorces 
                                                
766 ibid., p. 681. 
767 ibid.  
768 Most provisions of Law 100 of 1985 were included in the 1979 Law no. 44, which was later abrogated because it 
was ruled to be unconstitutional. See Daoud E. El-Alami, “Law No. 100 of 1985”, p. 117. 
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her against her will and without any cause on her part is entitled to compensation (mutµa) to be 
assessed as a minimum of two years’ maintenance, taking into consideration the status of the 
divorcing husband in terms of wealth or poverty, the circumstances of the divorce, and the length 
of the marriage.”769 The provision of post-divorce compensation, as an obligation on the 
husband, taking into consideration his status, agrees with µAbduh’s tafsÏr of verse 2:236. The 
Explanatory memorandum justifies the amendment by the fact that divorced women are in need 
of more than the post-divorce µidda maintenance, and the fact that the basis of the Islamic 
legislation of mutµa is “jabr kh¥~ir al-mu~allaqa”, or consolation of the divorcee, on the basis of 
verse 2:236 – adding that the mutµa requirement would also “dissuade many from rushing to 
divorce”. While µAbduh referred to a list of sholars from the early centuries of Islam who viewed 
post-divorce compensation as obligatory, the 1985 memorandum referred to the opinions of later 
scholars – specifically from the established madh¥hib – who considered mutµa to be obligatory: 
“al-Sh¥fi’Ï new madhhab, the opinion of A^mad chosen by Ibn Taymiyya, <¥hiris, M¥lik (in Al-
Madhhab of al-ShÏr¥zÏ and Al-Mu^all¥ of Ibn Hazm)”. On the basis of these, mutµa was made 
obligatory by article 18, to be no less than 2 years’ nafaqa.770  
 
 
7.3 µAbduh & Contemporary Calls for Restricting Male Repudiation 
 
7.3.1 Divorce in a State of Anger or Intoxication 
 
While the majority of what µAbduh wrote on divorce was concerned with facilitating 
divorce for women and guaranteeing their material rights after divorce, he did express his 
dissatisfaction with men’s unrestricted use of repudiation. This was in relation to divorce in a 
state of intoxication or extreme anger and to triple repudiation.  
In his fatw¥ on “divorce in a state of anger/intoxication”,771 µAbduh responded to a 
question about divorce by an old angry husband. In his answer, he referred to the Hanafi text 
                                                
769 ibid. 
770,µIzzat Hasanayn, Adhw¥’ µal¥ Q¥n›n al-A^w¥l al-Shakh|iyya al-JadÏd Muµallaqan µalayhi wa Mudhayyalan bi 
A^dath A^k¥m Ma^kamat al-Naq\, Maktabat Wahba ,1986, p. 40. 
771 p. 674, fatw¥ no. 167, fatw¥ date 15 Shaµb¥n 1318, vol. 2 of Book 228 of D¥r al-Ift¥’ records, p. 106. 
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Radd al-Mu^t¥r to clarify the view that “the “insane” or “person under shock” – whose actions 
and statements are different from the norm – as well as the aged whose rational capacities are 
undermined, as long as they are in such a state, their statements are void”. Applied to this case, 
“if – as the question describes – the man uttered what he understood and what he did not, and his 
actions included those demonstrating lack of control and comprehension, he has the same ruling 
as what is mentioned in Radd al- Mu^t¥r, and the divorce is not valid”.  
It appears that µAbduh is stressing the importance of intention in the pronouncement of 
divorce. However, he did not address other related controversial issues, such as divorce 
pronounced in jest or unintentionally. Similarly, he did not seem to see the matter of intention as 
affecting the validity of divorce oaths – a “form of oath that makes repudiation of one’s wife 
contingent on the fulfillment of the sworn undertaking”.772 In a fatw¥  published in D¥r al-Ift¥’ 
Records, µAbduh was asked about a married young man who lives with his parents, whose 
mother agreed to pay a sum to the authorities in order to exempt him from military service, in 
return for a divorce oath that he would continue to live with them (or his wife would be 
divorced). When he was excused from the service (without having to pay for exemption), he 
asked whether moving out of his parents’ house would result in his divorce. The answer did not 
deal with the validity of divorce oaths, but held that the oath was conditional on paying the 
exemption fee, but since he was not called for military service and no fee was paid, the oath was 
not relevant. 773  
A number of the fat¥w¥ published as part of µAbduh’s Complete Works (which represent 
a selection of his fat¥w¥), deal with questions on divorce oaths: no. 163, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 
173, 174, 175, 176. In all cases, µAbduh had no objection to divorce oaths, nor to triple divorce, 
although his view on the matter is different when approached in his tafsÏr. This is not an isolated 
case, as it is similar to the issue of mutµa discussed above as well as other questions, where 
µAbduh’s position as muftÏ appears to restricts him to more orthodox views, whereas in his tafsÏr 
his interpretations are more liberal. Another explanation could be that he either did not believe 
the problem of excessive male divorce was an urgent priority (perhaps prioritising widening 
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women’s grounds for divorce), or that he did not believe people were ready for such a change in 
the law.  
Historically, most jurists accepted triple divorce as well as divorce oaths (and the 
consequent and related practice of ‘ta^lÏl’ or formal marriage to permit re-marriage). The most 
prominent rare jurist who challenged the acceptance of such practices was Ibn Taymiyya. 
Staunch opposition to Ibn Taymiyya’s views highlight “the central role of divorce oaths to 
Mamluk society”, as Rapoport argued. Divorce oaths were not only used within the family (to 
threaten wives), but also to strengthen promises in social and commercial contexts, becoming 
“the most solemn form of oath”. Divorce oaths acquired political importance too, as according to 
Rapoport, they “were incorporated into the oath of allegiance (bayµa) used by later medieval 
Muslim rulers, including the Mamluk sultans.”774  
Against the prevailing consensus, Ibn Taymiyya argued775 that “intentions supersede the 
explicit or formal meanings conveyed in speech”.776 Ibn Taymiyya argued that “when a man has 
the intention of either deterring (manµ) or inciting (^athth) himself or someone else from or to a 
certain action, or attesting (ta|dÏq) or contesting (takdhÏb) a certain piece of information, he is in 
fact undertaking an oath.”777 Hence, divorce oaths should not, according to this view, be 
considered conditional divorces, and the violation of a divorce oath requires an act of atonement, 
like any oath in the name of God, and not the actual dissolution of marriage. In view of the 
special political power of such oaths, “guarded by the Mamluk state as a cornerstone of the 
political order”, Ibn Taymiyya’s views could not be ignored. After having been prohibited twice 
from issuing fat¥w¥ on this subject, Ibn Taymiyya was eventually arrested.778  
The issue of divorce oaths is closely related to that of triple divorce, since divorce oaths 
are usually pronounced in the form of a conditional triple divorce (My wife would be triply 
divorced if...), and since the two lead to the definitive end of the marriage, necessitating “ta^lÏl”. 
Ibn Taymiyya considered triple repudiation to be invalid. He argued that repudiation is only 
valid if it is made in the way recommended by the Prophet – sunnÏ divorce: single revocable 
repudiation uttered when the wife is in a state of purity. While there is consensus that sunnÏ 
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775 See Rapoport, pp-96-104. 
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divorces are preferable, all the orthodox schools recognise the validity of both sunnÏ and bidµÏ 
divorces. Ibn Taymiyya, however, argued that bidµÏ divorces do not bind at all.779 
The Sunni doctrine on divorce oaths withstood Ibn Taymiyya’s attacks. His position 
never gained wide acceptance among the jurists, nor even spread beyond the Hanbali stronghold 
in the al-ß¥li^iyya quarter in Damascus. In part, this was due to the efforts of the state 
authorities, which continued to suppress his doctrines long after his death.780 As Rapoport, noted, 
Ibn Taymiyya's failed reform attempt and the way it was repressed highlights “the inextricable 
link between the patriarchal order of the domestic sphere and the patriarchal values at the heart 
of the political and social order”.781  
 
7.3.2 µAbduh on Triple Divorce 
 
Whereas in his fat¥w¥ µAbduh seems to accept triple divorce unreservedly, opposition to 
triple divorce can be found in the tafsÏr. Commenting on the verse “divorce is (to be issued) 
twice”, µAbduh considered triple divorce to be invalid, adding that “jurists and scholars of Hadith 
agree that the ruling of irrevocable triple divorce (by repeating consecutively or saying ‘three 
times’) cannot be deduced from this verse or any other verse in the Qur’an.”782 
A matter related to irrevocable, triple divorce is re-marriage to the triply-divorced wife, 
which can only take place after a valid consummated marriage to another man. Like Ibn 
Taymiyya, µAbduh, in the tafsÏr, strongly condemns and rejects attempts to bypass this condition: 
Every Muslim should know that the verse explicitly indicates that the marriage that 
renders re-marriage to the triply-divorced wife permissible is the valid marriage with 
genuine desire which achieves the purpose of marriage. When one marries a triply-
divorced woman with the aim of enabling her former husband to remarry her, his 
marriage would be formal and not valid, and the wife is not able to marry her former 
husband, but this is rather an act of disobedience cursed by God... If she does remarry 
him, it would be ^ar¥m.783 
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Although µAbduh’s view on triple divorce seems to be clear and strong, its expression 
seems to have remained confined to the tafsÏr, whereas in his fat¥w¥, there seems to be no such 
opposition expressed, and he continued to apply the contemporary rules on divorce. The reason, 
as in other questions where Abduh’s fat¥w¥ did not follow the views he expressed in his tafsÏr, is 
that the fat¥w¥ were solicited from and given by the official state muftÏ and thus followed the 
official state madhhab, and specifically the strongest and most common view in the madhhab. 
Having said that, as discussed in Chapter 1, there were occasions where µAbduh’s fat¥w¥ did 
either contravene all expectations (e.g. the Transvaal fatw¥) or contravene the accepted Hanafi 
position, while being presented as in fact acceptable within the Hanafi madhhab, as in the case of 
proposed reforms for divorce procedures. Why did µAbduh propose far-reaching reforms to 
extend women’s access to divorce on the basis of the inability or unwillingness of the husband to 
provide marital maintenance, his unavailability, or harm caused to the wife, but on the other hand 
did not propose any changes to the use of triple-divorce and divorce oaths? Is it because his 
concern was widening women’s access to divorce, rather than limiting the husband’s right of 
divorce? It is possible that µAbduh’s proposed expansion of women’s access to divorce were in 
response to widespread calls for such reforms and a conviction that such reforms were socially 
required and acceptable. In contrast, µAbduh’s judgment may have been that there was neither 
sufficient demand nor readiness to accept limiting the use of triple divorce and divorce oaths.784  
Another reason is that µAbduh often emphasised the need for people to reform their own 
understanding and behaviour, before legal reform, hence the splitting of his efforts between 
education and admonition on the one hand, and legal reform on the other. The two methods are 
not mutually exclusive, but they often find their expression in the distinct fields of tafsÏr and 
fatw¥. TafsÏr and fat¥w¥ differ not only in terms of the content, but also the methods and 
language used. In the tafsÏr, we find a focus on admonition and reflection on the wisdom behind 
divorce rulings, rather than simple literal application. µAbduh repeatedly highlights how “God 
wished to establish those rulings within people’s hearts through persuasion and reminding them 
                                                
784 In fact, some studies show that women used these male rights as a way out of undesirable marriages, by ending 
the marriage through inducing the husband to pronounce divorce oaths and then deliberately contravene them. See  
for instance, Judith Tucker’s In the House of Law, p. 104-5; Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, “History of Marriage 
Contracts in Egypt”, Hawwa, vol. 3, no. 2, July 2005, 159-196, p. 178.  
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of their benefits and advantages... for understanding a matter together with the wisdom behind it 
is conducive to real comprehension and admonition which leads to compliance.”785 
µAbduh believed that the absence of such understanding of religious rulings and the 
wisdom behind them prevented Muslims from willingly and fully abiding by those rulings. 
Repeatedly in the tafsÏr of rulings on divorce, µAbduh highlighted the importance of “advice and 
reminding of goodness and the truth in a way that leads to softening the heart and inspires 
action”.786 The lack of such understanding and motivation causes men to “follow their own 
wishes in the treatment of women, and imitate the ways of their forefathers and peers”. He 
repeatedly stressed his conviction that “religious rulings, including those related to muµ¥mal¥t 
should be presented to people through admonition that affects hearts”, criticising the way rulings 
are “listed in a dry way as one finds in the books of fiqh”.787 As previously discussed, µAbduh 
had an exaggerated faith in the power of education and how it would transform individual 
behaviour and society as a consequence, which could account for the fact that he spoke at length 
and in strong terms about certain practices and desired changes, without making use of his 
position as mufti to enforce any concrete reform in relation to those changes. He was also careful 
to keep his various roles distinct, as there was in essence a potential conflict between his position 
of MuftÏ (responsible for overseeing the application of the Hanafi-based law) and that of a caller 
for reform in his other writings. His previous involvement in the aborted µUr¥bÏ revolt and the 
continuing hostility of the Khedive towards him probably led µAbduh to avoid a similar fate to 
Ibn Taymiyya who was demonised and persecuted during his life and beyond. 
 
 
7.4 µAbduh & Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a  Revisited 
 
The above deals with µAbduh’s writings in relation to divorce, in his articles, fat¥w¥ and 
tafsÏr. There remains the debated question of whether he also wrote the chapter on divorce from 
Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a. Although in the previous chapter, I have already argued against attributing 
certain chapters of Ta^rÏr al-Mar’a to µAbduh, it is important to briefly compare specifically the 
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chapter on divorce from that book, and whether there are any differences to what is directly and 
explicitly written elsewhere by µAbduh on this subject.  
In the Divorce chapter, Q¥sim AmÏn, who – according to Cuno –788 was the first author to 
write about the danger of rising divorce, saw divorce as a consequence of inappropriate 
traditional ways of choosing a spouse, often resulting in incompatibility. AmÏn believed that 
“marriage based on such compatibility would be a respected matter in the hearts of the two 
spouses, and the bond would be so strong that it is not easy to undo”. Following the same 
assumption that divorce in the past had been low, AmÏn reasoned that “since nowadays this 
condition is not respected in marriage, the bond between the two spouses has become weak, 
coming undone at the first problem encountered.” Ignoring material problems which µAbduh 
focused on, AmÏn believed that divorce took place “mostly for no reason other than the desire of 
each to leave a bond for which they see no reason to preserve, and to get out of something which 
has no value in their hearts.”789 
AmÏn expressed an idealistic view of companionate marriage, believing no material 
problems could affect such a marriage: 
Look at two loving spouses, you would find them in heavenly bliss... Why would they 
care if the money box is empty, or if there is just lentil and onions on the table? Would 
the heart’s joy in each moment of the day not be sufficient for them?790 
 
While Abduh focuses on nafaqa – like in classical fiqh – AmÏn imagines a happy 
marriage, regardless of such duties. In contrast µAbduh recognised that “it is clear that.... 
financial dealings can affect relations/feelings” [in the context of post divorce mutµa].791 Like 
typical nationalist writings on the family and divorce, AmÏn imagined a mythical strong, rarely 
broken, family in the past, and contrasted it with a perceived present of alarmingly rising divorce 
and weak families: 
 
How far are we from the state of our families nowadays, where each spouse is the 
furthest person away from the other spouse?.... The situation ends with the wife 
abandoning her home to the servants leaving them to do what they like, leading disorder 
                                                
788 Kenneth M. Cuno, “Divorce and the Fate of the Family in Modern Egypt”, Family in the Middle East: Ideational 
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to dominate and the traces of neglect to appear... The wife spends her time in one place 
thinking about her miserable situation, or leaves her home in the morning to go around to 
her neighbours to distract herself from her problems. Nor is the man’s state any better. He 
abandons his home, finding solace in cafes or at his neighbours’, and when he returns 
home, he remains isolated from his wife, in silence.792 
 
It is noteworthy that the family described above, where the wife can afford to spend the 
day “reflecting” or visiting her neighbours, neglecting the management of her domestic servants, 
is hardly typical of most Egyptian women. It appears that while µAbduh seems to think of the 
average – poor – woman/family, focusing on material needs, AmÏn seems to have the upper-class 
family in mind. 
AmÏn criticised western laws for not accepting divorce and praised fiqh for recognising 
its necessity, although it is not recommended. However he criticised three exceptions: the 
opinion (particularly in Hanafi fiqh) that the word ~al¥q leads to execution of divorce even if it 
not intended, triple divorce, and the fact that jurists take explicit divorce (using the word ~al¥q) as 
revocable, whereas implicit divorce (using ambiguous terms) is irrevocable (b¥’in). He argued 
against all those, since “divorce can only be valid if accompanied by the intention of 
separation”.793 He strongly criticised divorce oaths. AmÏn called for the reform of divorce, such 
that it is done in the presence of witnesses, which he argued is prescribed in the Qur’an, and 
mentioned by al->abarÏ. He suggested the following divorce procedure: inform the Shariµa judge; 
appoint mediators; if mediation fails, the judge approves divorce, which must take place before a 
judge and in the presence of two witnesses.794 He argued that such a procedure serves the 
purpose of Shariµa and does not contradict it, does not deny men’s right to divorce, and “serves a 
great interest that is reducing the number of divorces”.795 AmÏn also suggested that educating 
women would increase the respect due to them and dissuade their husbands from taking divorce 
lightly. 
                                                
792 ibid., vol. 2, p. 74. 
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Although AmÏn’s description of divorce practices and proposed reforms were in the 
direction of restricting divorce, he ended the chapter with a brief note recommending equalising 
access to divorce for men and women, arguing that “however much we restrict divorce, women 
cannot obtain the respect and dignity they deserve unless they are granted the right to divorce”. 
He suggested that this could be achieved either by borrowing from other madh¥hib like the 
M¥likÏ madhhab where grounds for divorce are greater, or by continuing to follow the Hanafi 
madhhab while allowing every woman to include a condition in the marriage contract giving her 
the right to divorce herself whenever needed. AmÏn argued that the second option is superior in 
the sense that certain matters that can make marriage untenable in the views of wives, such as the 
husband’s taking of a second wife, are not valid grounds for divorce in the M¥likÏ madhhab.796 In 
contrast, if the wife included the condition of divorcing herself whenever she chose, or in the 
case of her husband taking a second wife, she would be able to leave the marriage.  
Having suggested that the second option was preferable for women, AmÏn still concluded 
that “adopting the first method is wiser and leads to greater control, for placing divorce under the 
judge’s authority is more likely to restrict it and more conducive to protecting marriage”. This is 
compatible with nationalist authors’ concern about perceived rising divorce and their principal 
aim of restricting divorce as part of the mission of protecting the stability of the family. AmÏn 
still ends the chapter by lamenting the situation of oppressed wives, appealing to “every truth-
loving man among my compatriots, particularly fathers to come to the rescue of these oppressed 
weak patient women”. Thus, AmÏn – like most nationalist authors – preferred to restrict divorce, 
and avoid widening women’s access to divorce, while at the same time portraying women as 
“weak and oppressed”, in need of men’s help and sympathy rather than legally enforced equal 
rights.  
There are some similarities between AmÏn’s and µAbduh’s approaches to the question of 
divorce, particularly their concern about the restriction of access to divorce for women in 
problematic marriages, while at the same time being concerned about a perceived weakening of 
the Egyptian family. However, there are also clear differences: a more legalistic approach in the 
case of µAbduh as opposed to a more “social” approach by AmÏn, a greater blame and 
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responsibility placed on husbands in the case of µAbduh, in contrast to a more sympathetic 
evaluation of Egyptian men by AmÏn a greater focus on material factors in µAbduh, and a 
preponderance of a will to restrict male divorce over the expansion of women’s access to divorce 
in AmÏn’s approach unlike µAbduh’s. These differences support my earlier conclusion that the 
chapters in question were written by indeed AmÏn and not by µAbduh. 
 
 
7.5 µAbduh’s proposals and Subsequent Divorce Law Reform 
 
The inclusion of stipulations in the marriage contract (common throughout history, but 
curtailed by the codification of fiqh) continued to be among women’s groups main demands, but 
also to be opposed by traditionalists. Only in 2000 was a marriage contract officially approved, 
when “a much changed and watered-down version of the proposed marriage contract was quietly 
issued.”797 A number of reforms, however, were achieved, and most of µAbduh’s proposals for 
reforming divorce by incorporating views from the M¥likÏ madhhab to widen the available 
grounds for divorce were adopted in Law no. 25 of 1920 and Law No. 25 of 1929.798  
Articles 4-6 of Law No. 25 of 1920 allowed women to file for divorce on the grounds of 
husband’s failure to provide maintenance, articles 9-12 allowed judicial divorce if the husband 
suffers from contagious disease, while articles 12-14 allowed judicial divorce on the grounds of 
husband’s desertion or imprisonment. The arguments used were those put forward by µAbduh, by 
borrowing from other madh¥hib in order to protect wives and their children. Article 4 is almost 
identical to µAbduh’s proposed Article 1 on divorce based on non-provision of maintenance (See 
Appendix A), while Article 5 combines µAbduh’s proposed Articles 2 and 3 on absent and 
imprisoned husbands. Article 6 is identical to µAbduh’s proposed Article 5 which considers 
divorce in all the above cases to be revocable and contestable by the husband if he proves his 
ability and willingness to provide maintenance.799 In 1929, PSL No. 25 was passed. The new law 
included further reforms such as women’s right to file for judicial divorce on the grounds of 
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harm. µAbduh’s proposed articles 10 and 11 on divorce based on harm are implemented in the 
1929 Law Article 6 and subsequent articles on divorce based on harm and mediation. While 
µAbduh detailed examples of harm such as “illegitimate desertion” or “unjustified beating or 
cursing”, Article 6 allows divorce between spouses on the basis of “harm that renders the 
continuation of marital life between their likes impossible”.800 Also, repudiations that occurred 
under coercion and intoxication were considered invalid (Article 1), which agrees with µAbduh’s 
fatw¥ discussed in Section 7.3.1 above – although the 1929 law did not extend to divorce 
pronounced in a state of anger. Moreover, repudiations based on conditional oaths made merely 
with the intention of inciting compliance or avoidance were similarly considered void (Article 2). 
Triple divorces were to be considered a single divorce (Article 3). 801 As we had seen in sections 
7.3.1 and 7.3.2, µAbduh had rejected those forms of divorce in his tafsÏr, while accepting them in 
his fat¥w¥. The Explanatory Memorandum also follows µAbduh’s reform strategy of using 
considerations of “necessity”, “protection of wives and children” and Qur’anic arguments to 
justify reform, while resorting to borrowing established rulings from other madh¥hib when it 
comes to specific proposals. For instance in the case of restriction of divorce oaths and triple 
divorces, the Explanatory Memorandum uses arguments based on wives’ interests and Qur’anic 
verses in the introduction, while explicitly basing the new laws on opinions of established 
scholars.802 
Ron Shaham noted that after these reforms, “approximately 50% of applications for 
judicial divorce were based on the ground of general injury and around 30% on the ground of 
non-provision of maintenance”.803 The 1929 law also required judges to grant women divorce if 
they fail to prove harm but still insist on terminating the marriage, which was not explicitly 
proposed by µAbduh. The courts could dissolve the marriage, unless they found the blame for the 
discord chiefly lay with the wife. That changed with the adoption of Law no. 100 of 1985, which 
allowed divorce, even if the wife was at fault, in return for her payment of compensation and 
forfeiture of some of her financial rights. The explanatory memorandum justified the amendment 
not on the basis of expanding women’s access to divorce, but discouraging a “quarrelsome wife” 
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from harming her husband as a stratagem to compel him to repudiate her without 
compensation.804 As Lama Abu Odeh noted, “the latter effectively means that Egyptian wives 
have come close to acquiring access to no-fault divorce. Divorce is conditional, however, upon 
the woman’s willingness to go through an elaborate process of attempted reconciliation with the 
husband, mediated by the court, as required by the law. This conciliation process is not required 
when the husband divorces the wife.”805 Resistance to equalising men’s and women’s access to 
divorce continued, however, until the year 2000 where the controversial law of khulµ, which does 
not require the husband’s agreement to divorce, was passed – after much resistance. Such a 
reform went beyond µAbduh’s proposals, but was based on primary texts from the Qur’an and 
Hadith, going beyond the opinions of the madh¥hib – the form of ijtih¥d µAbduh promoted but 
avoided using as the basis of his specific reform proposals. 
Debate on the 2000 Law “has not abated since its introduction”806. This demonstrates the 
continued resistance to equal access to divorce for women and perception of divorce as 
dangerous and destabilising for society. This supports my observation that µAbduh’s focus on 
widening women’s access to divorce rather than restricting male divorce differed from the 
tendency of contemporary nationalist discourse and judicial reform. However, the dominance of 
the nationalist discourse has been reflected in a focus on µAbduh’s perceived opposition to easy 
male divorce – although his views were only expressed in his tafsÏr. 
µAbduh’s varied – and at times inconsistent – writings on divorce reveal once again the 
different and distinct roles µAbduh assumed: teacher and educator aiming at transforming 
people’s understanding and inducing an internal motivation for change, state legislator, reformer, 
etc. It also reveals once again his pragmatic and gradualist approach with an eye not only on 
what should be done, but also what is reasonably possible at that particular time. As Kerr noted: 
Abduh was prudent and pragmatic, avoiding sharp breaks with traditional dogmatic 
formulas and elaborating what was novel in his thought only to the extent demanded by 
clear and present needs. By doing this he made his message more palatable to the 
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orthodox and established a common ground of discourse between them and the products 
of modern secular education.807  
 
This approach seems to have been adopted by his successors, leaving a lasting – but 
disputed – legacy in the field of Egyptian family law reform. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
µAbduh’s writings on women are a rich tapestry of fat¥w¥, treatises and articles situated 
in different contexts, aimed at addressing complex and conflicting social demands in an era of 
great upheaval and flux. µAbduh identified and addressed a plethora of religious, intellectual, 
social and cultural norms in need of reform while seeking to achieve a balance between 
complying with a faithful understanding of the religious sources and achieving progress and 
deep-rooted change. This balancing act can be seen throughout his extensive writings, from his 
defense of women’s status in Islam as a rebuttal to colonialist attacks, to his criticism of taqlÏd-
based restrictive family rulings, and from his attempts at producing legal reforms able to respond 
to modern social questions to his endeavours to reform individuals and society through education 
and a contextual understanding of Islam as compatible with modernity. He utilised a number of 
strategies, approaches and innovative ideas to achieve this, as will be summarised below. 
 
 
8.1 Reform Strategies & Approaches 
 
8.1.1 Islamically-justified women’s reform: Social and ethical reform based on 
religious reform 
 
As discussed in the first chapter, religious reform – both religiously-based social reform 
and reform of religious thought – was central in µAbduh’s thought and work. He believed that the 
nature of Egyptian society made the language of religious reform the most appropriate and 
effective for achieving real social change. Thus, his reforms in relation to women were expressed 
using the same logic and language. 
Inverting the colonialist discourses which blamed what they described as the 
backwardness of Egyptian women on Islam, µAbduh blamed the ignorance of women and 
injustices towards them on Egyptians abandoning Islamic guidance, as he described it. He 
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repeatedly argued that westerners’ allegations about the state of Muslim women were either 
based on their ignorance of the real situation of women, or on their incorrect attribution of the 
causes of that situation to Islam. In fact, he presented it as the starkest example of corrupted 
practice as a result of straying from revealed teaching, as in his view, Muslims’ treatment of 
women demonstrates the distance separating the actions of most Muslims from the beliefs and 
teachings of their religion – a complete inversion of the colonialist discourse. Nevertheless, he 
recognised that in order for religiously-based reform to take root, reform of religion itself must 
first occur.  
µAbduh believed that the most effective way of precipitating change in the situation of 
women was to advocate an Islamically-based liberation of women inspired by an understanding 
of their faith as the guarantor of perfect rights. Indeed, Leila Ahmed suggests that µAbduh was 
“probably the first to make the argument, still made by Muslim feminists today, that it was Islam 
and not, as Europeans claimed, the West, that first recognised the full and equal humanity of 
women”.808 Thus, the rights, freedom, justice and equality offered by Islam were presented as not 
only equal, but superior, to foreign liberation theories.  
However, there is a recognition of the advanced status of women in Europe and its 
honouring of women and care to educate them in the sciences and arts. These positive 
advantages in modern Europe are presented as an effect of “advances in civilisation and 
development”.809 µAbduh attributes this progress in women’s status to “the new civilisation of the 
last century”,810 rejecting the colonialist claims of the superiority of Christianity and its treatment 
of women, as was discussed in Chapter 2. Conversely, religion is seen to be central to such 
progress in the Muslim context.  
The use of religious language to justify social reform and the construction of a perfect 
past is also common to nationalist discourses on women. The difference is that µAbduh’s 
employment of religious language, arguments and references is done not only with the purpose 
of justifying the reform against detractors or conservative opponents, but also, and sometimes 
more importantly, with the aim of motivating individuals to adopt his proposed reforms, “to use 
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the Muslim’s confidence in his religion to reform his affairs.”811 The backwardness, injustices 
and social decay observed by µAbduh in his society were attributed to ignorance and corruption 
of morals. What was needed was ethical reform, and in his view, “religion is the most potent 
factor in the formation of moral traits”.812 The reform and prosperity aspired to would follow 
from a “reform of spirit” resulting from a reformed understanding of religion; once “their morals 
are refined with sound capabilities, reform would flow from individuals to the umma.”813 
Morality for µAbduh comprised “faith in God alone, and sincerity in the performance of the 
prescribed religious duties, and the mutual aid of all humans, to one another, in the doing of good 
and the prevention of evil as much as they are able to do so”.814 His socially-oriented view of 
ethics is evident in his focus on social relations, always stressing the two values of cooperation 
and justice. 
The idea of women’s liberation, whether it is influenced by colonialist critiques or 
motivated by nationalist rebuttals of those critiques, is adopted as an Islamic concept and cause; 
in µAbduh’s words, women’s liberation was among the principles which “the Islamic religion 
calls for in the most complete and perfect ways”. In fact, µAbduh believed that the idea that the 
position of women was of direct and crucial significance for social reform was an indigenous 
idea, one introduced by Islam: “People, because of their ignorance of all dimensions of social 
interests, used to see no importance for women in the success or corruption of social life, until 
revelation taught them [about it].” However, this concept took on different forms according to 
the context. Although the early practice of the Muslim community is seen as perfect, there are 
indications that µAbduh believed in the importance of the historical context of the application of 
revelation. He argued that although Islam advocated the most advanced forms of women’s 
liberation, “people, in each era, take from the revelation as much as they are ready for.” He went 
as far as saying that “the rulings brought by the Qur’an for reforming the state of homes through 
good treatment of women have not been completely implemented by the umma”. Although it is 
not explicitly stated, µAbduh’s assertion that the Qur’anic guidance in relation to women has not 
been fully implemented can be understood to also apply to the “golden era of Islam” including 
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the early practice of the first Muslim community – thus establishing the primacy of the Qur’anic 
revelation as a source of guidance above the practice of Muslims, including the Sunna. Thus, the 
Islamic liberation of women is to be achieved through a return to the perfect divine guidance, 
rather than its incomplete historical applications; thus a new reading and re-interpretation of 
revelation are necessary. 
Although it is not explicitly stated, µAbduh set the ground for the very important principle 
of recognising the social limitations of the particular historical context in which revelation is 
applied. Thus, while revelation may direct people towards justice and equality, a particular 
context may not allow for those ideals to be fully implemented. However, future generations may 
continue to reform society towards achieving those ideals advocated in revelation. This is the 
basis for µAbduh’s advocacy for ijtih¥d, inspired by the Qur’an and unrestricted by its historical 
applications – although by no means disregarding those applications. 
This contextual approach is facilitated by µAbduh’s understanding that “such matters as 
divorce, polygamy and slavery do not belong to the essentials of Islam”.815 Thus, matters of 
family law are within the sphere of muµāmalāt that are open to re-interpretation in accordance 
with new social contexts, taking into account current associated harms and benefits, and guided 
by the conviction that the purpose of revelation is achieving humans’ wellbeing. This, together 
with µAbduh’s belief in gradual reform that takes into account changing circumstances and 
contexts, opens the door to innovative future interpretations that meet social needs as well as 
embodying the ideals intended by revelation. 
A strong basis of extreme importance in ‘Abuh’s “Islamic liberation of women” was his 
critique of certain assumptions that had become part of the classical consensus, such as the view 
that women were created from men and that women’s essential nature was different and inferior. 
Through a re-interpretation of the Qur’an that is freed from the historical opinions of – male – 
scholars and inauthentic narrations, µAbduh insisted on the absence of any basis for such 
interpretations, rejecting them and stressing women’s independent and equal origin and their 
responsibility and agency expressed in the creation story. This re-interpretation is crucial for 
reforming the deeply-ingrained religiously-justified cultural perceptions underlying social 
                                                
815 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 359. 
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inequalities. Although µAbduh’s views were very significant in this regard, they were not always 
taken to their ultimate conclusions. 
Thus, µAbduh’s discourse on women carries the same characteristics of his general reform 
discourse: gradualism and pragmatism, reform with a focus on the practical over the theoretical, 
a maintenance of “strategic ambiguity”, inversion of the colonialist discourse, the re-
interpretation of the sources with a contextual approach, and a focus on social and ethical reform 
based on religious reform. 
 
8.1.2 A reformed marriage for the reform of the nation 
 
In µAbduh’s vision of the reform of the status of women, reform of family was a 
prerequisite to reform of the nation – also a well-established theme in nationalist discourses on 
women. However in µAbduh’s discourse, the assertion that ‘the reform of the nation depends on 
the reform of families’ was explicitly presented as a natural as well as divinely revealed 
principle, as was discussed in Chapter 4. 
µAbduh was alarmed at the “unprecedented” “weakening and breakdown of the marital 
bond in our times”, resulting from a corrupted understanding of marriage and its proper meaning 
and function, in his view. Thus µAbduh wrote at length to emphasise the divinely-revealed 
meaning and purpose of the institution of marriage. Marriage is presented as a necessary and 
natural relationship. Arguing that the lack of veneration for this relationship and resulting 
problems were due to a lack of appreciation of its profound and diverse dimensions, µAbduh 
dwells on the religio-ethical and emotional dimensions of marriage often neglected in juristic 
discussions, stressing that marriage is not only a purely juristic matter. The characteristics of 
“love and mercy” are often emphasised. 
In his discussion of mahr, µAbduh emphasised the elements of “love and mercy” in the 
Qur’anic definition of marriage and criticised its characterisation as a material exchange in fiqh. 
As well as its emotional and spiritual aspects, µAbduh repeatedly described marriage as a pledge 
of cooperation, of mutual aid towards achieving happiness and contentment, and more 
specifically towards establishing a stable family and producing and nurturing children.  
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µAbduh’s interest in reforming the family is informed by his vision of a society that is 
composed of mutually-supportive families that are characterised by internal cooperation – or in 
other words society as a large-scale family. His discussions of marriage tend to emphasise the 
social function of marriage, as leading to the building of a family and the provision of an 
environment in which children are educated, and a set of social ties that promote solidarity and 
cooperation in society.  
While cooperation, common interest, mutual care and equivalence are common features 
of µAbduh’s characterisation of marriage, it does not seek to transform the family into an 
egalitarian framework. Rather it seeks to emphasise the values of justice and mercy and widen 
available rights, while maintaining a “rationalised” hierarchy. While equality of men and women 
is stressed in contexts such as the creation of men and women, religious capacity and education, 
differences re-emerge in the context of the laws of marriage – while simultaneously emphasising 
values of mercy and cooperation.  
Examples of this include µAbduh’s ambivalence towards asserting women’s right to 
conducting their marriages, although he condemned guardians’ prevention of women from 
marrying husbands of their choice on the basis of its consequences for them and for society. 
Thus justice and woman’s freedom are to be defended – but not at the expense of society; a 
balance between the individual’s and society’s needs must be sought – an elusive balance and an 
unresolvable tension.  
In this reformed view of marriage, equivalence and mutual rights are emphasised, while 
at the same time, different roles are assumed. While his tafsÏr criticised the view of the mahr as 
being a “compensation for the sexual capacity or a price for it”, µAbduh’s reforms of family law 
were within the framework of widening the rights available to women and restricting men’s 
absolute domination, but without going as far as to equate the rights of both spouses – although 
some general passages speak abstractly of “equal rights and duties”. These rights and duties are, 
however, defined by µurf, or customs, which varies according to time and place. 
The undisputed role of the husband remains financial maintenance and leadership of the 
family. Leadership in µAbduh’s tafsÏr, however, is described in such a way that preserves the led 
person’s independence, and where words such as “guiding”, “educating”, “watching over” are 
used rather than “commanding” or “controlling”. This view is logical within an approach that 
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seeks to maintain, and activate, the social function of the family as a building block of the wider 
society and the basis of the network of social solidarity, particularly at a time characterised by 
“unprecedented family breakdown” – in µAbduh’s and his contemporaries’ perception. The 
insistence on hierarchy is also part of the modern emphasis on efficiency and management, 
where the family as a social unit needs, in his view, a clear – but not absolute or unrestrained – 
hierarchy for effective control. It is also inspired by the then-popular social Darwinism and its 
accepted hierarchies, and coherent with the contemporary linking of the nature of the state and 
the family, both of which were being reformed to restrict absolute despotic rule, while 
maintaining the paternalistic position of leader – or “benevolent despot” who cares for, rather 
than oppresses, his subjects. The same contradiction and ambivalence is seen in µAbduh’s 
ambivalent advocacy of constitutional rule and social equality, both permeated with a persistent 
belief in a world ruled by hierarchies – although it will not necessarily always be so. In politics, 
society as well as the family, the principal guiding values were  “fairness”, “mercy”, “solidarity” 
and “cooperation” more so than equality.816 
As seen in Chapter 4, µAbduh’s discourse on the family combines both reformist Islamic 
elements which can be seen as a continuation of classical reformist discourses (re-reading the 
sources to re-interpret them and to motivate Muslims to understand divine injunctions and apply 
them) and a modernist nationalist discourse influenced by modern concepts of family, society 
and governance. Or in other words, this points to the overlap between the various discourses in 
Egypt – and the rest of the Muslim world – and their various inspirations, as opposed to the 
tendency to place figures into distinct camps. 
Despite common themes, there are clear differences between µAbduh’s discourse on the 
family and the nationalist discourse. Unlike in the latter, µAbduh did not seem to have an “ideal 
family” in mind which is formed in a specific way, where women had fixed specific roles, where 
polygyny is absolutely condemned, and where divorce is always seen as a disaster. µAbduh’s 
vision appears to be more flexible and closer to the view of marriage in classical Islamic rulings: 
                                                
816 Equality was a rather ambiguous concept in turn-of-the-century discourses, vaguely mentioned, simultaneously 
with a view of hierarchies as natural. For instance the nationalist leader Lutfi al-Sayyid, a pioneer of the secular 
post-µAbduh school called for a return of corporal punishment against workers, the abolition of which reduced 
productivity (and a practice µAbduh had denounced – See Aµm¥l, vol. 1, p. 446, 839). Q¥sim AmÏn defined public 
opinion as “the mindless masses, enemies of change, servants of falsehood” (Al-Aµm¥l al-k¥mila li Q¥sim AmÏn, 
vol. 1, p. 166). 
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no particular focus on how the bride/groom should meet or how low/high the mahr is; polygyny 
is discouraged, but with a possibility of achieving justice if practised “as intended”, and similarly 
with divorce, if practised with full respect of Islamic provisions; and no domestic role is rigidly 
assumed for women.  
Abduh’s interpretation of verses on men’s “preference” focused on financial duties rather 
than inherent natural superiority. However when discussing leadership in the family, he saw 
men’s nature as “stronger and more perfect” making them better leaders. Leadership in marriage 
is thus accepted as being based on essential superiority, although it should be characterised by 
justice and consultation. As discussed in Chapter 5, the family hierarchy is justified in two 
simultaneous ways: the need for a single leadership of the family unit, and the natural leadership 
of men, while stressing its benign nature and the complementarity and inter-dependence of the 
spouses. The logic of exchange is less used by µAbduh to justify men’s leadership position. 
Whereas µAbduh theoretically rejected the characterisation of marriage as a material 
exchange, his attempts to widen women’s access to divorce strongly emphasised the non-
negotiable obligation of nafaqa or financial maintenance in marriage. In his official proposal on 
the subject of maintenance of the wives of prisoners, absent husbands, or husbands who are 
unable or refuse to provide maintenance, in response to the repeated complaints of wives, he 
strongly stressed the husband’s obligation to provide nafaqa and used it as a way of significantly 
widening women’s rights to seek judicial divorce. It is important to remember that the primacy 
of marital nafaqa was already established by Muslim women historically stressing that obligation 
by demanding it in court and by using it as a strategy to obtain divorce; in fact historical court 
records show that lack of maintenance was the most frequently referred to ground for divorce.817 
However, although he strongly emphasised the absolute right to maintenance, µAbduh in 
return maintained its link with obedience and its abrogation by the wife’s nush‰z  - at least in his 
fatāwā – although there is no precise definition of it. The husband’s authority included the right 
to discipline his wife, although µAbduh emphasised it was allowed only against recalcitrant wives 
if the husband judges that it will lead to ending the state of recalcitrance, and the disciplinary 
                                                
817 “Breaking Up the Family: Divorce in Egyptian Law and Practice”, Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron and Baudouin 
Dupret, Journal of Women of the Middle East and the Islamic World 6 (2008) 52–74, p. 56. See also Shaham R., 
“Judicial Divorce at the Wife’s Initiative: The Shariµa Courts in Egypt, 1920-1955”, Islamic Law and Society, 
volume 1, Number 2, 1994, pp. 217-257. 
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steps should be applied in a gradual progressive way. While µAbduh did not reject this power of 
husbands, he stressed the prophet’s sayings and examples that discouraged it, but justified its 
conditional and limited use on the basis of “corruption of environment and characters” to be 
reformed through education, thus – at least theoretically – envisaging a time/society where the 
practice is not necessary or acceptable. He also highlighted the moral aspect that cannot be 
regulated by law – reminding spouses of God’s watching over them and admonishing them not 
to transgress against the weaker party. This mixed reaction to this issue – ambivalence, 
acceptance, justification, admonition, restriction, condemnation – continues in Islamic literature 
on this practice. The ambivalence, however, was not necessarily a modern stance: as pointed out, 
Judith Tucker had noted in her study of eighteenth-century court records and fat¥w¥ that muftis 
were mostly silent on the question. Just like the ambiguous nature of the verse and its 
“circumstances of revelation”, jurists seem torn between religiously sanctioning the practice and 
leaving it to social customs and evolution to resolve. 
As well as widening women’s grounds for divorce, µAbduh sought to restrict men’s 
absolute right to polygyny, by stressing the primacy of the obligation of justice without which 
polygyny becomes prohibited and by detailing polygyny’s contemporary harmful consequences 
for the family and society, concluding that in order to avoid harm, it is permissible to restrict or 
ban polygyny. 
  Thus, µAbduh’s reform, and subsequent family law reform in general, maintained what 
Deniz Kandiyoti called the “patriarchal bargain”, but tried to negotiate better terms within it. 
Marriage was still legally a contract of rights and duties, but reforms were introduced to 
reinforce women’s rights such as financial maintenance and their access to divorce, while 
restrictions were placed on men’s absolute right to obedience and to polygyny.818  
  
 
 
 
                                                
818 Lama Abu-Odeh’s review of family law reform in the twentieth century in Egypt indicates that the preservation 
of the ‘transactional quality’ of marriage while reducing and abolishing additional powers over and above this 
contractual relationship, has persisted and guided legal reform in Egypt. Abu-Odeh, L. (2005) ‘Modern family law, 
1800—present. Arab States’ in S. Joseph (general ed), Encyclopedia of Women in Islamic Cultures II. 
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8.1.3 Gradual Reform from within orthodoxy  
 
µAbduh strongly and repeatedly criticised taqlÏd, blaming it for the rigidity of certain fiqh 
rulings, their inability to respond to people’s modern needs, and the continuous disputes and 
rivalry of those engaged in fiqh. He advocated ijtih¥d in order to produce rulings that were more 
in tune with people’s needs. In a phase characterised by change and an influx of novel 
challenges, µAbduh stressed the importance of the well-known – but often ignored – fiqh 
principle of the change of fatw¥ according to change of time, place and conditions. He strongly 
argued that in order for people to abide by laws, the laws must be suitable for their conditions 
and needs, and they must be expressed in an accessible and comprehensible way.  
Although µAbduh deplored taqlÏd and advocated ijtih¥d, when it came to specific legal 
reform, he resorted to the use of established fiqh principles such as necessity, public interest, and 
methods of selective borrowing from other madh¥hib in order to produce legal reform. 
Furthermore, while much has been said about µAbduh’s emphasis on re-interpretation of the 
Qur’an and his criticism of the complex, contradictory and abstract nature of many medieval 
classical works, he relied on those classical works not only in his official role as judge and muftÏ, 
but also considered them a useful basis for arriving at modern reforms.  
Responding to the English clergyman’s questions about polygyny, divorce and slavery, 
µAbduh clarified that “such matters are not considered by Muslims to be among the fundamentals 
of religion”.819 Yet he did not dismiss all related legal rulings, but rather praised the juristic 
heritage on these matters, assuring the questioner that “had you looked into the madh¥hib of 
Muslims you would have found the best of what you are seeking”.820 Thus the view of µAbduh as 
an enemy of the heritage of classical fiqh who wanted to destroy it or bypass, it in order to solely 
rely on the fundamental texts, is not entirely justified. 
In addition to his regular fat¥wa issued as the Grand Mufti which followed the Hanafi 
madhhab, even in his proposed legal reforms, µAbduh presented them not as novel interpretations 
of the revealed texts but as derived from well-established principles of fiqh and supported by the 
known madh¥hib. An example is his proposal for the reform of divorce laws. µAbduh first 
                                                
819 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 359. 
820 ibid. 
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stressed the need for the reform, by detailing the inefficiency of current laws and the suffering 
they caused to women, as well as their harmful consequences for society as a whole. As 
discussed in Chapter 7, his suggested solutions in his proposal “on the subject of maintenance of 
the wives of prisoners, absent husbands, or husbands who are unable or refuse to provide 
maintenance”, were presented as being arrived at through consideration of \ar‰ra – necessity.  
While µAbduh promoted the principle of ma|la^a and the need for new laws to protect 
and achieve people’s interests, he did not base his proposed reforms on ma|la^a, but rather on 
\ar‰ra. This is a more cautious strategy to stress the urgency of the reform and to base them on a 
more easily acceptable rule. ™ar‰ra and ma|la^a are not mutually exclusive concepts. A \ar‰ra is 
a vital interest. There are several differences between the two. The principle of \ar‰ra is 
temporary, while that of ma|la^a is permanent. When the ‘state of harm’ ends, all rulings must 
return to normal. Also, while \ar‰ra leads to ma|la^a, the opposite is not true.821 The temporary 
nature of \ar‰ra may account for its easier acceptance, but in the long-term, it may not be as 
effective and lasting. However, it continues to be a popular strategy for reform in modern 
reformist Islamic discourses.  
µAbduh explicitly distanced his proposed reforms from the controversial principle of 
ijtih¥d, reassuring judges that “ruling in consideration of necessity is not ijtih¥d”. Being 
conscious of how deeply entrenched the mentality of taqlÏd was, µAbduh further reassured these 
judges that Hanafi judges ruling according to the Maliki madhhab on the basis of necessity 
would not be contravening their madhhab. In addition, µAbduh possibly felt that the use of ijtih¥d 
itself, even if accepted, was probably not possible, as the judges lacked the necessary training. 
µAbduh’s careful attempt to achieve acceptance of his proposed reforms through 
presenting them as rulings based on established and non-controversial rules of fiqh demonstrate 
his pragmatic nature and his focus on achieving acceptance and conviction, or what Andrew 
March called “the Reformer’s Dilemma”. Of course such caution does not guarantee immediate 
success. µAbduh’s proposals were still met with resistance. However, the resistance to µAbduh’s 
proposals was not always a rejection of his arguments, but often involved a combination of 
rejection of his position and a defence of the established order. Many of his reforms were 
eventually accepted and adopted – using his own reasoning – decades after his death. As 
                                                
821 See Shari'a: Islamic Law in the Contemporary Context, Abbas Amanat and Frank Griffel. 
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discussed in the thesis, these include the widening of women’s access to divorce on the basis of 
absence, non-provision of maintenance or harm, the establishment of the obligation of post-
divorce compensation and the restriction of polygyny. 
Although more conducive to acceptance, reliance on “partial and limited ijtih¥d” can also be 
said to have been subsequently used to delay the elaboration of more radical ijtih¥d. Subsequent 
legal reform which followed µAbduh’s cautious attitude and preference for partial methods of 
reform at the expense of ijtih¥d remained constrained and of limited capacity to extend the ambit 
of reform on certain points. Approaches that focused instead on his promotion of ijtih¥d and the 
direction in which his reforms were moving were better able to stretch those limits – although 
they still face the “Reformer’s Dilemma” of finding the most effective way to gain wide 
acceptance to ensure successful reform. 
Despite µAbduh’s caution, the ‘charge’ of ijtih¥d continued to be leveled at him. His 
opponents repeatedly accused him of being unfit for the position of Grand Mufti since he was 
required to issue rulings on the basis of the official Hanafi madhhab. His defence demonstrates 
the same combination of multiple strategies of taqlÏd and ijtih¥d, arguing first that even within 
taqlÏd, it is permissible to follow opinions from more than one madhhab, and second, that in any 
case he was qualified for independent ijtih¥d outside all the madh¥hib. This focus on the ruling 
and indifference to the actual methodology used to arrive to it and its coherence is among the 
criticisms leveled at modern reformist jurisprudence.822   
µAbduh’s pragmatic nature was also evident in his emphasis on gradualism as an essential 
feature of reform. On the whole µAbduh was a reformist and not a revolutionary. He preferred 
gradual reform that takes the people’s level of understanding and “readiness” for change into 
consideration. This can be seen in the fact that his opinions on issues such as restriction of 
polygyny were clearly and confidently expressed in his early articles and in the tafsÏr, while he 
did not insist on applying them immediately in society. µAbduh was not a theorist, but a practical 
reformer engaged in his close daily involvement in society as a judge, teacher and administrative 
reformer. His main concern was the long-term success of his reform ideas, which he believed 
                                                
822 See, for instance, Wael Hallaq, "Can the Shari‘a be Restored?" in Yvonne Y. Haddad and Barbara F. Stowasser, 
eds., Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity, Walnut Creek: Altamira Press, 2004, 21-53. 
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depended on choosing the time when people recognised the need for the proposed changes to 
their customs. 
Pragmatism and gradualism explain in part the ambivalent views expressed on matters 
such as guardianship (See Chapter 4) and triple divorce (See Chapter 7), partially criticising their 
textual basis without completely rejecting them in practice. Nevertheless this critical approach in 
questioning and at times, reasoned rejecting of textual evidence used in some madh¥hib for 
certain rulings paved the way to future novel interpretations. 
The view that µAbduh’s decision to call for a particular reform or avoid another depends 
on the expected opposition or the avoidance of controversy does not completely explain 
µAbduh’s mixed record of radical and cautious reform. I believe it is better explained by his 
assessment of the proposed reform’s chances of success. For instance his views on certain issues 
was far from orthodox, and he expressed them in an explicit and forthright manner, in published 
articles and in his tafsÏr, yet without demanding immediate application.  
A clear example of this is his support for the restriction of polygyny as necessary and 
Islamically permissible. While polygyny was by all accounts practiced by a small minority of 
Egyptians, and while historically women who could, placed conditions preventing their husbands 
from taking a second wife, the modern standardisation and codification of law restricted 
women’s options and contributing to strengthening the view of marriage as a contract involving a 
fixed set of rights and duties, including the husband’s right to polygyny. The colonialist 
discourse exaggerating and singling out polygyny as a sign of Egyptian inferiority and 
backwardness further led to a defence of that male privilege, as discussed in Chapter 6. µAbduh 
believed there was a need for the restriction of polygyny. The strategy he opted for was not 
encouraging or enforcing the placing of legally enforceable conditions in the marriage contract, 
but resorting to the central authorities’ power to regulate and restrict men’s resorting to this 
practice.  
In harmony with his view of marriage as a partnership and a pledge of cooperation, 
µAbduh questioned justifications for the often-harmful practice of polygyny. He based his 
argument on a link between verses 4:3 and 4:129 to point towards discouragement of polygyny 
in the Qur’an and its prohibition unless one is confident of achieving justice. However, his tafsÏr 
of the two verses does not imply a legally enforceable prohibition, but a strong moral warning of 
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the extreme difficulty, almost impossibility, of achieving the required and obligatory condition of 
justice.  
However, like in his proposed divorce reforms, arguments combined both juristic 
arguments and others based on the urgent need for reform. In addition to the textually-based 
condition of justice which is rarely achieved, two further justifications were used to propose the 
permissibility of restricting polygyny: preventing harm which often results in the mistreatment of 
multiple wives and their deprivation of their rights to “maintenance and contentment”, and 
preventing the harm which often results from polygamous marriages to children, family stability, 
and its consequences for society. Exceptions are recognised; since the prohibition is not founded 
on an absolute opposition to polygyny, but mainly on the rule of “preventing harm”, a balance of 
possible “benefits” and “harms” needs to be considered in certain cases. The conclusion is that 
“it is permissible to have a general ban for all men banning them from marrying more than one, 
except for a necessity which is to be proven before a judge.” µAbduh’s recommendation is based 
on sadd al-dhar¥iµ – prevention of harm, a principle that is not rejected by Hanafi judges 
(althought it is more associated with the Maliki and Hanbali madhahib). 
µAbduh’s silence on certain issues, ambivalent questioning of some, and partial or radical 
reform of others raises the question of when µAbduh was radical and when he was gradualist – 
what factors determined his stance on an issue? While some, such as those who argue that 
µAbduh co-authored Ta^r Ïr al-Mar’a under a different name to avoid a hostile reaction, believe 
that popular reaction to µAbduh’s views determined whether or not he expressed them explicitly, 
I believe that was not, in fact, a crucial factor. I believe that although there are multiple 
considerations, the principal factors determining µAbduh’s decision to push for reform on a 
particular issue were whether there was an urgent need felt by people, and whether they were 
ready for change, the two factors which have a decisive effect on the proposed reform’s chances 
of success. 
Opposition to µAbduh was indeed considerable, and it was not simply opposition to his 
views, but brought together a ‘coalition’ of figures and trends with political, professional, juristic 
and even personal disagreements with him. µAbduh’s rivals awaited any fatw¥ or declaration to 
ignite campaigns against him. With his attainment of elevated official positions and the 
constantly-changing power alliances, the last few years of µAbduh’s life saw the uniting of a 
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coalition against him composed of a hostile press, an obstructive khedive, µulama challenging 
µAbduh’s credentials and reforms and nationalist leaders accusing him of unpatriotism and 
treason. While one can point to decisions such as µAbduh’s refusal to publicly give his opinion 
on the controversial Ta^r Ïr al-Mar’a to argue that popular reaction determined his declarations, 
one can also point to other controversial opinions he explicitly expressed in that period, despite 
huge opposition by the political and religious elites. The clearest example is his Transvaal 
fatw¥,823 issued despite the context of his deteriorating relations with Azhar scholars, the 
Khedive, and nationalist leaders. 
Another argument put forward to explain µAbduh’s radical view on restriction of 
polygyny points to the influence of British colonialist views on him. What I believe undermines 
this argument is first the fact that µAbduh had expressed his view on polygyny as early as 1881, 
and second the fact that colonialist discourses often focused on the “twin ills of polygyny and 
^ij¥b” the eradication of which was necessary for the reform of Egyptian society. However, one 
finds no parallels between µAbduh’s view on polygyny and his views on ^ij¥b (seclusion), since 
he expressed no view on the latter. While he was silent on the matter, the mixed view and 
ambivalence of Ri\¥ towards ^ij¥b can be seen as expressing µAbduh’s attitude. Ri\¥ recognised 
the lack of textual basis for the seclusion of women, but did not see benefit in calls for its 
immediate abolition. Another difference is that “veiling and seclusion”, singled out and attacked 
in colonialist discourse, are mostly practiced by wealthy urban families, whereas, as µAbduh 
pointed out, polygyny was practiced – with harmful consequences – by the wealthy and poor, the 
rural and urban. As a social reformer, µAbduh’s prioritised issues that transcended class and 
region.  
Although µAbduh did engage with orientalist and colonialist discourses, his engagement 
cannot be seen to be a one-way acceptance of those discourses, nor can his views be seen simply 
as reactions to them. In response to the question of whether µAbduh was working within, against 
or outside “the Islamic Tradition”, one would need to consider the paradigm it is measured 
against, the model defining ‘Tradition’. For if one were to draw on Alasdair McIntyre’s 
conceptualisation of tradition as an ever-changing set of socially embodied arguments extended 
through time, defining and redefining fundamental agreements “in terms of two kinds of conflict: 
                                                
823 See Chapter 2. 
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those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of those 
fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning 
and rationale of fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition 
is constituted”,824 µAbduh could be considered as engaged in a creative reconstruction of 
tradition, redefining it in terms of the conflict with external attacks and misrepresentations, as 
well as internal resistance to change. As such a definitive answer to this will always depend on 
what is considered to be normative in “the Tradition”. 
µAbduh’s emphasis on readiness for reform and preference for gradual reform also 
explains his focus on educational reform rather than relying purely on legal reform. His vision of 
marriage as being “the strongest spiritual bond” founded on love and mercy and leading to a 
strong family characterised by cooperation and unity could not be realised through law alone. 
µAbduh stressed that a reformed understanding of marriage could only follow from “the good 
upbringing of both males and females, their spirits adorned with virtues and their minds with true 
knowledge”. Thus, µAbduh often used moral admonition and emphasised understanding of the 
maq¥sid (intended purposes) of rulings so as to motivate humans to abide by them, even if those 
rulings were not legally enforceable. µAbduh believed that the conditions and “capacities” of the 
subjects were as important as the laws that governed them, and that equal attention must be paid 
to the reform of those capacities as to the laws themselves. 
Although µAbduh’s emphasis on the education of men and women was part of a general 
enthusiasm for education as a path to progress, µAbduh’s discourse on education does not display 
the obsession with women’s ignorance seen in other nationalist discourses (See Chapter 2). He 
spoke about education in general, with a focus on religious knowledge and education of women 
about their rights and their duties to God, to themselves, to their families and to society, which is 
unlike the common nationalist restriction of education for women to specialised training in 
domestic management and parenting. As well as religious knowledge, µAbduh believed women 
needed “worldly knowledge” according to their changing needs. This view is significant since it 
does not restrict women to a particular type of education suited to a particular social role.  
While this focus on education is positive and can empower both men and women, 
µAbduh’s emphasis on raising awareness of the moral and spiritual principles underpinning 
                                                
824 Alasdair McIntyre, Whose Justice, Which Rationality, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988, p. 12. 
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marriage still leaves them at the level of unenforceable requirements, at a lower degree than the 
well-defined legal rights and duties in marriage. This focus on these moral principles has 
continued in later discourses on the family, but whereas µAbduh had envisaged that education 
would ensure their actualisation and enforcement, more often than not they have remained 
theoretical ideals, often used merely for apologetics.  
 
 
8.2 Contradictions and Unresolved Paradoxes 
 
8.2.1 Equality or Justice?  
 
While µAbduh did succeed in inspiring what can be called an Islamic movement for the 
liberation of women, the definition of that liberation remained far from clearly defined. While 
there is an emphasis on its Islamic nature and its distinction from the western version of 
liberation, it shares the concept of equality while not fully sharing its understanding. While 
equality of value and common origins and essence are emphasised,825 differences are still 
emphasised in certain contexts,826 resulting in a simultaneous recognition of equality and 
inequality. This paradox, which persists in subsequent debates on the status of women in Islam, 
reveals an ambiguous use of the term equality, which is understood differently in different 
approaches. 
The above explains the affinity with the “equal but different” discourse which has 
emerged in recent times. While few support explicitly considering women as either “inferior” or 
“identical” to men, it is common for Muslim discourses to emphasise women’s “equality in 
terms of spirituality, rights and duties” and their “different roles”.827 This points to the success of 
the turn-of-the-century drive, whether by religious reformers or nationalists, to integrate the 
principles of equality and division of labour. 
                                                
825 See Chapter 3. 
826 See Chapters 4 and 5. 
827 Katherine Bullock, Rethinking Muslim Women and the Veil, London: IIIT, 2002, “The Muslim women I 
interviewed did not agree that believing in male-female difference was to believe that women and men are unequal”, 
p. 58-59. 
 260 
 
This confusion and contradiction is seen most clearly in µAbduh’s – and later reformers’ – 
views on women within marriage. Here equality is still emphasised simultaneously with a view 
of marriage as an exchange of different rights and duties and the fulfillment of different roles. 
Scholars such as Amira Sonbol argue that marriage turned into a contract of exchange 
(maintenance for obedience) with fixed duties and roles as a result of the codification and 
standardisation of law in the modern period and the influence of modern views of marriage. In 
fact Muslim women have bolstered this view through their insistence on the husband's obligation 
of financial maintenance, and modern states have bolstered this through their formalisation of 
marriage contracts and codification of family law. µAbduh followed the same logic, for instance 
through proposing state restriction of polygyny, rather than the individual negotiation of the 
terms of marriage through the insertion of conditions in the marriage contract. Lama Abu Odeh 
has noted the limitations of legal reform based on expansion of the wife’s rights and limiting her 
obligations within the nafaqa-obdience equation as well as a suggested way out of this 
paradox.828 
A tension remains between two simultaneous views of marriage as the most sacred and 
intimate spiritual bond and a belief in a “corporatist family” with a social function which must be 
achieved efficiently. In addition, the family is represented on the one hand as a social unit with a 
leader with the authority to manage and discipline, at times comparing it to an army or a state 
with a leader. On the other hand, in other contexts, the emphasis is on cooperation and the 
limited authority of the husband and the limited duties legally expected of the wife. This is 
further complicated nowadays with the changing perception of political leadership and its limited 
powers. 
 
8.2.2 Divorce: Family stability or individual rights? 
 
Concern about family stability as essential for a strong and healthy nation motivated 
nationalist and reformist movements of family reform, as was the case also with µAbduh. Indeed 
many reforms, including women’s education and the restriction of polygyny, were explicitly 
                                                
828 Abu-Odeh, L., “Egyptian feminism: trapped in the identity debate” in Y. Haddad and B. Stowasser (eds), Islamic 
Law and the Challenges of Modernity. 
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promoted on the basis of their positive effects on the health of the family and hence on society. 
This concern is also what is often used to justify the view of marriage as a hierarchical relation. 
However, the primacy of this concern about family stability in discourses on women leads to 
unresolved tensions. This is seen in the issue of divorce, with simultaneous concern about family 
breakdown and about the unjust restriction of women’s access to divorce. While µAbduh 
criticised men’s easy divorce in his criticism of triple divorce or his invalidation of divorce 
pronounced by a man in a state of anger, he also criticised the restriction of women’s access to 
divorce in marriages where the husband is not fulfilling the duty of providing nafaqa or where 
there is proven harm caused to her. This tension remains unresolved in discourses on women, 
with various groups – religious scholars, states, women’s groups, reformers – torn between 
widening women’s access to divorce and restricting men’s right of divorce. This tension is also 
partly responsible for the misalignment of legal reform and real change as a result of new laws: 
For instance, the  “no-fault” khulµ law passed in Egypt in 2000 was controversial and met with 
strong opposition from many quarters. But in application, it was still difficult as mediation took 
significantly longer than provided for by the law, and stigma continued to be attached to khulµ.829 
It is important, however, to point out that although µAbduh criticised both men’s 
excessive use of divorce (triple divorce, divorce oaths…) and women’s restricted access to 
divorce, his criticism of the former was expressed theoretically, without calling for any specific 
legal reforms in this area, whereas his criticism of the latter was more explicit and was followed 
by practical proposals for legal reform. However, paradoxically, in most writings that briefly 
refer to µAbduh’s women-related reforms, one finds frequent reference to µAbduh’s “restriction of 
polygyny and men’s excessive divorce”, a view that is unsupported by this study, as discussed in 
Chapter 7, where I showed that µAbduh was more concerned about widening than restricting 
divorce. An explanation for this discrepancy could be the male-oriented nationalist-driven nature 
of the early accounts of family law reform focused on creating a stable family as a basis for a 
stable society. Whereas many studies have argued that nationalist discourses on “women reform” 
and “family reform” aimed at bringing Egyptian family in line with the requirements of a 
bourgeois household, it is noteworthy that Abduh’s efforts to facilitate women’s access to 
                                                
829 See Mulki al-Sharmani, p. 40 and Farida Deif, “Egypt, Divorced from Justice: Women’s Unequal Access to 
Divorce in Egypt”, Human Rights Watch vol. 16. No. 8 (E), p. 49-51. 
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divorce and his relative lack of obsession with promoting “training” women in “modern” 
parenting and home-management skills, an obsession of most nationalists, highlight his different 
perspective on women’s reform, which cannot be completely identified with the “male 
nationalist” discourse on women’s reform.  
Nevertheless, µAbduh’s contribution to women’s reform continues to be primarily seen 
through the lens of the nationalist discourse on women: with a focus on promotion of education 
and “restriction of polygyny and divorce”, and less attention paid to his efforts to widen 
women’s access to divorce and improve post-divorce provisions, and to undermine the textual 
basis for cultural perceptions of women as derivative and inferior. 
 
8.2.3 Between state and society: between education and codification 
 
While µAbduh promoted education as a tool of reform, he was also engaged in legal 
reform. µAbduh’s enthusiasm for relying on state codification and regulation of family life was 
due to his concern about effective and efficient reform, and his lack of awareness of the pitfalls 
and excesses of modern centralised state power. Indeed that enthusiasm was shared by all actors 
from all trends, including women’s groups, throughout the first half of the twentieth century. 
µAbduh saw codification as both inevitable – as it had already been set in motion before him – 
and useful, since it was available to him in his official position, and a practical alternative to the 
shortage of judges able to engage in independent ijtih¥d. State codification was thus supported 
and mobilised in his own reform aims. Post-modern critical theory later facilitated the emergence 
of a more nuanced understanding of the modern state and its multiple means of control. Feminist 
critics have applied the concepts of ‘governmentality’ and ‘biopolitics’ to describe modern 
states’ regulation of family life for its own ends. Many studies have applied these concepts to 
Egypt in precisely the same period µAbduh was engaged in his reform efforts there. The intrusion 
of the state into the family was thus promoted by modernists such as µAbduh in their belief in the 
benign nature and pastoral role of the state, ignoring consequences such as the restriction of 
women’s options and the rigidification of perceptions of marriage and gender roles. 
The paradox we have is that on the one hand, µAbduh advocated reliance on re-education 
as key to reform and progress, hence a gradual, social-based, bottom-up process. On the other 
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hand, he supported standardisation of legal and educational systems and the re-appropriation of 
the power of legislation by the state, hence a centralised, political, top-down process. Both 
Islamist reformers and secular reformers remain torn and confused between these two options. 
The dilemma is that the two approaches are not separate, but their intended and unintended 
results can be contradictory: While education and promotion of ijtihad can make social views 
and norms more open and flexible, potentially facilitating change, the process of codification and 
legislative change (even if in the direction of reform) can make views of social relations and 
roles more rigid, limiting the extent of future change. 
 
8.2.4 Unresolved Paradox of What µAbduh Really Said 
 
I have analysed chapters of Q¥sim AmÏn’s important book Ta^r Ïr al-Mar’a to assess the 
validity of claims that they were written by µAbduh. I demonstrated that there is no evidence to 
conclusively support such a claim and exposed several significant differences between the 
approaches of AmÏn and µAbduh to the same topics. Hence, I have concluded that Ta^r Ïr al-
Mar’a was not written by µAbduh and that it is important to limit oneself to µAbduh’s other 
writings on women when making claims about his discourse of women. In contrast, I have 
revealed that there remains persistent ambiguity about the overlap between µAbduh’s views and 
Ri\¥’s views in TafsÏr al-Man¥r. While µAbduh’s compiled Complete Works (by µIm¥ra) tried to 
remove any additions explicitly claimed by Ri\¥, I had to exclude further additions by Ri\¥ 
which had been kept in the Complete Works but which I had shown to be absent from the 
original serialisation of the tafsÏr in the published journal. However, I have not been able to 
resolve the ambiguous attribution of certain opinions to µAbduh and Ri\¥, in view of the fact that 
the serialised publication of the tafsÏr was not completed during µAbduh’s life. I have highlighted 
passages which can be probably attributed to Ri\¥ on the basis of various indications (clear 
contradiction with µAbduh’s views, Ri\¥’s own views expressed in his own writings, 
punctuation) questioning their attribution to µAbduh. However, the ambiguity persists, and 
deserves further attention, since I argue that Ri\¥’s contribution to the tafsÏr is greater than 
commonly assumed. As well as the widely-recognised fact that Ri\¥ explicitly added further 
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comments of his own to TafsÏr al-Man¥r, in view of his explicit and unannounced “elaborations” 
and “clarifications”, there remains a sense of uneasy uncertainty as to what µAbduh really said. 
 
 
8.3 Subsequent Discourses & µAbduh’s Legacy 
 
µAbduh’s discourse on women, his strategies of reform, and the contradictions and tensions 
inherent within them form a significant basis of subsequent Muslim reformist debates on women. 
Charles Adams’ verdict in his study of µAbduh that “he did not live to see the fruition of his 
endeavours; but he set in motion influences which outlived him”,830 and Albert Hourani’s 
suggestion that his ideas “remained working beneath the surface, the unacknowledged basis of 
the religious ideas of the ordinary educated Muslim”831 are certainly valid when applied to 
µAbduh’s reform efforts in relation to women, as will be explored further below. 
 
8.3.1 Using Islamic references to justify feminist demands 
 
µAbduh’s promotion of an Islamic liberation of women as a vital part of a general social 
reform based on a moral reform which is in turn inspired by religious reform continued to 
influence subsequent discourses on women. Various elements of this approach continued to 
characterise diverse discourses, from official legal reform articulated in Islamic terms and 
feminist activists who present their demands as Islamically justified and required, to 
conservatives using the notion of an Islamic liberation of women as a tool for apologetics and a 
basis for the rejection of wider reforms. 
 
 
 
                                                
830 Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt, p. 103. 
831 Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, p. 130. 
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8.3.2 Justice as the starting point 
 
In µAbduh’s discourse on women, there is an emphasis on justice– what Leila Ahmed 
calls “the ethical voice within Islam... a voice insistently enjoining Muslims to act justly and 
fairly, and constantly reiterating the equal humanity of all”.832 There is a pervasive conviction 
that all Islamic rulings derive from justice and must be just. This continues to characterise 
Muslim discourses on women, both those that attempt to stretch the limits of reform, and those 
satisfied with justifying existing hierarchies on the basis of justice. Ahmed stresses that the belief 
in the “ethical voice of Islam” continues to inspire Muslim women’s understanding of Islam, 
although it may not be the voice informing those in power, and although lay women do not 
always perceive the contrast between the two. This is true both of “feminist” and “conservative” 
women.833 However, more recently Muslim women have become more conscious of the contrast 
between the two voices and the need to highlight the ethical egalitarian voice and re-interpret the 
sources and the law according to it.834  
This focus on the ethical voice of Islam was also evident in µAbduh’s initial contributions 
to the deconstruction of anti-women cultural perceptions, as an equally important need to legal 
reform. This attention to the importance of pervasive and persistent cultural perceptions of 
women as inferior, weak, vulnerable, untrustworthy, motivated a re-reading of the sources to 
uncover roots of such perceptions and purge the texts of such interpretations. The emphasis on 
women’s spiritual equality can clearly be seen in µAbduh’s interpretation of the Creation story, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, to emphasise women’s equal and independent origin and their full human 
agency, stressing “that woman’s capacity is like man’s capacity in all human matters”, and his 
rejection of the link between the rules of testimony and an alleged inherent failing that is 
                                                
832 Ahmed, Women & Gender in Islam, p. 229. 
833 Although the two have been mostly seen as opposed, more recent studies have questioned the assumption of a 
strict demarcation between the two. See Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam, p. 228; L Abu-Lughod, “The 
Marriage of Feminism and Islamism in Egypt: Selective Repudiation as a Dynamic of Postcolonial Cultural 
Politics”, in Lila Abu-Lughod (ed.) Remaking Women: Feminism And Modernity In The Middle East (ed.), 
Princeton Studies In Culture/Power/History, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1998; Mervat F. 
Hatem, “Egyptian Discourses on Gender and Political Liberalization: Do Secularist and Islamist Views Really 
Differ?”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Autumn, 1994), pp. 661-676; Lama Abu-Odeh, “Egyptian Feminism: 
Trapped in the Identity Debate”, in Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity, 183-212 (Yvonne Yazbeck 
Haddad & Barbara Freyer Stowasser eds., Walnut Creek, Cal.: AltaMira Press 2004); Saba Mahmood, Politics of 
Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject, Princeton University Press (2011). 
834 See, for instance, works by Leila Ahmad, Asma Barlas, Amina Wadud, Kecia Ali, Khaled Abou El-Fadl. 
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essential to women’s nature. These re-interpretations continued within reformist Islamist trends, 
to a certain extent. They have been enthusiastically revived and stretched further in late-20th and 
21st century Muslim feminist writings. 
 
8.3.3 Focus on education 
 
The image that emerges from the study of µAbduh’s tafsÏr of selected verses is one of 
women as autonomous individuals, essentially possessing the potential to be equal to men in 
terms of human characteristics. However, that may not be the case in reality due to various 
factors, notably among which in µAbduh’s view is education. Thus, education acquires a central 
position in µAbduh’s discourse on women. Throughout his writings, one cannot fail to grasp his 
powerful conviction that it is through educating people and changing their perceptions, gradually 
and consistently, that radical and lasting changes can be achieved.  
The same focus on education flows through subsequent discourses on women, as the 
principal tool of change in the situation of women. While this has generally become 
uncontroversial, and progress has been achieved, studies question the assumption that the effect 
of increased education of women is linear and necessarily liberating, nor that it is able to 
radically reform women’s economic and political participation, nor eradicate cultural 
foundations of negative gender perceptions.835  
µAbduh stressed the need to educate women about their rights and duties, but he argued 
that women’s education should not be restricted to any particular field. However, in conservative 
discourses the fields that are seen as appropriate for women have not changed significantly and 
remain restricted, most commonly, teaching and medicine.  
 
8.3.4 Family law reform & family feminism 
 
µAbduh’s strategies of reform of family law were a leading influence on subsequent 
official family law reform, as well as discussions on family law within diverse Muslim gender 
                                                
835 Amira El-Azhary-Sonbol, “Muslim Women and Legal Reform: The Case of Jordan and Women’s Work”, 
Islamic Law and the Challenges of Modernity, edited by Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Barbara Freyer Stowasser, 
Altamira Press, 2004, pp. 213-232. 
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discourses. In addition, women’s groups and male jurists and officials working on family law 
reform heavily drew on µAbduh’s proposals and continue to do so. 
To a certain extent reformist Islamic discourses proved more conservative and more 
resistant to radical reform, perhaps because family became even more central to resistance to 
western attacks on Muslim customs and culture. Mainstream Islamic discourses were particularly 
more defensive of polygyny and the unique male right to divorce.  
The separation of moral injunctions and legal obligations in gender discourses and 
particularly in relation to family law continue clearly in modern discourses. µAbduh seems to 
have strengthened this, by focusing on the ethical motivation of individuals and their 
understanding of divine intent so as to inspire them to abide by them, rather than legal 
enforcements. This has continued, in various gender-related contexts, including official family 
law formulations and popular manuals, where egalitarian moral tendencies are encouraged, but 
with no legal effect. This – rightly – opens such statements on egalitarianism to the charge of 
being mere apologetics. 
A related problem is that while marriage has been labeled a matter of m‘u¥mal¥t, instead 
of interpreting related rulings on the basis of ma|la^a, they have often been interpreted on the 
basis of ‘urf. Ri\¥ explicitly uses this argument in relation to kaf¥’a and to women’s domestic 
duties, simultaneously arguing against textual bases for them, while supporting them on the basis 
of ‘urf. 
The insistence on the general equality of men and women while maintaining marital 
hierarchy is a pervasive feature of the majority of Muslim gender discourses, to various degrees. 
The general assertion is that unlike western feminism focused on individualism and autonomy, 
the dominant acceptable form of feminism is one that asserts equality of men and women, but for 
the sake of family, subscribes to complementarity within marriage and recognition of ‘male 
leadership’ within it. 
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8.3.5 Between defensiveness and apologetics and integration of colonialist 
themes 
 
µAbduh’s promotion of an indigenous Islamic liberation of women that is superior to its 
western counterpart is an example of the presence of the West in his – and other reformers’ – 
discourses as an opposite, rival, model or partner. Simultaneously western advances in the 
treatment of women are highlighted – to highlight the backwardness of the state of Muslim 
women and motivate reform – and the shortcomings of western discourses and treatment of 
women are pointed to in order to emphasise authentic superiority and respond to colonialist 
appropriation of feminist language to argue for the inferiority of the colonised culture. At the 
same time, western tools such as modern education systems and state legal standardisation are 
recruited into the process of indigenous gender reform. 
These themes have continued in subsequent gender discourses, being initially common to 
all mainstream approaches, from the conservative to the liberal, and later moving in divergent 
directions, with some stressing the negative view of the west which increased and became more 
exaggerated than found in µAbduh’s discourse, while others stressed western superiority and 
accepted the alleged link between the state of women and culture. 
 
8.3.6 Divergences and Convergences 
 
I conclude that µAbduh’s contribution to the formation of the Arab women’s reform 
movement is more significant and more complex than often thought. The themes, strategies and 
contradictions within µAbduh’s discourse on women have had a lasting effect on subsequent 
divergent trends. In µAbduh’s writings on women, there is a discourse that brings together 
overlapping approaches to the question of women (pragmatic, theological, western-influenced, 
gradualist reformist, radical, patriarchal, social-based, official/state-based...). This overlap was 
followed by a divergence of discourses: Islamist and secularist, anti-western and pro-western, 
liberal and conservative... All of these carried certain elements of µAbduh’s approach. While the 
nationalist secular discourse was dominant in the first half of the twentieth century, the Islamist 
reformist discourse became increasingly influential tending towards becoming the mainstream 
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discourse on women by the end of the century. Other studies question the strict demarcation 
between these discourses. The challenges posed by the secular discourse (Arab and foreign), as 
well as the challenge of the neo-traditionalist salafi discourse on women in the last quarter of the 
20th century were catalysts for the emergence of a bolder feminist discourse stretching the 
boundaries of “the Islamic liberation of women”. µAbduh’s name, and many of his principles 
often emerges as an inspiration in these reformist feminist discourses. 
Many emphasise µAbduh’s influence on Arab liberal secular trends and later on recent 
Muslim feminist trends – in both cases without a detailed study of the exact nature and extent of 
that influence.836 This creates an imagined trajectory where µAbduh’s ideas are perceived to have 
been carried on through the liberal secular discourse to eventually reside within the Muslim 
feminist discourse, with the assumption that the latter emerged out of the former. I believe that 
such conclusions are generalised claims that are not based on a detailed study of µAbduh’s 
discourse on women. Tracing the influence of various features of µAbduh’s discourse on women 
on the various gender discourses in Egypt throughout the twentieth century needs to be the topic 
of a complete study, which cannot be achieved in this thesis. Nevertheless, my study of µAbduh’s 
discourse led me to the view that the new Muslim feminist discourse has as much in common 
with the twentieth-century Islamist reformist discourse, as with secular discourses, just as those 
two discourses have clearly both carried much of µAbduh’s legacy. Yet the differences between 
the reformist Islamist trends and the Muslim feminist trends are often highlighted, at the expense 
of the commonalities and common inspirations. This differs from categorisations 837  of 
contemporary discourses on women into traditional, neo-traditionalist (combining Islamist 
reformist and conservative salafi) and liberal feminist discourses. Such categorisations ignore the 
many overlaps and common inspirations and approaches of the Islamist reformist and Muslim 
feminist discourses and the debt of both to µAbduh’s reform in general and women’s reform in 
particular. 
 Miriam Cooke’s discussion of “Islamic feminists” and “multiple critique”838 is useful for 
                                                
836 For instance, works by Beth Baron, Margot Badran, Leila Ahmed. 
837 e.g. by Ziba Mir-Hosseini, as referred to in the Introduction. 
838 Cooke, Miriam, “Multiple Critique: Islamic Feminist Rhetorical Strategies”, Nepantla: Views from South 1.1 
(2000) 91-110. 
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approaching the link between these various approaches, as well as the link between “Islamic 
feminism” and Abduh and his discourse on women. Cooke describes how Islamic feminists’  
“multiple belonging” and “multiple critique, a multilayered discourse that allows them to engage 
with and criticise the various individuals, institutions, and systems that limit and oppress them 
while making sure that they are not caught in their own rhetoric”839 allows Islamic feminists to 
reach out across boundaries and “to invent a contestatory, but also enabling, discourse within the 
global context that will not be easily coopted.”840 Islamic feminists engage in “challenging and 
deconstructing traditional interpretations of authoritative texts that have served to construct 
norms that exclude them as women” as well as “defend their transnational, religious, and 
national communities against detractors”.841 They are able “to speak effectively to, with, and 
against several audiences” and develop “an effective strategy of resistance, engagement, and 
steadfastness”.842 
It is perhaps for these qualities that Muslim feminists look to µAbduh for inspiration, as 
someone who combined theoretical and practical reforms, built alliances with diverse groups, 
was not easily “categorisable”, sought to stretch the boundaries of the Islamic “tradition” by 
engaging with internal and external critiques and challenges, and whose life and reform efforts, 
with their shortcomings and contradictions, demonstrated courage, determination, flexibility and 
evolution. The tensions and contradictions resulting from µAbduh’s pragmatism and focus on 
practical reform and broad acceptance of his proposals, sometimes at the expense of radical 
coherent theoretical reform, are realised by the new Muslim feminist trend which seeks to 
overcome those tensions and contradictions. 
  
                                                
839 ibid., p. 100. 
840 ibid., p. 99. 
841 ibid., p. 108. 
842 ibid., p. 109. 
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APPENDIX A: Fatw¥  on divorce based on absence, inability or 
refusal to provide nafaqa ,  and harm 
 
 
1. The issue of prisoners referred to in your letter (prisoners who do not maintain their 
wives nor divorce them) 
2. The issue of the husband's inability or refusal to maintain his wife, as happens with the 
majority of people from the lower classes of the population as well as many from the 
middle and upper classes. 
3. The issue of the disappeared with no news or prolonged absence whose wives and 
children are left with no source of income, or with some inaccessible source, or where the 
wife, as a human being, needs an end to her situation, particularly if she is young. 
4. The issue of the husband who harms his wife and causes her suffering such that there is 
no possibility of marital life.843    
 
 
1. If the husband refuses to maintain his wife, then if he has visible assets, and does not 
claim inability, but insists on refusing to pay nafaqa, the judge orders immediate 
divorce. If he claims inability, then if he does not prove it, divorce is ordered 
immediately. If he does prove inability, he is granted a maximum of one month 
within which to provide nafaqa, otherwise divorce is ruled. 
2. If the husband is ill or imprisoned, and refuses to pay nafaqa for his wife, the judge 
grants him a period within which he may recover or be released from prison. If the 
period of illness or imprisonment is prolonged, such that harm or fitna is feared, the 
judge orders divorce. 
3. If the husband is absent, in a nearby place, and does not leave nafaqa for his wife, the 
judge sends him a warning through the known methods, and sets him a deadline. If he 
does not send nafaqa for his wife or return to provide nafaqa, the judge orders divorce 
after the deadline. If the husband is away in a distant place, a distance of ten days or 
over, or in an unknown location, and it is proven that he possesses no money from 
which the wife may spend, the judge orders divorce. 
4. If the absent husband has money, or a debt or deposit with someone else, the wife has 
the right to demand the payment of nafaqa from that money or debt, after taking an 
oath that she deserves nafaqa from the absent husband and that he has not left her any 
money or appointed anyone to provide for her. The absent husband can contest upon 
his return. 
5. The divorce by the judge on the basis of non-maintenance is revocable, and the 
husband may return his wife if his ability to maintain is proven and his willingness to 
pay nafaqa is expressed during the µidda. If his ability is not proven or he is not 
willing to pay nafaqa, revoking the divorce is not permitted. 
6. On the disappeared in a Muslim land... the wife can be considered a widow after four 
years... 
                                                
843 Aµm¥l, vol. 2, p. 654. 
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7. Continued from Article 6 
8. On the disappeared during an inter-Muslim war... the wife can be considered a widow 
once it is confirmed that he cannot be found... 
9. On the disappeared during a war between Muslims and others: the wife can be 
considered a widow after the passing of one year.. In all the above cases of the 
disappeared, the wife waits the specified period if the husband has left her 
maintenance and she does not fear fitna. Otherwise she may refer her case to the 
judge who can issue divorce once her claim is proven. 
10. If disputes intensify between the two spouses and it is not possible to put an end to 
them through the methods prescribed in the Qur’an, the matter is referred to the local 
judge who appoints two mediators from the husband’s and wife’s relatives, preferably 
neighbours, or if not possible, then mediators who are not relatives. If these mediators 
reconcile the couple, so much the better, otherwise they can rule to divorce them; they 
refer the case back to the judge who has to execute their decision. The divorce is then 
a single irrevocable divorce, and the mediators cannot add any further divorces. 
11. The wife may ask the judge to divorce her from her husband if the latter causes her 
harm- that is what is prohibited in Shariµa, such as desertion with no legitimate cause 
(in Shariµa) or beating or cursing without a justified cause (in Shariµa). The wife has to 
prove such claims through permissible means. 
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APPENDIX B: Fatw¥  on Delegating Divorce 
 
 
On whether the condition that the divorce is to be in the hands of the bride’s father is valid: 
 
“They said: if the woman pronounces the Ïj¥b, which includes the condition that divorce is in her 
hand, and the husband accepts the marriage on that condition, the marriage is valid, and the 
condition is binding. However, if the husband pronounced the Ïj¥b with the condition, and the 
woman accepts, the condition is then void. They said: the invalidity of the condition in the 
second case is due to the fact that the husband possesses the right of divorce before the contract, 
such that if the woman accepts with the mention of the condition, it would be as if she gave 
herself that right upon the conclusion of the contract, which she does not necessarily possess, 
whereas if she begins with the Ïj¥b, and the husband accepts with the condition, the condition 
would obtain after the conclusion of the contract, and the husband would have given her what he 
does possess, hence it is binding… Hence, the contract is valid and the condition is binding. 
Then they said: if the husband tells his wife: your divorce is in your hand, or: choose for 
yourself, without saying: you may divorce yourself when you wish, or whenever you wish, the 
delegation is valid, but the right only lasts as long as the sitting, and when it is over, she no 
longer has the right to divorce herself. Thus, according to their arguments, the delegation of the 
right of divorce is valid since it occurred after the µaqd, and the bride’s father cannot divorce his 
daughter once the sitting is over, because neither he nor the husband specified “when you wish”. 
We have not found any statements (of Hanafi scholars) regarding a similar case to ours. 
However, if we were to consider the condition in the contract to be a delegation which occurred 
after it, the condition would have been meaningless, and it would have been different from the 
aim of the two parties, for the wife placed the condition of granting the right of divorce to her 
father in order to avoid her husband’s refusal of divorce after the consummation of the marriage 
or before it in the case of discord. The husband similarly accepted that the right of divorce be in 
the father’s hand in the future when the father wishes, not that he has it during the contract 
sitting, which would mean that he would have to pay half the mahr before leaving, without 
having acquired any benefit. That would be tantamount to the wife saying: I have delegated you 
(her father) to conclude my marriage, and you may immediately divorce me. Or that the husband 
says: “I accept that, and you may divorce her before we leave this gathering”, which is extremely 
ridiculous, and no sane person could mean that…. Which is what I choose, because not 
mentioning this restriction (whenever you wish) is of no consequence, because the condition 
itself is only meaningful with its inclusion, and it has only been omitted because it is readily 
understood. Secondly, the marriage is conditional upon it, and it is as if each said: the marriage is 
to last as long as this condition holds, and there is no marriage without it, hence the condition 
holds as long as the marriage does, and it is as if it was explicitly said “divorce whenever you 
wish”. Thirdly saying that the condition took place after the contract of marriage does not equate 
this case with that of delegation which they mentioned… as in delegating the right of divorce to 
another person, which is undoubtedly restricted to the time of pronunciation of the delegation, 
unless otherwise specified. As for our case, the contract was concluded with the condition, hence 
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it lasts as long as the contract does… Therefore the wife’s father has the right to divorce her 
whenever he wishes- only once.844 
 
Similarly another fatwa asking whether a woman who married on the condition that “her 
divorce is in her hand, such that she can divorce herself when (mat¥) she wishes”. µAbduh 
answered that the condition is valid, and she has the right to divorce herself once, as the 
condition did not specify kullam¥- whenever. 
The above fat¥w¥ deal with two formal questions in Hanafi fiqh in relation to the condition of 
µisma in the marriage contract: whether the condition is valid beyond the sitting where the 
contract takes place without the explicit inclusion of “mat¥ sh¥’at” (whenever she wishes), and 
whether the wife has the right to make use of this right only once or more than once, or whether 
it is necessary to explicitly mention “kullam¥ sh¥’at” (whenever and every time she wishes). In 
the above fat¥w¥, µAbduh argued against the necessity of explicitly mentioning “whenever”, 
since it would be meaningless to include such a condition, if it were only valid during the writing 
of the contract. However, he accepts the view that explicit mention of “whenever and every 
time/however many times” in the contract, otherwise the wife can only use that right once. The 
problem of course is that either way, such a divorce is only revocable and fiqh gives the husband 
the right to return his wife during the ‘idda, with the possibility of making such a right (assuming 
a woman is able to include the condition in her marriage contract) useless. Theoretically, 
however, even if the divorce is revocable, if the wife has the right to use this condition more than 
a single time, she can eventually leave the marriage after 3 such divorces. Reformers, following 
AmÏn’s example, did not seem to be too keen to develop this right of the woman to stipulate her 
right to divorce herself as part of the marriage contract, as a solution to unequal access to 
divorce, preferring to either maintain men’s monopoly of unilateral repudiation, or delegate some 
of his rights to the courts. 
  
                                                
844 Aµm¥l, vol. 6, p. 395 
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